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Progress on Missile Defense, Part 2

Russia has long been active in anti-ballistic missile development.  In 2017, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense the nation successfully tested an upgraded interceptor missile of the Russian Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) system.

Russian media widely covered the combat-ready status of a new ABM facility in Kaliningrad in late 2011. The Russia and India Report publication revealed in 2016 that “Russia plans to overhaul its missile defence system and is developing a state-of-the-art anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence shield… Colonel Andrei Cheburin, speaking in 2017, said Russia’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was being completely overhauled over the past few years. ‘I think that in the near future our country will have a truly ultramodern missile defence system,’ he concluded…In autumn of 2012, Russia’s defence authorities stated that the functional ABM system, the A-135 Amur, was being given a major upgrade. Colonel General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, then chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, told RIA Novosti that the missiles were being replaced with new ones with an improved design. All the other elements of the system, including the detection and tracking components, were also being revamped.

What is the status of America’s attempt to protect itself from an ICBM attack?  The Department of Defense has issued its latest Missile Defense Review.  We provide our outline of the Report’s Executive Summary: 

“…[T]he threat environment is markedly more dangerous than in years past and demands a concerted U.S. effort to improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional missile defense. This effort will include a vigorous science and technology research program in addition to the exploration of innovative concepts and advanced technologies that have the potential to provide more cost-effective U.S. defenses against expanding missile threats.

This 2019 MDR also emphasizes that the missile threat environment now calls for a comprehensive approach to missile defense against rogue state and regional missile threats. This approach integrates offensive and defensive capabilities for deterrence, and includes active defense to intercept missiles in all phases of flight after launch, passive defense to mitigate the effects of missile attack, and attack operations during a conflict to neutralize offensive missile threats prior to launch.

The Evolving Threat Environment

[T]oday’s security environment is “more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory.” Potential adversaries are investing substantially in their missile capabilities. They are expanding their missile capabilities in three different directions simultaneously: increasing the capabilities of their existing missile systems; adding new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals; and, integrating offensive missiles ever more thoroughly into their coercive threats, military exercises, and war planning.

New ballistic missile systems feature multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV), along with decoys and jamming devices. Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missile capabilities that can travel at exceptional speeds with unpredictable flight paths that challenge existing defensive systems. These are challenging realities of the emerging missile threat environment that U.S. missile defense policy, strategy, and capabilities must address.

Current and Emerging Missile Threats to the American Homeland

North Korea. While a possible new avenue to peace now exists with North Korea, it continues to pose an extraordinary threat and the United States must remain vigilant. In the past, North Korea frequently issued explicit nuclear missile threats against the United States and allies, all the while working aggressively to field the capability to strike the U.S. homeland with nucleararmed ballistic missiles. Over the past decade, it has invested considerable resources in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and undertaken extensive nuclear and missile testing in order to realize the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with missile attack. As a result, North Korea has neared the time when it could credibly do so.

Iran. Iran views U.S. influence in the Middle East as the foremost barrier to its goal of becoming the dominant power in that region. One of Iran’s primary tools of coercion and force projection is its missile arsenal, which is characterized by increasing numbers, as well as increases in accuracy, range, and lethality. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and continues the development of technologies applicable to intercontinentalrange missiles capable of threatening the United States. Its desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM, and progress in its space program could shorten the pathway to an ICBM.

Russia. Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threat to its contemporary revisionist geopolitical Still, many of overnight cheap viagra the ED sufferers are not aware of this characteristic, in order to play an active role in married life easily. It is the only brand, which is available there different appearance and avail users the many way to take care viagra online without prescription of their health. In general erectile dysfunction medication is free viagra in canada a great option for individuals who do not want to discuss or open the problem in front of anyone. Men and women are different overnight generic cialis in their approach to you will be positive, and through your counseling, you will come to see yourself as they do. ambitions and routinely conducts exercises involving simulated nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the coercive and potential military uses of nuclear weapons, particularly including nuclear-armed, offensive missiles, and has sought to enable this strategy through a comprehensive modernization of its strategic and theater missile arsenals. As counted under the 2010 New START Treaty, Russia is permitted a total of 700 deployed ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers, and 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russian leaders also claim that Russia possesses a new class of missile, the hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), which maneuver and typically travel at velocities greater than Mach 5 in or just above the atmosphere.

China. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region to its advantage. Offensive missiles play an increasingly prominent role in China’s military modernization, its coercive threats, and efforts to counter U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. It has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, including a new road-mobile system and a new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM. Beijing also now possesses 4 advanced JINclass ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), each capable of carrying 12 new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the CSS-N-14. Consequently, China can now potentially threaten the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles, some capable of employing multiple warheads, and its nuclear forces will increase in the coming years. Beijing also is developing advanced technologies, such as MaRVs and HGVs.

While the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland, U.S. active missile defense can and must outpace existing and potential rogue state offensive missile capabilities. To do so, the United States will pursue advanced missile defense concepts and technologies for homeland defense.

Missile Threats to U.S. Forces Abroad, Allies, and Partners

Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly diverse, expansive, and modern range of regional offensive missile systems that can threaten U.S. forces abroad, allies, and partners. These include multiple types of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles intended to provide coercive political and military advantages in regional crises or conflict. Expanding and modernizing U.S. regional missile defenses is an imperative to meet these ongoing adversary advancements in their regional offensive missile systems.

North Korea. Over the past decade, North Korea accelerated its efforts to field missiles capable of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the region. Since 2015, North Korea test-launched, from numerous locations throughout North Korea, over two dozen regional missiles. It has fielded more regional missiles and diversified its already large regional ballistic missile force, including delivery systems with road-mobile and submarine launching platforms. These wide-ranging North Korean offensive missile systems have given North Korea the capability to strike U.S. territories, including Guam, U.S. forces abroad, and allies in the Pacific Ocean. They are the tools North Korea has used to issue coercive nuclear preemptive threats, and potentially could use to employ nuclear weapons in the event of conflict in Asia.

