North Korea’s Growing Submarine Fleet

What do submarines, volleyballs, and North Korean nuclear missiles have in common? Personnel are back on the job at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility, according to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun of the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS). They can be seen in satellite imagery playing volleyball outside their labs and the administration building last Tuesday as they did in 2017 when the nuclear program was active. The test site is located in the mountains 2 miles west of the Hwasong Concentration Camp in the northeastern part of the country. The Punggye-ri facility has served as a test site since 2006 when North Korea detonated its first nuclear bomb.

Western analysts now expect North Korea may conduct a seventh nuclear test as early as next month. The decision will be up to President Kim Jong-un. Current satellite imagery indicates that preparations are well underway [for a nuclear test] and should not be discounted as insignificant activity,” according to an April CSIS report. It suggests the North’s nuclear program is again very active after five quiet years. There are signs of construction of new buildings, the movement of lumber, and additional equipment and supplies being stored outside the new entrance to Tunnel No. 3 and nearby areas.

Since President Biden assumed office, the North Korean regime also has ramped up other areas of research, including 13 ballistic missile tests. Kim has the goal of achieving a “credible, survivable nuclear weapons delivery system that can target the US homeland,” according to Victor Cha and Fraser Katz, writing in a CSIS commentary on Friday. In January Kim Jong-un delivered remarks to the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in which he openly mentioned in detail that he intends to perfect the guidance technology for a multi-warhead rocket. Kim also stated at the time that the regime was working to attain an advanced capability for making a preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike by further raising the rate of precision to “pinpoint accuracy.” Kim announced at the Congress that North Korea also is developing “solid-fuel engine-propelled intercontinental underwater and ground ballistic rockets.”

Earlier this week during a military parade in Pyongyang, Kim spoke about the increase in strength of the country’s nuclear forces both in terms of quality and scale. Cha and Katz point out that the tenor of the speech this week may be an indication of a shift in the North’s nuclear doctrine, as Kim noted that “our nukes can never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent” and they may be used in an “unexpected second mission” if outsiders violate the North’s “fundamental interests.” There has been little pushback or condemnation of the North as countries in the Western democratic world are concentrating on ongoing kinetic warfare in Ukraine. It also is possible that Kim Jong-un primarily is using the nuclear program to boost his support at home. Advances in the country’s technology have eliminated the need for foreign assistance. New developments could give him a public victory with only the threat of a launch.

Satellite imagery from North Korea’s Sinpo South Shipyard also is showing signs of unusual activity as well. This is the location of the 8.24 Yongung (August 24th Hero) experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA). Currently it is within the secure boat basin under a submersible missile test stand with a small harbor tug tied up alongside. Analysts suspect that the 8.24 Yongung submarine plays a critical role in the under-way development of SLBMs, ballistic missile submarine technology, and operational procedures. While moving the SSBA around the shipyard could be part of a strategic deception campaign, CSIS suggests it is more likely due to modification and repair work.

Although the submarine- launch ballistic missile program is not as far along as the country’s ground-launched, multiple reentry vehicle missile research, it could provide North Korea a second leg in a nuclear triad. The final leg, an air-launched nuclear cruise missile, is not close to the capability required for actual use, according to Cha and Katz. They conclude that Kim is just “one launcher shy of being able to saturate the existing US national missile defense system” based on recent US disclosures by technical experts. Kim is picking up the tempo. If the nuclear program develops effective countermeasures, it could further complicate the picture for Washington. Kim has rebuffed the Biden Administration’s offer to meet without preconditions. No one is sure what comes next after the volleyball game ends.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.