Author: Frank V. Vernuccio, Jr.

U.S. Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, delivered remarks at a CSIS Aerospace Security Project event reflecting on the Space Force’s accomplishments and mission five years after its creation. We present key portions of his address.     People have come to realize the very real threats that exist in space and the compelling need for a Space Force.   This was all happening at a time when our reliance on space and the threats to our space systems were growing rapidly, as was a budding commercial space ecosystem. So where are we today?   The trends we saw then have significantly accelerated. There has been a roughly 400% increase in the number of satellites, driven primarily by commercial companies. Tens of billions of dollars of private investment are fueling bold innovation.   And the fabric of space is extending deeper into the joint force, as well as our daily lives.    I believe we are entering a new “Apollo-like” era for space and I’m excited about the future. But I am also concerned.   China and Russia haven’t been idle during this time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started with cyber-attacks of commercial space ground infrastructure. This was followed by persistent GPS jamming, demonstrating what many had warned about 5 years ago.   That future conflicts would extend to space. No adversary understands that better than China.   China has continued an unprecedented run to deploy systems on orbit designed to remove our space advantages. They will also enable the Chinese military to track and target our joint force.   General Saltzman recently described this pace of Chinese activity as  “mind boggling”. And they show no sign of slowing down.   So the Space Force has its work cut out for it, but they’re not going it alone.   Congress will be a partner.   We will continue providing the policies and resources to ensure the US is leading and strengthening our posture in space.    So, let’s get into some areas of focus as we look to the future.   I’ll start with people, and I’ll be blunt – the Space Force needs to grow. When we stood up the service, we called for a small, agile force. At that time, the focus was to get them on their feet and running. We addressed issues like having their own budget, personnel, and promotion structure.   We have come a long way from those early tasks. But now, it’s time for us to increase the size of the force to meet the growing threats.   This increase needs to include both enlisted and civilian guardians as well as, junior officers, and general officers. I know some of my friends in Congress are violently opposed to any growth as just increasing overhead.   But if we want to have a Space Force capable of doing what the nation expects, it has to have enough people, and the right people to carry out it’s mission.   Now I’m not advocating a wholesale increase in end strength. Everyone is going to have to give a little.   Congress should authorize more GOs; The Air Force should transfer some of their billets to the Space Force; And the Secretary of Defense should transfer additional billets from his pool. But, as we push to increase the size of the Space Force, we must make sure we are “developing” our guardians. When it comes to guardians it’s about quality AND quantity.   We need to give them the skills they will need to support a technology-driven force.   Both Generals Saltzman and Raymond have done a great job building a war-fighting culture and normalizing space as part of the joint fight. Nonetheless, we still have much more work to do.   Seven years ago, the General Officer promotion stats for the Air Force revealed that almost all of those promoted were pilots. As I look to the future of the Space Force, I’m going to be watching these statistics to ensure that the Space Force isn’t making the same mistake.   The Space Force has to be led by more than just operators. They must recognize the contributions of all career services if it is to be successful.   A deep understanding and connection with technology is at the core of the Space Force. Operators, acquisition, intel, and cyber professionals must all be on equal footing.   The future of the Space Force will depend on its ability to both nurture these unique specialties and tribes, while also creating a unified fighting force.   Don’t get me wrong, I agree that growing and building space operators is critically important. But, the development of acquisition and other professionals is just as important. After all, what are those operators going to operate if acquirers aren’t acquiring?     For the Space Force, and the joint force to succeed we must have guardians that are just as comfortable operating in space as they are breaking down a requirements document. That leads us to budget and acquisition.   As mentioned, General Saltzman has talked about a “mind-boggling” growth of national security threats in space. In this threat environment we expect the Space Force to perform two major missions.   The first is to enable the joint force.   