Iran. Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles with improved accuracy, range, and lethality. It fields an array of increasingly accurate short- and medium-range ballistic missile systems capable of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners. Iran’s medium-range systems can threaten targets from Eastern Europe to South Asia, and Iran has transferred missile systems to terrorist organizations, which in turn have used Iranian-supplied missiles against U.S. Middle East allies and partners. It has also flight-tested a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in an anti-ship role that can threaten U.S. and allied naval vessels in the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and has displayed a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) that has a claimed range of 2000 kilometers (km).

Russia. Moscow is fielding an increasingly advanced and diverse range of nuclear-capable regional offensive missile systems, including missiles with unprecedented characteristics of altitude, speed, propulsion type, and range. These missile systems are a critical enabler of Russia’s coercive escalation strategy and nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners. It is developing a new generation of advanced regional ballistic and cruise missiles that support its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy intended to defeat U.S. and allied will and capability in regional crises or conflicts. Since 2015, Russia has demonstrated its advanced cruise missile capability by repeatedly conducting long-range precision strikes into Syria, and has fielded a ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile, the SSC-8, in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

China. China is also developing missile capabilities intended to deny the United States the capability and freedom of action to protect U.S. allies and partners in Asia. A key component of China’s military modernization is its conventional ballistic missile arsenal designed to prevent U.S. military access to support regional allies and partners. China is improving its ability to strike regional targets, such as U.S. bases and naval assets, at greater ranges with the addition of the growing number of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This includes sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles that pose a direct threat to U.S. aircraft carriers. China also has ground- and air-launched LACMs, and is developing HGVs and new MaRVs. These and other wide-ranging developments in China’s expansive offensive missile arsenal pose a potential nuclear and non-nuclear threat to U.S. forces deployed abroad, and are of acute concern to U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

Photo: 2017 Russian Anti-missile test (Russian Ministry of Defense)

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DIA Report on China’s Military Threat, Part 3

The New York Analysis concludes its reporting on key provisions of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s just-released report on China’s military power.

Defense-Industrial Base

China’s defense-industrial complex comprises both a military and a state sector governed by the CMC and State Council, respectively, under oversight of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.166 The CMC’s Equipment Development Department oversees weapons planning, research, development, and acquisition (RDA) in conjunction with the military service armament organizations for China’s Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Armed Police, and Coast Guard

The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) is the key organ responsible for overseeing China’s state-owned defense-industrial corporations and enterprises. Twelve SASTIND-subordinatedefense-industrial enterprises conduct RDA and production in six distinct scientific, engineering, and technological domains:

 • Aerospace/missile

 • Naval/maritime

• Aviation

• Ground systems/ordnance

• Electronics

 • Nuclear

 During a speech at an equipment-quality work conference in 2015, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang stressed the need to build a strong defense-industrial base to support military development. Xu emphasized themes of quality, innovation, technology, and improving combat readiness, but also said it would be necessary to strengthen laws, regulations, and accountability within the defense industry to increase quality standards.

The PLA initiated defense-industrial reforms in 2016 that aimed to reduce bureaucracy, develop a more structured RDA and production decisionmaking apparatus, streamline developmental timelines, promote innovation, and institutionalize civil-military integration. Within an industrial context, the latter entails establishing a formal relationship between China’s defense and civilian industrial bases to develop a technologically advanced, domes tically reliant, and internationally relevant defense-industrial complex. Key components of the initiative include the establishment of widely distributed “science cities,” industrial parks, and high-tech zones—most near China’s defense-industrial corporations and commercial industrial centers, large cities, and provincial capitals harboring significant RDA and manufacturing capabilities to facilitate effi – cient logistics and supply. These reforms are expected to be implemented by 2020.

A key emphasis of defense-industrial reforms is developing an innovative military industrial complex capable of delivering cutting-edge technologies to meet future PLA requirements. China’s research and development apparatus is designed to both identify and maximize the utility of emerging and potentially disruptive science and technology for military use. Scientific and technological disciplines with military applications targeted for development include hypersonics; nanotechnology; high-performance computing; quantum Mentioned below are some myths about the impotence along with the original facts.Myth: Impotence can not be curedFact: tadalafil samples This is the first common myth that has been spread most widely in spite of the various medications available to cure it. In fact, opioids have been prescription for ordering viagra respitecaresa.org shown to cause more than 70% of the ED cases. Many erectile dysfunction or ED patients who take respitecaresa.org generic prescription viagra notice a change in blue and gree colors. But, if you are really looking for tangible and long-term real growth of your penile tissues, some pills may lead you to believe that they will be happy only when something specific happens. “I’ll be happy when I get order cialis promoted . . . or when I hit my target” Once these things happen (if they do at all) the feeling of happiness is very fleeting because. communications; space systems; autonomous systems; artificial intelligence; robotics; high-performance turbofan engine design; new, more efficient and powerful forms of propulsion; advanced manufacturing processes (including additive manufacturing/3-D printing); and advanced aerospace quality materials, just to name a few

Underground Facilities

The use of underground facilities for warfighting protection and concealment enhances China’s military capacity, with particular emphasis on protecting C4I functions and missile assets. The PLA maintains a robust, technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program. Given its NFU nuclear policy, China assumes it might have to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring that leadership and strategic assets survive.

