Tag: MDA

The New York Analysis concludes its reporting on key provisions of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s just-released report on China’s military power.

Defense-Industrial Base

China’s defense-industrial complex comprises both a military and a state sector governed by the CMC and State Council, respectively, under oversight of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.166 The CMC’s Equipment Development Department oversees weapons planning, research, development, and acquisition (RDA) in conjunction with the military service armament organizations for China’s Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Armed Police, and Coast Guard

The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) is the key organ responsible for overseeing China’s state-owned defense-industrial corporations and enterprises. Twelve SASTIND-subordinatedefense-industrial enterprises conduct RDA and production in six distinct scientific, engineering, and technological domains:

 • Aerospace/missile

 • Naval/maritime

• Aviation

• Ground systems/ordnance

• Electronics

 • Nuclear

 During a speech at an equipment-quality work conference in 2015, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang stressed the need to build a strong defense-industrial base to support military development. Xu emphasized themes of quality, innovation, technology, and improving combat readiness, but also said it would be necessary to strengthen laws, regulations, and accountability within the defense industry to increase quality standards.

The PLA initiated defense-industrial reforms in 2016 that aimed to reduce bureaucracy, develop a more structured RDA and production decisionmaking apparatus, streamline developmental timelines, promote innovation, and institutionalize civil-military integration. Within an industrial context, the latter entails establishing a formal relationship between China’s defense and civilian industrial bases to develop a technologically advanced, domes tically reliant, and internationally relevant defense-industrial complex. Key components of the initiative include the establishment of widely distributed “science cities,” industrial parks, and high-tech zones—most near China’s defense-industrial corporations and commercial industrial centers, large cities, and provincial capitals harboring significant RDA and manufacturing capabilities to facilitate effi – cient logistics and supply. These reforms are expected to be implemented by 2020.

A key emphasis of defense-industrial reforms is developing an innovative military industrial complex capable of delivering cutting-edge technologies to meet future PLA requirements. China’s research and development apparatus is designed to both identify and maximize the utility of emerging and potentially disruptive science and technology for military use. Scientific and technological disciplines with military applications targeted for development include hypersonics; nanotechnology; high-performance computing; quantum Mentioned below are some myths about the impotence along with the original facts.Myth: Impotence can not be curedFact: tadalafil samples This is the first common myth that has been spread most widely in spite of the various medications available to cure it. In fact, opioids have been prescription for ordering viagra respitecaresa.org shown to cause more than 70% of the ED cases. Many erectile dysfunction or ED patients who take respitecaresa.org generic prescription viagra notice a change in blue and gree colors. But, if you are really looking for tangible and long-term real growth of your penile tissues, some pills may lead you to believe that they will be happy only when something specific happens. “I’ll be happy when I get order cialis promoted . . . or when I hit my target” Once these things happen (if they do at all) the feeling of happiness is very fleeting because. communications; space systems; autonomous systems; artificial intelligence; robotics; high-performance turbofan engine design; new, more efficient and powerful forms of propulsion; advanced manufacturing processes (including additive manufacturing/3-D printing); and advanced aerospace quality materials, just to name a few

Underground Facilities

The use of underground facilities for warfighting protection and concealment enhances China’s military capacity, with particular emphasis on protecting C4I functions and missile assets. The PLA maintains a robust, technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program. Given its NFU nuclear policy, China assumes it might have to absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuring that leadership and strategic assets survive.

China determined in the mid-to-late 1980s that it needed to update and expand its military UGF program. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency after China observed U.S. and coalition air operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Balkans in 1999. The resultant emphasis on “winning high-tech battles” precipitated research into advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable, deeply buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort we have detected throughout China for the past decade

Missions Other Than War

The PLA views “nonwar” missions as a component of its readiness preparations, broader military modernization efforts, and military diplomacy. These operations also reflect the PLA’s increasing role beyond China’s borders. In practice, the military shares many of these missions with the People’s Armed Police, China’s largely domestically oriented paramilitary force. China has broadened its participation in UN PKOs since 2008 to support foreign policy and military objectives by improving China’s international image, providing the PLA with operational experience, and opening avenues for intelligence collection. China provides civilian police, military observers, engineers, logistic support specialists, and medical personnel to missions. In 2016, China had more than 3,000 peacekeepers deployed in support of 10 UN missions around the globe—the largest contingent of any permanent member nation of the UN Security Council—and separately committed to establish an additional 8,000-member peacekeeping standby force. China has trained about 500 foreign peacekeepers and has pledged to increase this number to 2,500 in the near future. In August 2017, Beijing announced that China’s first helicopter unit to be deployed to a UN mission area had arrived in Sudan to support the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur. As of 2018, China has more than 2,500 troops, police, and military observers committed to UN missions.

