It has become increasingly evident that America’s defense posture has weakened dramatically, particularly during the eight years of the Obama Administration. What are the most important steps the nation should take to address the crisis? The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its presentation of the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the National Defense Strategy Commission
Near- and Mid-Term Force Priorities
Innovations in operational concepts and leap-ahead technologies are vital to sustaining U.S. military advantages, particularly over the long term. In the near- to mid-term, the Commission identified a variety of critical improvements to U.S. military posture and capabilities that are imperative for prevailing against our most pressing security challenges.
In the Western Pacific, deterring Chinese aggression requires a forwarddeployed, defense-in-depth posture, buttressed by investments in capabilities ranging from undersea warfare to strategic airlift. In Europe, dealing with a revanchist Russia will entail rebuilding conventional NATO force capacity and capability on the alliance’s eastern flank and the Baltics, while also preparing to deter and if necessary defeat the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, U.S. security commitments and operations in the Middle East cannot be wished away. As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Middle East remains a major producer of oil, and as long as the United States has key U.S. allies and partners in the region, U.S. interests in the Middle East will be profound. Accordingly, U.S. military posture there should not shrink dramatically, even as the precise mix of capabilities is re-examined.
Across all theaters—especially Europe and the Indo-Pacific—our forward posture will be essential to deterring competitors and adversaries and thereby reducing the chances of conflict. In addition, the Army, Navy, and Air Force will all require selective warfighting capacity enhancements, and America will need to improve its capabilities in key cross-cutting areas such as munitions, missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and air and sealift. In particular, it is painfully clear that America is not competing or deterring its adversaries as effectively as it should in cyberspace. We must operate more nimbly, aggressively, and effectively in this crucial domain. Space is also an increasingly important and contested domain and the United States must place special emphasis on ensuring dominance there by devising a coherent space strategy that emphasizes technology, policy, organization, broader awareness through effective communication, and cooperation Another critical imperative is modernizing our nuclear deterrent. The NDS rightly identifies the “re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations” as a primary factor driving U.S. nuclear force posture and planning. Given the need for a robust deterrent, the aggressive nuclear modernization programs some rivals have been carrying out, and the increasing reliance of those rivals—particularly Russia—on escalatory doctrines that feature limited use of nuclear weapons, DOD must remain committed to the bipartisan nuclear modernization program outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. This pertains especially to modernizing the triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. In addition, it is urgently necessary to modernize the supporting infrastructure, including the national laboratories and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) network. At its peak, planned spending on nuclear modernization, operations, and sustainment should consume just 6.4 percent of the defense budget, although the impact on procurement will be greater and will require careful prioritization and sequencing by DOD, with Congressional support. Given that investments made today will pay strategic dividends well into the 2070s and 2080s, America can surely afford to pay this price to preserve such a critical element of its national defense.
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Readiness
The readiness of U.S. forces to conduct operations as effectively and safely as possible is another crucial component of America’s national security. Yet the readiness of our forces has suffered in recent years, due to extended operations in the greater Middle East as well as severe budgetary uncertainty and austerity. The Commission therefore firmly supports DOD’s efforts to improve readiness. We note, however, that U.S. forces will need additional resources to train to high levels of proficiency across a broader and more technologically challenging range of potential missions than in the recent past, particularly those missions focusing on advanced military threats from China and Russia. DOD must also develop and use analytic tools that can measure readiness across this broad range of missions, from low-intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, highintensity fights. Moreover, while resources alone can never cure a readiness shortcoming, timely and sufficient funding will be vital to overcoming readiness gaps created in part by a broken budgetary process.
The foremost resource required to produce a highly capable military is highly capable people—but the number of Americans with both the fitness and propensity to serve is in secular decline, putting the NDS at long-term risk. DOD and Congress must take creative steps to address the shortage of qualified and willing individuals, rather than relying solely on ever-higher compensation for a shrinking pool of qualified volunteers.
Civil-Military Relations
Constructive approaches to any of the foregoing issues must be rooted in healthy civil-military relations. Yet civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control. The implementation of the NDS must feature empowered civilians fulfilling their statutory responsibilities, particularly regarding issues of force management. Put bluntly, allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently politicalmilitary task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders. Unless global force management is nested under higher-order guidance from civilians, an effort to centralize defense direction under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may succeed operationally but produce profound strategic problems. It is critical that DOD—and Congress—reverse the unhealthy trend in which decision-making is drifting away from civilian leaders on issues of national importance.
The Report Concludes Tomorrow
Photo: The guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) (U.S. Navy)