Author: Frank V. Vernuccio, Jr.

The Parents Defending Education organization has released a report exposing extensive waste within the Department of Education, much of it taking funds from legitimate teaching purposes and shifting those dollars to leftist ideological propaganda.

Last January, the House Subcommittee on Health Care and Financial Services held a hearing titled “America’s Report Card: Oversight of K-12 Public Education”  At the hearing, lawmakers examined how billions of dollars in taxpayer funds distributed to state educational agencies to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 on elementary and secondary schools and to help them reopen safely were frequently misused to support pet projects and left-wing political agendas.

The Subcommittee found that “The Nation’s Report Card shows test scores in reading and math have significantly declined.

Despite the well-known harms of school closures and ineffectiveness of remote education, Democrats continue to put politics before students.

“The connection between closures and learning loss is clear. Education recovery scorecard and return to learn data show that in math, the most in-person third of districts lost 44 percent of a year’s progress. The most remote third lost 60 percent,” Dr. Nat Malkus, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Education Policy Studies at American Enterprise Institute said during his opening statement.

“The President and governors, leaders on Capitol Hill, and in districts must decisively communicate that pandemic-era exceptionalism in schools is over,” Dr. Malkus continued.

School districts are increasingly investing in diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs instead of focusing on student performance.

The recently released Parents Defending Education verifies those findings, exposing the misuse of approximately $1 Billion in grant funding. The analysis notes that:

• Total ED Grant Money Awarded (2021-present): $1,002,522,304.81.
• Total number of ED grants (2021-present): 229
• Number of States: 42 plus Washington D.C.
• Number of K-12 school districts: 296
• Number of K-12 students*: 6,766,158

Parents Defending Education breaks the grants down into “three buckets:

• Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Hiring: $489,883,797.81
  • This category includes DEI or race-based recruiting, training, and hiring practices. Read more about DEI Hiring in K-12 here.
• Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Programming: $343,337,286
  • This category includes general DEI programming and trainings, discipline including restorative practices, and youth activism.
• Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Based Mental health/Social Emotional Learning (SEL): $169,301,221
  • This category includes DEI based mental health training programs and SEL trainings and programming. Some grants covered two or all of the above categories, in those cases, the grant was counted only towards the most dominant category.”

The analysis provides key takeaways:

• Multiple grants feature programming that advances race-based teacher recruiting, hiring, and training, including the use of race-based affinity groups.
• Several grants were issued for youth activism programming widely used in far-left ethnic studies courses.
• A $4,000,000 grant was given for a 3-week residential “culturally responsive” computer science summer camp for 600 11th and 12th graders.
• Grants often feature Social, Emotional Learning (SEL) programming that uses curricula like Second Step and Harmony, as well as transformative SEL.
• The University of Iowa received a grant award of $1,261,718 to train 40 elementary teachers to “enact equity-centered education” in partner K-12 districts.
• The University of Missouri – St. Louis was awarded a $306,209 grant to train school counselors in Trauma-Informed, Antiracist Social-Emotional Learning (TIAR-SEL).
• The School District of Philadelphia was given $3,973,175 for its restorative justice program that is modeled after Oakland Unified School District’s (CA), and a program advisor is a far-left activist and former Communist Party USA member.
• A Michigan school district spent over $38,000 on an equity consultant for a one-day professional development and copies of their book.

From 2021 to the present, the Department of Education (ED) awarded to universities, school districts, and nonprofits 162 grants totaling $1,002,522,304.81. This report only captures grants that specifically included diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), Social-Emotional Learning (SEL), restorative practices, and/or youth activism as part of the programming.

Recently revealed details of the relationship between a California council woman with Mike Sun, who has been accused of pursuing Chinese interests, has renewed concern about the relationship between the state’s Democratic Party and Beijing’s Communist leadership.

The Los Angeles politician is Sun’s fiancée. Sun has been accused of peddling political influence on behalf of the Chinese regime, court records show.

Published reports state that “Mike Sun, has allegedly worked with a recently sentenced Chinese agent to advance the Chinese regime’s political interests in Los Angeles. Court documents suggest the two have worked closely for years to align U.S. policy interests with Beijing on sensitive issues, with the Chinese agent Chen Jun telling Chinese officials that Sun—and the councilwoman—were part of a ‘basic team dedicated for us.’”

Sun is a former Chinese army member. Despite his record and ties, he served as the campaign manager for Eileen Wang in her 2022 bid for Los Angeles City Council 2022.

Chinese communists have already made extensive use of the California Democratic Party to play an outsized role in American political life. 

