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Obama Administration Lied to Congress About Helping Iran, Part 2

Yesterday, we reported that the Senate’s Subcommittee on Investigations has found that the Obama Administration lied to both Congress and the media, concerning its attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran.  Today, we examine the Committee’s findings of fact and recommendations.

The curious desperation of the Obama Administration to help Iran was illustrated by the White House move to encourage foreign banks to assist the Tehran regime.  The just-released Report of the Senate’s Permanent SubCommittee on Investigations notes that “The State Department and Treasury Department held at least 200 meetings or ‘roadshows’ around the world to encourage other countries to do business with Iran. Treasury Department officials downplayed any potential future penalties or fines, stating that 95 percent of the time, The Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) sends a warning letter or takes no action. And at least one European regulator who attended an OFAC roadshow, commented that foreign financial institutions felt ‘political pressure’ to conduct business with Iran and Iranian companies. ”

Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System:  MAJORITY REPORT PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings of Fact

(1) Under the JPOA, Iran transferred roughly $13.4 billion in oil revenue assets to restricted accounts overseas. Iran deposited $8.8 billion of that oil revenue in one restricted account at Bank Muscat in Muscat, Oman.

(2) Following Implementation Day for the JCPOA, Iran began to seek the benefits of the deal, including requesting access to assets frozen in restricted accounts. While other countries were free to do business with Iran, primary sanctions by the United States remained in place under the terms of the JCPOA. This meant it continued to be illegal for U.S. persons and entities to do business with Iranian persons and entities.

(3) Iran requested access to the U.S. financial system. Three days after Implementation Day, Bank Muscat contacted OFAC on behalf of the Central Bank of Iran. Bank Muscat sought to convert $5.7 billion in Omai rials into euros on behalf of Iran. Because the rial is pegged to the U.S. dollar, the most efficient conversion was with an intermediary step through a U.S. bank using U.S. dollars. However, other options to convert the rials into euros without using the U.S. dollar existed.

(4) U.S. government officials testified before Congress that Iran was not granted access to the U.S. financial system under the JCPOA. In July 2015, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, under the JCPOA, Iran “will continue to be denied access to the [U.S.’s] financial and commercial market.” Later that same month, the Treasury Department’s Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Adam Szubin, testified to the Senate Banking Committee: “Iranian banks will not be able to clear U.S. dollars through New York, hold correspondent account relationships with U.S. financial institutions, or enter into financing arrangements with U.S. banks.” Ambassador Thomas Shannon from the State Department testified that there would not be an “exchange of dollars inside the U.S. financial system” and that Iran would not have access to the larger U.S. financial system.

(5) The Treasury Department issued a specific license to authorize Iran’s assets at Bank Muscat to be converted to U.S. dollars through the U.S. financial system. On February 24, 2016, OFAC issued a specific license to Bank Muscat authorizing Iranian assets worth roughly $5.7 billion to flow through the U.S. financial system. The Bank Muscat specific license expired on February 28, 2017.

(6) For the duration of the specific license, Bank Muscat was authorized to use the U.S. financial system to convert additional future Iranian deposits, known as “fresh funds.” One Bank Muscat executive wrote this was a “gigantic breakthrough which has assured Iran of almost full global financial inclusion.”

(7) U.S. government officials encouraged two U.S. banks to convert Iran’s rials. Following the issuance of the specific license, OFAC contacted two U.S. banks to convert Iran’s rials to U.S. dollars. A State Department official even suggested that Secretary Kerry or Secretary Lew should contact the U.S. banks and encourage them to facilitate the conversion. Both banks declined to complete the transaction due to compliance, reputational, and legal risks associated with doing business with Iran.

(8) The Senior State Department Official negotiating implementation of the JCPOA understood giving Iran access to the U.S. financial system was prohibited by U.S. sanctions and outside the relief under the JCPOA or JPOA. That official wrote to his Iranian counterpart that the specific license “exceeded” the U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. He continued that the Treasury Department authorized the transaction “as a gesture of support” to Iran.