The second is to protect and defend our interests in, to, and from space. This second mission, in particular, is no small task. And, this growth in mission must come with a growth in budget.   Space warfighting is a highly technical affair. But don’t expect Congress to just throw more money at doing things the way we always have.    We must approach acquisition differently. We can no longer afford to wait 8+ years to develop requirements, and conduct long drawn-out competition processes.   Nor can we afford these endless cost-plus development contracts. Fortunately, progress is being made. Secretary Calvelli for his part has worked to expedite things by emphasizing fixed priced contracts.   And SDA has taken advantage of many of the acquisition methods authorized by Congress for just this purpose.   Our commercial space sector, the envy of the world, is investing billions in new infrastructure and manufacturing. This includes modern technologies such as AI, autonomy, and more.   Everyone is moving a little bit in the right direction, but it is not enough.   The Department must be more agile and continue to use every lever that has been given to it by Congress to:  1) increase competition on these programs; 2) minimize requirement changes; 3) buy commercial; and 4) find ways to partner and draw more non-traditional companies into the defense market.    To be clear, this is not a problem with one solution but it is a problem that can be solved by hard work and creativity. It’s going to take a concerted effort from all sides to get capabilities into the hands of warfighters faster.   We need it all, more competition, better requirements, agile acquisitions, efficient programs, and on time appropriations.      So, we’ve talked about people, budgets, capabilities, and acquisition.    Next, lets talk about the policies that drive all of this.   As has been said so many times that it’s become cliché, operating in space is very different than operating in any of the other domains. The testing and training protocols that are tried and true for a new ground combat vehicle or an upgraded F-16 are not an option for space systems.   Guardians typically cannot take these systems out for a “spin” and get comfortable with how they operate during peace time. The Space Force needs to develop tactics, techniques and procedures that they then turn into training courses for future guardians.   Many of the limiting factors that contribute to this disconnect come from the demands of distance and the space domain itself. We must do our best to establish the test ranges, realistic simulators, and capabilities we need to ensure our dominance in space.   The remaining limitations are self-imposed.   My hope is that the incoming Trump Administration will take a hard look at some of the policies that limit how our guardians test and train on orbit. I believe there is room to allow the service to get better experience operating in space while also maintaining norms and behaviors that we in the U.S. have upheld for decades.    This brings me to my final point.   We must continue to aggressively push against the many policy and classification barriers that remain as relics of the Cold War. Here, I’ll take a moment here to commend the work of Dr. John Plumb. During his time at Space Policy, he began some of this hard work.   But there is more still to do.   There are Presidential policy directives, Defense Department directives, Joint Staff instructions, and on and on that need updating.   Many of these documents never considered more players than the U.S. and Russia in space, much less the existence of a Space Force.   We have to address this so that the public better understands the threats and the investments we need to make to mitigate them.   Looking forward, General Saltzman has developed new concepts guiding the Space Force such as “competitive endurance.”   This includes a key tenant for the need to be able to conduct “responsible counterspace campaigning.”   It challenged the Guardians to understand what systems we need to disrupt or deny an adversary’s space-based targeting.   This is the important work that we must tackle if we are to be successful and continue to develop guardians that can protect and defend our national interests in space.   These policy changes are at the heart of what we must do to:  1) establish deterrence; 2) integrate with the joint force; 3) conduct training; 4) and develop warfighting doctrine.   The continued changes in Space Force personnel, acquisition, and policy I’ve covered today highlight some of the establishing principles for the force.   We have to maximize our asymmetric advantages to ensure American’s continued space superiority.    We cannot standstill.   When we started we knew it wasn’t just about how many guardians and platforms we have in the force, but the quality of those guardians and platforms.    In my 2017 speech, when referring to a future Space Force, I said “it must be as world-class as our Army, our Navy, our Marines, and our Air Force. It must be as good as the University of Alabama football program or at least before Saban left!”

