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America’s Nuclear Posture, Part 2

Yesterday, the New York Analysis of Policy & Government presented the reasons the White House gave that mandated a review of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and international responses to to the report.  Today, we present the specific recommendations of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review:

Specifics of the Report

 The report states that “the United States will sustain and replace its nuclear capabilities, modernize NC3, and strengthen the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear military planning. Combatant Commands and Service components will be organized and resourced for this mission, and will plan, train, and exercise to integrate U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and employment. The United States will coordinate integration activities with allies facing nuclear threats and examine opportunities for additional allied burden sharing of the nuclear deterrence mission…. Given the increasing prominence of nuclear weapons in potential adversaries’ defense policies and strategies, and the uncertainties of the future threat environment, U.S. nuclear capabilities and the ability to quickly modify those capabilities can be essential to mitigate or overcome risk, including the unexpected…The increasing need for this diversity and flexibility, in turn, is one of the primary reasons why sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, (NC3) and modernizing  NC3, is necessary now. The triad’s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or conflict. Eliminating any leg of the triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs. Therefore, we will sustain our legacy triad systems until the planned replacement programs are deployed.”

Specific weapons systems

“The United States currently operates 14 OHIO-class SSBNs and will continue to take the steps needed to ensure that OHIO SSBNs remain operationally effective and survivable until replaced by the COLUMBIA-class SSBN. The COLUMBIA program will deliver a minimum of 12 SSBNs to replace the current OHIO fleet and is designed to provide required deterrence capabilities for decades.

“The ICBM force consists of 400 single-warhead Minuteman III missiles deployed in underground silos and dispersed across several states. The United States has initiated the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program to begin the replacement of Minuteman III in 2029. The GBSD program will also modernize the 450 ICBM launch facilities that will support the fielding of 400 ICBMs.

“The bomber leg of the triad consists of 46 nuclear-capable B-52H and 20 nuclear-capable B-2A “stealth” strategic bombers. The United States has initiated a program to develop and deploy the next-generation bomber, the B-21 Raider. It will first supplement, and eventually replace elements of the conventional and nuclear-capable bomber force beginning in the mid-2020s.

“The B83-1 and B61-11 gravity bombs can hold at risk a variety of protected targets. As a result, both will be retained in the stockpile, at least until there is sufficient confidence in the B61-12 gravity bomb that will be available in 2020.

“Beginning in 1982, B-52H bombers were equipped with ALCMs. Armed with ALCMs, the B-52H can stay outside adversary air defenses and remain effective. The ALCM, however, is now more than 25 years past its design life and faces continuously improving adversary air defense systems. The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile replacement program will maintain into the future the bomber force capability to deliver stand-off weapons that can penetrate and survive advanced integrated air defense systems, thus supporting the long-term effectiveness of the bomber leg.

“The current non-strategic nuclear force consists exclusively of a relatively small number of B61 gravity bombs carried by F-15E and allied dual capable aircraft (DCA). The United States is incorporating nuclear capability onto the forward-deployable, nuclear capable F-35 as a replacement for the current aging DCA. In conjunction with the ongoing life extension program for the B61 bomb, it will be a key contributor to continued regional deterrence stability and the assurance of allies.”

Cost

 “…even the highest of these projections place the highpoint of the future cost at approximately 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget. Maintaining and operating our current aging nuclear forces now requires between two and three percent of the DoD budget. The replacement program to rebuild the triad for decades of service will peak for several years at only approximately four percent beyond the ongoing two to three percent needed for maintenance and operations. This 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget required for the long-term replacement program represents less than one percent of the overall federal budget. This level of spending to replace U.S. nuclear capabilities compares favorably to the 10.6 percent of the DoD budget required during the last such investment period in the 1980s, which at the time was almost 3.7 percent of the federal budget, and the 17.1 percent of the DoD budget required in the early 1960s.”