Outlook: Developing a Robust Force

China’s military modernization efforts have followed the broader growth and development of China as a whole. The PLA has made efforts toward reducing corruption, professionalizing training and education, developing a science and technology base for research and development, and organizing the force for effective C2. With its economic and security interests reaching around the globe, Beijing perceives further modernization of the PLA as an imperative for continued stability and security of its growing interests.

During the past decade alone, from counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an expanded military presence in the East and South China Seas, China has demonstrated a willingness to use the PLA as an instrument of national power in the execution of “historic missions” in the new century. Improvements in PLA equipment and capabilities that have focused on generating combat power across the PLA services present Beijing with additional response options as China faces increasing global security concerns. Expected advances in areas such as nuclear deterrence, power projection, cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be critical components of the PLA’s developing capabilities. China also continues to develop capabilities for “nonwar” missions, such as HADR and counterpiracy.

In the coming years, the PLA is likely to grow even more technologically advanced, with equipment comparable to that of other modern militaries. The PLA will acquire advanced fighter aircraft, naval vessels, missile systems, and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China’s shores.

Photo: Coastal missile troops practice using anti-ship missile systems (China Ministry of Defense)

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its coverage of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s just-released report on China’s powerful military.

Nuclear Forces and Weapons

China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike. As part of this, China has long maintained a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China.There is some ambiguity, however, over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply. Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. Nevertheless, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.

China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, intended to ensure the viability of its strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, preci sion strike, and missile defense capabilities. China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness. China maintains nuclear-capable deliv ery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy. As of 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned a nuclear mission, probably with a developmental strategic bomber. The bomber’s deployment would provide China with its first credible nuclear triad of delivery systems dis persed across land, sea, and air—a posture considered since the Cold War to improve sur vivability and strategic deterrence.

PLA writings express the value of a “launch on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decisionmaking processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack. These writings highlight the posture’s consistency with Chi – na’s NFU policy. China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future.84 The PLA is developing a range of technologies to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and hypersonic glide vehicles. In addition, the PLA is likely to continue deploying more sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 pro cesses as growing numbers of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deterrence patrols require the PLA to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force.

China maintains a stockpile of nuclear warheads and continues research on and develop ment and production of new nuclear weapons.  The PLA probably has multiple nuclear war – head designs that are decades old and require routine observation, maintenance, or refurbishment to maintain effectiveness. China’s nuclear weapon design and production orga nization—the China Academy of Engineering Physics—is the key organization in developing and maintaining China’s nuclear force. It employs tens of thousands of personnel, and its scientists are capable of conducting all aspects of nuclear weapon design research, including nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, explosives, and computer modeling China has the required industrial capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium for mil- itary needs. The China National Nuclear Cor poration operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three plants. China probably intends the bulk of its enrichment capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear power industry but could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs. China’s plutonium production reactors probably ceased operation in the 1980s.95 However, China’s reprocessing facilities can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

Biological and Chemical Warfare

China has consistently claimed that it has never researched, produced, or possessed bio logical weapons and would never do so. Beijing says China has researched only defensive biological technology necessary for China’s defense.  China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. It declared the Academy of Military Science’s Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as a biodefense research facility. China regularly and voluntarily submits to confidence-building measures under the BWC. Although China is not a member of the Australia Group, Chi na’s export control regulations have been in line with Australia Group guidelines and control lists since 2002. China’s biotechnology infrastructure is sufficient to produce some biological agents or toxins on a large scale.

China has declared that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes; however, Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997 Beijing also has declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite. In 1998, Beijing published chemical export control regulations consistent with Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) standards. It also has consistently updated its chemical control list to reflect changes made to the Aus tralia Group chemical control list. China contin – ues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as well as its support for the activities conducted by the OPCW. Since acceding to the CWC, China has declared hundreds of dualuse facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars.

China’s chemical infrastructure is sufficient to research, develop, and produce some chemical agents on a large scale.

