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Bolton Outlines Plan to Exit Iran Nuke Deal

As the New York Analysis of Policy and Government outlined yesterday, many of the same policy errors that led to the current crisis with North Korea have been repeated in relations with Iran.  The Iran nuclear deal, even if Tehran fully complies with it, will allow the Islamic extremist state, which sponsors worldwide terrorism, to fully develop nuclear weapons within the near future.   Iran, in defiance of U.N. resolutions, and with a history of cooperation with North Korea, is developing the missile technology to launch atomic weapons to targets worldwide. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton believes that “Iran policy should not be frozen. The [Iran nuclear deal] JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] is a threat to U.S. national security interests, growing more serious by the day.” He has outlined a specific proposal  “to decertify and abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.”

We provide Ambassador Boltons’ proposal in its entirety:

I Background:

The Trump Administration is required to certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is complying with the July 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), and that this agreement is in the national security interest of the United States.1 While a comprehensive Iranian policy review is currently underway, America’s Iran policy should not be frozen. The JCPOA is a threat to U.S. national security interests, growing more serious by the day. If the President decides to abrogate the JCPOA, a comprehensive plan must be developed and executed to build domestic and international support for the new policy.

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the President must certify every 90 days:

(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;
(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and
(iv) Suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—
(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and
(II) vital to the national security interests of the United States.

U.S. leadership here is critical, especially through a diplomatic and public education effort to explain a decision not to certify and to abrogate the JCPOA. Like any global campaign, it must be persuasive, thorough and accurate. Opponents, particularly those who participated in drafting and implementing the JCPOA, will argue strongly against such a decision, contending that it is reckless, ill-advised and will have negative economic and security consequences.

Accordingly, we must explain the grave threat to the US and our allies, particularly Israel. The JCPOA’s vague and ambiguous wording; its manifest imbalance in Iran’s direction; Iran’s significant violations; and its continued, indeed, increasingly, unacceptable conduct at the strategic level internationally demonstrate convincingly that the JCPOA is not in the national security interests of the United States. We can bolster the case for abrogation by providing new, declassified information on Iran’s unacceptable behavior around the world.

But as with prior Presidential decisions, such as withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, a new “reality” will be created. We will need to assure the international community that the U.S. decision will in fact enhance international peace and security, unlike the JCPOA, the provisions of which shield Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The Administration should announce that it is abrogating the JCPOA due to significant Iranian violations, Iran’s unacceptable international conduct more broadly, and because the JCPOA threatens American national-security interests.

The Administration’s explanation in a “white paper” should stress the many dangerous concessions made to reach this deal, such as allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium; allowing Iran to operate a heavy-water reactor; and allowing Iran to operate and develop advanced centrifuges while the JCPOA is in effect. Utterly inadequate verification and enforcement mechanisms and Iran’s refusal to allow inspections of military sites also provide important reasons for the Administration’s decision.

Even the previous Administration knew the JCPOA was so disadvantageous to the United States that it feared to submit the agreement for Senate ratification. Moreover, key American allies in the Middle East directly affected by this agreement, especially Israel and the Gulf states, did not have their legitimate interests adequately taken into account. The explanation must also demonstrate the linkage between Iran and North Korea.

We must also highlight Iran’s unacceptable behavior such as its role as the world’s central banker for international terrorism, including its directions and control over Hezbollah and its actions in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The reasons Ronald Reagan named Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 remain fully applicable today.

II Campaign Plan Components

There are four basic elements to the development and implementation of the campaign plan to decertify and abrogate the Iran nuclear deal:

  1. Early, quiet consultations with key playerssuch as the U.K., France, Germany, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, to tell them we are going to abrogate the deal based on outright violations and other unacceptable Iranian behavior, and seek their input.
  2. Prepare the documented strategic casefor withdrawal through a detailed white paper (including declassified intelligence as appropriate) explaining why the deal is harmful to U.S. national interests, how Iran has violated it, and why Iran’s behavior more broadly has only worsened since the deal was agreed.
  3. A greatly expanded diplomatic campaignshould immediately follow the announcement, especially in Europe and the Middle East, and we should ensure continued emphasis on the Iran threat as a top diplomatic and strategic priority.
  4. Develop and execute Congressional and public diplomacy effortsto build domestic and foreign support.

