China in the Arctic – USA Gov Policy

Daria Novak, a former U.S. State Department official with significant experience in Chinese affairs, authored this column. She writes each Friday on related topics.

China is the only nation preparing for the Transpolar Passage, which likely will be commercially viable in a few decades and cut straight through the North Pole. If there is only one season of open water the normally fifteen-foot thick, multi-year ice will upon refreezing be very thin in the following years, even if temperatures grow colder. Russia’s nuclear ice breakers will no longer be required to keep open the passage. And, the now open route will cut two to three weeks off a trip through the Suez Canal making a dramatic difference between loss and profit for China. It also will help its ships avoid passing through waters controlled by East African pirates and western-dominated choke points. But is the 30% shorter sea route and increased profit for China’s shipping industry the sole motive for making political investments in the Arctic?

At the beginning of the 21^st century Chinese planners began to consider seriously a long-term governance role for the country in the Arctic region. Beijing’s strategists concluded that the prestige of being accepted as a global power and the military advantages of a polar route, along with the economic benefits offered by the shorter open Arctic sea route to Europe and the American east coast, outweighed any costs the country might incur. Beijing encouraged its enterprises to participate in the construction of infrastructure along the route, too, as it has in other areas of the world in which it was attempting to gain influence.

By 2006 Beijing had obtained observer status on the Arctic Council, the governing body run by the eight Arctic states, and soon after devised its formal “Polar Silk Road” strategy. The plan called for investing heavily in the infrastructure of the cash-starved Arctic nations. It enabled China to increase its access to Arctic political leaders and sign a series of energy and trade accords. China’s leaders even boldly attempted to buy a defunct US naval base from Greenland.

Advances in excavating technology opened the possibility of mining valuable undersea natural resources, including oil, natural gas, and rare earth minerals. Melting Arctic ice caps, at the same time, began extending the season for open water along the New Northern Route. This meant commercial viability for exporting more goods to Europe and eastern North America. By 2017 the first non-icebreaker ship traversed the route and a year later the Maersk Line sent one of its container ships through as a test. Western analysts believe the route will become commercially viable by 2040.

From Beijing’s perspective, the opportunity appeared right around the corner and they acted well before the United States even had a policy in place. Last April was the first time the Department of Defense included a section on the Arctic in its annual report to Congress on China’s military power. Beijing willingly uses multilateral diplomatic channels, its economic resources, and scientific studies to justify its presence, assert its commercial rights, increase its physical presence, and to establish itself as a key player in an environmentally fragile and strategic area of the world far from its shores.

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Desperately needed investment funds from China helped sway political leaders in Iceland and Greenland to support Beijing’s agenda. Last May Iceland’s foreign minister, the rotational head of the Arctic Council, announced his governing body was “working closely with all partners, inside as well as outside the region….” and that it is of the “utmost importance for prosperity and security in the Arctic region.” China’s influence continues expanding throughout the region although some countries are growing more concerned about its potentially disruptive role in the area.

Behind closed doors China discussed aiding Greenland in its attempt to become independent from Denmark. Should this relationship strengthen further in the near future it could impede operations at the US base in Thule, Greenland, and pressure that country not to join NATO. If given access to deep-water ports near Thule, China could easily deploy its subs and operate stealthily along the east coast of the United States. China’s Northern Lights Institute in Greenland may already be in use by China tracking Western satellites and NATO airspace.

China’s pattern of aggressively impeding free navigation of the seas in Asia does not bode well for the future of the Arctic Ocean in an era of great power competition. With a 400% increase in human activity in the Artic environment in recent years, and China’s lack of environmental stewardship, the already fragile area may suffer irreversible damage.

Since 2014 Beijing has been expanding its military capability to defend its interests in the region. China’s geopolitical ambitions are vast and its policy long-term. As it expands its influence beyond Asia, the eight Arctic nations will be forced to decide how much power they are willing to abrogate to non-Arctic states. Beijing’s 2018 Arctic Policy calls for it to gain a more direct role in governance of the region and urges all Arctic stakeholders to share resources with non-Arctic states and non-state entities. China, if unchecked, could move from a strategy of war by other means to one of limited open conflict over the abundant natural resources in the Arctic and the military and economic benefits gained by controlling the new Transpolar Passage.

Photo: Xi Jingping, China’s leader (Official CPhoto)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.