Author: Frank V. Vernuccio, Jr.

The Beige Book is a Federal Reserve System publication about current economic conditions across the 12 Federal Reserve Districts. It characterizes regional economic conditions and prospects based on a variety of mostly qualitative information, gathered directly from each District’s sources. The latest edition has just been released. We present key portions of the summary here.

Overall Economic Activity

Overall economic activity expanded slightly, on balance, since late February. Ten out of twelve Districts experienced either slight or modest economic growth—up from eight in the previous report, while the other two reported no changes in activity. Consumer spending barely increased overall, but reports were quite mixed across Districts and spending categories. Several reports mentioned weakness in discretionary spending, as consumers’ price sensitivity remained elevated. Auto spending was buoyed notably in some Districts by improved inventories and dealer incentives, but sales remained sluggish in other Districts. Tourism activity increased modestly, on average, but reports varied widely. Manufacturing activity declined slightly, as only three Districts reported growth in that sector. Contacts reported slight increases in nonfinancial services activity, on average, and bank lending was roughly flat overall. Residential construction increased a little, on average, and home sales strengthened in most Districts. In contrast, nonresidential construction was flat, and commercial real estate leasing fell slightly. The economic outlook among contacts was cautiously optimistic, on balance.

Labor Markets

Employment rose at a slight pace overall, with nine Districts reporting very slow to modest increases, and the remaining three Districts reporting no changes in employment. Most Districts noted increases in labor supply and in the quality of job applicants. Several Districts reported improved retention of employees, and others pointed to staff reductions at some firms. Despite the improvements in labor supply, many Districts described persistent shortages of qualified applicants for certain positions, including machinists, trades workers, and hospitality workers. Wages grew at a moderate pace in eight Districts, with the remaining four noting only slight to modest wage increases. Multiple Districts said that annual wage growth rates had recently returned to their historical averages. On balance, contacts expected that labor demand and supply would remain relatively stable, with modest further job gains and continued moderation of wage growth back to pre-pandemic levels.

Prices

Price increases were modest, on average, running at about the same pace as in the last report. Disruptions in the Red Sea and the collapse of Baltimore’s Key Bridge caused some shipping delays but so far did not lead to widespread price increases. Movements in raw materials prices were mixed, but six Districts noted moderate increases in energy prices. Contacts in several Districts reported sharp increases in insurance rates, for both businesses and homeowners. Another frequent comment was that firms’ ability to pass cost increases on to consumers had weakened considerably in recent months, resulting in smaller profit margins. Inflation also caused strain at nonprofit entities, resulting in service reductions in some cases. On balance, contacts expected that inflation would hold steady at a slow pace moving forward. At the same time, contacts in a few Districts—mostly manufacturers—perceived upside risks to near-term inflation in both input prices and output prices.

Highlights by Federal Reserve District

Boston

Business activity expanded at a modest pace in recent weeks, and prices rose slightly. Employment was flat overall, but one retailer reported significant layoffs. Convention and tourism activity grew at a robust pace. Home sales increased on a year-over-year basis, marking a turnaround. The outlook ranged from cautiously optimistic to bullish.

New York

On balance, regional economic activity remained flat. Labor market conditions were solid and continued to normalize as labor supply and labor demand came into better balance. Consumer spending was unchanged after a weak first quarter. Housing markets strengthened, with the spring selling season picking up beyond the seasonal norm. The pace of selling price increases remained modest.

Philadelphia

On balance, business activity was flat in the current Beige Book period—after declining slightly last period. Employment edged up, despite staffing and recruitment efforts slowing to a crawl. Wage and price inflation continue to moderate; however, housing affordability continues to be a concern. Overall, the outlook is positive, as firms remained optimistic about expectations for future growth.

Cleveland

District business activity increased modestly, as did employment. Firms anticipated greater ease filling open positions, including those that have been particularly challenging, because of increased labor availability. Wage pressures continued to normalize, and some contacts reduced starting wages for new roles. Cost and price pressures changed little.

Richmond

The regional economy grew at slight pace since our previous report. Consumer spending on retail goods was mixed but spending on travel and tourism was up slightly. Fifth District port activity slowed and was impacted by the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge. Employment growth slowed from a moderate to a modest rate in recent weeks, but wages continued to grow moderately. Price growth also remained moderate.