III Execution Concepts and Tactics

  1. Early, quiet consultations with key players

It is critical that a worldwide effort be initiated to inform our allies, partners, and others about Iran’s unacceptable behavior. While this effort could well leak to the press, it is nonetheless critical that we inform and consult with our allies and partners at the earliest possible moment, and, where appropriate, build into our effort their concerns and suggestions.

This quiet effort will articulate the nature and details of the violations, the type of relationship the US foresees in the future, thereby laying the foundation for imposing new sanctions barring the transfer of nuclear and missile technology or dual use technology to Iran. With Israel and selected others, we will discuss military options. With others in the Gulf region, we can also discuss means to address their concerns from Iran’s menacing behavior

The advance consultations could begin with private calls by the President, followed by more extensive discussions in capitals by senior Administration envoys. Promptly elaborating a comprehensive tactical diplomatic plan should be a high priority.

  1. Prepare the documented strategic case

The White House, coordinating all other relevant Federal agencies, must forcefully articulate the strong case regarding U.S. national security interests. The effort should produce a “white paper” that will be the starting point for the diplomatic and domestic discussion of the Administration decision to abrogate the JCPOA, and why Iran must be denied access to nuclear technology indefinitely. The white paper should be an unclassified, written statement of the Administration’s case, prepared faultlessly, with scrupulous attention to accuracy and candor. It should not be limited to the inadequacies of the JCPOA as written, or Iran’s violations, but cover the entire range of Iran’s continuing unacceptable international behavior.

Although the white paper will not be issued until the announcement of the decision to abrogate the JCPOA, initiating work on drafting the document is the highest priority, and its completion will dictate the timing of the abrogation announcement.

A thorough review and declassification strategy, including both U.S. and foreign intelligence in our possession should be initiated to ensure that the public has as much information as possible about Iranian behavior that is currently classified, consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We should be prepared to “name names” and expose the underbelly of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard business activities and how they are central to the efforts that undermine American and allied national interests. In particular, we should consider declassifying information related to activities such as the Iran-North Korea partnership, and how they undermine fundamental interests of our allies and partners.

  1. Greatly expanded diplomatic campaign post-announcement

The Administration, through the NSC process, should develop a tactical plan that uses all available diplomatic tools to build support for our decision, including what actions we recommend other countries to take. But America must provide the leadership. It will take substantial time and effort and will require a “full court press” by U.S. embassies worldwide and officials in Washington to drive the process forward. We should ensure that U.S. officials fully understand the decision, and its finality, to help ensure the most positive impact with their interlocutors.

Our embassies worldwide should demarche their host governments with talking points (tailored as may be necessary) and data to explain and justify abrogating JCPOA. We will need parallel efforts at the United Nations and other appropriate multilateral organizations. Our embassies should not limit themselves to delivering the demarche, however, but should undertake extensive public diplomacy as well.

After explaining and justifying the decision to abrogate the deal, the next objective should be to recreate a new counter-proliferation coalition to replace the one squandered by the previous Administration, including our European allies, Israel, and the Gulf states. In that regard, we should solicit suggestions for imposing new sanctions on Iran and other measures in response to its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, sponsorship of terrorism and generally belligerent behavior, including its meddling in Iraq and Syria.

Russia and China obviously warrant careful attention in the post-announcement campaign. They could be informed just prior to the public announcement as a courtesy, but should not be part of the pre-announcement diplomatic effort described above. We should welcome their full engagement to eliminate these threats, but we will move ahead with or without them.

Iran is not likely to seek further negotiations once the JCPOA is abrogated, but the Administration may wish to consider rhetorically leaving that possibility open in order to demonstrate Iran’s actual underlying intention to develop deliverable nuclear weapons, an intention that has never flagged.

In preparation for the diplomatic campaign, the NSC interagency process should review U.S. foreign assistance programs as they might assist our efforts. The DNI should prepare a comprehensive, worldwide list of companies and activities that aid Iran’s terrorist activities.

  1. Develop and execute Congressional and public diplomacy efforts

The Administration should have a Capitol Hill plan to inform Members of Congress already concerned about Iran, and develop momentum for imposing broad sanctions against Iran, far more comprehensive than the pinprick sanctions favored under prior Administrations. Strong congressional support will be critical. We should be prepared to link Iranian behavior around the world, including its relationship with North Korea, and its terrorist activities. And we should demonstrate the linkage between Iranian behavior and missile proliferation as part of the overall effort that justifies a national security determination that US interests would not be furthered with the JCPOA.

