Tag: Russian Gray Strategy

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes presentation of key excerpts of the “Strategic Multiyear Assessment”(SMA) prepared for the U.S. Military Joint Chiefs of Staff by key defense policy analysts. It examines Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them.

How Should the US Respond?

Determine Intent to Avoid Unintended Consequences Understanding why actors are violating norms (e.g., boundary testing, system breakage) reduces the probability of unintended escalation and informs the development of deterrent measures. Intent and attribution are inherently problematic in the gray zone. However, mistakenly attributing aggressive intent when an action is taken in ignorance of the consequences, or in self-defense, may lead to interpreting an action incorrectly as gray and thus potentially threatening. A response based on faulty interpretation may be perceived as aggressive as well as unprovoked and increase tensions and the probability of unwanted escalation. Conversely, interpreting as benign an action that is in fact part of a gray strategy risks missing the window of opportunity for derailing that strategy before it becomes a done deal.

Stay Engaged and Respond Early Inaction in the face of low-level gray actions can, over time, create a “new reality” that threatens US interests and security. At that point, reversion to the status quo ante will likely require much greater, and more costly actions, and may not be possible without the use of military force. Part of the reason Russia is choosing to operate in the gray zone is its perception that the US will not respond to lower level actions for fear of triggering escalation. US failure to develop early, effective response options reinforces this perception. An enduring, proactive presence and consistent messaging across all USG agencies is a significantly superior approach to taking select actions in response to Russian aggression. This approach would be aided by the DoD expanding its definitions of maneuver and objectives to better account for the human aspects of military operations.

What Capabilities Does the US Need? Engagment with population across multiple arenas (economic, political, media and others) is a defining characteristic of many gray actions and all gray strategies. Gray zone actors are consistently engaging with populations within and outside their borders, in efforts to effectively set the narrative for both their own actions and motivations, and those of the US. Unless and until the US does the same, it will be at a disadvantage in addressing gray zone challenges. Across all aspects of gray zone identification and response, one central theme emerges from the work done for this project: The US needs to think more broadly and deepen our understanding of the human / cognitive domain. We cannot afford to ignore populations, or engage with them only once a crisis has erupted.

A richer understanding of the operational environment provides the essential context for identifying those actors that are likely to engage in behavior the US considers to be gray, and a potential threat to US and/or partner nation interests. Understanding the drivers and buffers of stability within specific regions and countries can help analysts and planners identify actors that are likely to be vulnerable to another actor’s gray actions and strategies. It can also help identify the actors they are vulnerable to in specific areas (e.g. domestic political influence by Russia, or economic pressure or reward from China). For any response or deterrent action taken by the US and partner nations to be effective, we also need to be able to anticipate with greater accuracy the likely population response (at the group level, not just the state level) to our actions. Figure 2 highlights the aspects of the gray zone on which the SMA team analyses indicated the US and partner nations should build understanding. It also shows the areas in which the analyses suggest the US should further develop in order to improve both I&W and responses to gray zone challenges.

Deeper Understanding of the Human/Cognitive Domain When considering capabilities in the context of gray zone challenges, we need to think first in terms of information. Information provides a richer understanding of the operating environment and emphasizes the human/cognitive domain.

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 Specifically, the US must:

• Broaden its understanding of the strategic and operational environments to better incorporate the human / cognitive domain

• Consider the non-military arenas and non-state level of the gray zone when developing I&W, and deterrence and response options

• Think beyond purely kinetic responses and develop ways to shape the international environment to reduce the motivation for actors to engage in gray activities in the first place. This will require addressing the broad question of the sustainability of a global system built on norms that are not implicitly accepted by all major powers

• Build trust and credibility with partner nations to enable greater coordination of effort in collective gray zone deterrence and response activities, as well as earlier I&W or gray zone activity against vulnerable partners

• Narratives are not the only tool for building influence. Explore other (non- military) levers of power the US can use to increase its influence without violating or undermining international norms

Develop Clear and Compelling Strategic Narratives

• The US lacks a compelling “story” to present as a counter to competing narratives. We need to better articulate US interests and strategy to both ourselves and others

• Establish the extent to which the target population trusts the US, and have in place strategies to bolster that trust when it is low, prior to engaging in any narrative messaging

 • US messaging (and objectives) must be consistent across the USG agencies working in specific regions and countries. This will require coordination and communication across agencies

Conclusion

The findings from the SMA Gray Zone Project suggest that the capabilities to effectively respond to gray activities are, in some ways, as fluid as those activities themselves. Russia’s gray activities and strategy continue to evolve and adapt, so any capability to respond must itself be adaptable. Rather than focus on specific means (which will continue to change), US capabilities should focus on ends such as containing Russian influence and maintaining an international system consistent with US interests.