China determined in the mid-to-late 1980s that it needed to update and expand its military UGF program. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency after China observed U.S. and coalition air operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Balkans in 1999. The resultant emphasis on “winning high-tech battles” precipitated research into advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable, deeply buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort we have detected throughout China for the past decade

Missions Other Than War

The PLA views “nonwar” missions as a component of its readiness preparations, broader military modernization efforts, and military diplomacy. These operations also reflect the PLA’s increasing role beyond China’s borders. In practice, the military shares many of these missions with the People’s Armed Police, China’s largely domestically oriented paramilitary force. China has broadened its participation in UN PKOs since 2008 to support foreign policy and military objectives by improving China’s international image, providing the PLA with operational experience, and opening avenues for intelligence collection. China provides civilian police, military observers, engineers, logistic support specialists, and medical personnel to missions. In 2016, China had more than 3,000 peacekeepers deployed in support of 10 UN missions around the globe—the largest contingent of any permanent member nation of the UN Security Council—and separately committed to establish an additional 8,000-member peacekeeping standby force. China has trained about 500 foreign peacekeepers and has pledged to increase this number to 2,500 in the near future. In August 2017, Beijing announced that China’s first helicopter unit to be deployed to a UN mission area had arrived in Sudan to support the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur. As of 2018, China has more than 2,500 troops, police, and military observers committed to UN missions.

Outlook: Developing a Robust Force

China’s military modernization efforts have followed the broader growth and development of China as a whole. The PLA has made efforts toward reducing corruption, professionalizing training and education, developing a science and technology base for research and development, and organizing the force for effective C2. With its economic and security interests reaching around the globe, Beijing perceives further modernization of the PLA as an imperative for continued stability and security of its growing interests.

During the past decade alone, from counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an expanded military presence in the East and South China Seas, China has demonstrated a willingness to use the PLA as an instrument of national power in the execution of “historic missions” in the new century. Improvements in PLA equipment and capabilities that have focused on generating combat power across the PLA services present Beijing with additional response options as China faces increasing global security concerns. Expected advances in areas such as nuclear deterrence, power projection, cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be critical components of the PLA’s developing capabilities. China also continues to develop capabilities for “nonwar” missions, such as HADR and counterpiracy.

In the coming years, the PLA is likely to grow even more technologically advanced, with equipment comparable to that of other modern militaries. The PLA will acquire advanced fighter aircraft, naval vessels, missile systems, and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China’s shores.

Photo: Coastal missile troops practice using anti-ship missile systems (China Ministry of Defense)

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DIA Report on China’s Military Threat, Part 2

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its coverage of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s just-released report on China’s powerful military.

Nuclear Forces and Weapons

China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike. As part of this, China has long maintained a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China.There is some ambiguity, however, over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply. Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. Nevertheless, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.

China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, intended to ensure the viability of its strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, preci sion strike, and missile defense capabilities. China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness. China maintains nuclear-capable deliv ery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy. As of 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned a nuclear mission, probably with a developmental strategic bomber. The bomber’s deployment would provide China with its first credible nuclear triad of delivery systems dis persed across land, sea, and air—a posture considered since the Cold War to improve sur vivability and strategic deterrence.

PLA writings express the value of a “launch on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decisionmaking processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack. These writings highlight the posture’s consistency with Chi – na’s NFU policy. China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future.84 The PLA is developing a range of technologies to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and hypersonic glide vehicles. In addition, the PLA is likely to continue deploying more sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 pro cesses as growing numbers of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deterrence patrols require the PLA to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force.

China maintains a stockpile of nuclear warheads and continues research on and develop ment and production of new nuclear weapons.  The PLA probably has multiple nuclear war – head designs that are decades old and require routine observation, maintenance, or refurbishment to maintain effectiveness. China’s nuclear weapon design and production orga nization—the China Academy of Engineering Physics—is the key organization in developing and maintaining China’s nuclear force. It employs tens of thousands of personnel, and its scientists are capable of conducting all aspects of nuclear weapon design research, including nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, explosives, and computer modeling China has the required industrial capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium for mil- itary needs. The China National Nuclear Cor poration operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three plants. China probably intends the bulk of its enrichment capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear power industry but could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs. China’s plutonium production reactors probably ceased operation in the 1980s.95 However, China’s reprocessing facilities can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

Biological and Chemical Warfare

China has consistently claimed that it has never researched, produced, or possessed bio logical weapons and would never do so. Beijing says China has researched only defensive biological technology necessary for China’s defense.  China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. It declared the Academy of Military Science’s Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as a biodefense research facility. China regularly and voluntarily submits to confidence-building measures under the BWC. Although China is not a member of the Australia Group, Chi na’s export control regulations have been in line with Australia Group guidelines and control lists since 2002. China’s biotechnology infrastructure is sufficient to produce some biological agents or toxins on a large scale.

China has declared that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes; however, Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997 Beijing also has declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite. In 1998, Beijing published chemical export control regulations consistent with Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) standards. It also has consistently updated its chemical control list to reflect changes made to the Aus tralia Group chemical control list. China contin – ues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as well as its support for the activities conducted by the OPCW. Since acceding to the CWC, China has declared hundreds of dualuse facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars.

China’s chemical infrastructure is sufficient to research, develop, and produce some chemical agents on a large scale.

China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents.116 China has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack.

Entities and individuals in China continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production capabilities.

Space/Counterspace

The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and continues to invest in improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. China uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives. Strategists in the PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions to counter third-party intervention during military conflicts.

China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the research and possible development of satellite jammers and directed-energy weapons, China has probably made progress on kinetic energy weap ons, including the anti-satellite missile system tested in July 2014.China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in December 2015, has an important role in the management of China’s aero – space warfare capabilities. Consolidating the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domain synergy in “strategic frontiers.” The SSF may also be responsible for research, development, testing, and fielding of certain “new concept” weapons, such as directed energy and kinetic energy weapons. The SSF’s space function is primarily focused on satellite launch and operation to support PLA reconnaissance, navigation, and communication requirements.

Space and counterspace capabilities—like missile forces, advanced air and seapower, and cyber capabilities—are critical for China to fight and win modern military engagements. To support various requirements, China has built a vast ground and maritime infrastructure enabling spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.

Satellites

China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for civil and military remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and military intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data.

China pursues parallel programs for military and commercial communications satellites (COMSATs), and owns and operates about 30 COMSATs used for civil, commercial, and military satellite communications. The PLA operates a small number of dedicated military COMSATs.123 China’s civil COMSATs incorpo – rate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manu – factured components, and China produces its military-dedicated satellites domestically.China continues to launch new COMSATs to replace its aging satellites and increase its overall satellite communications bandwidth, capacity, availability, and reliability.