 Kamala Harris’ Vice Presidential running mate, Governor Walz has a history of being a devotee’ of Beijing. In 1993, according to the Star-Herald, as a teacher, he organized a trip to the PRC with Alliance High School students, where costs were paid by the Chinese government. In 1994, Mr. Walz set up a private company named “Educational Travel Adventures, Inc.,” which coordinated annual student trips to the PRC until 2003 and was led by Mr. Walz himself. The corporation was reportedly dissolved four days after he took congressional office in 2007. Since his first trip to China, Governor Walz has visited the PRC an estimated 30 times. While serving in Congress, Mr. Walz also served as a fellow at the Macau Polytechnic University, a Chinese institution that characterizes itself as having a “long held devotion to and love for the motherland.”

Governor Walz spoke alongside the President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which, a year later, the Department of State exposed as “a Beijing-based organization tasked with co-opting subnational governments,” including efforts “to directly and malignly influence state and local leaders to promote the PRC’s global agenda.”

In a letter to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray, Committee Chairman Comer requested information, documents, and communications related to the CCP-connected entities and officials Governor Walz has engaged and partnered with, as well as any warnings or advice the FBI may have given to Governor Walz about U.S. political figures being targeted by or recruited for CCP influence operations.

The Biden-Harris Administration’s relationship with China appears to have begun when Hunter Biden flew to China with then-Vice President Joe Biden aboard Air Force 2, and returned home with a vast financial gain, in return for no discernable commercial service.

Kamala Harris is a California Democrat.

The Biden-Harris Administration ties with China are just part of the Democratic Party’s concerning history with America’s most dangerous enemy.

  The late Democrat Senator from California, Dianne Feinstein, employed a chauffeur, who according to CBS News, was a Chinese spy, reporting to the Chinese government about local California politics for 20 years. 

The Chinese communist spy who compromised California Congressman Eric Swalwell, Fang Fang, also “socialized, networked with Rep. Judy Chu and then-Rep. Mike Honda, campaigned for now-Rep. Rho Khanna, volunteered for Bill Harrison, the mayor of Fremont, California at the time, and in some cases, developed romantic or sexual relationships with politicians to gain intelligence and send it back to her handlers, who were believed to be stationed in mainland China.” 

Donald Trump’s first campaign for President was marked by substantive warnings about China’s military, political, and economic policies. That may have been the prompt for the California Democrat,  then-Representative, now Senator, Adam Schiff’s vociferous (and, as subsequently revealed, wholly false) attacks on him.

The volume, intensity and consistency of the ties between significant members of the California Democratic Party and China require urgent and significant further examination.

China’s threats to violently conquer Taiwan, if necessary, has led Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to expand and diversify its operations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), using engineering talent from several sanctioned PRC firms. It is a risk to TSMC’s position as a leading-edge company in the global chip industry. Last summer TSMC announced that it was shifting to a “Foundry 2.0” model to ostensibly avoid monopoly concerns. The Foundry 1.0 model does not include back-end products. However, it complicates the company’s global position. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) want to shrink the technology gap between the mainland and Taiwan.

The plan calls for TSMC to expand to handle packaging, testing, mask-making, and other parts of the value chain, according to a recent Jamestown Foundation report. Foundry 2.0 comes with risks and may impact the Trump Administration’s support for Taiwan this year. The President made it clear on Monday that he intends to impose tariffs on imported chips to force manufacturing to return to the US.

“If TSMC cedes its dominance, the deterrent effect of Taiwan’s “silicon shield” would be greatly reduced,” says Matthew Brazil, the report’s author. He points out the company is now setting up fabrication plants in the United States at the urging of many of its main customers, including Apple and Nvidia. Some analysts are questioning whether TSMC will be successful in straddling a neutral line between Beijing and Washington, while Taiwan’s government labeled the move “a win-win business model for Taiwan and US industries.” 

TSMC’s new hedging strategy is viewed as more closely linked to Xi Jinping’s pronouncement on Taiwan than to President Trump’s tariff threat. The company is a target for Xi, as he pivots the PRC toward and economic model that Brazil says focuses on achieving dominance in several key technologies crucial for achieving a “Chinese-style modernization (中国式现代化)” and the country’s “great rejuvenation (伟大复兴).” It is a strategy long-practiced by Beijing; sometimes using illicit means to achieve its goals. 

The Jamestown Foundation report compiled a database that exposes the exchange of PRC talent between several of the TSMC fabrication plants, some of which has been sanctions by the US Department of the Treasury for violating exports controls or giving technology to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The report adds that others are on the US Department of Commerce Entity List.

