Top Intelligence Officer Discusses Strategy

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier recently shared his views and mission priorities concerning key issues. The DIA, like the CIA, is an intelligence organization. The CIA focuses on providing intelligence to the White House. The DIA is the provider of foreign intelligence relating to combat-related missions.

Berrier explained DIA’s long-term strategy to address Russia and China in an era of strategic competition. He noted that “The success that the intelligence community had about the prediction of the Russian invasion [of Ukraine] was really, really interesting,” He further explained that DIA’s biggest successes came from what he described as a “dynamic policy environment” that allowed DIA to modify existing policies to share intelligence with more and more partners. In doing so, the intelligence community was able to convince partners and allies of Russia’s impending invasion and when it would happen.

Based on what the DIA chief stated, it raises the question of why the Biden Administration failed to equip Ukraine with defensive weapons earlier, or what the U.S. President meant when he claimed he wouldn’t object to a “little” invasion.

While squarely focused on Russia, China and global defense in general, DIA is also investing in the cyberspace domain. It is leveraging data available through open-source intelligence (also known as OSINT), private sector partnerships and the expertise at U.S. Cyber Command. More and more, the first blow in warfare comes not from bombs but from internet attacks on key infrastructure. The recent assault on NYC airports is a prime example. Though not part of an attack on America, it was a test of Moscow’s ability to do so in the future.

On the difference between foundational intelligence and cyber intelligence, Berrier said, “If you think about foundational military intelligence, it’s based on understanding what the foreign militaries have, what their capabilities are, based on the physical presence of these things. It’s harder in cyber because you may know where a cyber facility physically is located, but you really don’t know what activity is going on inside that facility.”

He added that publicly available information and social media add a layer of complexity that further challenges cyber intelligence and remains a challenge for the intelligence community.

The DIA chief noted that substantial investment in cyber network defense is crucial to national security. DIA is investing in manpower and expertise and leveraging OSINT growth to expand the foundational understanding of foreign defense-related cyber issues and sharing OSINT with non-traditional partners.

“We think that there’s room for discussion about what the future of cyber intelligence really is in partnership with Cyber Command, NSA and others across the community to really define where it is we need to go,” he said.

Berrier also discussed the history of The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, or JWICS, a global intelligence network used by the defense intelligence community.
“We are going to invest significant dollars over the next five years to continue to modernize JWICS to ensure that it’s as hard as it can be; that it’s taking advantage of access to cloud data; and that we, along with our IC partners, are in the right place at the right time to deliver the information that we do as quickly as we can.”

MARS, DIA’s Machine-assisted Rapid-repository System, will fully replace the Military Intelligence Integrated Database, or MIDB, by 2024. Berrier noted that MIDB is an effective but dated database and that MARS will provide a richer program for analysts by infusing data with artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Berrier outlined the four lines of effort in DIA’s 10-year Strategy – intelligence advantage, the culture of innovation, allies and partnerships, and adaptive workforce.

“The third one, maybe the most important, is Allies and Partnerships,” said Berrier. “Over the course of this latest conflict with Russia and Ukraine, our allies and partners have been key. And we need to foster that and we need to nurture those relationships to the best of our ability. So that when we need help, that help is there and we can call.”

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.