China uses its domestically produced Dong – fanghong-4 (DFH-4) satellite bus—the structure that contains the components of the satellite—for its military COMSATs. Even though early satellites suffered mission-ending or mission-degrading failures, the DFH-4 has become a reliable satellite bus. The PLA and government continue to vigorously support the program and have signed numerous contracts with domestic and international customers for future DFH-4 COMSATs. The DFH-4 bus has also allowed China to position itself as a competitor in the international COMSAT market, orchestrating many contracts with foreign countries to supply on-orbit satellites, ground-control systems, and training.

In 2008, China launched the first Tianlian data-relay satellite of its China Tracking and Data Relay Satellite constellation. As of December 2017, China had four Tianlian data-relay satellites on orbit, allowing China to relay commands and data to and from its satellites even when those satellites were not over Chinese territory.

In 2000, China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system. By 2012, China had established Detoxification is essential to canadian pharmacy for viagra end the adverse effects of the drugs. Increase in Energy & Stamina Natives of Brazil are some of the most cheap viagra in usa active people in the entire world. You can massage the male organ using herbal secretworldchronicle.com cialis on line oils such as lavender, sweet marjoram, and chamomile. With online adult drivers ed cialis buy courses, you can easily fit the course in around work, school and family obligations. a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites and had initiated testing of a global constellation similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). As Beidou satellites continue to be placed in orbit, by 2020 China will complete its global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while maintaining a separate regional constellation providing redundant coverage over Asia.

China owns and operates 10 domestically produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites.128 The China Meteorological Administration supports civilian and military customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts. The newer satellites house almost a dozen all-weather sensors concerning atmospheric conditions as well as maritime terrain data for military and civilian customers. China’s membership in the World Meteorological Organization grants it free access to global meteorological data from the international organization’s 191 members.

Counterspace

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. China is developing antisatellite capabilities, including research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is test – ing dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an antisatellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconaissance…and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as nav – igation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”

Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes

China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight in 2003, when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft, followed by space laboratory Tian – gong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016, respectively. China intends to assemble and operate a permanently inhabited, modular space station capable of hosting foreign pay – loads and astronauts by 2022.

China is the third country to have soft-landed a rover on the Moon, deploying the rover Yutu as part of the Chang’e-3 mission in 2013. China’s Lunar Exploration Program plans to launch the first mission to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2018 (Chang’e-4), followed by its first lunar sample-return mission in 2019 (Chang’e-5).

Space Launch

China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles to support its requirements. The Chang Zheng, or Long March, and Kuaizhou SLVs can launch Chinese spacecraft to any orbit.

Cyberspace

Authoritative PLA writings identify con – trolling the “information domain”—sometimes referred to as “information dominance”—as a prerequisite for achieving victory in a modern war and as essential for countering outside intervention in a conflict. The PLA’s broader concept of the information domain and of infor – mation operations encompasses the network, electromagnetic, psychological, and intelli – gence domains, with the “network domain” and corresponding “network warfare” roughly analogous to the current U.S. concept of the cyber domain and cyberwarfare.

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) may be the first step in the development of a cyber – force by combining cyber reconnaissance, cyberattack, and cyberdefense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control of PLA cyber units. Official pronouncements offer limited details on the organization’s makeup or mission. President Xi simply said during the SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015 that the SSF is a “new-type combat force to maintain national security and [is] an import – ant growth point for the PLA’s combat capabilities.” The SSF probably was formed to consolidate cyber elements of the former PLA General Staff Third (Technical Reconnaissance) and Fourth (Electronic Countermea sures and Radar) Departments and Informati – zation Department.

The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to support military operations in three key areas. First, cyber reconnaissance allows the PLA to collect technical and operational data for intelligence and potential operational planning for cyberattacks because the accesses and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to conduct cyberattacks. Second, the PLA could employ its cyberattack capabilities to establish information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain an adversary’s actions or slow mobilization and deployment by targeting network-based C2, C4ISR, logistics, and commercial activities. Third, cyberwarfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with conventional capabilities during a conflict.

PLA military writings detail the effectiveness of information operations and cyberwarfare in modern conflicts, and advocate targeting an adversary’s C2 and logistics networks to affect the adversary’s ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. One authoritative source identifies an adversary’s C2 system as “the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.”145 China’s cyberwarfare could also focus on targeting links and nodes in an adversary’s mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities in the mobilization and deployment phase.

The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers on charges of hacking into the networks of U.S. companies for commercial gain. Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyberespionage and that the United States fabricated the charges.

Denial and Deception

The PLA uses military deception to reduce the effectiveness of adversaries’ reconnaissance and to deceive adversaries about the PLA’s warfighting intentions, actions, or major targets. PLA tradition emphasizes deception and psychological manipulation to create asymmetric advantages and enable surprise. The PLA has a longstanding doctrine for deception, and claims that it regularly practices deception during training. PLA sources describe military deception as a form of com – bat support, on par with ISR, meteorological support, missile calculation, engineering, and logistic support.

Denial and deception activities include:

 • Concealing and camouflaging.

 • Blending false or misleading military movements with actual deployments and war preparations.

• Employing counterreconnaissance: understanding and evading, jamming, or destroying the whole spectrum of enemy reconnaissance activities against PLA units and facilities.

• Using deceptive maneuvers, psychological ploys, and unorthodox schemes to deceive, confuse, or otherwise manipulate an adversary into a militarily disadvantageous position

Skillfully employed, deception can paralyze an enemy force and achieve decisive results. Options range from no-warning strikes, violent multiaxis strikes, and envelopment to a less ambitious attempt to confuse the adversary regarding the exact timing, nature, direction, or scope of a PLA operation.

