Russia’s Pacific Threat – USA Gov Policy

It is understandable to see China as the dominant threat in the Pacific, but unfortunately, it is not alone.

A Lowry Institute study notes that “Moscow has moved beyond platitudes about a ‘turn to the East’ and is pursuing a multi-dimensional approach towards the region: reinforcing the partnership with China; reaching out to other major players; and promoting itself as a significant security and economic contributor.”

According to Admiral John C. Aquilino, who leads the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Russia also presents serious risks to the United States as well as our allies and partners, and has the ability to threaten the homeland. As evident from their unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Ukraine, Russia has no regard for international law, its own prior commitments, or any principles that uphold global peace.”

In mid-2021, the Russian Pacific Fleet completed the largest naval exercise since the Soviet era, deploying approximately 20 ships, including the fleet’s flagship and other large combatants, to within 20-30 nautical miles off the Hawaiian island of Oahu. While in the area, Russia twice flew Tu-95 strategic bombers into the region as a further show of force, and an intelligence collection ship operated near Hawaii before, during, and after the exercise. All these actions were an attempt to demonstrate expeditionary and long-range strike capabilities.

He notes that Russia’s Eastern Military District continues to field new and improved weapons and platforms across all services. These expanding capabilities threaten the United States and our allies, including Japan, particularly in connection with its territorial dispute with Russia over the southern Kuril Islands.

The Russian Pacific Fleet increased its precision land attack and anti-ship cruise missile capacity in 2021 with two new upgraded Kilo-class submarines, one guided-missile frigate, and the modernization of one guided-missile destroyer. Eleven more new ships and submarines are expected to arrive in the next four years, including at least two Severodvinsk II class nuclear cruise missile submarines and four more advanced Kilo submarines.

The Russian Pacific Fleet employs Kalibr cruise missiles and the newly tested Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles. In the air domain, Moscow recently announced it would station its most advanced fighter aircraft, the fifth generation Su-57, in the Eastern Military District.

These aircraft will join an air defense structure already boasting significant numbers of fourth-generation fighters, interceptors, and advanced air defense missiles, including the state-of-the-art S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Since 2016, Russia has stationed coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM) in the disputed Kuril Islands, expanding its capability to threaten Japan and potentially U.S. forces. Moscow announced in late 2021 formation of a new CDCM unit to make their presence permanent.

Russia maintains a modern nuclear triad with upgraded Tu-95MSM bombers, armed with new Kh-101/102 land-attack cruise missiles. New capabilities will include at least one Dolgorukiy II class nuclear ballistic submarine, which will join two Dolgorukiy I missile submarines already in the Pacific Fleet, and a special purpose Belogorod nuclear submarine that Moscow announced would arrive in 2022. The Belogorod will carry the Poseidon unmanned nuclear weapon.

The first launch of the SARMAT heavy ICBM is expected by mid-2022. Russia is rapidly advancing its space and counter-space capabilities, conducting the thirdhighest number of space launches in 2021.

Russia is also developing a suite of anti-satellite capabilities, such as the PL-19 Nudol direct ascent missile, high-powered lasers, and various electronic warfare systems. These capabilities allow Russia to disrupt or destroy adversary satellites during peacetime or conflict. Moscow’s extensive cyber capabilities are well known and globally active. Advanced and emerging techniques, including artificial intelligence-enabled deep fakes, coupled with existing and new relationships with deniable proxy groups, are expected to expand Russia’s ability to deceive, deny, and destroy adversary networks and control systems.

Photo: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.