China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents.116 China has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack.

Entities and individuals in China continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production capabilities.

Space/Counterspace

The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and continues to invest in improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. China uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives. Strategists in the PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions to counter third-party intervention during military conflicts.

China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the research and possible development of satellite jammers and directed-energy weapons, China has probably made progress on kinetic energy weap ons, including the anti-satellite missile system tested in July 2014.China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in December 2015, has an important role in the management of China’s aero – space warfare capabilities. Consolidating the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domain synergy in “strategic frontiers.” The SSF may also be responsible for research, development, testing, and fielding of certain “new concept” weapons, such as directed energy and kinetic energy weapons. The SSF’s space function is primarily focused on satellite launch and operation to support PLA reconnaissance, navigation, and communication requirements.

Space and counterspace capabilities—like missile forces, advanced air and seapower, and cyber capabilities—are critical for China to fight and win modern military engagements. To support various requirements, China has built a vast ground and maritime infrastructure enabling spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.

Satellites

China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for civil and military remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and military intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data.

China pursues parallel programs for military and commercial communications satellites (COMSATs), and owns and operates about 30 COMSATs used for civil, commercial, and military satellite communications. The PLA operates a small number of dedicated military COMSATs.123 China’s civil COMSATs incorpo – rate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manu – factured components, and China produces its military-dedicated satellites domestically.China continues to launch new COMSATs to replace its aging satellites and increase its overall satellite communications bandwidth, capacity, availability, and reliability.

China uses its domestically produced Dong – fanghong-4 (DFH-4) satellite bus—the structure that contains the components of the satellite—for its military COMSATs. Even though early satellites suffered mission-ending or mission-degrading failures, the DFH-4 has become a reliable satellite bus. The PLA and government continue to vigorously support the program and have signed numerous contracts with domestic and international customers for future DFH-4 COMSATs. The DFH-4 bus has also allowed China to position itself as a competitor in the international COMSAT market, orchestrating many contracts with foreign countries to supply on-orbit satellites, ground-control systems, and training.

In 2008, China launched the first Tianlian data-relay satellite of its China Tracking and Data Relay Satellite constellation. As of December 2017, China had four Tianlian data-relay satellites on orbit, allowing China to relay commands and data to and from its satellites even when those satellites were not over Chinese territory.

In 2000, China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system. By 2012, China had established Detoxification is essential to canadian pharmacy for viagra end the adverse effects of the drugs. Increase in Energy & Stamina Natives of Brazil are some of the most cheap viagra in usa active people in the entire world. You can massage the male organ using herbal secretworldchronicle.com cialis on line oils such as lavender, sweet marjoram, and chamomile. With online adult drivers ed cialis buy courses, you can easily fit the course in around work, school and family obligations. a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites and had initiated testing of a global constellation similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). As Beidou satellites continue to be placed in orbit, by 2020 China will complete its global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while maintaining a separate regional constellation providing redundant coverage over Asia.

China owns and operates 10 domestically produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites.128 The China Meteorological Administration supports civilian and military customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts. The newer satellites house almost a dozen all-weather sensors concerning atmospheric conditions as well as maritime terrain data for military and civilian customers. China’s membership in the World Meteorological Organization grants it free access to global meteorological data from the international organization’s 191 members.

Counterspace

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. China is developing antisatellite capabilities, including research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is test – ing dual-use technologies that could be applied to counterspace missions.

China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an antisatellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconaissance…and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as nav – igation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”

Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes

China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight in 2003, when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft, followed by space laboratory Tian – gong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016, respectively. China intends to assemble and operate a permanently inhabited, modular space station capable of hosting foreign pay – loads and astronauts by 2022.

China is the third country to have soft-landed a rover on the Moon, deploying the rover Yutu as part of the Chang’e-3 mission in 2013. China’s Lunar Exploration Program plans to launch the first mission to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2018 (Chang’e-4), followed by its first lunar sample-return mission in 2019 (Chang’e-5).

Space Launch

China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles to support its requirements. The Chang Zheng, or Long March, and Kuaizhou SLVs can launch Chinese spacecraft to any orbit.