Logistics and Defense Industrial Modernization

The PLA’s increased focus on developing the capabilities required to conduct joint operations under “informatized” conditions that began in the 1990s has spurred efforts during the past two decades to develop the PLA’s capacity to supply and sustain its operations. Along these lines, the PLA has taken steps to modernize its defense-industrial base to ensure that the PLA is developing capabilities to meet future mission requirements. Key areas of focus have included civil-military integration, support to joint combat operations, and high-tech weapons development.

Logistics

According to various military officials, the PLA’s logistics system historically has been plagued with inefficiencies that degrade com – bat readiness and restrict its ability to support and sustain modern joint combat operations. Since the late 1990s, the PLA has invested in the modernization of its logistics system, force structure, and supporting infrastructure to enable a transition from a rigid command-directed and manpower-dependent system, rife with corruption. The overarching objective of these reforms is to build a precision logistic support system that is capable of comprehensive, timely, and accurate logistic support to PLA joint operations.

This transformation is dependent on building high-efficiency transportation and warehouse infrastructure, fielding new combat support equipment, integrating comprehensive information systems, and developing a new breed of officer capable of leveraging these capabilities to support rapid mobilization and high-tempo combat operations. For China, logistics modernization also is heavily dependent on the PLA’s ability to leverage the full potential of China’s comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities, ensure peacetime efficiencies, and guarantee a constant state of combat readiness The PLA has made great progress in logistics reform by improving logistics resources and procedures during the past two decades, and enhancing the PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines of communication for large operations (mostly disaster responses and exercises). Since 2016, the PLA has implemented structural reforms to improve command and control, procedural reforms to improve civil-military integration, and oversight mechanisms to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stem from longstanding corrupt practices within the logistics sector. The successful implementation of these measures remains to be seen, given the substantial cultural challenges of executing joint operations and reducing corruption. The extent to which the PLA will be able to sustain external military force projection operations effectively also remains in question because the PLA’s experience is still nascent. Efforts to support the PLA’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, may provide insight into these capabilities.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: A pilot cadet assigned to an aviation brigade under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Harbin Flight Academy gives a thumbs-up gesture in the cockpit of his JL-9 fighter trainer airplane prior to a flight training exercise in mid-January, 2019. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Liu Wei)

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DIA Report on Chinese Threat

On January 15, The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released its report, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, an analysis that examines the core capabilities of China’s military. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government has reviewed the study, and presents the key portions:

Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime, whether foreign or domestic, at times preemptively.

“As China continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests,” said Lt. Gen. Ashley. “With a deeper understanding of the military might behind China’s economic and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world.”

CHINA MILITARY POWER:  Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China has developed nuclear, space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that can reach potential adversaries across the globe.

Although Beijing states that its intent is to serve as a stabilizing force regionally, in practice the PLA’s actions frequently result in increased tensions. Since 2012, Beijing has routinely challenged Tokyo’s Senkaku Island claims in the East China Sea. China’s Coast Guard frequently conducts incursions into the contiguous zone surrounding the islands to further China’s claims, while its Navy operates around the claims to enforce administration. The PLA has expanded and militarized China’s outposts in the South China Sea, and China’s Coast Guard, backed by the PLAN, commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnamese ships in the region.

Examples of incremental improvements to PLA power projection in the region are readily found in annual military exercises and opera tions.60 For instance, in 2015 the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) carried out four exercise training mis sions past the first island chain through the Bashi Channel, the northernmost passage of the Luzon Strait, and through the Miyako Strait closer to Japan. The Miyako Strait flights were 1,500 kilometers from Guam, within range of the PLAAF’s CJ-20 air-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM). Also in 2015, the PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-range bomber, the PLAAF’s first aircraft capable of conducting strikes on Guam (with air-launched LACMs like the CJ-20), past the first island chain into the western Pacific.

China is also developing new capabilities that will enhance Beijing’s ability to project power. In September 2016, then-PLAAF Commander Gen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the first time that the PLAAF was developing a new long-range bomber that would undoubtedly exceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K. Although the H-6K recently began flying with LACMs, this Chinese-built airframe is the 10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16, which began flying in 1952. In 2016, China and Ukraine agreed to restart production of the world’s largest transport aircraft, the An-225, which is capable of carrying a world-record payload of nearly 254 tons. China expects the first An-225 to be delivered and operational by 2019. If used by the military, this capability would facilitate the PLA’s global reach.

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In addition to land-based aircraft, China is currently building its first domestically designed and produced aircraft carrier.64 The primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission. Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean. The carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 2019.

Other areas that reflect China’s growing military presence abroad include China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Separately, China routinely employs its modern hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR missions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatant evacuation operation, to extricate Chinese and other civilians from Yemen supported by Yemeni security forces.

China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad, such as establishing its first foreign military base in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Road under the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), could enable the PLA to project power at even greater distances from the Chinese mainland. In 2017, China’s leaders said that the BRI, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope of Beijing’s ambition.

Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced presence abroad may lead to an increase in demand for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese personnel. China’s increased presence also introduces the possibility that the PLA could play a more prominent role in delivering global public goods in the future.

Separately, China’s modern naval platforms include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based defenses. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate vicinity will provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, in addition to improving defensive capabilities such as exercising control of SLOCs. Improving bluewater capabilities will extend China’s maritime security buffer to protect China’s near- and far-seas interests more effectively.

China’s current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers will extend air defense umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations in far seas. Sea-based land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas, the PLAN must improve its ability to control land from the sea through development of a long-range LACM.

The PLA’s land-based missile and air forces enable other military assets to focus on conducting offensive missions, such as blockades and sovereignty enforcement, as well as defensive operations farther from China’s shores. China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s ISR capabilities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Photo: Chinese naval escort fleet in the Philippines. (Chinese Ministry of Defense)

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U.S. Moves to Improve Missile Defense

On January 17, President Trump, along with Vice President Pence and Acting Defense Secretary Shanahan announced the release of the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR).