Enhancing Deterrence with Non-strategic Nuclear Capabilities

 Existing elements of the nuclear force replacement program predate the dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment. To meet the emerging requirements of U.S. strategy, the United States will now pursue select supplements to the replacement program to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. It is a reflection of the versatility and flexibility of the U.S. triad that only modest supplements are now required in this much more challenging threat environment.

These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies. Russia’s belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow’s perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow’s first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercises and statements. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative.

To address these types of challenges and preserve deterrence stability, the United States will enhance the flexibility and range of its tailored deterrence options. To be clear, this is not intended to, nor does it enable, “nuclear war-fighting.” Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression. It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely.

Consequently, the United States will maintain, and enhance as necessary, the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and DCA around the world. We are committed to upgrading DCA with the nuclear-capable F-35 aircraft. We will work with NATO to best ensure—and improve where needed—the readiness, survivability, and operational effectiveness of DCA based in Europe.

Additionally, in the near-term, the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Unlike DCA, a low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect. They will provide additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and a valuable hedge against future nuclear “break out” scenarios.

DoD and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will develop for deployment a low-yield SLBM warhead to ensure a prompt response option that is able to penetrate adversary defenses. This is a comparatively low-cost and near term modification to an existing capability that will help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable “gap” in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Modernization

 Today’s NC3 system is a legacy of the Cold War, last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago. It includes interconnected elements composed of warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems.
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 While once state-of-the-art, the NC3 system is now subject to challenges from both aging system components and new, growing 21st century threats. Of particular concern are expanding threats in space and cyber space, adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and the broad diffusion within DoD of authority and responsibility for governance of the NC3 system, a function which, by its nature, must be integrated. In light of the critical need to ensure our NC3 system remains survivable and effective, the United States will pursue a series of initiatives. This includes: strengthening protection against cyber threats, strengthening protection against space-based threats, enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, improving command post and communication links, advancing decision support technology, integrating planning and operations, and reforming governance of the overall NC3 system.

Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure

 Over the past several decades, the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding. Over half of NNSA’s infrastructure is over 40 years old, and a quarter dates back to the Manhattan Project era. All previous NPRs highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure, but the United States has fallen short in sustaining a modern infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to unforeseen developments. There now is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons. Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable priority, so is a resilient and effective nuclear weapons infrastructure, without which our nuclear deterrent cannot exist. The U.S. must have the ability to maintain and certify a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Synchronized with DoD replacement programs, the United States will sustain and deliver on-time the warheads needed to support both strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities by:

› Completing the W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP) by Fiscal Year (FY) 2019; › Completing the B61-12 LEP by FY2024; › Completing the W88 alterations by FY2024; › Synchronizing NNSA’s W80-4 life extension, with DoD’s LRSO program and completing the W80-4 LEP by FY2031; › Advancing the W78 warhead replacement one year to FY19 to support fielding on GBSD by 2030 and investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive package in a Navy flight vehicle; › Sustaining the B83-1 past its currently planned retirement date until a suitable replacement is identified; and, › Exploring future ballistic missile warhead requirements based on the threats and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries, including the possibility of common reentry systems between Air Force and Navy systems.

The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the needed skills of the workforce, including the following:

› Pursue a joint DoD and Department of Energy advanced technology development capability to ensure that efforts are appropriately integrated to meet DoD needs.

› Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. A delay in this would result in the need for a higher rate of pit production at higher cost.

› Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the U.S. capability to produce lithium compounds are sufficient to meet military requirements.

› Fully fund the Uranium Processing Facility and ensure availability of sufficient low enriched uranium to meet military requirements.

› Ensure the necessary reactor capacity to produce an adequate supply of tritium to meet military requirements.

› Ensure continuity in the U.S. capability to develop and manufacture secure, trusted strategic radiation-hardened microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization.

› Rapidly pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established by Congress to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to advance warhead design, development, and production skills.

› Develop an NNSA roadmap that sizes production capacity to modernization and hedging requirements.

› Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs needed to meet deterrence needs.

› Maintain and enhance the computational, experimental, and testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons.