Based on a year-long investigation, the Congressional Committee on Education and the Workforce majority, under Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC), has released findings on how antisemitism engulfed college campuses while administrators put the wants of terrorist sympathizers over the safety of Jewish students, faculty, and staff.
 
“For over a year, the American people have watched antisemitic mobs rule over so-called elite universities, but what was happening behind the scenes is arguably worse. While Jewish students displayed incredible courage and a refusal to cave to the harassment, university administrators, faculty, and staff were cowards who fully capitulated to the mob and failed the students they were supposed to serve,” said Chairwoman Foxx. “Our investigation has shown that these ‘leaders’ bear the responsibility for the chaos likely violating Title VI and threatening public safety. It is time for the executive branch to enforce the laws and ensure colleges and universities restore order and guarantee that all students have a safe learning environment.”
 
The report’s findings clearly support four conclusions:

1. University administrators made astounding concessions to the organizers of illegal encampments. For example, in the case of Northwestern University (Northwestern), administrators entertained demands to hire an “anti-Zionist” rabbi and divest from and remove Sabra Hummus from campus cafeterias. 
2. University administrators deliberately chose to withhold support from Jewish students. Harvard University’s (Harvard) decision making was particularly egregious, as demonstrated by choices to intentionally omit condemnation of Hamas and acknowledgment   of hostages in its widely-criticized equivocal statement  on the October 7 attacks, and then-President Claudine Gay asking Harvard Corporation Senior Fellow not to call the phrase “From the River to the Sea” antisemitic hate speech.
3. University administrators overwhelmingly failed to impose meaningful discipline for those who engaged in antisemitic conduct. Across the board, enforcement of campus rules was wildly uneven, from Harvard and Columbia faculty playing key roles in derailing discipline toward antisemitic conduct violations and Rutgers University (Rutgers) actually disciplining Jewish students who spoke out against the harassment, to the overall lack of consequences for those involved in encampments at schools including the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), Yale University (Yale), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
4. University administrators considered Congressional oversight a nuisance at best and with open hostility at worst. Administrators at the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), for instance, attempted to orchestrate negative media coverage of Members of Congress who scrutinized the university while Harvard president Claudine Gay disparaged U.S. Representative Elise Stefanik’s (R-NY) character to the university’s Board of Overseers. 

Independent of Congress, private organizations have reached similar conclusions.

Recently Brooke Goldstein, the founder and executive director of The Lawfare Project, who also served as the founder of the #EndJewHatred civil rights movement, addressed antisemitism on campuses, using DePaul University as an example.

Brooke’s opinions were published in a campus paper, the Algemeiner https://www.algemeiner.com/2024/11/25/depaul-university-enabled-violent-attacks-and-brain-injury-on-jewish-students/ 

Goldstein noted that even before the horrific October 7 tragedy, problems were identified. She directly criticized the University’s administrators, stating in her article that “The unprecedented wave of hatred launched against Jews and Israelis at DePaul University over the past year is a direct result of the administration’s failure — not just to help its Jewish community feel safe, but to actually keep its Jewish students safe.”

She didn’t indicate that this was an issue confined to any one university, pointing out that “Jew-hatred has become systematized in higher education, and we are now seeing the consequences playing out on campuses across the country — including at DePaul University. Radicalized agitators who openly support foreign terrorist organizations target Jewish students with calls for their genocide.

“From the river to the sea” is a call for genocide…“Globalize the intifada” is a call for worldwide violent attacks on Jews, like we see in the streets of New York City and Amsterdam, and on campus here at DePaul…”

During the Biden Administration, there were deep and justified concerns that official agencies of the federal government were being used to suppress lawful opposition.  One of the measures included spying on members of Congress. The Department of Justice’s own Office of Inspector General has reviewed that charge, and has found there is merit to it. We present the executive summary of that report.

A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance

of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of

Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and

Members of the News Media

In the spring and summer of 2017, CNN.com (CNN), The New York Times, and The Washington Post published articles containing classified information, some of which was classified as Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. In May and June 2021, multiple news media outlets reported that, in 2020, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) issued compulsory process to obtain non-content communications records of reporters at CNN, The New York Times, and The Washington Post in an attempt to identify the sources of the leaked classified information. The reported revelations sparked widespread concern, including from the news media, that the Department’s use of compulsory process was an encroachment on the news media’s ability to report on government activities.

Concerns also were raised about the Department’s use of non-disclosure orders (NDO)—sought by the Department and issued by federal courts—that prevented the reporters and newsroom leadership from learning about the use of compulsory process to seek reporters’ non- content email records.2 Such NDOs could prevent reporters and news media companies from having an opportunity to challenge the compulsory process in court.3 Concerns also were expressed that the NDOs impeded the news media’s ability to report on the orders, thereby hindering public scrutiny of the government’s activities.4 In addition, the news media was troubled by the Department’s lack of notice prior to issuance of the compulsory process because in 2014 and 2015, in the wake of a controversy stemming from similar efforts by the Department to obtain reporters’ communications records, the Department issued new guidelines that presumptively favored prior notice to and negotiation with the affected parties when the Department sought records of members of the news media to allow the affected parties to challenge any request and negotiate the scope of the records sought.

On May 21, 2021, President Joseph Biden stated that the practice of subpoenaing news media records to identify reporters’ sources was “simply, simply wrong,” and he would not allow it.6 On June 5, 2021, the Department announced it would no longer “seek compulsory legal process in leak investigations to obtain source information from members of the news media doing their jobs.”

Shortly after the Department’s announcement, news media outlets reported that the Department used compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers in connection with the alleged unauthorized disclosure of classified information. In response to this reporting, Members of Congress expressed concerns that their records had been obtained for political reasons and/or that issuing the compulsory process violated the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government.8 Similar to the news media’s criticism, Members of Congress also voiced concern about the use of NDOs to prohibit the communication service providers from disclosing the existence of the compulsory process.

On June 11, 2021, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated a review to examine whether the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain communications records of Members of Congress and affiliated persons and members of the news media in certain investigations of alleged unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the news media complied with Department policies and procedures, and whether there was evidence that compulsory process seeking non-content records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers was sought based on party affiliation.

