China-Indonesia Relations – USA Gov Policy

Nations need friends in our highly-interconnected, interdependent world. Despite its vast size and power, China is no exception. President Xi Jinping plans to travel to Bali next week for the G20 Summit meeting. While there he will meet with Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for the second time this year. Jokowi was the first foreign leader to meet with the Chinese leader since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Political analysts familiar with their relationship point out that it is steady, complicated, and mutual, with both leaders interested more in what the other can do for his country than in a personal friendship.

As early as 2014 Jokowi started courting Xi. During his first 24 months in office, Jokowi met with Xi five times, according to the Jakarta Post. During Covid they spoke six times by phone. Last year one Chinese official framed it as “Indonesia and China are good friends and good brothers.” China also is Indonesia’s biggest trading partner with over $124 billion in total bilateral trade last year and its third largest foreign investor. William Yuen Yee, of the Jamestown Foundation points out that “Such realism follows an extended Indonesian tradition of foreign policy nonalignment that stretches back to the republic’s founding in 1945.”

Jokowi views the potential of Chinese low-cost loans through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and substantial investment and trade flows worth the effort to cozy up to China, despite his country’s tradition of “rowing between two reefs” or maintaining a nonalignment policy. He told the Australian Financial Review that “For me ‘free and active’ is making friends with countries that can provide us with benefits.” Despite the outward appearances of Indonesia moving closer to Beijing, there are serious historical issues between the two states that keep them from further cementing ties. In the 1960’s, the government’s anti-Communist purge took the lives of more than one million people. Further complicating the Beijing-Jakarta relationship are ideological issues and anti-Chinese violence.

From the Indonesian perspective, China is at fault for unkept economic infrastructure promises. The BRI- financed, Jakarta-Bandung railway project has suffered costly operational delays with an excessive debt burden owed to China. Beijing is four years behind schedule in delivering the first high speed train in Southeast Asia with cost overruns that have increased by 23%. The Indonesian people and Jokowi also have strong feelings about the way China has treated the Muslim population in western China and the ongoing territorial dispute over the Natuna Islands. The islands emerged as a contentious issue in 2019 when China made claims of sovereignty using its nine-dash line. Indonesia avoids the issue publicly although they are rich in natural gas and marine life.

Earlier in 2021 a study published by Indonesia’s premier graduate military academy called Beijing’s military threat to Indonesia’s sovereignty over the disputed Natuna Islands “highly imminent.” Later that year the Jakarata Post reported that Chinese law enforcement vessels conducted continuous patrols around a new Indonesian drilling site north of the Natuna Islands, and a Chinese survey ship monitored the seabed within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.

Although Jakarta has grown close to China there is an increased concern over China’s aggressive behavior in the Asia-Pacific region. This year during Indonesia’s expanded Garuda Shield exercises (with 14 countries, including the US, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, and Singapore), Japan joined for the first time. Almost as disconcerting as China’s maritime policy is to the Indonesian people, is China’s treatment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. Jokowi, balancing the costs and benefits of the bilateral relationship, has been almost silent on the issue.When questioned about the issue, Yee writes, “Jokowi’s answer did not mention China by name and instead responded in general terms: “We must not contradict Islam with democracy… Islam and Indonesia respect each other. We expect all countries to do the same.” Foremost in Jokowi’s mind is an Indonesia first policy, even if that means maneuvering through a complicated interpersonal relationship with Xi. It is through this narrow, self-interested lens that we must analyze the Beijing-Jakarta relationship, despite its global implications.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: President Xi (Chinese Government photo)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.