Atlanta

The Sixth District economy grew modestly. Labor markets continued to stabilize; wage pressures eased. Many nonlabor costs moderated. Retail sales were steady, but consumers remained price conscious. Tourism remained robust. Commercial real estate conditions slowed. Transportation activity was mixed. Manufacturing grew slightly. Loan demand was flat. Energy activity improved.

Chicago

Economic activity increased slightly. Employment increased modestly; business and consumer spending rose slightly; nonbusiness contacts saw no change in activity; and manufacturing and construction and real estate activity were flat. Prices and wages rose moderately, while financial conditions were stable. Prospects for 2024 farm income were unchanged.

St. Louis

Economic activity has continued to increase slightly since our previous report. Prices have increased modestly, as contacts are broadly feeling the pressures of increases in both labor and non-labor costs. The outlook was neutral to slightly optimistic, which is generally unchanged from our previous report, but better than one year ago.

Minneapolis

District economic activity grew slightly. Employment grew some, but labor demand was softer. Wage pressures were present but continued to ease, while price pressures ticked up. Consumer spending was mostly flat, and manufacturing slowed modestly. Commercial and residential construction improved slightly. Agricultural conditions were steady at low levels.

Kansas City

The District economy expanded modestly. Demand for auto loans and residential mortgages rose as borrowing rates declined. Demand for HELOC also increased as a means to consolidate or refinance household debt. Job gains were modest even as worker availability improved slightly.

Dallas

The Eleventh District economy expanded modestly. While activity in services and housing grew, manufacturing output, retail sales, and loan demand declined slightly. Employment growth slowed as wages, input costs, and selling prices grew at a moderate pace. Overall, Texas firms noted an uptick in uncertainty.

San Francisco

Economic activity continued to grow at a slight pace, employment levels were little changed, and prices and wages rose slightly. Retail sales were unchanged, and demand for services grew modestly. Demand for manufactured products changed little, and conditions in agriculture were mixed. Real estate activity was slightly down. Financial sector conditions were largely unchanged.

Note: This report was prepared at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston based on information collected on or before April 8, 2024. This document summarizes comments received from contacts outside the Federal Reserve System and is not a commentary on the views of Federal Reserve officials.

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture

NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

 The Commission recommends:   The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space.   The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture.   The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture   The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4   The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible.   The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS

The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible.   The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations.

RISK REDUCTION

The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces.   The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security.   The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change.   Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation.

The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now.

Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)

As we noted in Part 1, the dramatically deteriorating national security picture for the United States and its allies prompted a review of “America’s Strategic Posture.” We present Part 2, reviewing key strategic points.  

STRATEGY

To achieve the most effective strategy for stability in light of the 2027-2035 threat environment, the Commission identifies three necessary changes: ` The United States must develop and effectively implement a truly integrated, whole-of-government strategy to address the 2027-2035 threat environment. The objectives of U.S. strategy must include effective deterrence and defeat of simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia using conventional forces. If the United States and its Allies and partners do not field sufficient conventional forces to achieve this objective, U.S. strategy would need to be altered to increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or counter opportunistic or collaborative aggression in the other theater. ` The size and composition of the nuclear force must account for the possibility of combined aggression from Russia and China. U.S. strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included” threat. The United States needs a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.   The Commission recommends the United States maintain a nuclear strategy consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), based on six fundamental tenets—assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance, calculated ambiguity in declaratory policy, hedge against risk—and apply these tenets to address the 2027-2035 threat.