Unilateral US sanctions should be imposed outside the framework of Security Council Resolution 2231 so that Iran’s defenders cannot water them down; multilateral sanctions from others who support us can follow quickly.

The Administration should also encourage discussions in Congress and in public debate for further steps that might be taken to go beyond the abrogation decision. These further steps, advanced for discussion purposes and to stimulate debate should collectively demonstrate our resolve to limit Iran’s malicious activities and global adventurism. Some would relate directly to Iran; others would protect our allies and partners more broadly from the nuclear proliferation and terrorist threats, such as providing F-35s to Israel or THAAD resources to Japan. Other actions could include:

  • End all landing, docking rights for all Iranian aircraft and ships at key allied ports;
  • End all visas for Iranians, including so called “scholarly,” student, sports or other exchanges;
  • Demand payment w/set deadline on outstanding US federal court judgments against Iran for terrorism, including 9/11;
  • Announce U.S. support for the democratic Iranian opposition
  • Expedite delivery of bunker-buster bombs;
  • Announce U.S. support for Kurdish national aspirations, including Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria
  • Provide assistance to Balochis, Khuzestan Arabs, Kurds, others – also to internal resistance among labor unions, students, women’s groups
  • Actively organize opposition to Iranian political objectives in the UN

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IV Conclusion

This effort should be the Administration’s highest diplomatic priority, commanding all necessary time, attention and resources. We can no longer wait to eliminate the threat posed by Iran. The Administration’s justification of its decision will demonstrate to the world that we understand the threat to our civilization; we must act and encourage others to meet their responsibilities as well.

 

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Iran: a growing international danger

Last week, the New York Analysis of Policy & Government reported on its exclusive interview with Reza Khalili on the growing danger from Iran in the western hemisphere, emphasized by this month’s assassination of an Argentinian  prosecutor who was about to present evidence of Iranian involvement in the 1992 bombing of an Israeli embassy.

The Argentinian incident was not isolated. Iran has used its proxy, Hezbollah, to conduct international terrorist activities. The Atlantic publication  in a 2014 report noted that in 2012 “Hezbollah operatives murdered six people—five tourists and their bus driver—and wounded many more in a bus bombing at the airport in Burgas, Bulgaria. The incident brought global attention to the extent of the group’s operations in Europe, far afield of its traditional home base of Lebanon, where it was founded with a mission to fight Israel. But today, despite a European Union ban on the group’s military wing, Hezbollah is just as strong on the continent as it was two years ago.”

The Center for Security Policy’s Menges Hemispheric Report Project reports that the Argentina-Iran issue is a symptom of a wider problem.

“… Iran continues to mislead the entire world with its public willingness to dialogue over its nuclear program. Likewise, the Iranians have refused, so far, to even acknowledge that they are trying to develop a military nuclear capability. Nobody would have seriously thought that the Iranians were going to acknowledge their role in the terrorist attacks in Argentina or agree to extradite those accused by the Argentinean justice ministry of having been complicit in the attack. Entertaining those thoughts is particularly ridiculous when the current Iranian Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi is one of the accused. Furthermore, Mr. Vahidi, by virtue of his own position, has control over Iran’s regular armed forces, and, most importantly, the Revolutionary Guards, who at the same time oversee Iran’s terrorist operations abroad…”

It is clear that Iran’s military threat is not restricted to the Middle East. Several years ago, former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta noted that Tehran was actively developing Latin America as a base for anti-U.S. activities.  Before departing to a visit to Colombia, [then] Defense Secretary Panetta noted that “We always have a concern about, in particular, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and [their] efforts to expand their influence not only throughout the Middle East but also into this region…that relates to expanding terrorism.” In testimony before Congress in 2012, Southern Command Commander USAF General Douglas Fraser stated “Iran is very engaged in Latin America…they are seeing an opportunity with some of the anti-U.S.-focused countries within the region…”

  Rep. Jeff Duncan’s (R-SC) bill  –the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012“– was reported out by Congress’s House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2012. The measure was a successful attempt to force the Obama Administration to note the very real danger now presented by the Islamic Republic’s aggressive and rapidly growing military and diplomatic threat in Latin America. The legislation passed the House and Senate and was signed into law   by the President, but it remains unclear what substantive steps have been since taken.

     The legislation noted that Iran has:

  • Used its terrorist Hezbollah proxy force in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, to gain influence and power;
  • Built numerous  “cultural centers” and overstaffed embassies to assist its covert goals; and
  • Supported the activities of the terrorist group Hamas in South America.

