Xi Prepares His Future, and China’s

This week marks the opening of the 20^th Chinese Communist National Party Congress (NPC) which is held every five years. This is the second NPC since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. He will once again occupy center stage when he is officially chosen to serve a third term as Party General Secretary. It won’t be all festivities for Xi, though, as the Chinese economy and the country’s foreign policy are facing serious obstacles. Some of those are due to poor decisions made by Xi himself.

Economic self-sufficiency emerged as a major policy objective under Xi. In recent years he has attempted to move China further away from its connections to the US economy with mixed results. Chinese domestic economic growth, while still ahead of the more mature western economies, must deal with an expanding middle class that is finding it harder to locate good paying jobs and housing. One recent report out of Washington said that “Beijing’s planners have also allowed a housing bubble to grow, which is at risk of bursting.” Xi must keep social unrest low to retain power.

China has become more integrated with the world economy under his leadership although in many ways it counters his own economic policy. To secure power over the last decade Xi purged rivals and created campaigns to reinforce loyalties both to the Party and to him. The 170-plus purges extended into the military strengthening Xi’s hold on the armed forces. He redefined traditional security threats to include any foreign military presence on China’s border, and “non-traditional threats, like public uproar on Weibo,” according to one analyst. Chinese national insecurity institutionalizes paranoia within the CCP and encourages local cadres to act with paranoia rather than pragmatism.

Taiwan policy remains another thorn in Xi’s side, one that he intends to remedy during his tenure in office. His approach to Taipei is more coercive than in past decades, with military analysts this week suggesting there will be an escalation of incidents with Taiwan in the coming months after the close of the NPC. According to one analyst, “Informed by the events in Hong Kong, Xi instead envisions a two-system solution for Taiwan, under which Taipei would be subordinate to Beijing and guaranteed no political or military freedoms.”

The NPC this week may address Xi’s lack of progress on Taiwan, among other challenges to his rule. The scale of Xi’s ambitions and his vision for a Chinese global-led order is greater than his understanding of the Chinese economy. His Covid policy has resulted in economic stagnation that is expected to negatively impact the domestic economy for a long time. High youth unemployment, the escalating cost of housing, and rising discontent across the country also may cause him to flounder in the coming years.

These challenges together raise the risk of confrontation with democratic states. James Palmer, writing in Foreign Policy, says that “There is no question of who is in charge, and it would be very unlikely for that to change after the 20th Party Congress. For the moment, it’s Xi forever, with his image plastered all over China’s daily propaganda. The question is who falls beneath him and whether they have any real power to push their own agendas, especially when it comes to fixing an increasingly shaky economy.” A South China Morning Post article this week claims that Xi Jinping has learned a key lesson from Putin’s failing war in Ukraine, “A strong country must have a strong army.” As China readies to hand Xi an unprecedented third term as General Party Secretary, the world may be witnessing a new opening salvo in Asian conflict that could reverberate in the West. The Financial Times says that “Ten years is always enough. Even a first-rate leader decays after that long in office. One with unchallengeable power tends to decay more quickly. Surrounded by people he has chosen and protective of the legacy he has created, the despot will become increasingly isolated and defensive, even paranoid.” With Xi’s partner in Moscow failing to win the war in Ukraine, and problems at home, Xi’s historic third term in office may prove more volatile than expected.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.