STRATEGIC POSTURE

 In the context of a strategic posture deploying both conventional and nuclear capability, the Commission believes the traditional role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy remains valid and of continuing importance: deterrence of adversaries; assurance of Allies; achieving U.S. objectives should deterrence fail; and hedging against adverse events.   The Commission recommends fully and urgently executing the U.S. nuclear modernization Program of Record (POR), which includes replacement of all U.S. nuclear delivery systems, modernization of their warheads, comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), and recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure at the DOD and DOE/NNSA.   The current modernization program should be supplemented to ensure U.S. nuclear strategy remains effective in a two-nuclear-peer environment.   Comprehensive risk-mitigating actions across U.S. nuclear forces must be executed to ensure that delays in modernization programs or early age-out of currently deployed systems do not result in militarily significant shortfalls in deployed nuclear capability.   The U.S. strategic nuclear force posture should be modified to: ` Address the larger number of targets due to the growing Chinese nuclear threat. ` Address the possibility that China will field large-scale, counterforce-capable missile forces that pose a threat to U.S. strategic nuclear forces on par with the threat Russia poses to those forces today. ` Assure the United States continues to avoid reliance on executing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch under attack to retain an effective deterrent. ` Account for advances in Russian and Chinese integrated air and missile defenses (IAMD).   The U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified to: ` Provide the President a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter Russian or Chinese limited nuclear use in theater. ` Address the need for U.S. theater nuclear forces deployed or based in the Asia-Pacific theater. ` Compensate for any shortfall in U.S. and allied non-nuclear capabilities in a sequential or simultaneous two-theater conflict against Russia and China. ` Address advances in Russian and Chinese IAMD.

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE INFRASTRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The Commission recommends the DOD and DOE/NNSA strategic infrastructure be expanded to have sufficient capacity to: ` Meet the capability and schedule requirements of the current nuclear modernization POR and the requirements of the force posture modifications recommended by the Commission in time to address the two-peer threat. ` Provide an effective hedge against four forms of risk: technical failure of a warhead or delivery system, programmatic delays, operational loss of delivery systems, and further deterioration of the geopolitical environment. ` Flex to respond to emerging requirements in a timely fashion.   To support the proposed strategy, the Commission recommends Congress fund an overhaul and expansion of the capacity of the U.S. nuclear weapons defense industrial base and the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including weapons science, design, and production infrastructure. Specifically: ` Congress should fund the full range of NNSA’s recapitalization efforts, such as pit production and all operations related to critical materials. ` Congress should forge and sustain bipartisan consensus and year-to-year funding stability to enable the defense industry to respond to innovative DOD contracting approaches and invest with more certainty. ` Congress should enact annual DOD and DOE authorization and appropriation bills before the beginning of each fiscal year. ` Congress should place the purview of all “050” programs (President’s Budget line item for “national security”) that are in NNSA under Defense appropriations subcommittees (House Appropriations Committee-Defense (HAC-D), Senate Appropriations Committee Defense (SAC-D). ` Cabinet Secretaries, working with states and union leaders, should establish and increase the technical education and vocational training programs required to create the nation’s necessary skilled-trades workforce for the nuclear enterprise.   The Commission recommends a number of specific actions to expand the capacity and effectiveness of the nation’s infrastructure and supply chain for its strategic capabilities.

The Report concludes tomorrow

Photo: Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, speaks with members from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as well as industry leaders at the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters on Peterson Space Force Base, Colo.(DoD)

The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

As 2023 drew to a close, the dramatically deteriorating national security picture for the United States and its allies prompted a review of “America’s Strategic Posture.” A committee chaired by Madelyn Creedon and Jon Kyl issued a sobering analysis. We present a summary of this vital analysis.

The militarily troubling and increasingly aggressive behaviors of Russia and China over the past decade led Congress to direct a review of the strategic posture of the United States, including nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.

China’s rapid military build-up, including the unprecedented growth of its nuclear forces, Russia’s diversification and expansion of its theater-based nuclear systems, the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion in February 2022, have all fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape. As a result of China’s and Russia’s growing competition with the United States and its Allies and partners, and the increasing risk of military conflict with one or both, as well as concerns about whether the United States would be prepared to deter two nuclear peers, Congress determined it was time for a new look at U.S. strategic policy, strategy, and force structure.

The new global environment is fundamentally different than anything experienced in the past, even in the darkest days of the Cold War. Today the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared. While the risk of a major nuclear conflict remains low, the risk of military conflict with either or both Russia and China, while not inevitable, has grown, and with it the risk of nuclear use, possibly against the U.S. homeland.

The United States faces a strategic challenge requiring urgent action. Given current threat trajectories, our nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global setting than it has ever experienced: we will face a world where two nations possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own. In addition, the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared, unless its leaders make decisions now to adjust the U.S. strategic posture.

America’s defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia. Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nucleararmed adversaries arising during the 2027-2035 timeframe. Moreover, these threats are such that the United States and its Allies and partners must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously.

