China Vastly Growing Nuclear Threat

Several hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) silos are buried at three sites in the sands of China’s western deserts near Yumen, Hami, and Ordos. Beijing touts additional road mobile intercontinental missile launchers it says are capable of carrying advanced weapons of great destructive power and able to reach the continental US. Recently Beijing launched its third aircraft carrier. Add to that list Beijing’s advancements in ground-based, large-phased array radars, and space-based assets capable of detecting ballistic-missile launches, among other modern weapons. Together they represents a concerted effort by China to move to a Launch-on-Warning posture. According to Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the US Strategic Command, China’s self-defense claims are inconsistent with the qualitative and quantitative programs under way.

This Wednesday marks the ceremonial announcement by China of a new emerging offensive threat to SE Asia. It comes from the sea as the PLAN is breaking ground on new facilities at the northern end of Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville, Cambodia. It is located on a peninsula southeast of the provincial capital of Krong Preah Sihanouk and will offer China expanded access to the Gulf of Thailand and the southern region of the South China Sea. US naval experts predicted for years that Xi Jinping would establish an overseas naval outpost in the region. Washington is concerned, in part, because of the extraordinary efforts China made to conceal its plans prior to this week’s announcement. Ellen Nakashima and Cate Cadell, writing in the Washington Post, reported that anonymous American officials said it “is part of Beijing’s strategy to build a network of military facilities around the world in support of its aspirations to become a true global power.”

The base will be capable of hosting large China naval bases and is Beijing’s second overseas facility. Its first naval base outside China is located in Djibouti in East Africa. China will have exclusive use of the base which will allow it to increase access to and put pressure on countries in the region. Base visits to the area under construction are restricted. Chinese military working at the site over the last year wore uniforms similar to their Cambodian counterparts or none at all to avoid suspicion.

Last year, according to a Pentagon report, a US offer to pay to renovate part of the base was rejected by Phnom Penh. The Cambodian government followed up by demolishing two US-funded facilities at the port. The DOD report suggests that “Cambodia may have instead accepted assistance from the [People’s Republic of China] to develop the base.” A Vietnamese facility at Ream also was relocated off site as China and Vietnam have a tense relationship.

At the opening session of the National People’s Congress in March, China announced it intends to boost the country’s defense budget by 7.1 percent, to a total of 1.45 trillion yuan ($230 billion) in 2022 in the sixth consecutive year of massive increases in military funding. The government called for enhanced spending and advances in military technology to increase side-by-side with the domestic economy. The PLA will be 100 years old in 2027. China intends by that date to have a completely modernized army and by 2035 to have modernized all its national defense programs. Military analysts suggest that the types of programs and amount spent is not in line with a defensive program but represents an aggressive offensive policy.

In 2019 President Xi Jinping called on the PLA to “thoroughly implement” the “military strategic guideline for the new era.” It appears China is taking the next step forward this week with its ground-breaking ceremony at the Ream Base. In April, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley, said to Congress “We are entering a world that is becoming more unstable, and the potential for significant international conflict between great powers is increasing, not decreasing.” China is doing nothing to assuage his statement.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Illustration: DF-41 road-mobile missile (Wikipedia)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.