How does Iran perceive military threats? What steps does it take to react to its own worldview?
Threat Perceptions
Iran views the United States as its greatest enduring threat and believes the United States is engaged in a covert and “soft war” to subvert the regime, undermining what Iran perceives as its rightful place as a regional power. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintains a deep, long-standing distrust of U.S. intentions. Many regime elites view regional dynamics through the lens of perceived U.S. aggression, leading some to adopt the extreme view that the United States created ISIS in part to weaken Iran and its allies. Distrust of the United States predates the regime’s founding, dating back to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh that returned the shah to power.
Iran has focused on preparing and equipping its military forces for defense against air attack and ground invasion by a technologically superior adversary, primarily the United States. The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s and international scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program raised Iran’s fears of encirclement and potential Western attack. Tehran recognizes that it cannot compete with the United States on a conventional level and has prioritized the development of defensive capabilities that emphasize asymmetric tactics to protect the country and the regime.
In recent years, Tehran’s immediate perceived threats have shifted to those coming from regional state and nonstate actors. Iran probably views Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sunni extremist groups, such as ISIS, as its next most dangerous threats because of their immediacy and proximity to Iran’s territory, allies, and regional influence. Iran’s expanding regional activities have only exacerbated these views. The growth in militant Sunni extremism, particularly ISIS, and Iran’s perception of its regional adversaries’ growing military capabilities has prompted Tehran to adjust some of its military modernization priorities. Iran’s latest national development plan reflects this shift in threat perceptions by emphasizing a broader range of conventional capabilities than previous plans.
National Security Strategy
Tehran’s national security strategy aims to ensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain stability against internal and external threats, secure Iran’s position as a dominant regional power, and achieve economic prosperity.
Iran has developed
its security and military strategies based on these four enduring strategic
objectives:
• Ensure Continuity of Clerical Rule. The supreme leader’s position is based on the popular acceptance of velayat-e faqih. To ensure the regime’s continued legitimacy with the Iranian populace, Tehran attempts to control much of the domestic political, social, and cultural environment and promote its interpretation of Islamic ideology.
• Secure the Nation From Internal and External Threats. The regime uses its military and security capabilities to counter internal threats from political and ethnic opposition movements and terrorist groups and to prevent neighboring states’ instability from spilling over or causing violence in Iran. The military defends Iranian territory from foreign adversaries—including perceived existential threats, such as the United States, and regional rivals, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia—and provides support to allies and partners to counter regional threats.
• Become a Dominant Regional Power. Tehran aspires to lead a stable regional order in which it has dominant influence. In Iran’s vision for the region, its allies remain intact, the influence of the United States and U.S. regional partners is degraded, and Sunni extremist groups are defeated. In pursuit of these goals, Iran provides extensive military, advisory, and financial assistance to allies and partners, seeking to protect its regional interests and pressure adversaries.
• Attain Economic Prosperity. Domestically, President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani’s priority is to achieve national economic prosperity by reducing subsidies to the populace, curbing corruption, reforming the financial sector, and attracting foreign investment. Tehran aims to balance foreign investment and partnerships with the priority it places on economic self-sufficiency, in part to reduce the effects of U.S. and multilateral sanctions.
Iran remains committed to modernizing its military, forging new partnerships, and building the capacity of its partners across the region— including designated FTOs—all while balancing a desire to benefit from integrating into the global economic system. Despite some internal instability, Iranian military and security forces have also proven able to manage public unrest and low-level insurgencies from several ethnic opposition movements.
Stability Issues
Since the 1979 revolution, the regime has regularly cracked down on dissent to maintain political stability. Iranian political and ethnic opposition groups are largely localized and lack unity, posing little threat to the regime. Iran’s internal stability continues to be threatened by a growing schism between the country’s leaders, dominated by military and clerical elites, and the common people. The past 40 years have seen a growth in income inequality, increased IRGC political influence and control of key economic sectors, sustained sectarian and ethnic tension, violent suppression of dissent and reformists, persistent gender inequality, and tension stemming from the In other words, it is common practice for abusive relationships in route to divorce. prescription de cialis Small problems such as pains, burns or any other problem from which cheap cialis viagra human commonly sufferer are cured using these two local anesthetic chemical. The absorption of tadalafil does not require pfizer viagra tablets adherence to food during the reception, as it is completely natural and safe that would just help to arouse you sexually and spend a happy time with your partner. When to visit an IVF spe prescription for cialis purchaset in Goa Rule of Thumb: Couples who are under 35 years in age and have been unsuccessfully trying to get pregnant naturally. military’s involvement in regional conflicts.
In 2009, after the disputed reelection of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a loosely organized opposition called the Green Movement emerged with large-scale protests demanding democratic reforms. The demonstrations marked the country’s most significant unrest since the revolution. Bolstered by the Internet, hundreds of thousands of protesters turned out across the country. The government responded by ordering security services to crack down, which resulted in dozens of deaths, hundreds of arrests, restricted access to social media, and the closure of several newspapers. The regime quelled the unrest and nearly eliminated the Green Movement.
