Tag: American Foreign Policy Council

Is the Iran nuclear deal already dead?

Iran apparently violated a Security Council resolution in October when it tested a medium range missile. In December, it again conducted a prohibited test.

Some Congressional leaders believe that the tests violate at least one of the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, and indicate that Tehran has no serious intention of  fulfilling its obligations under the terms of the deal. President Obama has refused, however, to re-impose sanctions.

The White House continues to advocate its view of the agreements benefits:

“Iran would need two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb and tens of thousands of centrifuges. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs. But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% — significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb.

“Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models.”

Despite the President’s reassurances, however, the deficiencies in the deal are deeply troubling to many U.S. lawmakers, international observers, and arms control experts. In a stunning report entitled “A Nuclear Deal With Iran: Managing the Consequences,” a task force formed by the American Foreign Policy Council   (AFPC)  concludes that:

“[A] broad spectrum of national security practitioners, military experts, scientists and analysts concur that the deal is woefully deficient in several respects. The list of these deficiencies is long. Some, like significant shortfalls in verification and monitoring, preclude confidence that Iran will abide by the terms of the agreement in the future, or that the international community will know promptly if it does not. Likewise of concern is that the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action] weakens the global nonproliferation regime by setting a precedent for what counts as a “peaceful” nuclear program that will have effects well beyond the Middle East.”
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The difference in opinion comes down to this: The White House likes the deal because, on paper, it delays Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms for many years. Critics state that, based on precedent and current actions, it is clear that Iran has no intention of living up to its obligations under the deal, and will gain billions in funds it can use both to further weapons development and support terrorist activities.

This excerpt from AFPC’s report summarizes what, upon analysis, are the very real and substantial concerns about the nuclear deal: JCPOA, upon implementation, will empower a range of Iranian activities deeply inimical to the strategic interests and security of the United States and its allies and international partners.

These strategic, political and economic problems will include:

Expanded Iranian resources. Under the parameters of the JCPOA, Iran is poised to receive massive sanctions relief and unfrozen assets in the near term: an estimated $100 billion or more after a perfunctory six-month verification period. The scale of this economic assistance is staggering. It represents a quarter or more of Iran’s total annual GDP, which amounted to $415 billion in 2014 …The proportional impact of such relief to the Islamic Republic is comparable to an infusion into the American economy (currently estimated at $16.7 trillion) of roughly $4.2 trillion, approximately five times the economic stimulus that stabilized the U.S. financial sector following the 2008 global economic crisis.

Moreover, these funds will invariably be augmented by the benefits of post-sanctions trade between Iran and potential trading partners in Europe and Asia, which now appear eager to expand their economic ties to the Islamic Republic. White House officials have expressed their hope that its unprecedented windfall will be used by the Iranian regime overwhelmingly to improve domestic conditions and strengthen its economy. Even if Iran does spend the lion’s share of sanctions relief in this fashion, however, the sheer volume of funds to be unblocked means that the Iranian regime will nonetheless be able to significantly augment its expenditures on several fronts of concern to U.S. strategic interests.

Terrorism financing. The Islamic Republic, which was first formally designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the Reagan administration in 1984, still maintains its status as the world’s most active backer of terrorist groups. The scope of this material support is extensive, estimated by the U.S. Treasury Department several years ago to be in the billions of dollars annually.

More recently, a study by the Congressional Research Service found Iranian spending on these activities to range from $3.5 billion to $16 billion annually. These expenses include, inter alia, between $100 and $200 million per annum to Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia; tens of millions of dollars annually to the Palestinian Hamas movement and; the entire annual operating budget of the smaller Palestinian Islamic Jihad (estimated at some $2 million). That these expenditures have continued unabated, despite the growing adverse impact of U.S. and international sanctions on the Iranian economy in recent years, illustrate that terrorism support – euphemistically termed “export of the revolution” by the Iranian regime – represents a cardinal regime priority. With extensive sanctions relief now on the horizon, it would be prudent for policymakers to expect this support to grow significantly…

21 Democrat Senators and 35 of their Republican colleagueshave written to the President  asking him to act against Iran’s nuclear-capable missile tests, a violation, they maintain, of the nuclear deal. The Democrats’ letter, quoted in The Hill http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/263686-senate-dems-push-obama-to-act-on-iran-missile-tests states:

“Such action is essential to make clear to Iran’s leaders that there will be consequences for future violations of UN Security Council Resolutions and that the United States reserves the right under the [nuclear agreement] to take unilateral action in response to this and other significant actions by Iran in the areas of ballistic missile development, terrorism and human rights,”

The President has refused. The actions highlight the problems with the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The most comprehensive analysis of the controversial deal was that provided by the American Foreign Policy Council. http://www.afpc.org/ We conclude our two-part summary of that report http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewPolicyPaper/2926 today.