Hereby what is to be done? Think to yourself levitra tab 20mg robertrobb.com for a moment. A http://robertrobb.com/petersen-denied-the-presumption-of-innocence/ buy generic levitra medicinal drug like Sildenafil Citrate helps improve erection by boosting blood flow. Erectile dysfunction is an inability to retain a satisfactory erection while the sexual levitra on line intercourse. Many women are reluctant or too embarrassed to discuss their medical needs in a levitra overnight public place;- Lower costs, as well as tightens Pubo Coccygeal that enhance your performance in the bed. (9) Treasury Department officials strongly considered issuing a general license authorizing all foreign financial institutions to conduct similar transactions using the U.S. financial system to convert Iranian assets. One official at the National Security Council emailed concerns about linking the general license to the JCPOA. In response, a Treasury Department official disagreed and asserted a general license must be linked to the JCPOA and revoked in the event of a snapback. That general license was never issued once it was evident that U.S. financial institutions did not appear eager to conduct foreign currency exchanges on behalf of Iran. 7

(10) Materials prepared for Treasury Secretary Lew to testify before Congress about the JCPOA suggested he disclose the specific license to Bank Muscat “if pressed.” In his testimony, Secretary Lew did not disclose the specific license authorizing Iran to access the U.S. financial system. In fact, the Treasury Department maintained Iran was not given access to the U.S. financial system, nor was the U.S. government working to give them access.

(11) When the two U.S. correspondent banks declined to convert the funds, other options were considered. The other options considered included Bank Muscat coordinating with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Central Bank of Germany. None of these options were effectuated.

(12) The State Department and Treasury Department held at least 200 meetings or “roadshows” around the world to encourage other countries to do business with Iran. Treasury Department officials downplayed any potential future penalties or fines, stating that 95 percent of the time, OFAC sends a warning letter or takes no action. And at least one European regulator who attended an OFAC roadshow, commented that foreign financial institutions felt “political pressure” to conduct business with Iran and Iranian companies.

(13) Treasury Department officials proactively contacted foreign financial institutions to provide information about the JCPOA’s sanctions relief. In one example, an OFAC compliance officer proactively contacted a foreign financial institution to make sure they “understood Iran sanctions relief.” The communication left the foreign financial institution confused, since that foreign financial institution “had no business with Iran.” (14) Iran’s assets remained at Bank Muscat. Despite issuing the specific license to allow Iran to access the U.S. financial system, Bank Muscat was unable to effectuate the conversion using the U.S. dollar. The State Department indicated Iran converted the funds in small increments using European banks and without accessing the U.S. financial system.

Recommendations

(1) Informed future negotiations with Iran. The current Administration should be aware of the importance of Iran accessing the U.S. financial system in any future negotiations regarding sanctions relief with Iran. The Administration should brief congressional committees of jurisdiction 8 and oversight committees periodically and on request of the status of any future negotiations.

(2) Congress should require the Treasury Department to provide notice of any specific license to Congress. The notice to Congress should be provided to all congressional committees of jurisdiction and oversight committees within a reasonable time prior to the license taking effect. The notice should, at minimum, include a copy of the specific license.

(3) Understand other sanctions relief granted to Iran. The Treasury Department should immediately provide all JPOA and JCPOA related specific licenses and comfort letters to congressional committees of jurisdiction and oversight committees.

(4) Agencies should increase coordination with regard to sanctions. The State and Treasury Departments should closely coordinate when discussing sanctions relief to ensure that State Department policy goals can be properly executed with Treasury Department tools, such as general or specific licenses.

(5) Increased policing of U.S. sanctions policies. OFAC should effectively police U.S. sanctions and ensure the current sanctions regime is properly enforced. OFAC officials should also refrain from telling foreign persons and entities that violations of U.S. sanctions only result in an enforcement action five percent of the time.

Illustration: Pixabay

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Obama Administration Lied to Congress About Helping Iran

A just-released report from the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee reveals that the Obama administration violated existing sanctions on Iran and clandestinely attempted to give that nation unlawful access to America’s financial system. The White House specifically and repeatedly lied to both Congress and the American public about this.