Photo: Unarmed Minuteman missile launch, DoD

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America’s Nuclear Posture

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According to the White House “Over the past decade, despite United States efforts to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons, other nuclear nations grew their stockpiles, increased the prominence of nuclear weapons in their security strategies, and—in some cases—pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities to threaten other nations. Meanwhile, successive United States administrations deferred much-needed modernization of our nuclear weapons, infrastructure, and delivery systems.”

Since the end of the first Cold War, the U.S. reduced its nuclear stockpile by over 85 percent and did not deploy any new nuclear capabilities.  Despite that, international adversaries, including Russia, China, and North Korea have significantly enhanced their nuclear arsenals, and Iran has made considerable progress in building an intercontinental missile capability.

In response to those developments, the Administration issued a new “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR.)

The growing problem has been highlighted by Putin’s recent test of its “Sarmat” missile, a hypersonic rocket, and its growing arsenal of Iskander short range nuclear missiles, which violate nuclear arms agreements.  (The New START treaty, signed by President Obama in 2010, gave Russia the lead in nuclear weapons for the first time in history.)

China, too, is undertaking formidable increases in its nuclear weapons capabilities.  The National Interest notes that “technical developments are likely to propel China to undertake a significant nuclear buildup in the coming years. The first of these is China’s acquisition of a viable nuclear triad for the first time… China has now deployed a sea-based deterrent in the form of the JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). China has already commissioned four JIN-class SSBNs and will build at least another one of these vessels. Each Jin-class SSBN has twelve missile tubes and carries JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which have a range of 7,500 kilometers…[also] China is MIRVing its traditional land-based ballistic missiles. According to press reports, earlier this year China tested its DF-5C missile using ten MIRVed warheads. It is also believed to be MIRVing its older DF-5B, with somewhere between three and ten warheads.

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War on the Rocks believes that “the most controversial element of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review has been the push to deploy a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead.”

Response to the NPR from potential adversaries has been, as expected, negative. According to China’s Xinhuanet publication, “China firmly opposes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) published by the United States Department of Defense…The U.S. document presumptuously speculated about the intentions behind China’s development and played up the threat of China’s nuclear strength….”

Russia’s reaction was reported by the Memri news service  “The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is primarily concerned by what it described as “Washington’s no-limits approach” of nuclear weapons. “[The U.S.] might use nuclear weapons in ‘extreme circumstances,’ which are not limited to military scenarios in the new U.S. doctrine. Moreover, even military scenarios are presented so ambiguously that it seems like the U.S. planners may view practically any use of military capability as a reason for delivering a nuclear strike against anyone they consider an ‘aggressor’.”

Tomorrow: Specifics of the NPR

Photo: USAF, B-52

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Ignoring Catastrophe

Russian and Chinese activities correspond precisely to those that would be undertaken in preparation for the initiation of a major war. The two nations have dramatically and rapidly upgraded their militaries, trained together, expanded their overseas bases, insured access to raw materials, and conducted probing operations to test the responses of their foes.

President Obama appears oblivious, as does his two Democrat would-be successors. All three advocate continuing the addiction to transferring funds from defense to vote-buying social welfare programs. They continue to alienate U.S. allies. They adhere to tax and environmental policies that deteriorate the U.S. defense industrial base, and refuse to acknowledge the dramatic increase in the armaments and aggressive actions of Moscow and Beijing.

The deterioration of both the current arsenal of the U.S. armed forces, as well as funding for future replacements, is not limited to weapons.  Oval Office policies which have encouraged the retirement or outright dismissal of experienced military personnel play a large role in the downward trajectory of America’s defense infrastructure.

Affordable and common-sense precautions, such as protecting key assets from electromagnetic pulse destruction, have not been taken. It has been estimated that it would cost just a few billion dollars to accomplish this, yet it was wholly excluded from Mr. Obama’s $800 billion “stimulus” package.

The mass media’s lack of interest in military matters combined with its ideological inclination to favor domestic programs over national security prevents the citizenry from getting a clear picture of how hazardous the current global situation truly is.