Anticipating the Consequences

There are indications that the Islamic Republic has already begun to ramp up its defense expenditures… it has initiated major new procurement talks with arms suppliers such as Russia and China, and is now poised to acquire new aircraft, air defenses and components. Such acquisitions will lead, over time, to a significant strengthening of Iran’s ability to project power into its immediate periphery, as well as its capacity to threaten and/or challenge its strategic rivals. Even before then, however, the perception of growing Iranian military power will begin to have pronounced effects on the geopolitical balance of power in the greater Middle East.
A new rogue state patron. Although it has received comparatively little attention to date, one of the most significant consequences of the economic windfall inherent in the JCPOA will be its impact on the foreign allies and strategic partners of the Islamic Republic. This list includes the “Bolivarian” nations of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador in Latin America, the Stalinist regime of Kim Jong-un in North Korea, and the dictatorship of Omar el-Bashir in the Sudan, among others – all of which currently maintain significant political, economic and military ties to the Iranian regime. …An associated danger is the potential provision by Iran of strategic assistance to other aspiring nuclear weapons states; by allowing Iran to keep a large enrichment program, the JCPOA increases the risk that Iran could transfer enrichment technology and materials to other states or even non-state actors.

Stepped up Iranian proliferation. President Obama has publicly asserted that the JCPOA closes of “all pathways” by which the Iranian regime can acquire a nuclear capability. This, however, is not accurate. The agreement concerns itself overwhelmingly with the overt means by which Iran might develop a nuclear capability: by building one. A parallel, covert “pathway” – involving procurement of nuclear-related components and materiel from foreign suppliers – remains open. As such, the practical effect of the JCPOA, once implemented, will be to facilitate covert procurement by the Islamic Republic.

Moreover, given the expanded resources soon to be at Iran’s disposal, its purchasing power for such activities will expand exponentially. Willing foreign suppliers exist at both the state and non-state level. At the state level, Iran’s ongoing – and extensive – strategic alliance with the North Korean regime poses considerable future risks, insofar as nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between the two countries has a long history and is ongoing.

Similarly, multiple private entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs continue to operate within the People’s Republic of China, and have been estimated to provide as much as 90 percent of the necessary “goods and technology” for both. As such, nonproliferation experts have warned that “[t]here is considerable risk that Tehran could covertly procure nuclear materials from Chinese brokers and circumvent a nuclear deal by secretly creating a new parallel nuclear program.” At the same time, Iran will have both greater incentive and greater capability to engage in “offshore” development of a nuclear capability, relying on its existing strategic partnerships abroad to continue nuclear development outside of territorial Iran. Here, too, Iran’s contacts with North Korea represent a source of serious concern, with one or more of the nuclear tests carried out by the DPRK over the past decade believed to have been carried out at least in part to test Iranian capabilities.

A regional proliferation cascade. In the late 2000s, worries over Iran’s burgeoning nuclear capability had prompted the beginnings of a regional proliferation “cascade,” as vulnerable regional states moved ahead with the acquisition of strategic counterweights to Iran’s emerging nuclear capability… Thirteen other countries in the greater Middle East were in various stages of nuclear acquisition, with most doing so specifically in response to Iran’s nuclear effort… growing uncertainty over the regional strategic balance in the Middle East – coupled with fears of Iran’s imperial ambitions – has revived the interest of regional powers in acquiring their own nuclear deterrent. Most prominently, Saudi Arabia, Iran’s long-time ideological rival in the Islamic world, has made clear that, should Iran move toward the creation of a nuclear weapon, “we would do that also…” Other countries can be expected to follow suit, given both the inherent flaws in the JCPOA and the inability of the Obama administration to provide adequate security guarantees against the emergence of a nuclear Iran…

A slower, but stronger, Iranian nuclear program

The particulars of the JCPOA confirm that the initial objective of Western diplomacy with Iran – the “rollback” of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure – has not been attained. To the contrary, the existing terms of the agreement will actually help Iran to develop a stronger nuclear program over time…

Managing the Fallout

The foregoing makes abundantly clear that passage of the JCPOA does not signal an end to the Iranian challenge confronting the United States, but rather a new – and arguably even more challenging – phase in that contest. America’s strategy must change accordingly, and should do so in the following areas:

Tracking Iranian money The United States and its partners…need to focus on how to prevent post-agreement Iranian money from migrating into the coffers of Hezbollah and other terrorist actors or from fueling expanded nuclear procurement and proliferation…