In March 2016, Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Kirk wrote to the Treasury Department to seek clarity on “new reports suggesting the Administration is working to give Iran access to the U.S. financial system or to dollar transactions outside of the U.S. financial system.” The Treasury Department falsely responded in June 2016: “To be clear, the U.S. Department of Treasury is not working on behalf of Iran to enable Iranian access to U.S. dollars elsewhere in the international financial system, nor are we assisting Iran in gaining access to dollar payment systems outside the U.S. financial system. The Administration has not been and is not planning to grant Iran access to the U.S. financial system. Just three months earlier, the same agency issued a specific license for Iran to access to the U.S. financial system and the U.S. dollar.”

Previous to the 2016 deception, in July 2015, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Agreement)  that Iran “will continue to be denied access to the [U.S.’s] financial and commercial market.” Later that same month, the Treasury Department’s Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Adam Szubin, testified to the Senate Banking Committee: “Iranian banks will not be able to clear U.S. dollars through New York, hold correspondent account relationships with U.S. financial institutions, or enter into financing arrangements with U.S. banks.”

Under existing sanctions, it was illegal for any individual, entity, or financial institutions to do business with Iran or parties on behalf of Iran. This ban also included any “U-Turn” transactions—which are transactions by or on behalf of an Iranian bank in which a U.S. bank acted solely as an intermediary to convert one foreign currency into dollars and then to another foreign currency.

The joint dysfunction is treated in a variety of ways buy your doctor must cialis professional cipla OK it. Earlier sildenafil pfizer there was no proper cure to the issue of erectile dysfunction is a serious but common one. Diabetes is a slowly progressive, autoimmune disorder; associated with faulty regulation of order cheap viagra immune system; thus, attacking and destroying insulin production and/or insulin functioning. Purchase named buy viagra line and various IMPOTENCE PROBLEMS relief medication working with safe and sound internet obtaining models when taking advantage of definite prudence in the obtaining plus transport approach. Obama’s clandestine move, which gave license to Bank Muscat to do an end-run around the sanctions, ultimately failed because U.S. banks refused to cooperate. According to the report, they refused “primarily due to the unwillingness to take on the legal and compliance risk posed by the complex conversion, but also reputational concerns in doing business with a comprehensively sanction country like Iran.” Without a willing U.S. correspondent bank, Iran’s assets remained at Bank Muscat. Undeterred by the banks’ appropriate move,  Obama’s Treasury and State Department officials sought other ways to move the funds. Discussions involved coordinating with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Central Bank of Germany. The Report notes that “None of these alternatives were effectuated.”

Officials of the former Administration have refused to comment.

The Report notes that “For 30 years, the United States and its international partners imposed a strict sanctions regime against the Government of Iran to influence Iranian policy. In 2011, the United States and other world powers implemented crippling financial sanctions on Iran in response to the country’s enrichment of uranium and development of nuclear weapons. The sanctions took a toll on the country and its people. The pressure of effective sanctions afforded the United States an opportunity to work to achieve concessions in exchange for sanctions relief. As the United States negotiated with Iran, one important U.S. interest consistently remained off-limits: Iran would not be granted access to either the U.S. financial system or the U.S. dollar. This notwithstanding, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, at the direction of the U.S. State Department, granted a specific license that authorized a conversion of Iranian assets worth billions of U.S. dollars using the U.S. financial system. Even after the specific license was issued, U.S. government officials maintained in congressional testimony that Iran would not be granted access to the U.S. financial system.”

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Illustration: Pixabay

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Iran Nuclear Deal, North Korean talks: The Difference

There is a remarkable contrast between the current state of the North Korean negotiations and the recently decertified Iran Nuclear Agreement.