There are salient facts that rarely get discussed:

For the first time in history, Russia has a lead in strategic nuclear weapons, a result of the 2009 New Start Treaty. Moscow also possesses a ten-to-one lead in tactical atomic weapons. China’s known nuclear force is powerful, and intelligence sources believe that many more weapons may have been built, deployed, and hidden in a vast network of tunnels. Both are more modern than America’s increasingly obsolete deterrent. Added together, the U.S. is overmatched.

China already has more submarines than the United States, and by 2020, its navy will be larger than its American counterpart. The lead will not be merely quantitative.  The ships Beijing is building are every bit as capable as any in the world. With the loss of senior personnel, the American “experience advantage” is rapidly becoming ancient history. China has also developed an extraordinarily advanced shore to ship missile that dramatically changes the dynamic in sea power. Basing that missile both on mainland China and on the new island it has constructed in the South China Sea will establish regional dominance.

Russia, too, has engaged in a significant naval buildup, and has taken steps to provide its ready-for-war fleet with expanded basing infrastructure. Moscow’s actions in invading the Ukraine to insure control of its Black Sea naval base, its support of Syria’s Assad to protect its Tartus naval base, its extraordinary Arctic Sea buildup, and its return to Cuba are all clear examples.

The combined actions of the two nations along with the reduced size of the American Navy, which has shrunk from 600 ships to less than 274, present a potentially catastrophic challenge.
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The U.S. defense strategy is heavily invested in space, far more so than any potential adversary. However, China has developed and demonstrated the capability of destroying American satellites. If they are destroyed, replacement will not be easy.  Remember, the U.S. is dependent on Russian rocket engines to put many payloads in orbit.  In the conflict that may soon come, the Pentagon will rapidly become deaf and blind.

The 21st Century presents a far different world than that of the 1940’s.  The oceans that insulated the U.S. and gave it time to build an armed force sufficient to counter any foes no longer provide a barrier.

The once-mighty American industrial base has been reduced to a shadow of itself, and lacks the capability to rapidly build quantities of weapons as it did in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.  Just one example: there is only one plant in the entire U.S. that can manufacture tanks—and President Obama has repeatedly attempted to put it out of business.  In what can only be described as an act of insanity, some U.S. weapons systems depend on China for key components.  The military Washington has on hand is the only force it will have to depend on in the event of hostilities.

While Russia and China have fielded advanced new weapons systems on land, air, and sea, many of the Pentagon’s advanced weapons programs have been cut back, delayed, or eliminated.

The United States no longer is secure within its own hemisphere.  The Russian Navy has started to return to Cuba, and its nuclear bombers are being refueled in Nicaragua. China has infrastructure on both sides of the Panama Canal. Both Moscow and Beijing have established military-to-military ties with several Latin American and Caribbean nations.

For over half a century, the West had been secure in the knowledge that the U.S.-NATO alliance was the strongest military force on the planet.  That is no longer the case. The U.S. has decreased its conventional military strength and has failed to modernize its nuclear weapons, but Europe continues to act as if nothing has changed.  Since the end of the Second World War, it has largely depended on America for the bulk of its defense, and still does so. Freed of the burden of defense spending, it developed politically popular but extraordinarily expensive entitlement programs. European politicians lack the will to divert funds to their national security needs.

The increasingly close-knit Russian, Chinese, and Iranian axis has a real advantage over the U.S., NATO, and Pacific allies.  The three nations are in close proximity (Russia and China share an extensive border) and need not worry about their lines of supply and communication being interrupted. Geographically, Russia has a dominant position in Eastern Europe, China is rapidly becoming a hegemon in Asia, and Iran, with Russia’s assistance, has become the force to be reckoned with in the strategically vital Middle East. With their vastly increased navies, Russia and China can wreak havoc with U.S. attempts to reinforce bases and allies spread across the planet.

Unlike Germany and Japan in the Second World War, the new axis of Russia and China will not be at a disadvantage when it comes to raw materials.  Russia has vast reserves of energy, and China has worked diligently to corner the market in vital minerals, particularly in Africa. Indeed, when it comes to those raw materials, it will be America and its allies that face a severe challenge.

