Chinese Military Power 2018

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its summary of the The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual examination of China’s military power. The second part of key sections of the Executive Summary is provided, below.

THE U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEXT

The 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recognize the growing trend of military competition in a dynamic security environment. The United States will continue to seek areas of cooperation with competitors, while preserving the ability to compete successfully from a position of strength. The United States seeks a constructive and results- oriented relationship with China. U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2017 were designed to support overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China. They are carefully tailored to clarify and develop areas of cooperation where it is in our mutual interest and to manage and reduce risk; contacts are also conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

While the Department of Defense engages substantively with the People’s Liberation Army, DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt to China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization. The United States will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and operational concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the homeland, deter aggression, protect our allies and partners, and preserve regional peace, prosperity, and freedom.

SPECIAL TOPIC: OVERWATER BOMBER OPERATIONS

The PLA has long been developing air strike capabilities to engage targets as far away from China as possible. Over the last three years, the PLA has rapidly expanded its overwater bomber operating areas, gaining experience in critical maritime regions and likely training for strikes against U.S. and allied targets. The PLA may continue to extend its operations beyond the first island chain, demonstrating the capability to strike U.S. and allied forces and military bases in the western Pacific Ocean, including Guam. Such flights could potentially be used as a strategic signal to regional states, although the PLA has thus far has not been clear what messages such flights communicate beyond a demonstration of improved capabilities.

Western Pacific. PLA aircraft first operated beyond the first island chain in 2013, when a PLAN ASCM- capable H-6G bomber transited through the Bashi Channel; however, the H-6G bomber lacks the range and endurance to patrol the western Pacific Ocean effectively and strike key U.S. and allied facilities. China began to field the longer-range H-6K bomber in 2013, incorporating cruise missile pylons to turn the bomber into a stand-off strike platform. The H-6K’s capabilities provided the PLAAF an offensive strike capability against Guam with LACMs.
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The PLAAF began flying the H-6K past the First Island Chain into the western Pacific Ocean in 2015, alternating transits through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel and flying within LACM range of Guam. In 2016, the PLAAF improved its capabilities by adding AWACS and fighter aircraft to its bomber flight packages to provide defensive counter-air protection of the bombers beyond the first island chain.

In 2016, the PLAAF also circumnavigated Taiwan for the first time by passing through both the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel in the same mission, and significantly increased the number of circumnavigation missions in 2017. In addition to long-range flight plans, future H-6 missions may also target Taiwan. Depending on the weapons load, potential future H-6 missions could include anti- ship or shorter-range strikes targeting eastern Taiwan from all directions or supporting a blockade. Currently, such missions are vulnerable without defense counter-air support provided by fighters traveling along the route with the bombers.

South China Sea. In 2016, China began flying H-6K missions in the South China Sea, probably as far as Scarborough Reef, conducting maritime patrols and ISR. H-6s could, if deployed to airfields in the Spratly Islands, extend their range through the Balabac Strait into the Celebes Sea or through the Sunda or Malacca Strait to fly into the Indian Ocean.

Sea of Japan. In August 2016, two PLAN H-6 bombers accompanied by a Y-8 AEW&C aircraft conducted the first PLA flights into the Sea of Japan. In January 2017, they flew the same route, this time with six bombers supported by two reconnaissance aircraft. In August 2017, the PLAAF further expanded the PLA’s operating area by sending six PLAAF H-6K bombers through the Miyako Strait, and for the first time, turned north to fly east of Okinawa and as far north as the Kii Peninsula. These flights demonstrated a maturing capability for H-6K bombers to conduct off-axis strikes against U.S. and allied facilities. Previously demonstrated flight endurance of the PLAAF H-6K suggest future missions could fly around Japan, along the Philippines’ coast, and use a wider area of operations throughout the Philippine Sea than current operations by Chinese aircraft.

Photo: Chinese forces train for amphibious attacks. (Chinese Ministry of Defense)

The U.S. Department of Defense has provided its annual examination of China’s military power to Congress. The Executive Summary is provided, below. A discussion on Chinese pilots training to target the U.S. will be provided tomorrow

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018

Executive Summary

WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGY?

Since 2002, Chinese leaders – including President Xi Jinping – have characterized the 21st century’s initial two decades as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They assess that international conditions during this time will facilitate domestic development and the expansion of China’s “comprehensive national power.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has distilled these objectives into President Xi’s “China Dream of national rejuvenation” to establish a powerful and prosperous China.

GROWING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PRESENCE

China’s leaders increasingly seek to leverage China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand the country’s international influence. “One Belt, One Road,” now renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues. Countries participating in BRI could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could leverage to achieve its interests. For example, in July 2017, Sri Lanka and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) signed a 99-year lease for Hambantota Port, following similar deals in Piraeus, Greece, and Darwin, Australia.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO MANAGING REGIONAL DISPUTES

China seeks to secure its objectives without jeopardizing the regional stability that remains critical to the economic development that has helped the CCP maintain its monopoly on power. However, China is also willing to employ coercive measures – both military and non-military – to advance its interests and mitigate opposition from other countries. For example, in 2017, China used economic and diplomatic pressure, unsuccessfully, in an attempt to urge South Korea to reconsider the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

In its regional territorial and maritime disputes, China continued construction of outposts in the Spratly Islands, but also continued outreach to South China Sea claimants to further its goal of effectively controlling disputed areas. China also maintained a consistent coast guard presence in the Senkakus. In June 2017, India halted China’s efforts to extend a road in territory disputed with Bhutan near the India border, resulting in a protracted standoff lasting more than 70 days. In August, India and China agreed to withdraw their military forces from the vicinity of the standoff; however, both countries maintain a heightened military presence in the surrounding region.

