Category: Quick Analysis

he New York Analysis of Policy & Government presents its third and final excerpt from the  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Report to Congress.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015 Report to Congress

Military & Space Affairs

China’s meteoric rise to military superpower status comes both from its robust economy as well as through outright theft of U.S. and other nation’s technological advances.

China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is extending its global reach, particularly through the increased international activities of the PLA Navy. In 2015, the PLA Navy evacuated hundreds of Chinese and foreign citizens from Yemen in what was China’s firstever PLA-led noncombatant evacuation operation. In addition, the PLA Navy has maintained its antipiracy presence in the Gulf of Aden, and has expanded its naval presence in the Indian Ocean with submarine patrols. Since it first sent a submarine to the Indian Ocean in late 2013, the PLA Navy has conducted at least three more Indian Ocean submarine patrols. In September 2015, the PLA Navy sailed through Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, the closest it has ever sailed to U.S. territory during a far seas deployment without a port call. The PLA Navy’s increasing activities far from China’s shores reflect China’s growing capability and willingness to use its military to protect its overseas economic assets and expatriate population. To support these activities, China appears to be seeking to establish its first overseas military facility in Djibouti.

These developments are enabled by China’s continued military modernization program, which seeks to transform the PLA into a technologically advanced military capable of projecting power throughout the Asia Pacific region and beyond. In 2015, China acquired or produced an array of advanced naval and air platforms, many of which would be useful in contingencies in the East and South China seas and those involving islands held by Taiwan. Some of China’s military modernization developments, such as its continued development and production of advanced submarines and surface ships, could increase the PLA Navy’s expeditionary capabilities.

The PLA’s training missions and exercises are increasingly sophisticated and reflect China’s goal to build a modern, integrated fighting force. To support its military modernization campaign, China’s official annual defense budget rose 10.1 percent to $141.9 billion (RMB 886.9 billion) in 2015, though its actual aggregate defense spending is much higher, as Beijing omits major defense-related expenditures from its official budget. After nominally increasing its defense budget by double digits almost every year since 1989, China’s defense spending appears sustainable in the short term. Although China’s slowing economic growth will generate opportunity costs as government spending strains to meet other national priorities, there is no sign this has affected military spending.

U.S.-China security relations suffered from rising tensions and growing distrust in 2015, largely due to China’s cyberespionage activities against a range of U.S. government, defense, and commercial entities and its massive island-building campaign in the South China Sea. In May, as more details of China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea emerged, the U.S. Navy began to publicize its air surveillance patrols near China’s reclaimed land features; in October, a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer conducted a freedom of navigation patrol within 12 nautical miles of one of the reclaimed features for the first time. Though China’s maritime dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea was less newsworthy in 2015, China continued to quietly increase its military and civilian presence in contested waters by conducting regular air and naval patrols near the islands.

CHINA’S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS

Based on decades of high prioritization and sustained investment from its leadership, China has become one of the world’s preeminent space powers, producing numerous achievements and capabilities that further its national security, economic, and political objectives. China’s space program involves a wide network of entities spanning its political, military, defense industry, and commercial sectors, but unlike the United States it does not have distinctly separate military and civilian space programs. Rather, top CCP leaders set long-term strategic plans for science and technology development, coordinate specific space projects, and authorize resource allocations, while organizations within China’s military execute policies and oversee the research, development, and acquisition process for space technologies. China’s military also exercises control over the majority of China’s space assets and space operations.

China is pursuing a broad array of counterspace capabilities and will be able to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime if these capabilities become operational. China’s 2007 test of the SC-19 direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missile destroyed an aging Chinese satellite and sparked worldwide criticism for creating dangerous orbital debris. The test demonstrated China’s ability to strike satellites in low Earth orbit where the majority of U.S. satellites reside. China’s 2013 DN-2 rocket test reached the altitude of geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites, marking China’s highest known suborbital launch to date and the highest worldwide since 1976; this indicated China is developing the capability to target higher orbits which contain U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and most U.S. ISR satellites. Since 2008, China has also conducted increasingly complex tests involving spacecraft in close proximity to one another; these tests have legitimate applications for China’s manned space program, but are likely also used for the development of co-orbital counterspace technologies. Computer network operations against U.S. space assets attributed to China have likely been used to demonstrate and test China’s ability to conduct future computer network attacks and perform network surveillance. Finally, China has acquired ground-based satellite jammers and invested heavily in research and development for directed energy technologies such as lasers and radio frequency weapons.

China’s space program has also progressed in the areas of spacebased command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), space-based PNT, space-based communications, and space launch functions. China now has approximately 142 operational satellites in orbit, with approximately 95 of these owned and operated by military or defense industry organizations. China’s current system of C4ISR satellites likely enables its military to detect and monitor U.S. air and naval activity out to the second island chain‡ with sufficient accuracy and timeliness to assess U.S. military force posture and cue other collection assets for more precise tracking and targeting. China’s regional PNT satellite system, known as Beidou, became operational in 2012, with global coverage expected by 2020. When completed, this system will provide PNT functions, essential to the performance of virtually every modern Chinese weapons system, independent from U.S.-run GPS. Although it lacks a designated civilian space program, China since the mid-1990s has incrementally developed a series of ambitious space exploration programs, categorized as civilian projects. China is one of three countries, along with the United States and Russia, to have independently launched a human into space, and has launched ten Shenzhou spacecraft and the Tiangong space lab in recent years as part of its human spaceflight program. In the program’s next phase, scheduled for completion by 2022, China plans to launch a permanent manned space station into orbit. China’s lunar exploration program has featured several lunar orbiting missions with multiple Chang’e spacecraft and the landing of a lunar rover, Jade Rabbit, in 2014. China plans to land and return a lunar rover in 2017 and become the first nation to land a spacecraft on the Moon’s “dark side” in 2020. Beijing is likely also conducting research for a manned mission to the moon and a mission to Mars, although neither project has yet received official approval.

China’s space activities present important implications and policy questions for the United States. Space capabilities have been integrated into U.S. military operations to such an extent that U.S. national security is now dependent on the space domain, and China’s 2007 antisatellite missile test in particular has been described by General John Hyten, commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command, as a “wakeup call” to the U.S. military regarding the vulnerability of its space assets. In the economic realm, U.S. providers of commercial satellites, space launch services, and GPS-based services may face increased competition as China seeks to expand its foothold in these markets, benefited by the blending of its civilian and military infrastructures and by government funding and policy support. U.S. export controls have also prompted many European countries and their industries to pursue space systems that are free of U.S. technologies—and therefore restrictions—in order to reach the Chinese market. Finally, China’s achievements in space will provide Beijing with greater prestige in the international system and expand its growing space presence, concurrent with declining U.S. influence in space; the United States currently depends on Russian launch vehicles to send humans into space, and the International Space Station is scheduled for deorbiting around 2024. Moreover, given current Congressional restrictions on U.S.-China space cooperation, the United States would not participate in any space program involving China, which raises concerns that reduced U.S. investment in its manned space program could result in the continued erosion of its technological edge and a shift of influence within the international space community.

CHINA’S OFFENSIVE MISSILE FORCES

China’s offensive missile forces are integral to its military modernization objectives and its efforts to become a worldclass military capable of projecting power and denying access by adversaries to China’s periphery. The PLA’s Second Artillery Force— responsible for China’s missile forces initially as a solely nuclear force and since the 1990s as a conventional force as well—has taken on new missions and seen its bureaucratic status within the PLA elevated. The Second Artillery provides China with a decisive operational advantage over other regional militaries competing to defend maritime claims, and its long-range precision-strike capabilities improve its ability to engage the U.S. military at farther distances in the event of a conflict. These capabilities provide an increasingly robust deterrent against other military powers and— in the case of China’s nuclear arsenal—serve as a guarantor of state survival, ultimately bolstering the CCP leadership in its quest for legitimacy.

China is making significant qualitative improvements to its nuclear deterrent along with moderate quantitative increases in the course of its efforts to build a more modern nuclear force. China’s nuclear doctrine is premised on the concept of a “lean and effective” force guided by a doctrine of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons (although the exact circumstances under which China would use nuclear weapons, what China would consider “first use,” and whether the policy may be reconsidered have been subjects of debate). China has approximately 250 nuclear warheads, according to unofficial sources. It has specifically invested in enhancing its theater nuclear force and diversifying its nuclear strike capabilities away from liquid-fueled, silo-based systems.