The evidence demonstrates that the U.S.-led international order and the values it upholds are at risk from the Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes. The risk of military conflict with those major powers has grown and carries the potential for nuclear war. Therefore, the Commission reached the unanimous, non-partisan conclusion that today’s strategic outlook requires an urgent national focus and a series of concerted actions not currently planned. In sum, we find that the United States lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the looming twonuclear-peer threat environment and lacks the force structure such a strategy will require.

In reaching that overall conclusion, we make clear that the fundamentals of America’s deterrence strategy remain sound, but the application of that strategy must change to address the 2027-2035 threat environment. Those changes drive necessary adjustments to the posture of U.S. nuclear capabilities – in size and/or composition. A full spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities is also essential to the nation’s strategic posture. Such adjustments, in turn, drive the need to strengthen and expand the capacity of the infrastructure required to sustain and enhance U.S. strategic capabilities. In addition, Allies and partners are central to our findings regarding strategy and posture. We also emphasize the need for robust risk reduction efforts as fundamental to the U.S. approach in the new threat environment.

The Report continues tomorrow

Photo: The lead ground-based Interceptor is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., March 25, 2019, in the first salvo engagement test of a threat-representative intercontinental ballistic missile target. The test’s two interceptors successfully intercepted a target launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. (DoD)

Chinese technology is changing and its leadership is using it, along with espionage, to challenge the West in a number of critical areas. The United States is only one of its targets. Previously, Beijing’s spies primarily sought Western technologies as a way to skip generations of develop cost and time to modernize its economy. Today, its acquisition of advanced technologies, and now also its indigenous development, makes the communist giant a threat to freedom-loving people everywhere. This week Nan Mulchandani, the CIA’s chief technology officer, said Director William Burns is preparing for an “infinite race” with Beijing for artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. He argues the US must pivot toward providing American spies with the latest transformative technologies to outcompete China. 

Mulchandani says this means updating everything the agency does “from operations to the analytic function, support functions and other piece there.” America, he suggests, needs to alter its thinking toward viewing this not as a race with a finite end point, but as an ongoing competition. Mr. Mulchandani predicted that the next area of competition would “be primarily a software war that is powered by something like AI” rather than hardware fueled by software. That competition, however, is not confined to simply acquiring critical technologies for use in the future. China is also challenging the US in space.

China announced today it launched a groundbreaking mission to retrieve samples from the far side of the moon. The space capsule will arrive in four days and collect 4.4 pounds of moon rocks and regolith, or moon dirt. Beijing’s desire to one day become a space power and scientific force is for pragmatic purposes in 2024 a fait accompli. Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.), chairman of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, said during a NASA budget hearing this week, that “while the US remains the global leader in space exploration, we face increasing challenges internationally.” Referring to China’s space station, Lucas said:  “We cannot allow China to become the front-runner in space exploration… There are too many consequences for our competitiveness, our national security, and our continued ability to explore space.”

A new report released this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says that the United States, to further its geopolitical interests and maintain a strong domestic economy, must approach every aspect of economic and trade policy through the lens of global technology competition. The Biden Administration’s approach, it says, discounts the landscape of competition between China and the US and may “jeopardize US advancements in emerging technologies… which could cede the advantage to China….” In particular, the report recommends that the US take action now because quantum and artificial intelligence (AI) need a federal policy to ensure the country can spur the entrepreneurship and R&D efforts foundational to the strength of the technology sector.     

As China’s Communist Party (CCP) becomes more hostile to the United States and other Western nations, its aggressive activities abroad expand and intensify. Chinese spy cases far outnumber those of Russia and every other nation. CSIS reports that since President Xi took over in 2012 there have been 224 incidents of spying. Estimates of the long -term economic, scientific, and national security cost to the US run into the billions and have “created immeasurable damage to national security with the theft of weapons technology, including nuclear weapons test data… China has added the theft of massive quantities of personal information, political coercion, and influence operations, to its espionage activities.” The CSIS reports says that 49% of incidents of spying in the US directly involved Chinese military or government employees, with private Chinese citizens accounted for 41%. In 29% of the espionage cases the person involved was attempting to acquire military technology, while in 54% of the incidents it was related to commercial technologies. Almost half of the cases involved cyber espionage, usually by state—affiliated actors. 

