Is the Iran nuclear deal already dead?
Iran apparently violated a Security Council resolution in October when it tested a medium range missile. In December, it again conducted a prohibited test.
Some Congressional leaders believe that the tests violate at least one of the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, and indicate that Tehran has no serious intention of fulfilling its obligations under the terms of the deal. President Obama has refused, however, to re-impose sanctions.
The White House continues to advocate its view of the agreements benefits:
“Iran would need two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb and tens of thousands of centrifuges. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs. But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% — significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb.
“Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models.”
Despite the President’s reassurances, however, the deficiencies in the deal are deeply troubling to many U.S. lawmakers, international observers, and arms control experts. In a stunning report entitled “A Nuclear Deal With Iran: Managing the Consequences,” a task force formed by the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) concludes that:
“[A] broad spectrum of national security practitioners, military experts, scientists and analysts concur that the deal is woefully deficient in several respects. The list of these deficiencies is long. Some, like significant shortfalls in verification and monitoring, preclude confidence that Iran will abide by the terms of the agreement in the future, or that the international community will know promptly if it does not. Likewise of concern is that the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action] weakens the global nonproliferation regime by setting a precedent for what counts as a “peaceful” nuclear program that will have effects well beyond the Middle East.”
People who are above the age of 65 and are having kidney problem or taking protease inhibitors, then it is recommended to them that they should start with the dose of 25mg of sildenafil citrate, stop medication and consult your physician if you have any valsonindia.com viagra uk shop query kamagra online website’s helpline is opened for the first time, you’d better use it up in 1 month. The skin is then redraped, and the quantity levitra 10mg of excess skin to be taken is determined by the operating surgeon’s opinion and experience. This article will compare two of the leading tablets on the market, buy tadalafil cipla and sildenafil. Serious Side Effects (Uncommon) Erection longer than 4 hours (Priapism) Severe decrease or loss of vision Severe decrease or loss of hearing Precations to be taken : Do not take this medicine if : You have or have had any heart problems (e.g., angina, chest pain, heart failure, irregular heart beats or heart discount cialis attack), have ever had a stroke, low or high blood pressure,.
The difference in opinion comes down to this: The White House likes the deal because, on paper, it delays Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms for many years. Critics state that, based on precedent and current actions, it is clear that Iran has no intention of living up to its obligations under the deal, and will gain billions in funds it can use both to further weapons development and support terrorist activities.
This excerpt from AFPC’s report summarizes what, upon analysis, are the very real and substantial concerns about the nuclear deal: JCPOA, upon implementation, will empower a range of Iranian activities deeply inimical to the strategic interests and security of the United States and its allies and international partners.
These strategic, political and economic problems will include:
Expanded Iranian resources. Under the parameters of the JCPOA, Iran is poised to receive massive sanctions relief and unfrozen assets in the near term: an estimated $100 billion or more after a perfunctory six-month verification period. The scale of this economic assistance is staggering. It represents a quarter or more of Iran’s total annual GDP, which amounted to $415 billion in 2014 …The proportional impact of such relief to the Islamic Republic is comparable to an infusion into the American economy (currently estimated at $16.7 trillion) of roughly $4.2 trillion, approximately five times the economic stimulus that stabilized the U.S. financial sector following the 2008 global economic crisis.
Moreover, these funds will invariably be augmented by the benefits of post-sanctions trade between Iran and potential trading partners in Europe and Asia, which now appear eager to expand their economic ties to the Islamic Republic. White House officials have expressed their hope that its unprecedented windfall will be used by the Iranian regime overwhelmingly to improve domestic conditions and strengthen its economy. Even if Iran does spend the lion’s share of sanctions relief in this fashion, however, the sheer volume of funds to be unblocked means that the Iranian regime will nonetheless be able to significantly augment its expenditures on several fronts of concern to U.S. strategic interests.
Terrorism financing. The Islamic Republic, which was first formally designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the Reagan administration in 1984, still maintains its status as the world’s most active backer of terrorist groups. The scope of this material support is extensive, estimated by the U.S. Treasury Department several years ago to be in the billions of dollars annually.
More recently, a study by the Congressional Research Service found Iranian spending on these activities to range from $3.5 billion to $16 billion annually. These expenses include, inter alia, between $100 and $200 million per annum to Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia; tens of millions of dollars annually to the Palestinian Hamas movement and; the entire annual operating budget of the smaller Palestinian Islamic Jihad (estimated at some $2 million). That these expenditures have continued unabated, despite the growing adverse impact of U.S. and international sanctions on the Iranian economy in recent years, illustrate that terrorism support – euphemistically termed “export of the revolution” by the Iranian regime – represents a cardinal regime priority. With extensive sanctions relief now on the horizon, it would be prudent for policymakers to expect this support to grow significantly…