TSMC’s Shanghai plant produces its 200mm waters, while in Nanjing it began producing 300mm wafers at the 16 nm mode in mid-2018. This makes it one of the most advanced lines in all of the PRC with excellent commercial viability. Brazil used a Chinese-based platform called MaiMai.cn (脉脉) to identify a large personnel turnover of dozens of former TSMC specialists and experts now employed at Huawei in advanced technical roles. He notes that former “TSMC engineers and technical experts can also be found at several other leading PRC firms under U.S. government sanctions.” These include Changxin Memory Technologies Inc., Yangtze Memory Technology Co., Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, and SiEn Integrated Circuit. LinkedIn accounts indicate that several former TSMC and Maimai China employees list their address as in the Hanzhou Chengxi Science and Technology Innovation Corridor. This is a Silicon Valley like corridor but set up, funded and endorsed by Beijing’s Ministry of Science and Technology as a special science and technology development zone. It is the location of a large number of the PRC’s defense-linked technology firms that are subsidized by Beijing.

TSMC faces two risks beyond the loss of their intellectual property. If the company fails in its expansion attempt to move into other parts of the value chain, it could result in a global slowdown in technology worldwide due to the decreasing chip supply followed by steep increases in their products. Second, in the event of a kinetic war with the PRC, the Taiwanese company’s fabrication plants could be damaged which would also serve as a constraint on the global supply of leading-edge chips. TSMC currently holds 62 percent of the revenue in the global semiconductor foundry market, a share that is expected to grow to 66 percent by the end of this year. In comparison, Samsung controls only 11.5 percent of the market.

Since 2022, Beijing’s ability to project military power has grown dramatically, making the threat of physical action against Taiwan a greater possibility than only a few years ago, despite Xi’s lack of a definitive timeline for conquest. TSMC is hedging its bets on Taiwan’s ability to remain free at the risk of angering both China and the United States. With the new Trump administration policy of containing China, TSMC’s best bet may be to reduce the flow on talent to its Chinese competitors.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

Russia and Rosatom are on the move in Southeast Asia. While China actively pursues its military and economic operations in Southeast Asia, Rosatom is expanding its nuclear energy involvement in the region. Rosatom and Vietnam Electricity signed a new memorandum of the development of nuclear energy six days before President Trump returned to the Oval Office. It creates a long-term commitment for both countries to cooperate in the areas of power plant maintenance, fuel supply, and dispensing. According to Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear energy technology is one of its key foreign-oriented sectors, with numerous power plants under construction in countries such as Bangladesh, Türkiye, China, Egypt, India, and Hungary. The new administration in Washington is concerned that the agreement has negative implications for Western sanctions policies.  It appears that it may allow Russia to do an end run around current restrictions. 

Rosatom’s director, Valerii Likhachev, announced the resumption of construction of the Ninh Thuận-1 nuclear power plant, suspended in 2016, according to Mikael Pir-Budagyan, of the Eurasia Daily Monitor. On January 15, Izvestiya reported that Russia is also scheduled to build a research reactor in Vietnam with the project starting in 2027.  The Trump Administration, according to analysts in Washington, will face new challenges as Russia revitalizes its footprint in the region. 

Earlier this week, Rosatom officials claimed that the nuclear energy industry has been the hallmark of its capacity to outcompete foreign counterparts by offering one-stop-shop projects that include most, if not all, necessary stages of power plant construction, expedited licensing, and lucrative contractual terms. Historical data suggests that these types of Russian contracts are designed to last for decades. Pir-Budagyan notes that reports out of Russia suggest that Rosatom’s foreign revenue has doubled since 2017. Last October Likhachev pointed out that Rosatom  was expecting to receive $18 billion in foreign revenue for the year and owned eighty-three percent of the global nuclear power plant market. 

The Southeast Asia region represents more than a financial win in nuclear energy power for Russia. It is also about improving national pride during a time when Moscow has few accomplishments to cite in its war in Ukraine, now dragging into its third year. “Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly praises Rosatom’s overseas projects and has called them the “best in the world” in terms of technical sophistication and safety standards,” according to Pir-Budagyan. As of this month, Rosatom itself has avoided direct Western sanctions, although its subsidiaries have been targeted by the US Treasury, along with some Rosatom officials. Southeast Asia, according to a 2024 International Energy Agency report, is one of the fastest-growing areas and contributes twenty-five percent of the projected increase in global energy demand by 2035. The Agency points out that within twenty-five years it will surpass the European Union’s total energy consumption.

