The President’s decision to allow 8,400 U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan until next year is a recognition of the extraordinary harm that would result if the mistake he made in Iraq is repeated.
Mr. Obama’s total withdrawal of all U.S. troops in Iraq led to the disaster in Iraq, the rise of ISIS, general turmoil throughout the Middle East, and an escalation of worldwide terrorism. The result of withdrawing from Afghanistan while the Taliban is increasingly resurgent would be equally devastating.
While American troops could not remain in Afghanistan indefinitely, progress achieved before the current administration has been jeopardized by a series of poor decisions by the Obama Administration, including the opening of negotiations with the Taliban in violation of long-standing American policy of not negotiating with terrorists, and, against military advice, the announcement of a withdrawal date. The Obama White House has clearly renounced the goals candidate Obama announced “This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaida would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting; this is a – this is fundamental to the defense of our people.”
While the decision is appropriate, it may not be sufficient.
Off the record conversations by the New York Analysis with individuals who have been part of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan have indicated that during the Obama presidency the fight against the Taliban has been plagued by shortages of equipment, the forced layoffs of key officers, and the general reduction of funding for the U.S. military.
In 2014, notes the BBC, Taliban leaders declared “victory” as NATO withdrew its (mostly American) forces, leaving only a residual training force. The potential to reduce the Taliban to relative impotence was eliminated in 2012, when America abandoned its policy of not negotiating with terrorists and the White House outlined a policy goal that discarded the prior Administration’s reasoning for entering into the conflict in the first place.
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A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) study notes that the “Taliban has seized swaths of rural Afghanistan in such provinces as Helmand, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, and Kunduz. Over the past year, Taliban forces have also conducted several offensives against district and provincial capitals. In September 2015, for example, the northern city of Kunduz temporarily fell to the Taliban before being retaken by government forces.”
Clearly, the CFR notes, more than just a diminished commitment to victory by Washington is to blame for the reversal of fortunes. “[T]he effectiveness of the National [Afghan] Unity Government continues to be undermined by poor governance and internal friction between President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah, and their supporters.”
The Taliban resurgence could be halted through greater U.S. emphasis on fulfilling original goals such as insuring fair elections, and economic development of areas beyond the Taliban’s control. But a military option—similar to the 2007 “surge” in Iraq that produced outstanding results (which were destroyed as a result of the Obama pullout) remains the most important. The 8,400 troops will not accomplish that goal. It prevents an immediate disaster but leaves the hard decision-making to the next President.
The CFR study suggests that “The United States could halt further reductions—or even increase—the number and type of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. These forces can train, advise, assist, and accompany Afghan forces and conduct direct-action missions; supplement Afghan forces with more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enablers; and increase close air support. The United States could also broaden U.S. counterterrorism legal authorities to proactively target the Taliban and Haqqani network. At the moment, U.S. forces can only target al-Qaeda and ISIL-KP operatives in Afghanistan, except in situations where extremists are plotting attacks against U.S. or other international forces or during in extremis cases where the Afghan government requests U.S. aid. The United States could also increase the authority for U.S. forces, particularly conventional forces, to train Afghans below the corps level.”
It is fully understandable that after so long the American public would be weary of the effort in Afghanistan. But the results of a Taliban resurgence should also be realized. The Taliban played a key role in the 9/11 attacks, and would commit vast new resources if power is regained in Afghanistan. The influence that would be gained in neighboring Pakistan would be dramatic. A complete takeover of that government would give the terrorists access to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.