No matter where one turns today China is challenging the West, from the depths of our oceans to outer space. The United States cannot count on China to be a good global citizen and refrain from attempting to enforce its vision of world order with Beijing at the apex. The time is growing short for the West to take action.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

While Russia is celebrating May Day at home this week, it is also growing closer to breaching the threshold triggering a nuclear event in Western Europe. Military analysts in Washington consider the recent deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus a political sign designed to unnerve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) easternmost flank. Alexander Taranov, of the Jamestown Foundation calls it “practical preparation for nuclear escalation.” Last week the Kremlin publicly repeated its threat of nuclear war against the West. It immediately followed the US Congress’ vote to provide $61 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. 

Up for debate is whether Russia’s storage of nuclear warheads in Belarus is short-term preparation for their operational use. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly declared that increasing aid to Ukraine increases the threat of a direct military clash. From Moscow’s perspective, he points out, Ukraine is backed by three nuclear states, including the US, UK, and France. He uses it to justify the Kremlin’s moves in Belarus as Russia considers the situation a serious strategic risk. The nuclear environment in Europe is moving beyond simple rhetoric this spring.

Russian-Belarus preparations for an attack on the West include war gaming a simulated nuclear event in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The operating assumption for the games is that the West is “morally too weak to respond with retaliatory strikes,” according to Taranov. The representative for national defense of the Belarusian opposition-in-exile’s United Transitional Cabinet and former commander of the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (Brest), Valery Sahashchyk, says that the militaries are war-gaming and preparing for an attack on Lithuania. Last week the publication RIA Novosti suggested that the Kremlin may take matters into its own hands and that Russia is fighting a “long war” against the collective West and Ukraine. 

Just over a month ago, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) confirmed the establishment of a nuclear warhead storage facility near Asipovichy, Belarus, where, according to Taranov, the 1405^th Artillery Ammunition Base is located. The 465^th Missile Brigade is almost co-located and supplied with Russian Iskander-M operational-tactical missile (RMB) systems that are also known as TNW carriers. Pre-deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) raises the potential that Russia could choose to use them should the war in Ukraine go badly this summer. 

Western powers are divided on how to view the Russian nuclear moves. Some military planners are arguing that the West needs to be prepared, despite the possibility that Putin is simply posturing and not preparing for war. Other Western commentators suggest it is only posturing since prior to the recent nuclear deployment in Belarus, Russia already had the capability to launch a strike in Eastern Europe using its modernized nuclear weapons storage facilities in Kaliningrad. 

Taranov points out that the Belarusian nuclear site is only modernized with added perimeter security and an access point and that “No underground bunker-type fortifications, designed for the long-term storage of TNWs… were built on the Belarusian base’s territory. Instead, the nuclear warheads were placed in one of the arsenals of the ammunition base, which also stores operational-tactical missiles for the Iskander-M system.” He says this co-location with their launch vehicles is an indication that a repair and maintenance base has been organized there to support and prepare the TNWs for operational use. Personnel on the site are likely tasked with fitting the nuclear warheads on the missiles. 

What makes this more concerning is that during a peacetime environment, the standard Russian practice is to store TNWs in a special bunker-type fortified facility while RMBs typically are located off base. Military procedures in the past called for moving TNWs off base to the TNW carrier and delivery vehicle site only after receiving an order or special command from: 1) the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, 2) the Minister of Defense, and 3) the Chief of the Russian General staff. Co-positioning marks a change in standard operating procedures that indicates the weapons are, essentially, in field-ready conditions. This reduces the time to place the nuclear warheads on the missiles. This “indicates preparation for operational use,” according to Taranov.

There are additional signs that Putin is prepping for an escalation in the Ukrainian conflict. The Polish government says Russian Aerospace Forces are using Belarusian-based Kh-55 nuclear-capable cruise missiles with imitators of nuclear warheads against targets in Poland and Ukraine. This points to Russia’s practicing for at minimum of a tactical nuclear strike. The summer months may become very active in Europe if Putin sees it as an opportune time to act while the US is in the middle of a presidential election.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) ICBM. Photo: Wikimedia Commons / Vitaly V. Kuzmin

The Biden Administration continues to ignore the will and best interests of the American people regarding illegal immigration.

Recent polls indicate that illegal immigration is the most frequently cited problem noted by Americans.  Gallup notes that “a record-high 55% of U.S. adults, up eight points from last year, saying that “large numbers of immigrants entering the United States illegally” is a critical threat to U.S. vital interests.” A Monmouth survey found that “More than 8 in 10 Americans see illegal immigration as either a very serious (61%) or somewhat serious (23%) problem.”