In August, President Trump threatened the Pyongyang government with “Fire and fury like the world has never seen” in response to its advances in atomic weaponry. Much of the media and the political left reacted to those words with a fit of apoplexy, and predicted something not very short of Armageddon.  The threatening tactic, however, has achieved the desired result.  Before even taking a seat at the bargaining table, Kim Jong-un has returned Americans he had illegally detained, and announced that he would abandon his nuclear efforts. Indeed, journalist have already been invited to a ceremony later this month in which the Hermit Kingdom’s test facilities would be publicly destroyed.

Compare that with Obama’s stance in negotiations with Iran, in which the former administration essentially entered the talks signaling it would grant major concessions before receiving any solid give-backs from Tehran. The result, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), failed to provide any substantive benefit to the United States, except, at best, a delay in Iran’s developing nuclear weapons and some inconvenience caused by the necessity of hiding prior or ongoing research, a fact made startlingly clear by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent revelations.

The flaws in the Iran deal are glaringly obvious. Even if the Mullahs faithfully complied to its provisions, they would still have the right to build atomic bombs within a decade. Additionally, JCPOA did nothing to inhibit Iran’s ICBM development program. In return, Iran received, upfront, vast sums of cash, and an end to sanctions.

Critics of JCPOA note that “JCPOA… merely ‘rents’ Iranian arms control for a limited and defined period, after which Iran will be permitted to have an industrial-scale nuclear program with no limitations on number and type of centrifuges, or on its stockpiles of fissile material, buttressed by the economic benefits obtained through sanctions easing.”

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The concept of American negotiators entering into talks with adversarial powers from a position of strength has, despite its apparent success with North Korea so far, received little support from those more used to Washington’s prior agreement-at-any-price nature. Martin B. Malin and Hui Zhang, wrote in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists “It is not yet clear if the Trump administration has a strategy for negotiating with North Korea. Since the announcement of a possible meeting, much public commentary has focused on the improbability of North Korea ever giving up its nuclear weapons and on the apparent lack of preparedness inside the US administration. There are good reasons to be skeptical about a possible breakthrough. North Korea has spared no effort to develop its nuclear arsenal and missiles. Kim will not give up his arsenal before he is convinced his regime’s security is guaranteed. It is not clear he can be convinced… with few exceptions, there has been almost no US thinking about a negotiating strategy. Incoming national security advisor John Bolton has recently suggested bombing North Korea. Even the most thoughtful analysts have focused almost exclusively on maintaining coercive leverage in the course of negotiations… The United States must come to terms with the possibility that it may need to make peace with North Korea, and take significant steps toward full normalization before Kim Jong-un would ever implement a complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of his nuclear arsenal.”

Malin and Zhang have been proven incorrect, as were the extensive number of critics that decried President Trump’s “fire and fury” comments.

Obama was personally invested in the Iran deal. In essence, he placed his legacy above the needs of the nation.  Trump, despite the political gains he could reap from a North Korea deal, has repeatedly stressed that he is willing to walk away if the talks don’t produce good results, placing him in a far better negotiating position than his predecessor.

Photo: Trump at decertification of JCPOA (White House photo)

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Iranian Missile Threat

The world’s attention is currently focused on North Korea, but Iran should not be ignored due to its weapons program, its support for worldwide terrorism, and its ongoing aggressiveness in the Middle East. The Iran nuclear deal, which only temporarily slowed down Iran’s atomic weapons program, has not affected that nations’ strategic delivery systems development, including both ballistic and cruise missiles.

According to Ian Williams’ report for the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC.) , “Iran has invested significantly in the development of its strategic forces which today includes the region’s largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles, increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles, as well as an array of shorter-ranged anti-ship missiles … Iran has also established the technological basis for a nuclear weapons program. This effort has included a blend of overt activities under the auspices of a civilian nuclear energy program, and covert activities aimed at expanding Iran’s nuclear weapons potential without international blowback…even those with the highest hopes for the long-term efficacy of JCPOA  [Iran nuclear deal]  cannot deny that the agreement entirely neglects significant aspects  of malign Iranian behavior. In fact, mounting evidence suggests that the structure of the nuclear deal, its limitations, and its associated provisions have actually had the opposite of their intended effect, abetting and emboldening Iranian behavior and capabilities that fall outside of the parameters of the JCPOA…nuclear weapons, these forces give Iran the ability to impose significant costs upon the United States and its regional partners should conflict occur. They also provide Iran with a kind of deterrent cover to pursue its malign activities in the region with less perceived risk of direct military confrontation with the United States, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and/or Israel. Such a dynamic could easily to lead to strategic miscalculation and conflict.”