The MDR is the last of four strategic guidance documents that Trump directed the national security establishment to create to guide decision-making on critical defense policy issues.

The focus of the MDR is protection against “emerging and future rogue states’ missile threats.”  It calls for robust regional missile defense for U.S. forces abroad and allies and partners against all potential enemies.

The expanding capabilities of nations such as North Korea and Iran include emerging technologies such as advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons.  The U.S. has, according to defense officials, lagged in keeping up with these developments.

The MDR is geared towards protecting against these threats. According to the Pentagon, “To counter a potential threat from North Korea, it will strengthen the defense of the nation against the ICBMs they’ve developed. Trump has directed a 50 percent increase in homeland defense interceptors — from 44 to 64 — and supporting radars. These interceptors can also defend the homeland against an Iranian ICBM threat should it materialize.”

Developments from Russia and China have also been taken into consideration. Both nations have increasing number and types of short, medium and intermediate- range missiles, to include hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles. The MDR calls for a layered approach that includes integrated air and missile defense, cooperation with allies, increased numbers of missile defense interceptors, and new technologies for intercepting advanced threats. It also states that America should stay ahead of these threats by developing advanced technologies and innovative concepts.

The MDR included six specific steps that should be taken:

 First, 20 new ground-based interceptors are being constructed, which will bring the total to 64. Currently 40 GBIs are at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four are at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

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Second, The Department of Defense (DoD) will focus on developing new missile defense technologies, such as more powerful sensors and radars that will be deployed to detect missile launches and track them so countermeasures can be taken.

Third, measures should be taken to protect all American cities from ballistic missile attacks.  To do this, the DOD will develop an effective missile defense against emerging advanced cruise and hypersonic weapons.

Fourth, greater budget support will be provided to space activities in order to terminate hostile missile launches anyplace across the globe.

Fifth, bureaucratic obstacles that hinder speedy deployment of cutting-edge missile defense technologies will be eliminated.

Sixth, the U.S. will work with allies on missile defense protection, such as prioritizing the sale of American missile defense and technologies so they can be defended as well. The U.S. will also share with them early warning and tracking to detect missile launches.

The Arms Control Association has previously noted that “Upon taking office in 2009, the Obama administration took steps to curtail the Bush administration’s rush to expand the U.S. homeland missile defense footprint… and instead place greater emphasis on regional defense, particularly in Europe. The Obama administration decided to alter its predecessor’s plans for missile defense in Europe, announcing on Sept. 17, 2009, that the United States would adopt a European “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense (EPAA). President Obama’s first Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, also canceled a number of next generation programs, including two designed to intercept missiles during their boost phase, due to “escalating costs, operational problems, and technical challenges.”

Mr. Obama faced a major political embarrassment when, during a conference in South Korea, the former president, not realizing his microphone was on, promised his Russian counterpart that he would “be more flexible” for Moscow on missile defense after his next election.

Photo: Two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors are launched during a successful intercept test. (US Missile Defense Agency Flickr)

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U.S. Anti Missile Defenses: Too Little, Too Late? Part 2

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its report on American anti-missile defenses.

While former Presidents Clinton and Obama worked to halt missile defense, over thirty nations have acquired or seek to acquire ballistic missile technology, noted former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Ramussen.

In 2011, Rasmussen  discussed NATO’s needs for missile defense.

“As we sit here discussing missile defense, some people elsewhere are discussing missile attack.  Over 30 states already have, or are developing, missile technology. These missiles can be fitted with conventional technology, or with weapons of mass destruction.  Some of them can already reach parts of NATO territory.  Others can threaten NATO interests.  And all the time, technology is advancing.  Ranges are increasing. Accuracy and payloads are increasing.  And the number of countries with proven capability is increasing. We cannot ignore these trends.  We cannot afford to have even one of our cities hit.  We cannot take the risk of doing nothing.  Missile threats are real. And our defense must be real…At the same time, this will demonstrate that we will not be coerced or intimidated by proliferation programmes.  This is why NATO needs missile defense.  It is why we agreed that missile defence is a core element of our collective defence.  And it is why we have decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect NATO European populations, territory, and forces.”

The ability to defend against an incoming missile by means other than the threat of launching a counter attack against an aggressor helps eliminate the threat of a nuclear exchange escalating out of control.  Ellen Tauscher,who served as  the State Department’s Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile defense, explained that “it presents an opportunity to put aside the vestiges of cold war thinking and move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.”

The threat comes from both long-range ICBMs and theater-range missiles. Frank Rose, who served as the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of Arms Control, stated that “…The threat from short-, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles is likely to increase both in quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, mobile, and survivable.”
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The rapid and vast upgrading of the Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals, at the same time that America’s deterrent has been allowed to age into unreliability, is also a threat President Obama chose to ignore.

The threat has clearly moved to an imminent stage. The Washington Free Beacon reports that “North Korea could soon have the capacity to launch an attack on Hawaii that would devastate America’s Pacific military bases, accelerating the need for the United States to upgrade missile defenses in the area…Defense officials have warned that North Korea is on the brink of producing an ICBM that could target the United States…Pyongyang has worked for years to improve its missile capabilities, launching an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles in 2016 while conducting its fifth nuclear test in September 2016.”

The United States has some anti-missile capability. According to the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency “Missile defense technology [is] being developed, tested and deployed by the United States … to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges—short, medium, intermediate and long. Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, size and performance characteristics, the Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, ‘layered’ architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets.”

The problem is one of numbers.  Limited by a lack of budgetary support, and in the face of increasingly large threats, America’s capability is not sufficient to meet the expanding threat.

America’s options against North Korea in particular may be growing more limited. The Pukguksong-2 missile tested on February 12 by North Korea utilized solid fuel and was launched from a mobile platform, the BBC notes.  These two facts render the probability of a successful pre-emptive attack on a missile about to be launched highly unlikely. A comprehensive missile defense system, which former Presidents Clinton and Obama worked against, is urgently required.

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U.S. Anti Missile Defenses: Too Little, Too Late?