Blacklisting the IRGC With the exception of its Supreme Leader, there is no more important political actor in Iran than the regime’s clerical army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi). … it will therefore emerge as a major beneficiary of any sanctions relief received by the Islamic Republic, as well as becoming disproportionately enriched by the resumption of trade between Iran and potential trading partners in Europe and Asia. To limit this benefit, the United States should move resolutely to limit the IRGC’s ability to access the international economy…

Ensuring Iranian compliance
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Iran’s anticipated violations of the JCPOA in the near future are not likely to include an obvious “sprint” to the nuclear finish line in the form of major, sustained violations of the terms of the deal. Rather, it is far more likely to “inch out,” testing the resolve of Western nations to hold it to account over numerous small infractions… Indeed, such violations are believed to be occurring already…

By minimizing such instances as immaterial and defending Iran against criticism from the press, the White House has made clear that … does not currently possess the tools to exact tactical penalties from the Islamic Republic for minor infractions without torpedoing the nuclear deal as a whole. And because it does not, the White House is incentivized to turn a blind eye to instances of Iranian cheating.

Enhancing deterrence against Iran

…the danger of a breakout remains a real one. Moreover, the danger of an Iranian “dash” for the bomb becomes more acute as we move further into the future, and Iran’s nuclear program increases in both sophistication and maturity. The Obama administration has expressed its support for means of deterring Iran “from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon,” … Yet it so far has not undertaken concrete steps to communicate to the Iranian regime that it is prepared to do so

As former Administration offcials Dennis Ross and David Petraeus have outlined, one measure that the United States could take would be to provide Israel with ordinance capable of destroying Iranian nuclear facilities: Beyond bolstering Israel’s ability to act unilaterally to prevent Iranian “breakout,” however, the United States also needs to articulate a clear, unambiguous deterrence posture regarding its readiness to use resolute force to prevent Iran’s acquisition of an offensive nuclear capability, either during the lifespan of the JCPOA or afterwards. Iran must be put on notice in concrete terms that the United States is prepared to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran by any means necessary.

Intrinsic to this declaratory posture is a recapitalization of American defense capabilities. The U.S. military now finds itself at its lowest force strength since the end of World War II. Existing budgetary constraints have severely impacted both the readiness and power projection capabilities of American forces. This state of affairs calls into question the ability of the United States to credibly assure the protection of allies in the event of hostilities with Iran, or undertake unilateral military action against the Islamic Republic in the event of material breach of the JCPOA or some other casus belli. A recapitalization of the U.S. military writ large, including a strengthening of the nuclear triad, must become a national priority at the earliest possible time.

Strengthening missile defense capabilities

Conspicuous in their absence from the terms of the JCPOA are meaningful restrictions on the size and sophistication of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal…

To guard against this threat, the United States will need to significantly expand and strengthen its investments in Middle Eastern missile defense capabilities….

Preserving Iran’s democratic potential

Already ranked among the world’s most repressive regimes, the past several years have seen a deepening crackdown on human rights, freedom of expression and political choice within the Islamic Republic…

Domestic conditions within Iran should be of significant concern to American policymakers. The Islamic Republic’s nearly 82 million-person population is overwhelmingly youthful, educated and westward-looking. While Iran’s current clerical regime has made no secret of its ongoing animus to the United States, notwithstanding the passage of the JCPOA, this “other” Iran holds out the promise of a more durable and harmonious relationship with the West. But the JCPOA imperils Iran’s democratic potential, because it strengthens the current Iranian government at the expense of its captive population… In response, Congress will need to act more resolutely than ever before, through both public statements and concrete legislation, to shine a spotlight on Iran’s human rights abuses and to penalize the Iranian government for its repression of democracy at home.

Protecting American outreach…in the wake of the JCPOA, there is a danger that America’s voice will be muted – if not silenced outright… While the White House has given no indication that it is prepared to do so, Congress should be prepared for this to emerge as a demand of the Iranian regime and take proactive steps to preserve and ultimately to strengthen the ability of America’s public diplomacy outlets to communicate with the Iranian people – even as it continues to press for a robust, coherent strategy to underpin this outreach. Simultaneously, the United States needs to increase its investment in Internet freedom in Iran.

THE ROAD AHEAD

While a nuclear deal with Iran has now been struck, the broader strategic challenge that Iran poses to American interests and allies persists. Resolute American action is necessary to prevent Iranian cheating during the time that the JCPOA is in force, an Iranian nuclear breakout thereafter, and adverse effects stemming from Iran’s acquisition of the extensive sanctions relief inherent in the agreement. Currently, the United States lacks both the capacity and credibility to respond to the potential consequences of the nuclear agreement with Iran. We believe that altering this status quo must become a priority for U.S. lawmakers in the months and years ahead.