Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Part 2

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC’S PERIPHERY

• Theater Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theater. ‒ The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. The ETC executed exercise JOINT SWORD, aimed at pressure Taiwan in April 2023. ‒ The Southern Theater Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command, as needed, over all CCG and CMM ships enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRCoccupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including the deployment of howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border. ‒ The Western Theater Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asia borders. The WTC focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.” ‒ The Northern Theater Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. ‒ The Central Theater Command’s (CTC’s) mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to other theater commands.

• Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing X Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics against Taiwan: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.

• Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones useful for defending against PRC gray-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.

• Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLAN, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.

• PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behavior. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of U.S. platforms compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

• The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLAN’s evolving focus from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection” and the PLAAF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.

• PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theaters, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors important experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. XI Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

• Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalize its overseas presence and deepen defense ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC has expanded combined exercises with Russia, especially since 2018, when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.

• Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: China’s J-20 Multirole fighter (China Defense Ministry Photo)

Quick Analysis

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Conclusion

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION • PRC Defense Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defense budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defense spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defense spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defense, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending. • Developments in Defense Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. • Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide. U.S.-PRC MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication until weeks before President Biden and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in November 2023. Following the Woodside Summit, where the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communication at all levels, DoD and the PLA conducted several exchanges and working groups at the end of 2023 and through the end of 2024, including senior leader discussions, defense policy talks, operational safety talks, and calls between theater commanders. • DoD remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD objectives in maintaining military-to-military channels are to help prevent crisis, reduce strategic and operational risk, and clarify misperceptions. SPECIAL TOPICS • Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals. Between July and December 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernizing China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions. • Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been the focus on strengthening and revitalizing political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalize political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces. • PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualized across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates to at least the 1960s but, in the 1980s, as the PRC developed Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted the use of CNP as a measurement of China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist system and the West’s capitalist system. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country. Photo: China’s unmanned combat Ship (China Defence Ministry Photo)