The New York Analysis of Policy and Budget examines America’s lack of an adequate anti-missile shield, and the imminent threats of an attack. 

The potential of a nuclear missile strike against the United States is a rapidly increasing probability. For decades, the means to defend against that threat have been short-circuited by presidents and politicians who reflexively oppose adequate defense spending

Reuters  reports that North Korean sources claim that they are accelerating their capability to launch nuclear strikes.  Some experts believe the North Koreans may be able to hit the United States. “This includes developing a ‘pre-emptive first strike capability’ and an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), said Choe Myong Nam, deputy ambassador at the North Korean mission to the United Nations in Geneva.”

Unfortunately, despite decades of urging, America has only a limited capability to defend itself against a missile strike.

Thirty-four years ago, President Reagan first announced his “Strategic Defense Initiative,” (SDI) designed to provide an anti-ballistic (ABM) missile shield to protect the U.S. from nuclear attack.  Some historians believe the announcement was at least one factor in the Soviet leadership’s realization that they could not win the Cold War.  The move was resoundingly criticized by left-wing politicians and pundits, who pejoratively labelled the concept “Star Wars.”

SDI was never built, and even less capable systems were only marginally deployed. President Clinton cancelled a follow-up program known as “Brilliant Pebbles” and Barack Obama, first as a U.S. Senator, then as President, did everything possible to defund and even reduce various elements of ABM defenses.  in 2007, then-Senator Obama advocated cutting the anti-ballistic missile program budget by a greater amount than its entire allocated budget.

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Two incidents stand out: Obama’s reversal of U.S. agreements with Eastern European nations to deploy ABM facilities, and his infamous “whisper” caught on an open microphone to Russian leader Medvedev, in which Obama promised that he would further cut U.S. missile defenses after his re-election.

President Obama proclaimed on Sept. 17, 2009, that he was unilaterally stopping the plan. The date he announced this was the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland. The President’s decision infuriated Warsaw’s leaders, who had to expend significant political capital to gain approval from their voters.  The resulting loss of Eastern Europe’s trust in the White House directly led to the Czech Republic’s withdrawal from related agreements.

It is ironic that the media, which has incorrectly criticized President Trump’s attempt to get NATO members to pay their fair share of defense spending as being the alliance, made very little mention of President Obama’s betrayal of agreements with U.S. allies in Eastern Europe.

Moscow continues to develop its ABM capability.  Russian media widely covered the combat-ready status of a new ABM facility in Kaliningrad in late 2011. The Russia and India Report publicationrevealed in 2016 that “Russia plans to overhaul its missile defence system and is developing a state-of-the-art anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence shield… Colonel Andrei Cheburin, speaking on January 23, said Russia’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was being completely overhauled over the past few years. ‘I think that in the near future our country will have a truly ultramodern missile defence system,’ he concluded…In autumn of 2012, Russia’s defence authorities stated that the functional ABM system, the A-135 Amur, was being given a major upgrade. Colonel General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, then chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, told RIA Novosti that the missiles were being replaced with new ones with an improved design. All the other elements of the system, including the detection and tracking components, were also being revamped. The missiles would use launch silos currently mothballed, he added.”

The report concludes tomorrow

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Missile Defense Cut as Threats Expand

The inadequate funding of America’s missile defense program (See the New York Analysis of Policy and Government’s article “Obama Opposes Missile Defense even as Threats Expand) is getting harder to justify.

President Reagan originally championed anti-missile defenses against the vast Soviet arsenal. The potential success of that program—even before significant development began—has been considered by many a factor in the belief by some in the USSR hierarchy that they could no longer compete with the U.S.  After the collapse of the Communist regime, the program seemed unnecessary.  But the meteoric rise of China’s military and the growing missile prowess of North Korea and Iran made the concept again necessary.

And of course, there is Russia.  While the current missile defense program provides no defense against Moscow’s nuclear arsenal which, for the first time in history, is larger than America’s, the Kremlin opposes the existence of this purely defensive effort, without offering any logical reason why it takes such a position. At the same time, it works against international efforts to stop the proliferation of missile technology.  Russia has blocked UN Security Council attempts to oppose Iran’s growing missile program, much the same as China has taken no significant action against North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM efforts, despite its overwhelming influence over Pyongyang.

A recent General Accounting Office  study noted that “According to the Department of Defense (DOD), protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attacks is a critical national security priority.”

The FY2017 Missile Defense Agency budget request of $ 7.5 is considerably smaller than the last pre-Obama budget request of $9.3 billion, and smaller than the FY2016 request of $8.1 billion.  Strangely, as the threat increases, support for protection decreases.

In 2013, National Security expert  Loren Thompson, writing in Forbes,  observed “it is surprising to note how little money the Pentagon spends on missile defense, given the high priority of the dangers it addresses.”

Testifying before Congress in 2015, Vice Admiral J.D. Syring,  USN Director, Missile Defense Agency told the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
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“The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries acquire a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range, incorporating BMD countermeasures, and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate. Space-launch activities involve multistage systems that further the development of technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of 2 reaching Guam and the Aleutian Islands.

“As part of a series of provocations last year, North Korea conducted multiple short- and medium-range ballistic missile launches and threatened to conduct additional longer-range launches. Today it fields hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed to the Republic of Korea and Japan.

“Iran has publicly stated it intends to launch a space launch vehicle as early as this year (2015) that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as such. Iran also has steadily increased its ballistic missile force, deploying next-generation short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new submunition payloads. … Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and improve the range and accuracy of current missile systems, and it has publicly demonstrated the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple rockets and missiles.”

There are implications for America’s allies.

The Jerusalem Post reports that “The timing of the US cuts is regrettable as the capability of missiles developed by both Iran and North Korea is advancing and their production numbers are increasing. According to the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency overall funds earmarked for anti-missile defense will fall in 2017 by a projected 10 percent…Funding for the cooperative Israeli program will be slashed by 60% while funding for the highly effective Iron Dome system faces a 25% cut. This certainly hurts Israel, but these cuts also put South Korea and Japan at risk as those countries face off against an increasingly belligerent and technologically capable North Korea.