Too many politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have apparently decided that it is far more personally profitable to pretend that this imminent crisis does not exist than to take the necessary and expensive steps to address it. But whether the bill comes due in the form of an actual attack or the threat of an attack to obtain a massive strategic goal, it will come.

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Iran deal is deeply flawed

The nuclear deal with Iran is deeply flawed.

Iran is already a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation pact, an international obligation it has chosen to ignore. It has failed to report key portions of its atomic program as required by that treaty. What, then, are the prospects for compliance with the current deal?

According to the White House,

“Iran would need two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: tens of thousands of centrifuges and enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb. “There are currently two uranium enrichment facilities in the country: the Natanz facility and the Fordow facility.

“Let’s take a look at Iran’s uranium stockpile first. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs.“But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% — significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb. “Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models…

“As it stands today, Iran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8 to 10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly – if it so chose.

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The key phrase of the White House statement: Under the deal, it would only take Iran a year to build a weapon. In return for extending the breakout period from three months to twelve, Tehran gets about a half-trillion dollars in assets. A great deal for Iran, a bad one for the rest of the world.  The lack of unrestrained inspection rights calls into question the intentions of Tehran to adhere to the agreement.

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tx), chair of the House Armed Service Committee, “”If Iran decides to build a nuclear weapon, this deal only extends the timeline for Iran to break-out by 9 months – and that assumes that the agreement is being implemented precisely by all parties, which is dubious when we know Iran failed to adhere to the terms of the interim deal.  In exchange, Iran will receive billions in sanctions relief, a windfall to pursue its aggressive, destabilizing agenda in the region and beyond.  Whatever the claimed gains we get from this deal, it clearly does not outweigh the risks to the security in the region and to the United States and its interests.”

Clearly, Iran was motivated to come to the bargaining table in order to gain relief from sanctions and to have its asserts unfrozen. The Jerusalem Post quotes Israeli Education Minister Naftali Bennet’s view: “Western citizens who get up for another day at work or school, are not aware of the fact that about half a trillion dollars has been transferred to the hands of a terrorist superpower, the most dangerous country in the world, who has promised the destruction of nations and peoples.” His views were echoed by Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely, who stated that “The nuclear accord agreed upon in Vienna is a ‘historical capitulation of the West to the axis of evil led by Iran.”

Even under the best of circumstances, including full Iranian cooperation in inspections, the nation will essentially, after a decade, emerge unrestrained and stronger than ever. Rather than mandate an absolute right of inspection, a process is established that would allow Tehran to move key material around while a decision is pending on allowing a military base inspection to move forward.

The U.S. Congress has 60 days to review the agreement, but President Obama has stated that he would veto a verdict he disapproves of.

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US Slashes Military as Russia Expands

 As the United States continues to slash military funding and President Obama advocates unilateral nuclear reductions, Russia is rapidly and substantially increasing both its strategic and conventional armed forces.

Over the past five years, the United States has cancelled or indefinitely postponed numerous key weapons systems, including those involving advanced missile defense, strategic bombers, strategic submarine programs, and others. The numbers of those existing systems have shrunk to levels not seen since before the Second World War, including a naval force reduced to World War One size. It’s not just the numbers that are worrisome-although at less than half their 1990 numbers that is significant enough-it’s the condition the remaining equipment is in that troubles observers. The existing U.S. arsenal is increasingly old to the point of being dangerous to use.

According to a Foundry review, “… the U.S. is the only state with nuclear weapons without a substantive nuclear weapons modernization program. Since New START entered into force, the Russians have announced the most massive nuclear weapons build-up since the end of the Cold War. Over time, if the U.S. does not change its policy or Russia adopts a fundamentally different strategic posture, Washington policymakers will be left with a qualitative and quantitative disadvantage vis-à-vis Moscow and potentially other nuclear-armed states.”