A Fox News report based on a Foundation for Defense of Democracies study revealed that Iran has aggressively pursued its ballistic missile program “since agreeing to the 2015 nuclear deal…Iran has fired some 23 missiles …as many as 16 of them nuclear-capable… the robust missile program shows the Islamic republic is bent on intimidating its enemies and preparing for the day when it can do so with the ultimate weapon of mass destruction.”

A Foreign Policy  analysis notes that  “ According to multiple Directors of National Intelligence, Tehran boasts the Middle East’s biggest ballistic missile arsenal. This poses both a conventional and an unconventional threat, with many missiles exceeding the specifications that make them nuclear capable.”
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Iran is proliferating its missile weaponry. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, has stated  that  “…the Iranian regime’s behavior is growing worse…Its ballistic missiles and advanced weapons are turning up in warzones across the region…In its strongest language yet, the Secretary-General’s report describes violation after violation of weapons transfers and ballistic missile activity.”

Iran is rapidly developing the ability to directly threaten the American homeland. An NTI study notes that “In addition to its missile program, Iran possesses a space launch capability. Iran has successfully launched several satellites aboard its space launch vehicle (SLV) the Safir, with reports of an attempted launch from the new Simorgh SLV. Many have expressed concern over the dual- use capabilities of these systems and their potential application for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

NTI notes that “Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. In 2015, to support implementation of the JCPOA, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231, which called on Iran ‘not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.’ The U.S., U.K., France, and Germany have claimed that Iran’s subsequent ballistic missile tests were ‘inconsistent with’ and ‘in defiance of’ UNSCR 2231, with the U.S. imposing sanctions on Iran in response to its ballistic missile tests, most recently in 2017.”

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Bolton Outlines Plan to Exit Iran Nuke Deal

As the New York Analysis of Policy and Government outlined yesterday, many of the same policy errors that led to the current crisis with North Korea have been repeated in relations with Iran.  The Iran nuclear deal, even if Tehran fully complies with it, will allow the Islamic extremist state, which sponsors worldwide terrorism, to fully develop nuclear weapons within the near future.   Iran, in defiance of U.N. resolutions, and with a history of cooperation with North Korea, is developing the missile technology to launch atomic weapons to targets worldwide. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton believes that “Iran policy should not be frozen. The [Iran nuclear deal] JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] is a threat to U.S. national security interests, growing more serious by the day.” He has outlined a specific proposal  “to decertify and abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.”

We provide Ambassador Boltons’ proposal in its entirety:

I Background:

The Trump Administration is required to certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is complying with the July 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), and that this agreement is in the national security interest of the United States.1 While a comprehensive Iranian policy review is currently underway, America’s Iran policy should not be frozen. The JCPOA is a threat to U.S. national security interests, growing more serious by the day. If the President decides to abrogate the JCPOA, a comprehensive plan must be developed and executed to build domestic and international support for the new policy.

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the President must certify every 90 days:

(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;
(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and
(iv) Suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—
(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and
(II) vital to the national security interests of the United States.

U.S. leadership here is critical, especially through a diplomatic and public education effort to explain a decision not to certify and to abrogate the JCPOA. Like any global campaign, it must be persuasive, thorough and accurate. Opponents, particularly those who participated in drafting and implementing the JCPOA, will argue strongly against such a decision, contending that it is reckless, ill-advised and will have negative economic and security consequences.