Cyberspace

Authoritative PLA writings identify con – trolling the “information domain”—sometimes referred to as “information dominance”—as a prerequisite for achieving victory in a modern war and as essential for countering outside intervention in a conflict. The PLA’s broader concept of the information domain and of infor – mation operations encompasses the network, electromagnetic, psychological, and intelli – gence domains, with the “network domain” and corresponding “network warfare” roughly analogous to the current U.S. concept of the cyber domain and cyberwarfare.

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) may be the first step in the development of a cyber – force by combining cyber reconnaissance, cyberattack, and cyberdefense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control of PLA cyber units. Official pronouncements offer limited details on the organization’s makeup or mission. President Xi simply said during the SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015 that the SSF is a “new-type combat force to maintain national security and [is] an import – ant growth point for the PLA’s combat capabilities.” The SSF probably was formed to consolidate cyber elements of the former PLA General Staff Third (Technical Reconnaissance) and Fourth (Electronic Countermea sures and Radar) Departments and Informati – zation Department.

The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to support military operations in three key areas. First, cyber reconnaissance allows the PLA to collect technical and operational data for intelligence and potential operational planning for cyberattacks because the accesses and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to conduct cyberattacks. Second, the PLA could employ its cyberattack capabilities to establish information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain an adversary’s actions or slow mobilization and deployment by targeting network-based C2, C4ISR, logistics, and commercial activities. Third, cyberwarfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with conventional capabilities during a conflict.

PLA military writings detail the effectiveness of information operations and cyberwarfare in modern conflicts, and advocate targeting an adversary’s C2 and logistics networks to affect the adversary’s ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. One authoritative source identifies an adversary’s C2 system as “the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.”145 China’s cyberwarfare could also focus on targeting links and nodes in an adversary’s mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities in the mobilization and deployment phase.

The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers on charges of hacking into the networks of U.S. companies for commercial gain. Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyberespionage and that the United States fabricated the charges.

Denial and Deception

The PLA uses military deception to reduce the effectiveness of adversaries’ reconnaissance and to deceive adversaries about the PLA’s warfighting intentions, actions, or major targets. PLA tradition emphasizes deception and psychological manipulation to create asymmetric advantages and enable surprise. The PLA has a longstanding doctrine for deception, and claims that it regularly practices deception during training. PLA sources describe military deception as a form of com – bat support, on par with ISR, meteorological support, missile calculation, engineering, and logistic support.

Denial and deception activities include:

 • Concealing and camouflaging.

 • Blending false or misleading military movements with actual deployments and war preparations.

• Employing counterreconnaissance: understanding and evading, jamming, or destroying the whole spectrum of enemy reconnaissance activities against PLA units and facilities.

• Using deceptive maneuvers, psychological ploys, and unorthodox schemes to deceive, confuse, or otherwise manipulate an adversary into a militarily disadvantageous position

Skillfully employed, deception can paralyze an enemy force and achieve decisive results. Options range from no-warning strikes, violent multiaxis strikes, and envelopment to a less ambitious attempt to confuse the adversary regarding the exact timing, nature, direction, or scope of a PLA operation.

Logistics and Defense Industrial Modernization

The PLA’s increased focus on developing the capabilities required to conduct joint operations under “informatized” conditions that began in the 1990s has spurred efforts during the past two decades to develop the PLA’s capacity to supply and sustain its operations. Along these lines, the PLA has taken steps to modernize its defense-industrial base to ensure that the PLA is developing capabilities to meet future mission requirements. Key areas of focus have included civil-military integration, support to joint combat operations, and high-tech weapons development.

Logistics

According to various military officials, the PLA’s logistics system historically has been plagued with inefficiencies that degrade com – bat readiness and restrict its ability to support and sustain modern joint combat operations. Since the late 1990s, the PLA has invested in the modernization of its logistics system, force structure, and supporting infrastructure to enable a transition from a rigid command-directed and manpower-dependent system, rife with corruption. The overarching objective of these reforms is to build a precision logistic support system that is capable of comprehensive, timely, and accurate logistic support to PLA joint operations.