During his State of the Union Address, President Biden attempted to blame opposition to legislation as a factor.  However, rather than addressing the problem, the bill would have actually made the issue permanent by allowing vast numbers to enter the nation before any meaningful action was taken.

The dilemma is unique, in that this wasn’t a challenge that occurred, but rather one that was self-induced by the Biden Administration when it reversed existing measures that had been working.

Public reaction has become further inflamed due to recent and stunning revelations that the Biden White House secretly flew 320,000 illegals into the U.S. from Latin American airports.  Any Administration spin that this was a problem they hoped to deal with fell apart. It is obvious that the president has actually encouraged, aided and facilitated unlawful entry into the country, despite the massive financial and criminal challenges it causes.

A House Judiciary Committee report reports that “Far from disincentivizing the flood of illegal immigration by detaining and removing illegal aliens, President Joe Biden and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas continue to release illegal aliens into U.S. communities en masse. In fact, in early December 2023, DHS officials admitted that “an average of 5,000 illegal aliens are currently being released into the U.S. each day at the border.” Even Secretary Mayorkas has acknowledged the high rate of releases, telling Border Patrol “that the current rate of release for illegal immigrants apprehended at the southern border is ‘above 85 [percent].”

House Republicans have released extraordinary statistics:

 Since Joe Biden took office:

• There have been 8.7 million illegal crossings nationwide. 
  • There have been OVER 7.2  MILLION illegal crossings of our Southern Border.
    • The total number of illegal immigrants who have entered through our Southern Border is greater than the population of 36 states. Including;
      • Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
  • There have been 1.8 million known gotaways who evaded U.S. Border Patrol.  
• Since the start of FY 2024 there have been OVER 1 million illegal immigrant encounters.
• In January, there were 176,205 illegal immigrants encountered at the Southern Border.
  • January was the 35th straight month, where monthly illegal immigrant encounters have been higher than even the highest month seen under President Trump. 
• Under Biden, over 340 of these individuals whose names appear on the terrorist watchlist were stopped trying to cross the Southern Border.
  • So far in FY24, there have been 58 individuals whose names appear on the terrorist watch list who have been stopped trying to enter the U.S. illegally between ports of entry. 
  • This total is more than the encounters in all FY17, FY18, FY19, FY20, FY21, and FY22 combined. 
• Over 20,000 Communist Chinese nationals have illegally crossed the Southern Border since FY24 began in October. 
  • Communist Chinese nationals are exploiting Joe Biden’s failed Far Left open border policies at “record-breaking figures,” becoming “the fastest-growing demographic entering the country illegally.”
  • The surge in Communist Chinese nationals encountered at our Southern Border has raised serious concerns that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting the Biden border crisis for nefarious reasons.
  • There are OVER 60 instances of Joe Biden and his Administration taking actions that undermined our nation’s border security, including halting the construction of the border wall. 
  • In August 2022, Biden and his Administration decided to make the border crisis WORSE by formally ending former President Trump’s successful ‘Remain in Mexico’ program.”
  • The Biden Administration announced on May 10, 2023, that it would allow for the release of some migrants into the U.S. with no way to track them.
    • Biden’s Department of Homeland Security has now admitted that 40 percent of catch-and-release migrants have disappeared. 

Why would President Biden pursue a policy that has clearly caused significant financial hardships for cities and states? A KFF study notes that “Immigrants, including naturalized citizens, lean more towards the Democrats when asked which political party represents their own views, which party best represents the interests of immigrants overall, and whether immigrants were better off under the Biden or Trump presidencies.”

Photo: Pixabay

To summarize Hur’s additional reasons for not recommending a prosecution of Joe Biden for his retention of classified documents; Hur believes that jurors hearing any such case would believe that Biden may have thought it was no big deal that he had these documents, may not have had these documents in his possession at the time he made the statement admitting to possession of these documents, and may have been referring to other documents, even though Biden and his ghostwriter were discussing Biden’s opposition to Obama’s troop surge in Afghanistan, the subject of those same classified documents.

These reasons, in addition to the “maybe he forgot” defense, all lead Hur to conclude that any prosecution of Joe Biden couldn’t possibly succeed.