Toward this end, much of the SMA teams’ discussion and findings regarding response options in the gray zone coalesce around the role of influence. In particular, how the US can increase its ability to influence international state and non-state actors, and minimize the influence of actors potentially detrimental to the status quo, or to US interests specifically. For this, we need a better understanding of the human / cognitive domain, which can only be achieved with a combination of richer information and conceptual models and frameworks to guide search and interpretation.

Picture: Putin, (Pixabay)

The New York Analysis presents Part 2 of our presentation of key excerpts of the “Strategic Multiyear Assessment”(SMA) prepared for the U.S. Military Joint Chiefs of Staff by key defense policy analysts. It examines Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them.

WHAT CAPABILITIES DOES THE US NEED TO EFFECTIVELY RESPOND

TO RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES?

We cannot advance our understanding of gray zone challenges if we cannot integrate the work that is going on across the various commands and DoD offices. This requires a carefully crafted and widely accepted definition of what is in, and what is out, of the gray zone. Developing early I&W also requires the various groups working this problem to systematically and consistently measure gray activities against a shared operational definition. Finally, doctrine developed to address gray zone challenges will be most effective if it is based on a consistent definition. Before the question of necessary capabilities can be addressed, therefore, a consensus definition of the gray zone, specific enough to guide further work in this area, is required.

Nature of the Gray Zone The gray zone is a conceptual space between peace and war, where activities are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition yet intentionally fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict.

Gray Zone Strategies A series of actions by a state or non-state actor that challenge or violate international customs, norms, and laws for the purpose of pursuing one or more broadly-defined national security interests without provoking direct military response. Gray zone strategies can occur in three ways relative to international rules and norms. They can: Challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms while stopping short of clear violations of international law (e.g., much of China’s use of the Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese Maritime Militia); Employ violations of both international norms and laws in ways intended to avoid the penalties associated with legal violations (e.g., Russian activities in Crimea); or Consist of states using violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and non-state actors as proxies in an effort to integrate elements of power to advance particular security interests.

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Gray Zone Activity An adversary’s purposeful use of single or multiple elements of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of open warfare. In most cases, once significant, attributable coercive force has been used, the activities are no longer considered to be in the gray zone but have transitioned into the realm of traditional warfare. While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of national power, they are activities taken by an actor for the purpose of gaining some broadly defined security advantage over another.

Why Is Russia “Going Gray”?

We can not assume that all powerful states are satisfied with the status quo. The use of gray actions and strategies can be taken as a signal that an actor is dissatisfied with an aspect of the international system that those norms reflect and support. Norms and norms violations emerge as central to how we conceptualize the gray zone, and why we seem to find these actions and strategies so resistant to US current deterrent and response strategies. Russia has shown through military actions in Ukraine and Crimea, and wider political influence operations, its willingness to openly flout international rules and norms to achieve its strategic goals. In other instances it has challenged the assumed universality of international norms supporting civil rights and liberties and positioned itself as the champion of rule of law. Such was the case with Russia’s criticism of US support for the Arab Spring and other pro-democracy social movements, and evocation of sovereign legitimacy in its support of the Assed Regime in Syria.

To the extent that existing international norms reflect the interests of the US and Western European states, violations of these norms could signal intent to decrease US influence over the actions of other state and non-state actors. Indeed, Russia seems to be interested in establishing an entirely different set of rules of the game9 . In addition to a willingness to unequivocally violate existing international rules and norms, Russia has attempted to establish alternative international institutions, especially economic, to counter the dominance of existing Western institutions, such as the European Union.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow.

Picture: Pixabay