Putin’s Desperation – USA Gov Policy

Is Russian president Vladimir Putin becoming more desperate? Four weeks ago, he signed a “partial mobilization” decree that called for Russian citizens across the country “who are currently in the reserve and primarily those who served in the army and have particular military specialties [to] be called up for military service.” The Russian president needed to replace troops killed in the war in Ukraine. Soon after the announcement tens of thousands of young Russian men fled the country to avoid going to war. Putin still needed more troops and recently decided to call on Abkhazians to help. It has not gone as planned.

“Circassian activists have called on the leaders of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic to come out against Putin’s war in Ukraine and reject the partial mobilization,” according to Giorgi Manabde of the Jamestown Foundation. The publication Zapravakbr.ru reports that the Circassians are following the lead of Abkhazia, a small break away region of Georgia on the eastern side of the Black Sea, in rejecting Putin. Abkhazia was taken over by Russia after the 2008 war and has been formally blockaded by Georgia since that time. In 2014 Abkhazia signed a partnership with Russia.

Some authorities in Abkhazia today, however, reject Putin’s plea, although a large percentage of the area’s 250,000 residents are of Russian heritage. Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov simultaneously announced that the 90% of Abkhazians with Russian citizenship would now be subject to a forced mobilization. Pankov fell back on the false claim that Russia “saved” the population economically and they owed Russia. It was time to pay their debt. Beslan Tarba, the pro-Russian military commissar of Abkhazia, responded saying “Of course, we will do this. There are no debts to anyone, but we are always there, we are in favor.”

Barba’s comment was not well-received by the local population. Dissenters from inside the Ministry of Defense in Abkhazia labeled it “Tarba’s private views” and pointed out that they do not reflect the position of the Abkhaz government. The Foreign Ministry accused Pankov of attempting to “…sow panic in Abkhaz society.” To date, Abkhazia has not sent any military units to Ukraine to fight alongside regular Russian troops. In contrast, as of October, several thousand volunteers from Georgia have fought with Ukrainian forces.

Abkhaz society so strongly rejected Putin’s call up that Moscow quickly relented, abandoned its recruitment plans, and backed away saying it was meant only for those Russian citizens who are registered in the officially recognized territory of the Russian Federation. Manabde says that almost all Abkhazians have a Russian passport but only a small part of them are registered in Russia and live in Moscow or other Russian cities. Most of the young men have returned to Abkhazia, he points out, where Russian military commissars would not be able to mobilize them. In South Ossetia, another Georgian province also seized by Russia in 2008, dual Russian – Abkhazia citizens were barred from returning to South Ossetia.

On October 13 Abkhaz President Aslan Bzhania announced a mobilization but stressed that its purpose is not a war against Ukraine but rather “protection against Georgian aggression.” What is perhaps most revealing in the war of words is that it appears Georgia may actually open a ‘second front’ against Russia in Georgia. Throughout history Russian leaders have feared two-front wars, even those they knew they could win. Georgia is now considering holding a referendum on the issue asking its citizens if they want war with Russia. If Georgia opens a second front, it will symbolically change the nature of Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. As such, Manabde says, “opposition to Moscow’s mobilization will only serve to further exacerbate tensions between the center and periphery.” The war in Ukraine may not stay contained for much longer. Harvard University News last month suggested that if Putin’s “losing streak” continues, Western Europe may see conflict.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Photo: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.