These jaw-dropping findings are made even more incredible by the additional evidence of wrong doing discussed in Hur’s Report; “FBI agents recovered from unlocked drawers in the office and basement den of Mr. Biden’s Delaware home a set of notebooks he used as vice president. Evidence shows that he knew the notebooks contained classified information. Mr. Biden wrote down obviously sensitive information discussed during intelligence briefings with President Obama and meetings in the White House Situation Room about matters of national security and military and foreign policy…at least three times Mr. Biden read from classified entries aloud to his ghostwriter nearly verbatim.”

Let us understand these findings; besides the “classified stuff” that Biden told his ghostwriter he’d found in the basement of his Virginia home, Biden also kept notebooks that contained classified information in an unsecured location at his Delaware home, materials that he discussed with his ghostwriter, who did not have any security clearance.

Further, Hur details Biden’s purposeful reasons for retaining these notebooks; “[w]hen Mr. Biden left office, he also knew his staff decided to store notecards containing his classified notes in a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at the National Archives, and he knew his notebooks contained the same type of classified information. As he told his ghostwriter during a recorded interview, the same staff who arranged to secure his classified notecards ‘didn’t even know’ he had retained possession of his classified notebooks. Twice in 2017, Mr. Biden visited the National Archives SCIF to review his classified notecards while writing his book. Yet he kept his notebooks, which also contained classified information, in unlocked drawers at home. He had strong motivations to do so and to ignore the rules for properly handling the classified information in his notebooks. He consulted the notebooks liberally during hours of discussions with his ghostwriter and viewed them as highly private and valued possessions with which he was unwilling to part.”

Despite this evidence for Biden’s willful retention of classified documents while a private citizen, Hur persists in claiming that :”[w]e do not…believe this evidence would meet the government’s burden at trial – particularly the requirement to prove that Mr. Biden intended to do something the law forbids. Consistent with statements Mr. Biden made during our interview of him and arguments made by the White House Counsel and Mr. Biden’s personal counsel, we expect Mr. Biden’s defense at trial would be that he thought his notebooks were his personal property and he was allowed to take them home, even if they contained classified information.”

Let us restate these facts; Joe Biden maintained notebooks in which he kept classified information.  Biden knew there was classified information contained in those notebooks, and he conveyed classified information to a person without a security clearance (his ghostwriter) on at least three occasions.

Do these allegations remind you of a recent case involving another public figure?  Someone who was prosecuted and convicted of the unauthorized removal and retention of classified materials?

David Petraeus had a very storied career – up to a point.  As he is described in a Factual Statement provided by the US Attorney’s Office in 2015, Petraeus “was a United States Army four-star general when he retired from the Army on or about August 31, 2011. From on or about July 4, 2010, to on or about July 18, 2011, (he) served as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) in Afghanistan. From on or about September 6, 2011, to on or about November 9, 2012, (he then) served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”).” 

According to the US Attorney’s office, “[d]uring his tenure as Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan, [General Petraeus] maintained bound, five-by-eight-inch notebooks that contained his daily schedule and classified and unclassified notes he took during official meetings, conferences, and briefings. The notebooks had black covers and, for identification purposes, [General Petraeus] taped his business card on the front exterior of each notebook. A total of eight such books (hereinafter the “Black Books”) encompassed the period of [General Petraeus’] ISAF Command and collectively contained classified information regarding the identities of covert officers, war strategy, intelligence capabilities and mechanisms, diplomatic discussions, quotes and deliberative discussions from high-level National Security Council meetings, and…discussions with the President of the United States of America.”  These Black Books also “contained national defense information, including Top Secret//SCI and code word information.”

In 2011, after the General’s return from Afghanistan,  the Department of Defense (DOD) “historian gathered and organized the classified materials that [General Petraeus] collected during his DOD tenure. [General Petraeus]  never provided the Black Books to his DOD historian. Instead, [General Petraeus] personally retained the Black Books.”

General Petraeus than began work with a biographer named Paula Broadwell on his memoirs.  “[D]uring a conversation, recorded by his biographer, [General Petraeus] stated that the Black Books were ‘highly classified’ and contained ‘code word’ information: Biographer: By the way, where are your black books? We never went through,.. PETRAEUS: They’re in a rucksack up there somewhere. Biographer: Okay .. . You avoiding that? You gonna look through ’em first? PETRAEUS: Umm, well, they’re really – I mean they are highly classified, some of them. They don’t have it on it, but I mean there’s code word stuff in there.”