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In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, the “China Dream” includes a commitment to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) able to secure Chinese national interests overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations.

The PLA is undergoing the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control, and precision strike. Reforms seek to streamline command and control structures and improve jointness at all levels. Personnel cuts likely targeted non-combat personnel and rebalanced the preponderance of forces away from the PLA Army (PLAA).

Training continued to focus on executing large-scale, complex joint operations. This included increasing exercise realism by evaluating unit performance during force-on- force confrontations against dedicated opposing-force units, strengthening strategic campaign training, and executing long-distance maneuvers and mobility operations. The CCP also continued vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the armed forces.

China’s leaders continued to advance an ambitious military modernization and organizational reform agenda to achieve those requirements. China’s military modernization targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual- use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to these technologies. Several recent cases and indictments illustrate China’s use of intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.

Additionally, as China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and noncombatant evacuation operations. In August 2017, China officially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, deploying a company of marines and equipment to the base. China likely will seek to establish additional military logistics facilities in countries with which it has longstanding, friendly relationships.

CONTINUED POLITICAL AND SECURITY PREPARATIONS VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN

China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost an additional diplomatic partner in 2017, and international fora denied participation or observership to representatives from Taiwan. While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. Taiwan’s 2017 National Defense Report cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan pose an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait.”

The Report Concludes Tomorrow, with a Special Section in which the Department of Defense discusses the training of Chinese pilots to strike the U.S.

Photo: Chinese Air Force aerobatics team departs for performance in Russia (Chinese Ministry of Defense photo)

Quick Analysis

Why the Electoral College is Vital

Proposals for radical alterations in the way Americans vote are dangerous concepts that would have dramatic consequences for the nation and its Constitution. Some, such as ranked choice voting, are an unblushing bid to prop up fringe, leftist candidates. Others. if adopted, would essentially disunite the nation and overturn its Constitution. As they consistently have after each election loss, Democrat spokespeople have flooded the airwaves with complaints about the Electoral College. Why, they ask, can’t we have a “popular vote,” and let it be done with. Since the Electoral College process is part of the original design of the U.S. Constitution, it would be necessary to pass a Constitutional amendment to change this system. The National Archives notes that over the past 200 years more than 700 proposals have been introduced in Congress to reform or eliminate the Electoral College. There have been more proposals for Constitutional amendments on changing the Electoral College than on any other subject. The answer is as simple as the name of the country: The United States of America. The incredibly successful nation created almost two and a half centuries ago was a union of separate states. Fresh off of dealing with a monarch, it was intentionally set up that way to both prevent the possibility of having an all-powerful dictator, and to prevent larger states from bullying smaller ones. Abolishing the electoral college would essentially disenfranchise smaller states from having any say in the presidency. Indeed, even less populated areas of large states would lose influence. A collection of large cities, (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, Austin, Jacksonville, etc.) would decide the outcome in who gets the White House. Considering how badly many of those urban centers are run, that would not bode well for the future of the country! Beyond the practical policy implications, it would alienate the populations of those not living in California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, who would, for the most part, be reduced to bystanders in the race for the only nationally-elected position. A Heritage study analyzed the concept of a “National Popular Vote” (NPV) this way: “The National Popular Vote (NPV) plan is the latest in a long line of schemes designed to replace the Electoral College. Imbued with the ideals of this nation’s Founders, the Electoral College has proved itself to be both effective in providing orderly elections for President and resilient in allowing a stable transfer of power of the leadership of the world’s greatest democracy. Therefore, while it would be a mistake to replace the Electoral College, replacing this system with the NPV would be a disaster. The NPV would devalue the minority interests that the Founders sought to protect, create electoral administrative problems, encourage voter fraud, and radicalize the U.S. political system. It also would likely violate the U.S. Constitution’s Compact Clause while directly contravening the Founders’ view of federalism and a representative republic. In an age of perceived political dysfunction, effective policies already in place—especially successful policies established by this nation’s Founders, such as the Electoral College—should be preserved.” Trent England, writing for the National Conference of State Legislatures outlined key reasons for the institution: “At the Constitutional Convention, the primary concern of delegates opposed to direct election was that big states would dominate presidential politics. By using a two-step election process, the Electoral College prevents one region, or a handful of major metropolitan areas, from controlling the White House. Support must be geographically distributed around the country in order to win enough states to capture an electoral vote majority. This was particularly important after the Civil War. The nation remained divided, and Democrats became dominant in the south. A combination of intense popularity with some voters and violent suppression of others allowed Democrats to receive the most popular votes in 1876 and 1888 even though they lost the Electoral College and thus those elections.” Eliminating the Electoral College would be a disaster for the United States/