Accordingly, we must explain the grave threat to the US and our allies, particularly Israel. The JCPOA’s vague and ambiguous wording; its manifest imbalance in Iran’s direction; Iran’s significant violations; and its continued, indeed, increasingly, unacceptable conduct at the strategic level internationally demonstrate convincingly that the JCPOA is not in the national security interests of the United States. We can bolster the case for abrogation by providing new, declassified information on Iran’s unacceptable behavior around the world.

But as with prior Presidential decisions, such as withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, a new “reality” will be created. We will need to assure the international community that the U.S. decision will in fact enhance international peace and security, unlike the JCPOA, the provisions of which shield Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The Administration should announce that it is abrogating the JCPOA due to significant Iranian violations, Iran’s unacceptable international conduct more broadly, and because the JCPOA threatens American national-security interests.

The Administration’s explanation in a “white paper” should stress the many dangerous concessions made to reach this deal, such as allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium; allowing Iran to operate a heavy-water reactor; and allowing Iran to operate and develop advanced centrifuges while the JCPOA is in effect. Utterly inadequate verification and enforcement mechanisms and Iran’s refusal to allow inspections of military sites also provide important reasons for the Administration’s decision.

Even the previous Administration knew the JCPOA was so disadvantageous to the United States that it feared to submit the agreement for Senate ratification. Moreover, key American allies in the Middle East directly affected by this agreement, especially Israel and the Gulf states, did not have their legitimate interests adequately taken into account. The explanation must also demonstrate the linkage between Iran and North Korea.

We must also highlight Iran’s unacceptable behavior such as its role as the world’s central banker for international terrorism, including its directions and control over Hezbollah and its actions in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The reasons Ronald Reagan named Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 remain fully applicable today.

II Campaign Plan Components

There are four basic elements to the development and implementation of the campaign plan to decertify and abrogate the Iran nuclear deal:

  1. Early, quiet consultations with key playerssuch as the U.K., France, Germany, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, to tell them we are going to abrogate the deal based on outright violations and other unacceptable Iranian behavior, and seek their input.
  2. Prepare the documented strategic casefor withdrawal through a detailed white paper (including declassified intelligence as appropriate) explaining why the deal is harmful to U.S. national interests, how Iran has violated it, and why Iran’s behavior more broadly has only worsened since the deal was agreed.
  3. A greatly expanded diplomatic campaignshould immediately follow the announcement, especially in Europe and the Middle East, and we should ensure continued emphasis on the Iran threat as a top diplomatic and strategic priority.
  4. Develop and execute Congressional and public diplomacy effortsto build domestic and foreign support.

III Execution Concepts and Tactics

  1. Early, quiet consultations with key players

It is critical that a worldwide effort be initiated to inform our allies, partners, and others about Iran’s unacceptable behavior. While this effort could well leak to the press, it is nonetheless critical that we inform and consult with our allies and partners at the earliest possible moment, and, where appropriate, build into our effort their concerns and suggestions.

This quiet effort will articulate the nature and details of the violations, the type of relationship the US foresees in the future, thereby laying the foundation for imposing new sanctions barring the transfer of nuclear and missile technology or dual use technology to Iran. With Israel and selected others, we will discuss military options. With others in the Gulf region, we can also discuss means to address their concerns from Iran’s menacing behavior

The advance consultations could begin with private calls by the President, followed by more extensive discussions in capitals by senior Administration envoys. Promptly elaborating a comprehensive tactical diplomatic plan should be a high priority.

  1. Prepare the documented strategic case

The White House, coordinating all other relevant Federal agencies, must forcefully articulate the strong case regarding U.S. national security interests. The effort should produce a “white paper” that will be the starting point for the diplomatic and domestic discussion of the Administration decision to abrogate the JCPOA, and why Iran must be denied access to nuclear technology indefinitely. The white paper should be an unclassified, written statement of the Administration’s case, prepared faultlessly, with scrupulous attention to accuracy and candor. It should not be limited to the inadequacies of the JCPOA as written, or Iran’s violations, but cover the entire range of Iran’s continuing unacceptable international behavior.

Although the white paper will not be issued until the announcement of the decision to abrogate the JCPOA, initiating work on drafting the document is the highest priority, and its completion will dictate the timing of the abrogation announcement.