Nonetheless, despite their “highly classified” status, General Petraeus eventually let Broadwell, who was the General’s mistress as well as his biographer, have access to these Black Books.  Subsequently, according to NPR, “[t]he nature of Petraeus’ relationship with Army reservist Paula Broadwell emerged during an FBI investigation that was sparked by allegations from another woman, Jill Kelley, that she was receiving harassing emails. Those messages were reportedly traced to Broadwell.” 

According to the US Attorney’s 2015 Statement of Facts,  “[o]n or about October 26, 2012, [General Petraeus] was interviewed by two FBI special agents…[General Petraeus] was advised that the special agents were conducting a criminal investigation. During that interview, the special agents questioned [General Petraeus] about the mishandling of classified information. In response to those questions, [General Petraeus] stated that (a) he had never provided any classified information to his biographer, and (b) he had never facilitated the provision of classified information to his biographer. These statements were false. [General Petraeus] then and there knew that he previously shared the Black Books with his biographer.” 

The end for Petraeus came “[o]n or about April 5, 2013, [when] the FBI executed a court-authorized search warrant…and seized the Black Books from an unlocked desk drawer in the first-floor study of the [General’s] Residence.”In April of 2015, “Petraeus was sentenced…to two years of probation and handed a $100,000 fine for the unauthorized removal and retention of classified material.” 

In other words, General Petraeus, willfully kept notebooks that contained classified information in his personal possession, in an unsecured location, and shared the information contained in those notebooks with his biographer, who did not have security clearance. 

Just how is this conduct different from that of Joe Biden, who basically did the exact same thing?

In a footnote buried in Chapter 13 of his Report, Special Counsel Hur notes that “[t]here are significant similarities between Petraeus’s case and Mr. Biden’s.”  However, Hur believes ” the differences are more significant.”

Hur then details these supposed differences.  “First, Petraeus’s retention of notebooks violated numerous nondisclosure agreements he signed as an employee of the Department of Defense. By contrast, by virtue of his unique constitutional role as vice president, Mr. Biden signed no such nondisclosure agreements or attestations. Second, Petraeus lied when questioned by FBI agents, telling them he had not provided classified information to his biographer…Mr. Biden’s case began with a proactive self-disclosure, and he has cooperated with the Department of Justice and special counsel by consenting to multiple searches of his personal residence and offices. Third, there was stronger evidence of willfulness in Petraeus’s case, in light of his lies and obfuscations, whereas Mr. Biden has asserted his rightful ownership of his notebooks .”

These differences, according to Hur, justify the fact that  “Petraeus was charged only with a misdemeanor,” and President Biden should not be charged with anything.

Other than General Petreaus signing a series of non-disclosure agreements, and lying to the FBI, all other aspects of both cases are similar.  Petraeus knew he shouldn’t maintain possession of his Black Books.  Biden knew, or had good reason to know, that he should not keep personal control of his notebooks.  Petreaus kept his notebooks in an unlocked desk in his residence, an unsecured location; Biden did the same.  Petreaus shared the classified information contained in those Black Books with his biographer, who had no security clearance; ditto for Biden.

Clearly, these similarities outweigh the minor differences. But there are some additional differences in the outcome of each case that are not discussed by Robert Hur. 

Petreaus is not “a sympathetic, well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory.”  The General did not have a Special Counsel to make excuses for him, arguing that he probably “forgot” that he had these documents after referencing them and describing their specific location, that his Black Books weren’t the documents he was talking about, that these notebooks weren’t even in his residence while he discussed their existence, that he thought he was entitled to maintain these documents in his possession, and keep that information from his staff.

General Petreaus did not have an advocate in the US Attorney’s office who was looking for reasons not to charge him.

But Joe Biden does.

In other words, rather than seek a basis to charge President Biden for the unlawful retention and dissemination of classified information to unauthorized persons, Robert Hur looked for every reason possible not to charge Joe Biden with this, or any other, crime related to his retention and dissemination of classified information.

For this reason, if no other, the Hur Report is nothing more than almost 400 pages of pure whitewash.  

Judge John Wilson (ret.) served on the bench in NYC