“On an institutional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has consistently reaffirmed its interest in exploring nuclear energy cooperation with Russia,” notes Pir-Budagyan. ASEAN’s strategic plan, called the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)  and the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Energy Cooperation for 2022–2025, identified nuclear energy as a focus area beginning in 2021. 

In Indonesia, Rosatom is actively engaging with national agencies and institutions to promote its small modular reactor (SMR) technologies. It received recognition in 2024 as the “Best Nuclear Technology Supplier” at the Electricity Connect 2024 event. “In Myanmar,” says Pir-Budagyan, “Rosatom is advancing an SMR project under a 2023 intergovernmental agreement. It is also involved in education, with Russian experts and Myanmar institutions partnering on training programs and science festivals to build local expertise.”

From 2019-2025, according to Likhachev, Rosatom trained approximately 400 Vietnamese workers by employing them in the firm’s projects in other countries. This newest agreement puts Russia back on track to finish the construction of Ninh Thuận 1 and is likely to lead to additional construction projects in Southeast Asia at a time when China is also increasingly aggressive in its foreign moves. ASEAN’s goal of obtaining carbon neutrality by 2050 is driving many Southeast Asian states into increasing their ties with Moscow.

The consequences are significant for the free world. New, regional long-term commitments provides Russia a major role in the area. As more states use complex Russian nuclear technology it will be increasingly challenging to divest those countries of ties with Moscow, Rosatom and its subsidiaries. Sanction may work in the initial development stage but as plans progress, they could end up posing safety concerns once new nuclear plants are in operation. Russia still must overcome a number of hurdles, including fragmented politics in the region and local public opinion, and safety concerns. Western companies, should they decide to compete, will need government support to remain competitive. The Trump Administration needs to add the Southeast Asian nuclear market to a growing list of concerns in the region.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

• PRC Defense Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defense budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defense spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defense spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defense, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending.

• Developments in Defense Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.

• Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

U.S.-PRC MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication until weeks before President Biden and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in November 2023. Following the Woodside Summit, where the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communication at all levels, DoD and the PLA conducted several exchanges and working groups at the end of 2023 and through the end of 2024, including senior leader discussions, defense policy talks, operational safety talks, and calls between theater commanders.

 • DoD remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD objectives in maintaining military-to-military channels are to help prevent crisis, reduce strategic and operational risk, and clarify misperceptions.

SPECIAL TOPICS

• Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals. Between July and December 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernizing China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions.

• Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been the focus on strengthening and revitalizing political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalize political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces.

• PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualized across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates to at least the 1960s but, in the 1980s, as the PRC developed Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted the use of CNP as a measurement of China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist system and the West’s capitalist system. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.

Photo: China’s unmanned combat Ship (China Defence Ministry Photo)

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC’S PERIPHERY

• Theater Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theater. ‒ The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. The ETC executed exercise JOINT SWORD, aimed at pressure Taiwan in April 2023. ‒ The Southern Theater Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command, as needed, over all CCG and CMM ships enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRCoccupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including the deployment of howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border. ‒ The Western Theater Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asia borders. The WTC focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.” ‒ The Northern Theater Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. ‒ The Central Theater Command’s (CTC’s) mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to other theater commands.

 • Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing X Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics against Taiwan: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.

 • Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones useful for defending against PRC gray-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.

• Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLAN, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.

• PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behavior. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of U.S. platforms compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

• The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLAN’s evolving focus from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection” and the PLAAF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.

• PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theaters, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors important experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. XI Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

• Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalize its overseas presence and deepen defense ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC has expanded combined exercises with Russia, especially since 2018, when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.

 • Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: China’s J-20 Multirole fighter (China Defense Ministry Photo)

The Department of Defense has publicly released its annual report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), commonly known as the China Military Power Report (CMPR.) This congressionally mandated report charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic and military strategy, and offers insights into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. The CMPR illustrates why the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the Department’s top pacing challenge.

We present the entire Executive Summary of the report in three parts, beginning today.

• The PRC’s National Strategy. The PRC’s longstanding national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC’s national power and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests.

• The PRC’s Foreign Policy. The PRC’s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into what it calls a “community of common destiny” to support its strategy to realize “rejuvenation.” PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an environment favorable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.

• The PRC’s Economic Policy. The PRC acknowledges that internal and external challenges complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favorable factors in the PRC’s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.

• The PRC’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy. In 2023, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.

