Russia and Iran’s Deepening Relationship

Bilateral cooperation between Russia and Iran runs much deeper than a single shipment of Iranian-made drones for Moscow’s use in the war in Ukraine. Regular arms deliveries from Tehran to Moscow now also include large shipments of drones and surface-to-surface missiles. Russia, in turn, is sending advanced weapons stolen from the West and cash to Iran. In late November Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Iran is studying the weapons it receives and working to reverse engineer the systems. According to Stephen Blank of the Jamestown Foundation, it is possible that the “modifications Russian forces introduced to the Shaheed-136 drone to improve its accuracy may have been communicated to Iran ahead of time, as suggested by the drone strike on an Israeli-owned oil tanker on November 15.” It does not stop there. Asia Times notes that Russian re-engineered drones produced originally by Iran could pose a major existential threat to shipping routes from the Persian Gulf, Black, Baltic, and Mediterranean seas and as far away as the Indian Ocean. Naval experts in Washington are concerned that progress on these weapons could be the first part of an Iranian sea-denial strategy aimed at fulfilling Tehran’s desire to control vast swaths of the Middle East and beyond. Earlier this summer Tehran launched its Khayyam satellite on a Russian Soyuz rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. It was designed for use, according to Iranian sources, for “border surveillance of agriculture, monitoring land use changes such as unauthorized construction, deforestation and environmental hazards and scouting for mineral deposits, among others.

More concerning it that the satellite could be used to conduct reconnaissance of Ukrainian groupings and weapons systems, according to an August 11 Russian Space Web story. It reports that beginning in 2018 Russia and Iran have also been conducting negotiating to secure delivery of a Russian Kanopus-V satellite with “high-resolution cameras” for Tehran. Many in the US intelligence community also believe that Iran wants Russia’s help to expand and speed its nuclear program in the area of nuclear materials and fuel fabrication. Although Iran may not possess an assembled nuclear weapon, with Russia’s assistance it could achieve “nuclear latency,” or the ability to assemble one in a short period of time. As Russo-Irian political and economic ties strengthen, so does anti-American sentiment driving those policies.

In December the Tasnim News Agency (TNA) reported that Iran and Russia were working on new frameworks and mechanisms for deepening their relationship that “go beyond Syria and military transfers to include the Caucasus, where Iran is already expanding its influence to the point of dangerously mounting tensions with Azerbaijan and Turkey.” TNA says that Russia and Iran were growing closer before the war in Ukraine, but are even closer now. It points out that “a gas swap, which would allow Iran to import Russian gas and then export it to third countries, is in the works.” As Putin and the Iranian president continue building cooperative ties, Iran is working to circumvent Western sanctions through a joint working group. Lastly, Iran asked for Putin’s help in suppressing the long-running demonstrations across the country by transferring Russian anti-riot equipment and training to Tehran earlier this month. As the war progresses in Ukraine, the West must remember that Russia is engaged in other parts of the world, including the Middle East and the Caucasus. Israel has labeled the growing bilateral relationship “dangerous” and that this new entente will give Tehran cover in Syria to expand its activities up to the Israeli border. Russia, the Jerusalem Post says, “might step in to limit Israeli air strikes against Iranian facilities and installations there.” Taking advantage of the increasingly visible estrangement between Riyadh and Washington, the Post suggests that Moscow is trying to facilitate a means by which Iran and Saudi Arabia might mend their differences, a development that, if it occurs, would send shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Russia’s growing ties with Iran could represent a risk to Middle East stability and security and a major rupture in the non-proliferation order.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.