The Next Russian War? – USA Gov Policy

What was once expected to be a short war in Ukraine has stretched from winter into summer and shows no signs of shutting it down as we approach fall. Now Putin is growing more concerned over a separate Russian enclave, Kaliningrad, that was separated from the country after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991. There are two aspects that are particularly critical: transportation links between Kaliningrad and Russia proper and changes in the Kaliningrad population’s attitudes because of their neighbors’ actions. The “populace [are] less like their nominally Russian ethnic counterparts and potentially less loyal” to Russia, according to Paul Goble of the Jamestown Foundation. The area is separated from the Russian Federation by Lithuania and Poland.

Recently Lithuania imposed and then removed a ban on the movement of EU sanctioned goods between Russia and Kaliningrad. Last year a NATO exercise appeared to practice the taking of Kaliningrad in a war. For Putin, this represents a clear and long-term threat to his country as he continues to face regionalist sentiment in various regions of Russia. Renamed Kaliningrad by Joseph Stalin at the end of World War II the region has lingering negative feelings about ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians brought into the enclave as the original residents , “the people of Koenigsberg,” view themselves as distinct from other groups.

“Some have even talked about becoming ‘the fourth Baltic republic’ and formed a political party to promote that outcome,” says Goble, and “such feelings are further intensified by the Kaliningrad population’s far more frequent visits to Lithuania and Poland, both EU and NATO members, than to Russia proper, as well as by earlier efforts on the part of Kaliningrad officials to promote tourism, playing up German, Lithuanian and Polish links in the past and present.” Since last November Putin has cracked down on even the slightest hints of separatism and, in particular, against the German influence that remains in the region.

Lithuanian influence in the region is targeted due to the impact of Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine and its recent moves to restrict the flow of goods to the exclave. Goble calls the Kremlin’s action “both harsh and possibly dangerous given the reactions of Kaliningrad residents, who had been loyal to Moscow up to now—even if these moves are still flying under the radar in the West.” Since early July, Russian officials have gone after Lithuanian cultural institutions in Kaliningrad itself. It is viewed as an act of revenge against Vilnius’ failed attempt to impose a partial blockade on the region and to limit Lithuanian influence on Kaliningrad.

Last week, at the insistence of the Russian Ministry of Justice, officials closed the Association of Teachers of the Lithuanian Language in Kaliningrad. The group totaled about 20,000 ethnic Lithuanian. Putin’s political motivation was obvious as the activist association and has served as a base for teachers since 1995. The publication Lituanika.ru points out this week that its members are appalled because they care about their nation and about Kaliningrad and believe that the association has served both equally well. It raises questions concerning how far Putin will go to secure Kaliningrad.

Maksim Makarov, reports Goble, heads the Russian community in Kaliningrad Oblast. Earlier Makarov garnered attention for his fight against “Germanization,” saying the closing of the association was absolutely correct, if belated, because the group has been funded by Vilnius and has tried to organize opposition within Kaliningrad to Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. At this point Russia is using propaganda to dissuade those in the enclave from dissociating themselves from Russia. Msocow’s mouth piece, Makarov calls the association “an LGBT organization” and “the chief structure of the special services of Lithuania on the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast.” There are other cases where Russia is interfering in Kaliningrad in recent weeks. A Lithuanian children’s ensemble was blocked from traveling to a festival in the Russian Federation and acts of vandalism have also been committed against Lithuanian statues and busts in various parts of the oblast simply because they represent “the wrong nationality.” No one is sure what will next happen in this campaign to defend “Russianness” in the enclave. “In the current environment… more attacks, both official and unofficial, on Lithuanian groups in Kaliningrad are probable in the coming days, a reflection of Kremlin fears that even folkloric groups can undermine the population’s Russian identity and its loyalty to Moscow,” according to Goble. Putin’s war may yet spread and not close to a conclusion.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Photo: Kaliningrad museum (Pixabay)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.