This report summarizes the results of our review and describes the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and members of the news media in four criminal investigations into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information that were opened in 2017.

The Department did not charge anyone in these investigations with unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and all four of the investigations are now closed.

As described in this report, we make several findings regarding the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain non-content communications records of Members of Congress and congressional staff and members of the news media. With respect to Members of Congress and congressional staff, which are the focus of Chapter Two, we found the Department issued compulsory process for the non-content communications records of 2 Members of Congress and 43 individuals who were congressional staffers at the time the articles containing the classified information were published as part of the investigations to identify the sources of the leaked classified information. Both Members of Congress were Democrats, and of the 43 congressional staffers, 21 worked for Democratic Members of Congress or the Democratic staff of a congressional committee or congressional leadership office, 20 worked for Republican Members or the Republican staff of a congressional committee or congressional leadership office, and 2 worked in nonpartisan positions for congressional committees. All of the Members and staffers whose records were sought became aware of the classified information in connection with their congressional responsibilities. For most of the staffers, the basis for the Department’s decision to include them in the pool of possible leakers (subject pool) was that the Department or a U.S. Intelligence Community agency determined that they had been provided, consistent with their job responsibilities, access to the classified information by the Department, a U.S. Intelligence Community agency, or another congressional staffer, or may have otherwise gained access to the information; the decision to issue compulsory process was based in most instances on the close proximity in time between that access and the subsequent publication of the news articles.

During the relevant timeframe of this review, the Department did not have a policy that expressly or clearly addressed the use of compulsory process to obtain from third parties the communications records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers, or the use of NDOs in connection with such compulsory process. Further, Department policy did not require any supervisory approval, including by senior Department officials, before a prosecutor issued such compulsory process or sought an NDO in connection with such process.

The Department’s decision to compel the production of non-content communications records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers implicated the constitutional rights and authorities of a co-equal branch of government. Although Members of Congress and congressional staff are not immune from prosecution for criminal conduct, including the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and we did not find any evidence of retaliatory or political motivation by the career prosecutors who issued the compulsory process for non-content records that we reviewed, we believe that using compulsory process to obtain such records when based solely on the close proximity in time between access to the classified information and subsequent publication of the information— which was the case with most of the process issued for non-content communications records of congressional staff in the investigations we examined—risks chilling Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch because it exposes congressional officials to having their records reviewed by the Department solely for conducting Congress’s constitutionally authorized oversight duties and creating, at a minimum, the appearance of inappropriate interference by the executive branch in legitimate oversight activity by the legislative branch. Moreover, even non-content communications records—such as those predominantly sought here—can reveal the fact of sensitive communications of Members of Congress and staffers, including with executive branch whistleblowers and with interest groups engaging in First Amendment activity.

We also determined that the Department obtained 40 NDOs related to the compulsory process that was issued for records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers, most of which were renewed at least once, with some extended for up to 4 years. The NDO applications filed with the courts—both in original and renewal applications—relied on general assertions about the need for non-disclosure rather than on case-specific justifications. Department policy permits prosecutors to make boilerplate statements in applications. However, Department policy also expects that in the later stages of investigations, applications will include more specific facts relevant to the requests “as available” to extend non-disclosure. The renewal applications in these investigations, including a renewal application filed in August 2021 after news broke about the Department’s issuance of compulsory process for congressional records and after the Department determined that a former congressional staffer on whom one of the investigations had focused likely did not leak the classified information, contained the same boilerplate assertions about the need for non-disclosure that were contained in the original applications. Additionally, DOJ policy in effect at the time did not require the NDOs filed with the courts to reference, and they did not reference, the fact that they related to requests for records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers.

In November 2023, the Department substantially revised its policy on congressional investigations (Congressional Investigations Policy) to require, among other things, approval of the Department’s Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorney before issuing compulsory process to a third party for records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffer when related to the staffer’s duties and before seeking NDOs in connection with such compulsory process. The revised policy also stated that the Public Integrity Section “should” notify the Criminal Division’s Assistant Attorney General of approvals, although it did not unambiguously require similar notice to the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General. Although we believed the revised Congressional Investigations Policy represented an improvement over prior policy, we were concerned that it still lacked a provision clearly requiring senior level DOJ notification to ensure that senior leadership would be able to consider and decide matters potentially raising constitutional separation of powers issues. This report therefore recommends that the Department evaluate when advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General, should be required before compulsory process is issued, and any corresponding NDOs are sought, for records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffers and establish, as necessary, implementing policies and guidance. We also recommend that the Department consider the circumstances in which NDO applications and renewals should identify for the reviewing judge that the records covered by a proposed NDO are records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers.