“Israel, with American help, has proven the investment in missile defense pays off. It should be clear to the United States and all Americans that in an increasingly dangerous world with missile proliferation rampant it is more important than ever to give our leaders more options to protect our cities and our allies.”

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Defenseless

Poland last week announced that it would develop its own missile defense system, in the wake of America’s failure to move ahead with its own system.

The world continues to nervously wait for the next Iranian advance in nuclear weaponry, and new North Korean missile tests. Defense officials worry about the possibility of terrorists obtaining an atomic bomb.

Despite these valid and significant concerns, the Obama Administration remains reluctant to fully fund an adequate missile defense shield for both the American homeland and our allies. Indeed, in 2007, then-Senator Obama advocated cutting the anti-ballistic missile program budget by a greater amount than its entire allocated budget.

The growing international sophistication in missile technology is represented by the endeavors of Iran, which will launch three domestically made satellites next Spring.  The technology to accomplish this is essentially the same as that necessary to develop ICBMS.  Tehran’s Shabab 3 military missile has a range of almost 2,000 miles, and can strike American allies in the Middle East and Europe.

China continues to accelerate its potent nuclear weapons technology. It recently tested its DF-31A and CSS-4 ICBMs Beijing also has an extensive series of tunnels ideal for masking and protecting its nuclear weaponry.

And, of course, there is Russia.For the first time since the atomic age began, Moscow now has more deployed nuclear weapons than the United States. Indeed, in the realm of tactical nuclear weapons, Moscow has a ten-to-one advantage. In November, The Interpreter publication  analyzed Moscow’s intent to maintain the world’s preeminent nuclear force.

“…nuclear weapons have become the key element of ensuring Russia’s national security and presence in international relations. At the expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry on December 10, Putin detailed the efforts at ‘modernizatsiia’, mentioning that Russia is set to receive 40 advanced and upgraded ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile). This follows a meeting with the leaders of Russia’s strategic missile forces at the end of [October 2013], where plans detailing the deployment of 22 silo based and 18 mobile RS-24 Yars-M ICBMs were discussed. Russia is also conducting snap readiness checks alongside the introduction of new ICBMs.”
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In 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen  discussed NATO’s needs for missile defense.

“As we sit here discussing missile defense, some people elsewhere are discussing missile attack.  Over 30 states already have, or are developing, missile technology. These missiles can be fitted with conventional technology, or with weapons of mass destruction.  Some of them can already reach parts of NATO territory.  Others can threaten NATO interests.  And all the time, technology is advancing.  Ranges are increasing. Accuracy and payloads are increasing.  And the number of countries with proven capability is increasing. We cannot ignore these trends.  We cannot afford to have even one of our cities hit.  We cannot take the risk of doing nothing.  Missile threats are real. And our defense must be real…At the same time, this will demonstrate that we will not be coerced or intimidated by proliferation programmes.  This is why NATO needs missile defense.  It is why we agreed that missile defence is a core element of our collective defence.  And it is why we have decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect NATO European populations, territory, and forces.”

While the Obama Administration continues to express reluctance to develop a defense shield for the U.S., Moscow has never expressed a similar reluctance.  The White House’s priorities is perhaps best exemplified by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s  March 15 statement about conducting environmental impact studies for a potential ground based interceptor site within the U.S.  The Obama Administration decided in 2009 that the missile threat from countries like North Korea wasn’t significant, and mothballed 14 of the 44 antiballistic missile interceptors. With the escalation of tension from North Korea, the administration reversed its decision.  The course correction cost approximately $200 million.

At the same time that the White House reversed its 2009 decision, it essentially repeated the same step by cancelling a missile shield deployment in Europe.  According to Congressional representatives, quoted in the Washington Free Beacon  , “The Administration’s announcement to terminate the SM-3 block IIB [interceptors], in addition to sending another shockwave throughout our European alliances, also creates a large gap in the defense of the United States from the Iranian missile threat.” Critics contend that this leaves the American East Coast and NATO nations with an inadequate defense.

There are several areas in which the White House has essentially “zeroed-out” any U.S. ABM activity.  Despite recommendations from various sources that the nation should have at least 1,000 space-based interceptors, the President committed to not deploying any such devices at all.

The White House funding request for $7.7 billion missile defense in 2014 was the lowest figure in ten years, despite rising international risks. The FY 2015 request will be even lower. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is requesting $7.459 billion in FY 2015.

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National Security Summit Outlines Key Threats

The New York Analysis of Policy & Government covered the recent National Security Action Summit in Washington, D.C. where a worried group of current and former elected officials and military leaders expressed their concern over a variety of problems, including the diminished size of the American military, which is scheduled for further cuts, at a time when Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are racing to expand their armed forces as quickly as possible, and the looming threat of an EMP event destroying the national electrical grid.

Rep. Trent Franks (R-Az.) has been vocal in his support for providing the U.S. and its allies with a viable missile defense shield. He reiterated his belief that “The people of the United States should know beyond a show of a doubt that they are safe from any missile attack that might come their way.”

Frank Gaffney, President of the Center for Security Policy which sponsored the event, emphasized the nation’s vulnerability to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) incident, which can occur through both natural means such as solar activity, or an enemy assault.  An EMP event actually occurred in 1859, when a geomagnetic storm burned out telegraph system throughout Europe and North America.  A similar event could destroy all electrical plants, reservoirs, and transportation facilities throughout modern America. The chance of a naturally occurring event is 12% within the next eight years.  Without the ability to provide food, water, modern medical care or emergency services, the United States could lose a majority of its population.
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Despite the very real possibility of this disaster occurring, the cost to protect the nationwide grid from its devastating effects is quite affordable, in the range of about ten billion dollars.

We will review further results from the Summit in future reports.