This transformation is dependent on building high-efficiency transportation and warehouse infrastructure, fielding new combat support equipment, integrating comprehensive information systems, and developing a new breed of officer capable of leveraging these capabilities to support rapid mobilization and high-tempo combat operations. For China, logistics modernization also is heavily dependent on the PLA’s ability to leverage the full potential of China’s comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities, ensure peacetime efficiencies, and guarantee a constant state of combat readiness The PLA has made great progress in logistics reform by improving logistics resources and procedures during the past two decades, and enhancing the PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines of communication for large operations (mostly disaster responses and exercises). Since 2016, the PLA has implemented structural reforms to improve command and control, procedural reforms to improve civil-military integration, and oversight mechanisms to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stem from longstanding corrupt practices within the logistics sector. The successful implementation of these measures remains to be seen, given the substantial cultural challenges of executing joint operations and reducing corruption. The extent to which the PLA will be able to sustain external military force projection operations effectively also remains in question because the PLA’s experience is still nascent. Efforts to support the PLA’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, may provide insight into these capabilities.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: A pilot cadet assigned to an aviation brigade under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Harbin Flight Academy gives a thumbs-up gesture in the cockpit of his JL-9 fighter trainer airplane prior to a flight training exercise in mid-January, 2019. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Liu Wei)

On January 15, The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released its report, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, an analysis that examines the core capabilities of China’s military. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government has reviewed the study, and presents the key portions:

Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime, whether foreign or domestic, at times preemptively.

“As China continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests,” said Lt. Gen. Ashley. “With a deeper understanding of the military might behind China’s economic and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world.”

CHINA MILITARY POWER:  Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China has developed nuclear, space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that can reach potential adversaries across the globe.

Although Beijing states that its intent is to serve as a stabilizing force regionally, in practice the PLA’s actions frequently result in increased tensions. Since 2012, Beijing has routinely challenged Tokyo’s Senkaku Island claims in the East China Sea. China’s Coast Guard frequently conducts incursions into the contiguous zone surrounding the islands to further China’s claims, while its Navy operates around the claims to enforce administration. The PLA has expanded and militarized China’s outposts in the South China Sea, and China’s Coast Guard, backed by the PLAN, commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnamese ships in the region.

Examples of incremental improvements to PLA power projection in the region are readily found in annual military exercises and opera tions.60 For instance, in 2015 the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) carried out four exercise training mis sions past the first island chain through the Bashi Channel, the northernmost passage of the Luzon Strait, and through the Miyako Strait closer to Japan. The Miyako Strait flights were 1,500 kilometers from Guam, within range of the PLAAF’s CJ-20 air-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM). Also in 2015, the PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-range bomber, the PLAAF’s first aircraft capable of conducting strikes on Guam (with air-launched LACMs like the CJ-20), past the first island chain into the western Pacific.

China is also developing new capabilities that will enhance Beijing’s ability to project power. In September 2016, then-PLAAF Commander Gen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the first time that the PLAAF was developing a new long-range bomber that would undoubtedly exceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K. Although the H-6K recently began flying with LACMs, this Chinese-built airframe is the 10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16, which began flying in 1952. In 2016, China and Ukraine agreed to restart production of the world’s largest transport aircraft, the An-225, which is capable of carrying a world-record payload of nearly 254 tons. China expects the first An-225 to be delivered and operational by 2019. If used by the military, this capability would facilitate the PLA’s global reach.

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In addition to land-based aircraft, China is currently building its first domestically designed and produced aircraft carrier.64 The primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission. Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean. The carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 2019.

Other areas that reflect China’s growing military presence abroad include China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Separately, China routinely employs its modern hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR missions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatant evacuation operation, to extricate Chinese and other civilians from Yemen supported by Yemeni security forces.

China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad, such as establishing its first foreign military base in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Road under the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), could enable the PLA to project power at even greater distances from the Chinese mainland. In 2017, China’s leaders said that the BRI, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope of Beijing’s ambition.

Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced presence abroad may lead to an increase in demand for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese personnel. China’s increased presence also introduces the possibility that the PLA could play a more prominent role in delivering global public goods in the future.

Separately, China’s modern naval platforms include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based defenses. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate vicinity will provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, in addition to improving defensive capabilities such as exercising control of SLOCs. Improving bluewater capabilities will extend China’s maritime security buffer to protect China’s near- and far-seas interests more effectively.

China’s current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers will extend air defense umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations in far seas. Sea-based land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas, the PLAN must improve its ability to control land from the sea through development of a long-range LACM.

The PLA’s land-based missile and air forces enable other military assets to focus on conducting offensive missions, such as blockades and sovereignty enforcement, as well as defensive operations farther from China’s shores. China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s ISR capabilities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Photo: Chinese naval escort fleet in the Philippines. (Chinese Ministry of Defense)