A thorough review and declassification strategy, including both U.S. and foreign intelligence in our possession should be initiated to ensure that the public has as much information as possible about Iranian behavior that is currently classified, consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We should be prepared to “name names” and expose the underbelly of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard business activities and how they are central to the efforts that undermine American and allied national interests. In particular, we should consider declassifying information related to activities such as the Iran-North Korea partnership, and how they undermine fundamental interests of our allies and partners.

  1. Greatly expanded diplomatic campaign post-announcement

The Administration, through the NSC process, should develop a tactical plan that uses all available diplomatic tools to build support for our decision, including what actions we recommend other countries to take. But America must provide the leadership. It will take substantial time and effort and will require a “full court press” by U.S. embassies worldwide and officials in Washington to drive the process forward. We should ensure that U.S. officials fully understand the decision, and its finality, to help ensure the most positive impact with their interlocutors.

Our embassies worldwide should demarche their host governments with talking points (tailored as may be necessary) and data to explain and justify abrogating JCPOA. We will need parallel efforts at the United Nations and other appropriate multilateral organizations. Our embassies should not limit themselves to delivering the demarche, however, but should undertake extensive public diplomacy as well.

After explaining and justifying the decision to abrogate the deal, the next objective should be to recreate a new counter-proliferation coalition to replace the one squandered by the previous Administration, including our European allies, Israel, and the Gulf states. In that regard, we should solicit suggestions for imposing new sanctions on Iran and other measures in response to its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, sponsorship of terrorism and generally belligerent behavior, including its meddling in Iraq and Syria.

Russia and China obviously warrant careful attention in the post-announcement campaign. They could be informed just prior to the public announcement as a courtesy, but should not be part of the pre-announcement diplomatic effort described above. We should welcome their full engagement to eliminate these threats, but we will move ahead with or without them.

Iran is not likely to seek further negotiations once the JCPOA is abrogated, but the Administration may wish to consider rhetorically leaving that possibility open in order to demonstrate Iran’s actual underlying intention to develop deliverable nuclear weapons, an intention that has never flagged.

In preparation for the diplomatic campaign, the NSC interagency process should review U.S. foreign assistance programs as they might assist our efforts. The DNI should prepare a comprehensive, worldwide list of companies and activities that aid Iran’s terrorist activities.

  1. Develop and execute Congressional and public diplomacy efforts

The Administration should have a Capitol Hill plan to inform Members of Congress already concerned about Iran, and develop momentum for imposing broad sanctions against Iran, far more comprehensive than the pinprick sanctions favored under prior Administrations. Strong congressional support will be critical. We should be prepared to link Iranian behavior around the world, including its relationship with North Korea, and its terrorist activities. And we should demonstrate the linkage between Iranian behavior and missile proliferation as part of the overall effort that justifies a national security determination that US interests would not be furthered with the JCPOA.

Unilateral US sanctions should be imposed outside the framework of Security Council Resolution 2231 so that Iran’s defenders cannot water them down; multilateral sanctions from others who support us can follow quickly.

The Administration should also encourage discussions in Congress and in public debate for further steps that might be taken to go beyond the abrogation decision. These further steps, advanced for discussion purposes and to stimulate debate should collectively demonstrate our resolve to limit Iran’s malicious activities and global adventurism. Some would relate directly to Iran; others would protect our allies and partners more broadly from the nuclear proliferation and terrorist threats, such as providing F-35s to Israel or THAAD resources to Japan. Other actions could include:

  • End all landing, docking rights for all Iranian aircraft and ships at key allied ports;
  • End all visas for Iranians, including so called “scholarly,” student, sports or other exchanges;
  • Demand payment w/set deadline on outstanding US federal court judgments against Iran for terrorism, including 9/11;
  • Announce U.S. support for the democratic Iranian opposition
  • Expedite delivery of bunker-buster bombs;
  • Announce U.S. support for Kurdish national aspirations, including Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria
  • Provide assistance to Balochis, Khuzestan Arabs, Kurds, others – also to internal resistance among labor unions, students, women’s groups
  • Actively organize opposition to Iranian political objectives in the UN

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IV Conclusion

This effort should be the Administration’s highest diplomatic priority, commanding all necessary time, attention and resources. We can no longer wait to eliminate the threat posed by Iran. The Administration’s justification of its decision will demonstrate to the world that we understand the threat to our civilization; we must act and encourage others to meet their responsibilities as well.