U.S. planning centers on the belief that the Cold War is over, but Russia does not concur. Indeed, Moscow has taken precisely the opposite course. As noted by NTI,

“Once Russia completes recapitalization and modernization of its strategic triad, the structure and composition will largely mirror the strategic triad the Soviet Union created during the Cold War, and that Russia attempted to maintain following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”

While the terms of the New START treaty adopted in the first Obama term left the U.S. and Russia in rough numerical strategic nuclear parity, it overlooked a needed ban on Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle warheads (MIRVs). As a result, Russia “out-MIRVS“the U.S. by one per each accountable deployed delivery system. Further, Moscow is rapidly gaining the advantage due to the diverse treatment of each nation’s arsenal.

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America’s strategic weaponry is aged and increasingly unreliable.  In contrast, Russia is diligently and rapidly modernizing its forces. As noted by the New Deterrent Working Group:

“As America refrains from modernizing its deterrent, Russia is demonstrably relying ever more heavily on its nuclear forces, which are being systematically built up…they are working hard on a range of nuclear improvements and also on consolidating their advantage in short range nuclear weapons in order to dominate their neighbors. The Kremlin is simultaneously engaging more and more direct nuclear threats against our allies, eroding confidence in the United States’ extended deterrent.  An Moscow is irrefutably doing hydronuclear and hydrodynamic experiments at Novaya Zemlya, underground nuclear testing of a sort the United States claims is impermissible under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that it has, as a signatory…forsworn.”

Russia has actually increased the danger of nuclear weapons use in recent years. The Congressional Research Services study released in January discusses Moscow’s growing emphasis on nonstrategic atomic arms:

“Russia has altered and adjusted the Soviet nuclear strategy to meet its new circumstances in a post-Cold War world. It explicitly rejected the Soviet Union’s no-first-use pledge in 1993, indicating that it viewed nuclear weapons as a central feature in its military and security strategies. However, Russia did not maintain the Soviet Union’s view of the need for nuclear weapons to conduct surprise attacks or preemptive attacks. Instead, it seems to view these weapons as more defensive in nature, as a deterrent to conventional or nuclear attack and as a means to retaliate and defend itself if an attack were to occur.

“Russia has revised its national security and military strategy several times in the past 20 years, with successive versions appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. For example, the military doctrine issued in 1997 allowed for the use of nuclear weapons “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation.” The doctrine published in 2000 expanded the circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons to include attacks using weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies “as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” In mid-2009, when discussing the revision of Russia’s defense strategy that was expected late in 2009 or early 2010, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Presidential Security Council, indicated that Russia would have the option to launch a “preemptive nuclear strike” against an aggressor “using conventional weapons in an all-out, regional, or even local war.”

Moscow is expected to increase military spending by $770 billion within the current decade, and that is just the public portion of the nation’s armed forces budget.  Nuclear weapons expenditures will be hiked by 50% in the next two years.

As President Obama seeks to close down the only American plant manufacturing tanks, Russia plans to add 2,300 new tanks.

Putin’s air force will fly 1,200 new helicopters and planes, and his navy will float fifty new surface ships, including a new missile sub.

Within a year, PRAVDA notes, 40 new intercontinental missiles will be deployed.  In 2013, Russia’s powerful new YARS mobile ICBMs were deployed. The Iskander tactical mobile nuclear missiles were positioned to threaten Europe.

More Missile defense radars wll be fielded and the Triumph missile defense will be implemented this year-an irony considering Moscow’s opposition to U.S. missile defense plans.

Russia’s emphasis on the need for tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional threats appears unnecessary.  According to the New York Times American forces in Europe have been sharply reduced, dropping from 400,000 to 67,000.  The arsenal of weapons at the disposal of the U.S. military in Europe is said to be 85% smaller than in 1989.

Moscow is deploying its modernized military in areas immediately threatening to the United States. It is establishing a presence  in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Putin has also ordered his forces to establish a significant presence in the Arctic.

President Obama’s belief that Russia is only a “regional power” is truly bizarre in light of these statistics, and his policy of unilateral arms reduction appears to be exceptionally imprudent.