Moscow’s Gas Strategy – USA Gov Policy

Putin is on the hunt, but not in the way you might think. According to the Russian news service TASS, Uzbekistani Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov recently announced that Russia would begin supplying his country with natural gas via its Soviet-era pipelines. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was supplying about 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to Europe annually. John Daly, of the Jamestown Foundation, says that Europe was Russia’s most lucrative export market and as a result of sanctions, “Central Asia has become a crucial area for Russia’s energy export needs, with Uzbekistan playing a key role.” The Central Asian state was experiencing a severe energy crisis and in January started importing Russian gas, according to an earlier AP report, “… [like] its Central Asian neighbors Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan suffers from frequent power and heating outages due to its aging Soviet-era infrastructure.”

Some energy analysts are speculating that Russia is attempting to draw in its southern neighbors to create a tripartite gas union. Temur Umaroc, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that it won’t be easy for Russia to do it, although it “wants to gain control over Central Asian exports to China” by encouraging Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to join it.

In the post World War II period the Soviet Union exploited Central Asian hydrocarbon deposits in the region to fulfill its domestic demand. Today, in the post-Soviet period “hydrocarbon exports have become an increasingly integral component for the economies of the post-Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, particularly those surrounding the hydrocarbon-rich Caspian Sea,” says Umaroc. One issue is that Uzbekistan does not have excessive gas deposits and has challenges meeting its own internal needs, unlike Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Last winter Uzbekistan suffered from severe shortages due, in large part, to economic development that raised its energy demands.

Russia recognizes that over 80% of Uzbekistan’s energy derives from gas. The Central Asian country’s outputs are insufficient to cover its rapidly growing domestic consumption and export obligations. Domestic consumption is increasing 7-10% annually, along with the country’s expanding population. Moscow is using its 1960’s-built network of pipelines that had run north from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the USSR by reversing the flow of gas. The Truboprovodnaiia sistema Sredniaia Aziia-Tsentr network (Central Asia-Center pipeline system; SATS) now controlled by Gazprom can handle 50 bcm of gas annually. It covers most of what was called Soviet Central Asia.

Russian natural gas exports to Uzbekistan in March alone, according to Umaroc, grew exponentially. It represents a 260 percent increase over the same period in 2022 and provided over $150 million in revenue for Moscow in the first quarter of 2023. This reorientation away from the sabotaged Nord Stream One and Two subsea pipelines, along with Western sanctions, has provided Gazprom with new and extensive business opportunities. The repurposed, 60-year-old, SATS-4 pipeline is still undergoing renovations to aid in handling the extreme climatic conditions in the Kyzylkum and Karakum deserts. Once completed, Neftegaz.ru reports Russia will re-equip and upgrade it to operate in reverse. In past years the pipeline has experienced major accidents, fires, and explosions, including a 2009 incident on the Turkmenistan portion of the SATS-4 pipeline that took almost a year to repair and damaged Russia’s relations with the country. Today, Russia, China and the United States are competing for influence in the Central Asian region. Reliable energy supplies are an important factor for improving economies in a land-locked region that is geographically isolated. It may cause these states to rely more heavily on Russia, while providing Putin with needed revenue. The remaining unknown is at what cost to the region. China also has plans in Central Asia that may bring the two nuclear powers to loggerheads.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.