• The PRC’s Military Leadership. The Central Military Commission (CMC), the PRC’s top military decision-making body, consists of a civilian chair (Xi Jinping), two vice chairs, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission.For most of 2023, Li Shangfu served as the PRC’s minster of National Defense before his removal in October 2023 for corruption-related offenses. In December 2023, President Xi Jinping selected Adm. Dong Jun as the PRC’s new Minister of National Defense.

PLA FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

• The PLA’s Modernization and Reform. The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies including in commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.

 • PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues its decades-long effort to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLAA continued to demonstrate long-range joint fires capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.

• PLA Navy (PLAN). Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLAN continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLAN carrier in a calendar year.

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is modernizing and indigenizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems rapidly, matching U.S. standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLAN shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defense, and radar units to the PLAAF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC’s integrated air defense systems as well as the network of ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC’s national integrated air defense system network.

 • PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

• The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF). On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF, and the alignment of its subordinate forces—Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)—directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF), under the CMC, to coordinate the management of military’s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organizational structure features four theater-grade services—the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF—and four deputy-theater-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).

 • The Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilization, the JLSF probably will rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.

• PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is an additional paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.

 • Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF do not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite an emphasis on joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.

• PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.

 • Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasized power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.

• Advancements Toward an Informatized and Intelligentized Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which it considers a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 • Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.

The Report continues tomorrow

Photo: Xi inspects troops in Macao (China defense Ministry photo)

