Russia’s Orbital Plans – USA Gov Policy

Twenty seconds before the scheduled liftoff in March, Russia aborted its launch of three astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). Putin’s space program continues to suffer from a number of challenges. For over a decade the Russian program has endured turbulence, funding constraints, a shrinking workforce, and low workforce productivity. The March incident was reported as “…a significant mishap for the Russian space program.” This week a newly-released Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) report examines the Russian government space program in light of President Putin’s announcement that he intends to put a new space station into orbit by 2027.

It may be a challenge beyond what Putin can effectively deliver as Russia is suffering from monetary inflation in the aerospace industry, as well as a devaluation of the ruble. For Putin, however, the military space program is an “at any cost” venture for him. The current environment, according to the FPRI report, notes that there is not only a deficit of financial resources but also limited access to advanced machine tools and space-grade electronics. “These challenges for Russia to focus efforts on the military space activity and leave manned spaceflights and space exploration only to maintain its international status as a space superpower and sense of domestic legitimacy of authoritarian governance without any sustainable outcomes of the civil space activity itself,” says the report.

Wester military analysts are growing more concerned as Russia’s military space program is increasingly asymmetrical. It currently depends on a large number of inexpensive satellites composed of consumer and industrial-grade imported electronic components, and notes, FPRI, “technologies of nuclear power to increase its counter-satellite electronic warfare capabilities.” These satellites have relatively short lives, increasing Russia’s constraints on developing a modern, comprehensive system. This is growing more pronounced since Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Economic sanctions take time to work. Putin’s space program is experiencing a dearth of components due to the embargo on advanced industrial equipment, limited finances spread across too many major projects, and the general Russian inefficiency within the space industry. Added to the domestic economic challenges, the cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners has made it impossible for Putin to reverse the negative trends.

Russia’s two main priorities for the next decade are to maintain the presence of its astronauts in outer space after the ISS era and even if it is unable to proceed with scientific research and discoveries. Second, according to FPRI, is that Russia must move satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to “relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics.” This would be one option for Putin given the preference for quantity over quality. Russia could then afford to quickly replace its short-lived satellites and at the same time develop more advanced communications and intelligence capabilities to support the armed force.

Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) is also at risk since the development of new architecture with fewer resources in the sky may make it impossible for Putin to achieve his goal of covering Russia and its neighboring territories. The FPRI report suggest that the armed forces already use consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so avoiding the deterioration of GLONASS may not be a top priority. By 2026 Moscow plans to transfer additional federal project funds that are not targeted for other projects to space activities.

The Russian state space program has two subprograms to improve management of its space endeavors. Putin’s first priority is innovation projects within the space industry, and second, is to ensure implementation of “space activity.” The latter is inclusive of its military program and includes development of the Plesetsk launch site for military orbital launches. Cuts in funding since 2020 indicate that Putin will be unable to achieve his objectives by 2030, despite the lengthening of project timelines. Originally planned and approved as a $50 billion effort, less than $26 billion in funding has actually been allocated to the space program. This critical underfunding, taken together with other constraints such as the country’s high military casualty rate, may provide the West with the leeway needed to press Russia further to end the war in Ukraine. It may also make Putin a more dangerous opponent of the West should he feel cornered without options.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: Photo: Backdropped against black space above Earth’s horizon, the International Space Station’s (from left) Zvezda service module, Zarya module, and Unity module are pictured following the undocking of Space Shuttle Atlantis on Sept. 18, 2000, during the STS-106 mission. (NASA)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.