Peace with Putin May be Impossible

The world is facing an impossible path to peace in Ukraine as long as Vladimir Putin, or a like-minded successor, is leader of the Russian Federation without Western intervention. This month the war in Ukraine passed its 18-month point. What can’t be overlooked is that this conflict is linked closely to the outcome of the Russo-Georgian conflict that began in August 2008. At the time there was heavy artillery fire in the small villages of South Ossetia, controlled by Russian forces since 1992, according to Pavel Baev of the Jamestown Foundation. Tanks reached the area just outside the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, before pulling back a week later to Tskhinvali. French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire, while US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held talks with Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili to convince him to sign an agreement. The Kremlin then recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “independent states.” It was swift and with the aid of Western leaders settled in favor of Moscow’s retention of Georgian territory. Those events encouraged and charted the policy roadmap for Putin in Ukraine.

Georgy Kobaladze, writing in Svoboda, says that “…the war between Russia and Ukraine explains many of the Kremlin’s technologies and true intentions that were less obvious in 2008 during the war against Georgia.” Baev adds that immediately after the Georgian war, drastic military reforms were launched in Moscow intended to turn the Russian army into a combat-ready force capable of engaging in dynamic multi-domain operations in modern wars. This was followed by the rapid deployment of special forces and airborne troops to Crimea in early 2014 and was viewed as positive proof of success in that modernization.

What the war in Ukraine reveals is that a gap exists between the political ambitions of Kremlin leaders and the ground truth. Russia’s military machine is designed for fast offensive maneuvers but lacks the ability to sustain a protracted war. The Russian General Staff simply did not plan for a high-intensity long war in Ukraine. This is evident in the failed march on Kiev in early 2022 and today in Russia’s Black Sea fleet’s poor performance in defending itself against recent naval drone attacks. After Georgia, Russian military commanders ignored significant factors such as the quantity and quality of the country’s reserves, despite the limited mobilization of Russian troops needed to hold its defensive lines and for offensive tactical operations around Kupyansk. Moving closer to this year’s September 10 elections, with drone attacks more frequent deep inside Russia, the High command is even more anxious about upsetting the population, according to Baev.

Domestically Putin must also contend with the Russian business elite who continue to endure strict personal sanctions this fall. Forbes reports that as of August 11, Mikhail Fridman, who ranks ninth in the ranking of the richest businessmen in Russia at $ 12.6 billion, German Khan with an estimated $8.2 billion, Kuzmichev at $6.4 billion, and Aven at $4.2 billion, all have had their assets block as “sanctioned persons.” US citizens are also prohibited from doing any business with them and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), the country’s largest business association. Putin is laying his hopes for disunity inside the United States on the upcoming 2024 presidential election, wishing it spreads conflict among the Western powers. Putin is also encountering challenges with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is keen to host Russian President Vladimir Putin and persuade him to return to the abruptly canceled “grain deal.”

During the Georgian war in 2008, Erdogan was cautious, seeking primarily to ensure that the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline remained intact, and that Batumi was off-limits to Russian intervention. Today his main goal in the Caucasus is set on “strengthening its alliance with Azerbaijan, and Russia’s dominance over the region was damaged in the fall of 2020, when Armenia was defeated in the Second Karabakh War,” according to the Russian publication Kommersant. In a Svobada blog last week, one writer suggested that ceasefires have proven unreliable in managing conflict and that “Georgia feels compelled to minimize the risks inherent to the “hybrid peace” with Russia,” with Moscow’s maintaining military groupings in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Baev says this risk avoidance translates not only into abstention from condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but also into profiteering from the war by keeping trade channels open for sanctioned goods and Russian tourism in Georgia. He adds that various business connections with Russia inevitably involve the export of corruption, which distorts Georgia’s democratic institutions and compromises its official course set on transatlantic integration. “Instead, rapprochement with China has been cultivated, and the recent week-long visit of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili culminated with a meeting with President Xi Jinping and the signing of a treaty on strategic partnership.”

The Georgian war illustrates the long-term consequences of Russia’s heavy-handed military actions intended to dominate neighboring states and restore the Russian Empire. At the same time, it also indicates that even minor Western support for the regime in Tbilisi can deter the Russian military from further annexation of Georgian provinces. Ukraine is better prepared going into the fall season to stand up to Russian forces. With various types of assistance from the international community, Kyiv’s prospects for defeating Russian imperialism and militarism in Europe remain a realistic goal.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.