U.S. Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, delivered remarks at a CSIS Aerospace Security Project event reflecting on the Space Force’s accomplishments and mission five years after its creation. We present key portions of his address.     People have come to realize the very real threats that exist in space and the compelling need for a Space Force.   This was all happening at a time when our reliance on space and the threats to our space systems were growing rapidly, as was a budding commercial space ecosystem. So where are we today?   The trends we saw then have significantly accelerated. There has been a roughly 400% increase in the number of satellites, driven primarily by commercial companies. Tens of billions of dollars of private investment are fueling bold innovation.   And the fabric of space is extending deeper into the joint force, as well as our daily lives.    I believe we are entering a new “Apollo-like” era for space and I’m excited about the future. But I am also concerned.   China and Russia haven’t been idle during this time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started with cyber-attacks of commercial space ground infrastructure. This was followed by persistent GPS jamming, demonstrating what many had warned about 5 years ago.   That future conflicts would extend to space. No adversary understands that better than China.   China has continued an unprecedented run to deploy systems on orbit designed to remove our space advantages. They will also enable the Chinese military to track and target our joint force.   General Saltzman recently described this pace of Chinese activity as  “mind boggling”. And they show no sign of slowing down.   So the Space Force has its work cut out for it, but they’re not going it alone.   Congress will be a partner.   We will continue providing the policies and resources to ensure the US is leading and strengthening our posture in space.    So, let’s get into some areas of focus as we look to the future.   I’ll start with people, and I’ll be blunt – the Space Force needs to grow. When we stood up the service, we called for a small, agile force. At that time, the focus was to get them on their feet and running. We addressed issues like having their own budget, personnel, and promotion structure.   We have come a long way from those early tasks. But now, it’s time for us to increase the size of the force to meet the growing threats.   This increase needs to include both enlisted and civilian guardians as well as, junior officers, and general officers. I know some of my friends in Congress are violently opposed to any growth as just increasing overhead.   But if we want to have a Space Force capable of doing what the nation expects, it has to have enough people, and the right people to carry out it’s mission.   Now I’m not advocating a wholesale increase in end strength. Everyone is going to have to give a little.   Congress should authorize more GOs; The Air Force should transfer some of their billets to the Space Force; And the Secretary of Defense should transfer additional billets from his pool. But, as we push to increase the size of the Space Force, we must make sure we are “developing” our guardians. When it comes to guardians it’s about quality AND quantity.   We need to give them the skills they will need to support a technology-driven force.   Both Generals Saltzman and Raymond have done a great job building a war-fighting culture and normalizing space as part of the joint fight. Nonetheless, we still have much more work to do.   Seven years ago, the General Officer promotion stats for the Air Force revealed that almost all of those promoted were pilots. As I look to the future of the Space Force, I’m going to be watching these statistics to ensure that the Space Force isn’t making the same mistake.   The Space Force has to be led by more than just operators. They must recognize the contributions of all career services if it is to be successful.   A deep understanding and connection with technology is at the core of the Space Force. Operators, acquisition, intel, and cyber professionals must all be on equal footing.   The future of the Space Force will depend on its ability to both nurture these unique specialties and tribes, while also creating a unified fighting force.   Don’t get me wrong, I agree that growing and building space operators is critically important. But, the development of acquisition and other professionals is just as important. After all, what are those operators going to operate if acquirers aren’t acquiring?     For the Space Force, and the joint force to succeed we must have guardians that are just as comfortable operating in space as they are breaking down a requirements document. That leads us to budget and acquisition.   As mentioned, General Saltzman has talked about a “mind-boggling” growth of national security threats in space. In this threat environment we expect the Space Force to perform two major missions.   The first is to enable the joint force.   The second is to protect and defend our interests in, to, and from space. This second mission, in particular, is no small task. And, this growth in mission must come with a growth in budget.   Space warfighting is a highly technical affair. But don’t expect Congress to just throw more money at doing things the way we always have.    We must approach acquisition differently. We can no longer afford to wait 8+ years to develop requirements, and conduct long drawn-out competition processes.   Nor can we afford these endless cost-plus development contracts. Fortunately, progress is being made. Secretary Calvelli for his part has worked to expedite things by emphasizing fixed priced contracts.   And SDA has taken advantage of many of the acquisition methods authorized by Congress for just this purpose.   Our commercial space sector, the envy of the world, is investing billions in new infrastructure and manufacturing. This includes modern technologies such as AI, autonomy, and more.   Everyone is moving a little bit in the right direction, but it is not enough.   The Department must be more agile and continue to use every lever that has been given to it by Congress to:  1) increase competition on these programs; 2) minimize requirement changes; 3) buy commercial; and 4) find ways to partner and draw more non-traditional companies into the defense market.    To be clear, this is not a problem with one solution but it is a problem that can be solved by hard work and creativity. It’s going to take a concerted effort from all sides to get capabilities into the hands of warfighters faster.   We need it all, more competition, better requirements, agile acquisitions, efficient programs, and on time appropriations.      So, we’ve talked about people, budgets, capabilities, and acquisition.    Next, lets talk about the policies that drive all of this.   As has been said so many times that it’s become cliché, operating in space is very different than operating in any of the other domains. The testing and training protocols that are tried and true for a new ground combat vehicle or an upgraded F-16 are not an option for space systems.   Guardians typically cannot take these systems out for a “spin” and get comfortable with how they operate during peace time. The Space Force needs to develop tactics, techniques and procedures that they then turn into training courses for future guardians.   Many of the limiting factors that contribute to this disconnect come from the demands of distance and the space domain itself. We must do our best to establish the test ranges, realistic simulators, and capabilities we need to ensure our dominance in space.   The remaining limitations are self-imposed.   My hope is that the incoming Trump Administration will take a hard look at some of the policies that limit how our guardians test and train on orbit. I believe there is room to allow the service to get better experience operating in space while also maintaining norms and behaviors that we in the U.S. have upheld for decades.    This brings me to my final point.   We must continue to aggressively push against the many policy and classification barriers that remain as relics of the Cold War. Here, I’ll take a moment here to commend the work of Dr. John Plumb. During his time at Space Policy, he began some of this hard work.   But there is more still to do.   There are Presidential policy directives, Defense Department directives, Joint Staff instructions, and on and on that need updating.   Many of these documents never considered more players than the U.S. and Russia in space, much less the existence of a Space Force.   We have to address this so that the public better understands the threats and the investments we need to make to mitigate them.   Looking forward, General Saltzman has developed new concepts guiding the Space Force such as “competitive endurance.”   This includes a key tenant for the need to be able to conduct “responsible counterspace campaigning.”   It challenged the Guardians to understand what systems we need to disrupt or deny an adversary’s space-based targeting.   This is the important work that we must tackle if we are to be successful and continue to develop guardians that can protect and defend our national interests in space.   These policy changes are at the heart of what we must do to:  1) establish deterrence; 2) integrate with the joint force; 3) conduct training; 4) and develop warfighting doctrine.   The continued changes in Space Force personnel, acquisition, and policy I’ve covered today highlight some of the establishing principles for the force.   We have to maximize our asymmetric advantages to ensure American’s continued space superiority.    We cannot standstill.   When we started we knew it wasn’t just about how many guardians and platforms we have in the force, but the quality of those guardians and platforms.    In my 2017 speech, when referring to a future Space Force, I said “it must be as world-class as our Army, our Navy, our Marines, and our Air Force. It must be as good as the University of Alabama football program or at least before Saban left!”