Between December 2017 and January 2018, small incidents of civil disobedience converged into widespread public protests, the largest unrest Iran has faced since 2009. Some protestors challenged Iran’s foreign policy—including its involvement in regional conflict and support to proxy groups—but most focused on economic and social issues. Elected in 2013, President Ruhani promised increased financial benefits and eco- nomic growth, but these have not translated into an improved standard of living for everyday Iranians. While oil output had risen before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, significant economic growth did not follow, and domestic prices for both food and fuel increased.
Some longstanding opposition groups, mostly originating from minority ethnic and religious groups, continue to challenge Iran’s internal security. Along the western border, the regime faces several militant Kurdish opposition groups— including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK)—which advocate for increased autonomy and the right to Kurdish self-determination. Armed opposition from PJAK has been especially violent, resulting in dozens of Iranian deaths annually since 2005. Iran also faces periodic violence from Baluchi militants in southeastern Iran along the Pakistani border. The most prominent of these groups, Jaish ul-Adl (JAA), periodically attacks Iranian military facilities, border posts, and security patrols and occasionally takes military and security personnel hostage. JAA hampers Iran-Pakistan relations, with Tehran accusing Islamabad of failing to curb Baluchi militants operating from Pakistani soil. The Iranian military conducts counterinsurgency campaigns against the Kurdish and Baluchi militants in these regions on a nearly annual basis.
The most well-known group opposed to the regime is the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK). The MEK, founded in 1965 by Muslim students advocating a combination of Marxist communism and Islamist ideology, is an Iranian political-militant organization in exile that proposes the overthrow of the Iranian regime to establish itself as a new government. After initially supporting the 1979 revolution, the MEK fought on behalf of Saddam late in the Iran-Iraq War and was responsible for a series of bombings and assassinations in the 1990s and early 2000s. Widely unpopular in Iran, the MEK remains one of the regime’s foremost internal security concerns. Formerly designated as an FTO by the United States, the Iranian government still considers the MEK a terrorist group.
External Defense Relations
Tehran maintains defense and security ties to both state and nonstate actors to project power and support Shia groups and Shia-led governments in the Middle East. Iran relies on its regional partnerships to help counter perceived threats from Sunni extremist groups, adversarial states, and Western military presence in the region. Iran refers to its efforts to build a regional network to counter Israeli and Western influence as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Huthis, and some Palestinian militants. Beyond these closer allies, Tehran seeks to cultivate relations with other countries; Iran is also a member of the Nonaligned Movement and has observer status with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Particularly in recent years, Tehran has committed extensive resources and deployed military personnel to support key partners facing internal conflicts. Since at least 2012, Iran has escalated its involvement in the Syrian civil war to include providing arms, training, advisers, and select combat personnel to support the Syrian regime. Since at least 2014, Iran has also provided direct military assistance—including IRGC advisers, training, and materiel support—to Iraqi Shia militias to help combat ISIS, which Tehran views as a critical national security threat, and to strengthen its influence in Iraq.
Iran maintains strong defense ties to Hizballah in Lebanon—its most significant and oldest nonstate partner and a core member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”—and provides sup- port to some Palestinian groups in an attempt to pressure Israel. Iran also provides advanced
weapons support to the Huthis in Yemen and calibrated support to Shia militants in Bahrain and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF, the IRGC’s external operations element, is Iran’s primary conduit of support and guidance to these nonstate partners and proxies.
Tehran maintains particularly close military-to-military ties with Syria and Iraq and has signed basic military cooperation agreements with Afghanistan, Belarus, China, Oman, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Venezuela. Iran has also held discussions on defense and security issues with a wider range of countries, including Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Djibouti, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. Djibouti and Sudan have since severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Tehran has also purchased military equipment from Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine.
Military cooperation between Russia and Iran has grown significantly in recent years, despite Tehran’s uncertainty about Moscow’s long-term regional objectives. Iran and Russia have cooperated to support Asad’s regime in Syria since at least 2015. Iran has briefly allowed Russian combat aircraft to use its Hamadan Airbase as a stopover to launch strikes in Syria, marking the first time Tehran has permitted a foreign military to use its territory since the Islamic Revolution. Iran also seeks to procure Russian military hardware. In 2016, it completed its high-profile purchase of the Russian SA-20c air defense sys- tem, which provided Iran with its first capability to defend against a modern air force.
The Iranian military is also increasing its defense diplomacy efforts, particularly through near-continuous naval deployments beyond its immediate neighbors. Since 2009, Iran has sent small naval groups to “show the flag” through a series of port calls overseas and counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Intended to enhance its soft power, Iran’s use of naval diplomacy has demonstrated its capability to con- duct out-of-area operations increasingly farther from Iranian shores, extending from the Medi- terranean Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait in the west to the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca in the east.
The Report Continues Tomorrow
Photo: Iran’s Shahab-3 missile (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance)