What do current trends indicate for the future of both individuals and nations? That questions is the central focus of the new “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), a government organization that is the U.S. center for long-term strategic analysis.
Established in 1979, the NIC has attempted to “act as a bridge between the intelligence and policy communities.” The NIC’s National Intelligence Officers, from government, academia, and the private sector, are the intelligence community’s senior experts on a range of regional and functional issues.
According to the NIC, its Global Trends 2030 is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories over the next 15 years. As with the NIC’s previous Global Trends reports, it does not seek to predict the future, which it admits would be impossible, but instead provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.
The NIC utilized in-depth research, detailed modeling and a variety of analytical tools from public, private and academic sources from 20 nations for the report, as well as the offerings from contributors to an open web site.
The report describes a world in which American power and influence is significantly reduced, along with the rest of western civilization.
Any endeavor of this sort must be viewed with a panoply of caveats. Jeffrey Gedmin, president of the London-based think tank, the Legatum Institute,points out that that “A century ago, two popular forecasts stood out: one that the advent of international trade would soon make war obsolete; the other, that the one nation poised to play a leading role for peace in the world was Germany.” Today, even the most well-reasoned predictions by the most informed experts stand an equal chance of being as completely wrong as that, and so the results of Global Trends 2030 must be viewed skeptically.
All that being said, certain beliefs about the future, and actions based on those beliefs, can become self-fulfilling prophesies. A nation that believes it is in decline, and rejects its core values, may take actions that make that mere possibility an eventual reality.Similarly, a nation with few resources and with the odds dramatically against it can prevail and prosper. There were few who would have bet that the American Revolution could succeed; before the Battle of Britain, the United Kingdom appeared doomed.
Reflecting this, Gemin is concerned that “In the United States, what made America of the past great–things such as risk, thrift, self-reliance, humility, and deferred gratification–have slowly been fading as central tenets of America life and key ingredient of the American dream. In foreign policy, we’ve always been at our best when we balance interests and values, and fuse American values to universal values, so that we can work closely with and appeal to the enlightened interests of other nations.”
Certainly, the United States of the past four years appears poised for decline. An already substantive national debt has been turned into an immediate crisis, thanks to four years of trillion-dollar plus annual deficits. Worse yet, the vast sums were not invested in the national future, but were, essentially, transferred from productive citizens to government programs whose major accomplishment was increasing the popularity of elected officials.
America has endured periods of extraordinary crisis in the past. The invasions of 1812, the Civil War of the 1860s, the Great Depression of the 1930s are salient examples of dire challenges that were met and conquered. In more recent memory, the United States at the end of the 1970’s seemed the model of a power in decline.
National pride had reached its nadir after the Watergate scandal and an ignominious end to the war in Vietnam. Massive government errors had resulted in fuel disruptions. The Apollo space program, which placed men on the moon and significantly boosted national pride and the value of U.S. international trade, was prematurely concluded. Inflation of over 20% plagued the economy. Foreign policy errors had produced major problems in the Middle East, particularly in Iran. Anti-U.S. forces increased their sway in Latin America. Internationally, it appeared that the Soviet Union was becoming the world’s greatest power.
But American policy, both at home and abroad, changed dramatically in the 1980s. An optimistic new president helped virtually eliminate inflation. His dedication to rebuilding American military strength tamed the Russian bear and brought an end to the possibility of Moscow becoming an international hegemon. Along with a Pope that had seen the face of evil and was prepared to openly confront it, a Polish labor leader who refused to submit to tyranny, and an English Prime Minister more bold than any since Churchill, the world changed in ways that appeared impossible just a few short years before.
The condition of the United States today is remarkably similar to that of the late 1970s, and perhaps, even worse. The national economy remains mired in a dismal period of high unemployment and extremely slow growth. Vast spending programs have produced no noticeable gains. American military strength has reached a low point in relation to other nations not seen since the Carter Administration, and the potential impact of deep budget cuts may further and dramatically weaken it. Similar to the premature end of the Apollo program, we currently have no ability to place astronauts in orbit for purposes both practical and inspirational. The public’s lack of confidence in the federal government is at Watergate levels. The debacle of the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran at the end of the ’70’s has its echo in the failure of the current Administration to rescue the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi.
The question of whether the United States can recover as it did in the 1980’s remains unresolved. The Global Trends 2030 report reviews current conditions, and makes projections based on them.
PART 2
In last week’s edition, we introduced the U.S. Intelligence Council’s
(IC) new “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” report, and discussed its broad outline. We now look into the reports’ specific thoughts on the trends and outcomes the agency believes will create our future.
Once again, we provide a caveat: predictions are merely interpretations of current trends and conditions, and cannot foresee with accuracy how events will actually develop. As the author Mark Steyn has noted, “None of us knows how things will stand in 2030, any more than most of our forebears in 1908 could have predicted the collapses of the Russian, Turkish, Austrian, and German empires within a decade.”
There are criteria that neither the Global 2030 report or any other similar attempt can calculate. The relative military, economic, and social strength of any nation will depend on both specific factors and hard facts such as the availability of resources, and nonspecific criteria such as cultural shifts. A nation may have a major change brought on not by any hard fact, but by a change in attitude. Some Soviet leaders noted that they believed their cause was lost when their youth, who were swayed by western rock n’ roll, began adopting western norms of dress and taste.
While it remains too early to tell, a similar seismic shift may now be occurring in the United States. The alteration in public attitudes, reflected in presidential elections, between the era of Ronald Reagan and that of Barack Obama could not be more drastic.
Reagan preached the doctrine of free markets, and gave rise to significant economic improvement over the financial challenges of the 1970s. Obama’s emphasis is on social entitlements above all else. The nation, as a consequence, concurrently endures a prolonged period of high unemployment and an ongoing period of little or no growth.
A similar comparison may be made in the dramatically different international relationships and “hard” power attitudes of the two administrations. Reagan confronted Soviet power by an unprecedented peacetime buildup of military force, and maintaining strong relationships with traditional allies such as the United Kingdom. The result was an end to the Soviet empire.
Confronted with a similar challenge from China, the Obama administration takes the opposite course, as it seeks to deemphasize and further reduce an already sharply diminished American military. It has distanced itself from traditional allies such as the United Kingdom and Israel, and seeks warmer ties with Moscow.
The Major Changes:
Tectonic shifts between now and 2030
The IC believes that there will be seven major “tectonic shifts” between now and 2030:
1. According to the report, the middle class throughout the developing world will expand substantially both in numbers and in percentage of the population.
2. A wider spectrum of instruments of war-especially precision strike capabilities, cyber instruments, and bioterror weaponry-will become accessible. Individuals and small groups will have the capability to perpetuate large-scale violence and disruption-a capability formerly the monopoly of states.
3. U.S, European, and Japanese share of global income is projected to fall from 56% today to well under half by 2030. By 2020, emerging markets share of financial assets is projected to almost double.
4. Whereas in 2012 only Germany and Japan have matured beyond a median age of 45 years, most European countries, South Korea, and Taiwan will have entered the post-mature age category by 2030. Migration will become more globalized as both rich and developing countries suffer from workforce shortages.
5. Today’s roughly 50% urban population will climb to nearly 60%, or 4.9 billion people, in 2030. Africa will gradually replace Asia as the region with the highest urbanization growth rate. Urban center are estimated to generate 80% of economic growth; the potential exists to apply modern technologies and infrastructure, promoting better use of scarce resources.
6. Demand for food is expected to rise by at least 35% by 2030 while demand for water is expected to rise by 40%. Nearly half of the world’s population will live in areas experiencing severe water stress. Fragile states in Africa and the Middle East are most at risk of experiencing food and water shortages, but China and India are also vulnerable.
7. With shale gas, the US will have sufficient natural gas to meet domestic needs and generate potential global exports for decades to come. Increased oil production from difficult-to-access oil deposits would result in a substantial reduction in the US net trade balance and faster economic expansion. Global spare capacity may exceed over 8 million barrels, at which point OPEC would lose price controls and crude oil prices would collapse, causing a major negative impact on oil-export economies.
OUTCOMES
Based on these trends, Global 2030 then explores the “best and worst outcomes” they could foreshadow. NY Analysis comments are encapsulated within [brackets.]
TRADE: International GDP expanded by an extraordinary 32% from 1980 to 2005. World merchandise imports/exports increased over seven-fold. Currently, however, the Doha trade round has stalled.
Worst case scenario: Prospects for trade are dim. Destabilizing trade imbalances make multilateral trade coordination difficult, although protectionism is unlikely.
Best case scenario: Concessions by both developing and emerging markers lead to productive agreements.
CLIMATE CHANGE: Annual meetings have failed to yield any new post-Kyoto comprehensive agreements. [It should be noted that internationally, revelations about falsified data have caused appropriate increased skepticism, along with the continued discussion of the possibility raised that climate change may be due in siginficant part to nonhuman factors.]
Worst case scenario: Global economic slowdown makes it impossible for the U.S., China and other major emitters to reach meaningful agreement. The result leaves UN-sponsored climate negotiations in a state of collapse, with greenhouse gas emissions unchecked.
Best case scenario: Cheaper and more plentiful natural gas makes emissions target easier to achieve, but so-called “two degree” target would be unlikely to be met. As disparities between rich and poor countries decrease, rising powers may be more prepared to make economic sacrifices.
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Global 2030 discusses how the establishment and near universal adoption of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has facilitated the emergence of a powerful international norm against nuclear proliferation. Unilateral action and military force has been employed to address non-compliance in some cases.
Worst case scenario: Iran and North Korea trigger others’ active interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Terrorists or extremist elements also acquire WMD material. The erosion to NPT spills over, potentially triggering a total breakdown in the international system.
Best case scenario: Iran and North Korea are dissuaded from further WMD development. Terrorist groups do not acquire WMDs. The West may need to extend the nuclear umbrella to countries feeling threatened by proliferation. [However, in response to the current American administration’s intent to substantially reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal, this may prove difficult.]
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P): Multilateral efforts to prevent violent physical repression have been sporadic and partially successful, especially since the end of the Cold War. [Throughout the Islamic world, the repression of females has risen sharply in nations adopting a strict brand of Sharia as the central law.]
Worst case scenario: Western countries have become increasingly isolated. The lack of international consensus prevents UNSC from acting to impose sanctions, authorize military force, or make referrals to the International Criminal Court. Facing political and economic constraints, the US and Europe would only be capable of taking ad hoc actions to prevent atrocities.
Best case scenario: Western engagement with India, Brazil, and other rising democracies would lead to greater consensus on R2P, particularly the basis for military intervention.
FAILING STATES/UNGOVERNED SPACES: Multilateral efforts to date have been sporadic, spotty, and under-resourced. Most have focused on acute security threats.
Worst case scenario: As a result of shrinking international commitments, criminal and terrorist networks flourish. UN and regional organizations find themselves further under-resourced to combat growing challenges. Resources in fragile states are squandered, adding to corruption and governance problems. Increase in number of failed states.
Best case scenario: Emerging powers see their interests threatened by failing states. With a growing consensus, the G-20 facilitates burden sharing among major powers, the UN, and regional groups. Regional organizations assume greater responsibilities for fragile states in their neighborhoods.
PART 3
THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT
In the aftermath of World War I, many believed that the scale of the conflict and the resulting destruction made it “The War to End All Wars.” Similarly, following the conclusion of World War II, the advent of nuclear weapons led many to believe that the dire threat of devastation on a global scale rendered the possibility of another conventional conflict unthinkable. A half century later, the downfall of the Soviet Empire led some observers to conclude that the world had arrived at the end of history, at least as it related to warfare, as noted by author Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama.
None of the optimistic forecasts proved even remotely accurate, of course. Currently, many are arguing that the U.S. military budget can be significantly reduced because no large scale conflicts are in sight. The facts, however, indicate that that rosy prediction will prove as disappointing as its predecessors.
Throughout the globe, potential adversaries are rapidly developing powerful militaries, including two powers that rival the United States in technological prowess and significantly outnumber the U.S. in several categories of weapons.
How does the National Intelligence Council see the future of conflict? We continue our review of its Global 2030 report with an examination of its analysis on the future of warfare. The agency’s analysis breaks down its discussion into intrastate and interstate areas.
GLOBAL 2030’S REVIEW OF
INTRASTATE CONFLICT POTENTIAL
The report notes that “the proportion of youthful countries experiencing one or more violent intrastate conflicts declined from 25% in 1995 to 15% in 2005.” The potential for future armed disputes varies sharply depending on location.
In South America and Asia, maturing age structures (median age above 25years) are declining. That probably indicates a lessening of the chance for fighting. However, in the western, central and eastern portions of sub-Saharan Africa, in the Middle East, South Asia, and in a number of Asian-Pacific island areas, the reverse is true.
Competition for natural resources, especially arable land and water, and the presence of disproportionate amounts of young males will serve as provocative factors leading to conflict. Our NEW YORK ANALYSIS review adds Islamic extremism as a key factor prompting this danger. The harsh lack of tolerance for other faiths, and even for different interpretations of the Moslem religion, render Islamic extremism a major source of intrastate and interstate conflict.
Global 2030 notes that the increased availability of sophisticated weaponry renders this civil warfare far more dangerous than in the past. While terrorism, subversion, sabotage and insurgency will continue their traditional roles, the use of precision missiles and similar devices will bring many aspects of conventional warfare into play.
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
The type of large scale, nation vs. nation warfare that became unfortunately familiar over the Twentieth Century has not been particularly prominent in the past decade, but the NEW YORK ANALYSIS believes that significant storm clouds are brewing.
For Americans, the main danger remains the massive and unprecedented buildup of China’s armed forces. Buoyed by a powerful economy, Beijing has invested heavily in matching the U.S. technology edge. The full extent of that nation’s military budget cannot be accurately outlined, since significant portions are hidden.
Satellite killing weapons, electromagnetic pulse devices that can cripple U.S. carriers, stealth aircraft, and a growing naval force render it a significant threat to the United States military. China’s land forces vastly outnumber their American counterparts in many key areas.
Beyond the mere existence of a powerful military, a newly belligerent attitude on the part of Beijing is also apparent. China’s navy has occupied a mineral-rich off- shore region belonging the Philippines, and is currently feuding with Japan and several other neighboring states concerning territorial disputes.
China also has the financial and diplomatic clout to reign in North Korea (which recently announced the test of a nuclear capable missile targeting the U.S.) but has failed to do so.
Second only to China in serving as a significant threat to America is Russia, which under Vladimir Putin has returned to a cold war emphasis on military might. Renewed patrols off the U.S. coast by nuclear-capable bombers and submarines, and significant funding of new air and naval force construction clearly indicate that Moscow is once again a potent potential problem for the U.S.
Russia has expressed distress over the diplomatic independence of the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. The possibilities of a NATO/Russian dispute over this will continue to exist for some time.
GLOBAL 2030’S REVIEW OF
INTERSTATE CONFLICT POTENTIAL
Global 2030 accurately points out that the number of traditional nation vs. nation conflicts have been at historically low levels over the past decade.
Optimistically, while noting the rise of new powers, The National Intelligence Council stresses that while “new powers are rising…they stand to benefit from the existing international order and are therefore status quo oriented. An increasing number of states have consciously or implicitly chosen to maintain military capabilities far below their inherent capabilities.”
However, the report goes on to note that “A more fragmented international system increases the risks. Additionally, increased resources competition, spread of lethal technologies, and spillover from regional conflicts increase the potential for interstate conflicts…Future wars in Asia and the Middle East could include [a] nuclear element. Information superiority will be increasingly vital. Proliferation of standoff missiles will increase the capacity of non-state actors. [The] distinction between regular and irregular forms of warfare may fade as some state-based militaries adopt irregular tactics.”
Global 2030 notes that while the chances for interstate conflict are historically low, they are nevertheless rising. In addition to the possibility of a Sino-American or Russian/NATO dispute, the possibility of a Russo-Chinese conflict may rise in the future, as well. While Moscow and Beijing have drawn significantly closer in their mutual animosity towards Washington, Russia continues to cast a wary eye on China’s need for resources, which exist within Moscow’s territory, and the increasingly powerful forces Beijing now fields.
In addition to the increased demand for resources, the existence of new technologies lowers the threshold for the start of some forms of conflict, which may quickly escalate from cyber attacks to full blown warfare. According to The National Intelligence Council,, “Cyber weapons can take various forms including viruses (self-replicating programs that require human action to spread), worms (a sub-class of viruses that can spread without human action) Trojan horses (malicious software programs hidden within a legitimate program) denial-of-service attacks (bombarding servers with messages that make them crash) and phishing (rogue emails and websites that trick people into revealing password information.)
Similarly, the relatively inexpensive use of bio-weapons could allow lesser powers or terrorist groups to cause massive harm.
In addition to cyberspace and biotechnology, the use of electro magnetic pulse technology technology can be employed by a secondary power to render a modern military and an advanced economy virtually helpless. The NEW YORK ANALYSIS believes that nations such as North Korea or Iran could pose a significant danger to the western powers through these “non-lethal” weapons.
Since the conclusion of the Second World War, conflict on a global scale has not plagued the planet, although significant interstate conflicts have occurred between nations. Unfortunately, while historically low levels of international combat have been reached, the growing danger from newly empowered nations, asymmetrical warfare, scarce resources, and inexpensive technologies may bring this relatively benign period to an end before 2030.