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The bill specified that Iran is complicit in numerous dangerous unlawful activities in addition to military threats, including drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged travel documents, intellectual property pirating, and providing havens for criminals and other terrorists.

It also noted that sophisticated narco-tunneling techniques used by Hezbollah in Lebanon have been discovered along the U.S.-Mexican border, and Mexican gang members with Iranian-related tattoos have been captured.

    Evidence of Iran’s increasing boldness could be seen in the thwarted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, Adel al-Jubeir.

 A Growing Military Threat

   Some disagree with the extent of the threat posed by Iran. Several years ago, Vice President Biden stated that “I guarantee you Iran will not be able to pose a hemispheric threat to the United States.” That, however, appears to be a minority opinion.

  Reports from around the world have noted Tehran’s growing military presence in the Western Hemisphere.  Germany’s Die Welt described the Islamic Republic’s construction of intermediate range missile launch pads on Venezuela’s Paraguana Peninsula.

The Foundry’s Peter Brookes discloses that in return for economic favors, several South American nations, including Venezuela, Brazil, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador have been supportive of Tehran in diplomatic forums.

The threat is not confined to low-level tactics.  There is mounting concern that both nuclear and ballistic missile threats are emerging from Venezuelan-Iranian cooperation.

  The Tehran/Caracas axis, originally encouraged by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, is particularly troubling.  Brookes reported that the two nations have a Memorandum of Understanding “pledging full military support and cooperation that likely increases weapons sales. One could easily see Tehran using Caracas as a stepping off point for attacking U.S. or other (e.g. Israeli) interests in this hemisphere or even the American homeland, especially if action is taken against Iran’s nuclear program.”  Brookes goes on to note that “There is concern that Iran and Venezuela are already cooperating on some nuclear issues.  There have been reports that Iran may be prospecting for uranium ore in Venezuela, which could aid both countries’ nuclear programs, should Caracas proceed…  While still prospective, of course, there is the possibility that Tehran, which has an increasingly capable missile program, could sell or help Caracas develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching American shores.”

 Iran’s interest in Latin America entails both its goals of threatening the United States and enhancing its nuclear capability.  In his testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Ilan Berman stressed Iran’s need for uranium ore.

 “Iran’s indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be limited and mostly of poor quality…Cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between the Islamic Republic and the Chavez Regime.  Iran is currently known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela’s border with Guyana.  Significantly, that geologic area is believed to be analogous to Canada’s Athabasca Basin, the world’s largest deposit of uranium.”

He notes that Iran “boasts an increasingly robust paramilitary presence in the region.  The Pentagon, in its 2010 report to Congress on Iran’s military power, noted that the Qods force, the elite paramilitary unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, is now deeply involved in the Americas, stationing ‘operatives in foreign embassies, charities and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building  on socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia Diaspora,’ and even carrying on ‘paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes.”

 Skirting international sanctions is also a key interest for Tehran. Despite mounting evidence, however, Berman notes that Washington has “done little concrete to respond to it…a comprehensive strategy to contest and dilute Iranian influence in the Americas remains absent.  Unless and until such a strategy does emerge, Iran’s efforts-and the threats posed by them to American interests and the U.S. homeland-will only continue to expand.”

But is Iran truly prepared to attack the United States from Latin America?  The Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, appears to believe so.  He has testified before the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere that “Iranian officials…are now more willing to conduct an attack on the United States.”

Roger F. Noriega, the former ambassador to the Organization of American States and former Assistant Secretary of State, notes that “Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime’s intention to carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States and Europe.” As a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Noriega continues his review of Latin American issues. Through his ongoing research, he has concluded that:

  •  “Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle against U.S. security and to abet Iran’s illicit nuclear program. Their clandestine activities pose a clear and present danger to regional peace and security.
  • Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon systems capable of attacking the United States and our allies in the region.
  • Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures in Venezuela as means to launder money and evade international financial sanctions.
  • Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador and other countries in the region and is conducting suspicious mining operations in some uranium-rich areas.Two terrorist networks – one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.
  • Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in South America as a means of raising resources and sharing tactics.
  • The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran – providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narco-traffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband and other materiel.”

During his interview on the Vernuccio/Novak Report, Kahlili warned that Iran’s leadership was more dangerous than the west realized.  An objective review of the facts indicate that he is correct. In addition to its imminent nuclear capability, it has been reported by the Washington Free Beacon  that Iran would test its intercontinental missile prowess this year.