Iran’s Assists Russian Invasion

For decades the Iranian regime’s belligerent behavior has elicited the concern of western world leaders. This summer is no different. As Iran moves closer to official completion of its nuclear weapons program its military remains active on other fronts, too. US intelligence is reporting that Tehran is prepping to deliver potentially hundreds of Iranian unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to Moscow. Two weeks ago, Iran showcased the Shahed-191 and Shahed-129 drones during a visit from a Russian delegation. Sine Ozkarasahin, of the Jamestown Foundation, noted that Radio Farda is reporting that “Commercial satellite imagery allegedly confirmed that a delegation from the Kremlin had visited Kashan Air Base at least twice in the past month.”

Disruption in the critical global supply chain inflated the cost to produce Russian drones domestically. According to the Russian publication Lenta, cost increases range from 30 percent to 200 percent. In June it reported that “The shortage of goods arose after the Chinese DJI, which occupies 90 percent of the market of ‘consumer drones,’ stopped supplying to Russia.” Putin’s drones have proved weak against Western UCAVs. The drones have been particularly vulnerable against man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), including Stingers and LLM Martlets, as well as optically guided Martlets and Starstreaks, according to Ozkarasahin.

He added that although Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian reassured his Ukrainian counterpart to the contrary in a recent phone call, the Kremlin might indeed find what it needs from its non-NATO ally’s combat solutions. The Iranian drones can serve as an intelligence platform, conduct surveillance and reconnaissance (IRS) and an asset to strike at high-value Ukrainian targets. It closes a gap in the Russian’s strike inventory with a precision-tool that is cost-effective and a force multiplier.

“Iranian drones can also overwhelm sensor networks, blurring the enemy’s line of sight. Yet, the West’s heavy counter-drone measures (supplemented by high-end, sophisticated systems, such as Starlink) coupled with the lack of deployment of some of Russia’s most promising electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, including the Krasukha-4, to suppress Ukrainian air operations render Iranian drones’ chances of making a grand impact relatively slim,” says Ozkarasahin.

Tehran recognizes that its UCAV capabilities will boost Moscow’s ability to deliver precision-guided strikes during a period when Russia is suffering from a munition’s shortage. Ozkarasahin says that while this is an improvement, Iran’s drones are a mismatch as they lack the desired interoperability. They cannot be efficiently integrated into Russian networks and datalinks without some form of database synchronization in place, nor can the Iranian drones operate as mobile base stations.

The drone sale will put Tehran in a difficult position as it appears likely that uniformed Iranian soldiers would need to be on the ground to operate the UCAVs, placing Iran in the middle of Putin’s “special military operation.” At that point Iran would become a direct party to the war in Ukraine. In the past it formed military-strategic relationships and supplied rogue states and non-state allies with its indigenously-built, drones that are part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) program.

“Acting as the long-arm of Iran’s strategic outreach, IRGC members provided on-site, yearslong training and real-time support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Shia groups in Iraq concerning Iranian drone CONOPS” says Ozkarasahin. At the same time Iran is claiming to be neutral in the conflict. That stance will be difficult to maintain once its soldiers are in the field given the transparency provided by sophisticated open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques. This is more that a simple defense transaction, according to analysts.

Obstacles still exist before any sale of Iran’s Shahad-191, Shahed-129, or other kamikaze drones is finalized. Ozkarasahin suggests that the difficulty of integrating systems without Iranian boots on the ground, and the potential political sensitivities still could prove too much and prevent any notion in Tehran of actively supporting Putin’s war in Ukraine. Other military analysts purport that the deal already is inked and ready to go. If Iran’s drones are used in the war in Ukraine, it will represent a widening of the conflict and present new challenges for the West in dealing with Iran at a sensitive time in Tehran’s nuclear development program.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: Iran President Raisi meets with Putin, July 20 (Iran Govt. )

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.