China’s DF-5 missiles have been equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, confirmed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for the first time in 2015; newer intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in development could also have this capability, increasing China’s ability to penetrate adversary missile defenses and enhancing the credibility of its nuclear forces as a deterrent. China is expected to conduct its first nuclear deterrence submarine patrols using the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine by the end of 2015, marking China’s first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear capability and presumably requiring changes to its “de-alerting” policy of keeping nuclear warheads stored separately from missiles.

China may also be developing a nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile, the CJ-20, potentially introducing an air-delivered theater nuclear strike capability into its arsenal for the first time. Importantly, as stated by Dr. Christopher Yeaw, founder and director of the Center for Assurance, Deterrence, Escalation, and Nonproliferation Science & Education, in his testimony to the Commission, China may also perceive its nuclear arsenal to be useful in the political management of an unsustainable conventional conflict, in which it would punctuate non-nuclear operations with tactical- or theater-level nuclear strikes to seek deescalation on terms favorable to China.

A key implication of this approach for the United States is that China “may escalate across the nuclear threshold at atime and manner, and for a purpose, that we do not expect.” China has achieved extraordinarily rapid growth in its conventional missile capability, according to DOD, developing a wide range of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to hold targets at risk throughout the region, even as far as the second island chain. China’s short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force has grown from 30 to 50 missiles in the mid-1990s to at least 1,200 in 2015, mostly deployed along the Taiwan Strait.

China’s development of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) provide the ability to conduct precision strikes against land and naval targets within the first island chain. China in 2010 fielded the world’s first antiship ballistic missile, an MRBM variant known as the DF-21D, and revealed at a September 2015 military parade that the DF-26 IRBM—with a stated range reaching out to the second island chain, including Guam—also has an antiship variant.

China has also continued to modernize its cruise missiles, most notably by developing two supersonic antiship cruise missiles: the surface ship- or submarine-launched YJ-18 and the air-launched YJ-12, both of which will provide a significant range extension over previous capabilities. China has a hypersonic weapons program in developmental stages, and reportedly conducted its fourth and fifth hypersonic glide vehicle tests in 2015, after conducting three in 2014.

Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, testified to the Commission that China may be able to field a regional hypersonic glide vehicle by 2020 and a supersonic combustion ramjet-propelled cruise vehicle with global range before 2025. Whether China arms its hypersonic weapons with nuclear or conventional payloads—or both—will provide more information regarding how it intends to incorporate hypersonic weapons into PLA planning and operations.

The increasing survivability, lethality, and penetrability of China’s missile forces present several implications for the United States. First, these forces can threaten increasingly greater portions of the Western Pacific, and a spending competition between additional Chinese missiles and U.S. missile defense systems would likely be highly unfavorable to the United States based on relative cost. In response, the United States is working to develop lower-cost-per-shot missile defense systems, while other options include disrupting networks that would support Chinese missile forces or using long-range stealth bombers to operate beyond the reach of advanced Chinese missiles. Second, China’s increasing ability to threaten U.S. partners and allies with its missile arsenal supports its regional ambitions, improves its coercive ability, weakens the value of deterrence efforts targeted against it, and widens the range of possibilities that might draw the United States into a conflict. Third, China’s missile buildup has contributed to a U.S. policy debate regarding the modern-day relevance of U.S. treaty obligations to forgo developing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (311 and 3,418 miles); some experts suggest modifications could allow the United States to strengthen its regional deterrence capabilities. Finally, these developments present new challenges for the United States and China as they consider how to successfully manage and deescalate potential crises in an environment with new factors of instability.

The Commission recommends:

• Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to provide an unclassified estimate of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force’s inventory of missiles and launchers, by type, in future iterations of its Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, as included previously but suspended following the 2010 edition.
• Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to prepare a report on the potential benefits and costs of incorporating ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional cruise and ballistic missile systems into the United States’ defensive force structure in the Asia Pacific, in order to explore how such systems might help the U.S. military sustain a cost-effective deterrence posture.
• Congress continue to support initiatives to harden U.S. bases in the Asia Pacific, including the Pacific Airpower Resiliency Initiative, in order to increase the costliness and uncertainty of conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes against these facilities, and thereby dis-incentivize a first strike and increase regional stability.
• Congress continue to support “next-generation” missile defense initiatives such as directed energy and rail gun technologies, and require the U.S. Department of Defense to report to committees of jurisdiction on the status of current component sourcing plans for the development and production of directed energy weapons.

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