 

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Iran and North Korea: Two Sides of the Same Nuclear Crisis

The North Korean nuclear missile crisis, and the threat of Iran’s current advanced missiles and, due to the limitations of the Iran nuclear deal, the near future possession of atomic weapons may be two sides of the same dilemma.

A Congressional Research Service report has revealed that:  “…ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful…Iran has developed a close working relationship with North Korea on many ballistic missile programs, starting with acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the 1980s…In 1992 testimony, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates identified Iran and Syria as recipients of North Korean Scud missiles. In 1993, then-DCI R. James Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had sold … Iran extended range Scud C missiles and apparently agreed to sell other forms of missile technology. .. North Korea’s ongoing export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase in capabilities to countries such as Iran. Second, Iran was using North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium range ballistic missiles. Third, Iran’s acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related components, including potentially significant inputs of space launch vehicle technology and support, could significantly improve Iran’s ability to produce an ICBM. In the latter 2000s, the IC continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran’s ballistic missile programs was ongoing and significant…Iran has likely exceeded North Korea’s ability to develop, test, and build ballistic missiles. But Tehran may, to some extent, still rely on Pyongyang for certain materials for producing Iranian ballistic missiles.”

A Strategic Sentinel study first reported by the Voice of America noted that “…reviews of satellite images suggest North Korea may possess another missile launching site at a village once suspected of having nuclear facilities. The images… exposed a missile silo in mountainous Geumchang-ri, North Pyongan province, where the U.S. intelligence community said in the late 1990s there was a nuclear weapons site…The silo, an underground chamber used for storing and firing missiles, seems analogous to the one at a missile base in Tabriz, Iran…”

Another plant that is in use in the manifesting world. tadalafil super active This gland is responsible for the secretion of a milky white alkaline fluid that constitutes around 30% of them suffered from or had experienced PE at some tadalafil in canada point in their lives. For anyone who has a faltering sex drive, premenstrual symptoms, low sperm counts, menopause, infertility, and any similar symptoms are encouraged to seek a sex tadalafil cheapest therapist that can medically help you through treatment. The purpose in generic levitra pills considering these is to shed some light on the drugs and how they work. North Korea’s nuclear threat, the result of decades of U.S. neglect and appeasement, has grown into a crisis that has Washington scrambling to determine a meaningful response. The Iran nuclear deal has laid the groundwork for precisely the same problem with that nation in the very near future.

In April, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson stated: “Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a grave risk to international peace and security… With its latest test of a medium-range ballistic missile, Iran’s continued development and proliferation of missile technology is in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. nd it has previously stated it will conduct a second test flight of the Simorgh space-launch vehicle, which would put it closer to an operational intercontinental ballistic missile.Any discussion of Iran is incomplete without mentioning the JCPOA. [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] The JCPOA fails to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran; it only delays their goal of becoming a nuclear state. This deal represents the same failed approach of the past that brought us to the current imminent threat we face from North Korea. The Trump administration has no intention of passing the buck to a future administration on Iran. The evidence is clear. Iran’s provocative actions threaten the United States, the region, and the world.”

In July, the Jerusalem Post  stated that “German intelligence reports emerged in June and July revealing the Iranian regime’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile technology in defiance of international sanctions and UN resolutions… According to the German state of Hamburg’s intelligence agency: ‘there is no evidence of a complete about-face in Iran’s atomic polices in 2016’ [after the Islamic Republic signed the JCPOA accord with world powers in 2015, designed to curb Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief]. Iran sought missile carrier technology necessary for its rocket program.”