After reviewing a draft of this report that included these recommendations, the Department revised applicable DOJ policies in September 2024 in response to the concerns we identified. The newly revised Congressional Investigations Policy now requires the Public Integrity Section (PIN) to notify the Criminal Division’s Assistant Attorney General of all consultations and approvals undertaken by PIN in connection with investigations involving Members of Congress or congressional staffers, including concerning the issuance of compulsory process to a third party for the communications records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffer and related NDOs.

The newly revised policy also makes explicit that, prior to taking one of the enumerated investigative steps specified in the policy, including issuing compulsory process and related NDOs for records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers, the U.S. Attorney’s Office or other prosecuting component must file an “Urgent Report” to Department leadership, including the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.

At the same time, the Department also revised the Urgent Reports Policy to explicitly add “investigations involving elected or appointed officials” to the list of circumstances that require urgent reporting when there are major developments.12 The Department also revised applicable DOJ policy to require that, in cases where an NDO would delay notice to a Member of Congress, congressional office, or a congressional staffer, the prosecutor must disclose this fact in the application filed with the court.

Our review also observed that while the Department’s former and current News Media Policy requires the government, with some exceptions, to exhaust all reasonable avenues to obtain the information sought from non-news media sources before seeking approval to issue compulsory process for news media records, no similar exhaustion requirement exists in the Department’s revised Congressional Investigations Policy. Consistent with the News Media Policy’s exhaustion requirement, DOJ prosecutors issued compulsory process for records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers approximately 3 years before issuing similar process for records of the news media.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Department consider whether there are circumstances in which a similar exhaustion requirement should be a prerequisite for issuing compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers.

With respect to compulsory process to obtain communications records of members of the news media, which is the focus of Chapter Three, the Department has emphasized the need to “ensure the highest level of oversight” when using this investigative tool. However, in the three investigations we examined as part of this review in which compulsory process was issued for non-content communications records of members of the news media, we found that the Department complied with some but not all of the then applicable provisions of the News Media Policy. Specifically, we found that the Department failed to convene the News Media Review Committee to consider the compulsory process authorization requests; the Department did not obtain the required Director of National Intelligence (DNI) certification in one investigation, and we were unable to confirm whether the DNI certification it obtained in another investigation was provided to the Attorney General before he authorized the request; and the Department did not obtain the Attorney General’s express authorization for the NDOs that were sought in connection with compulsory process issued in the investigations. Given the important interests at stake, we were troubled that these failures occurred, particularly given that only a few years had elapsed since the Department substantially overhauled its News Media Policy in 2014 and 2015 following serious criticisms concerning the Department’s efforts to obtain communications records of members of the news media. Having once again revised its News Media Policy to address this most recent criticism, the Department must make every effort to ensure full and exacting compliance with its new policy in the future.

Photo: Pixabay

December 10, 2024, As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. HicksRoyal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, The United Kingdom

Every war offers a window into how future wars will be waged. Unquestionably, Russia’s war against Ukraine has much to tell us.

For instance, we’re seeing novel applications of both old and new technologies, some of which will be significant factors in how wars of the future will likely be fought.

The war has had major consequences not only for Europe, but also other regions — especially the Indo-Pacific, where over the last four years we’ve sharpened our focus, and strengthened our posture and capabilities, in recognition of a long-term strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China.

We’ve done so recognizing that competition does not mean conflict — because no one should desire the global devastation that such a war would bring.

That’s why we seek to prevent conflict, by deterring PRC aggression against the United States and our allies and partners, and by defending our core national security interests. And key to deterrence is being able to win if called to fight.

Of course, there are differences between the regions and their security environments. But there are also similarities, and takeaways that are transferable. We’ve seen that clearly, and we know our competitors have seen it.

So, a few quick stipulations up front.

First, to be clear, I’m focused today on changes in war’s character, not its nature. I have no need to dispute Clausewitz that war is violent, it is foggy, full of friction, fear, uncertainty, and chance. There has been so much needless bloodshed in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and such a high cost paid, especially by the people of Ukraine. That’s one reason why war is always the last thing we want.

Second, human beings have a perfectly-imperfect record of predicting the future, let alone the week. So I’m careful here to avoid sweeping statements that leave no room for nuance. Wisdom requires knowing your limitations, after all, and there is irreducible uncertainty in international security affairs.

When future-casting, it’s tempting to proclaim a paradigm shift — even though we’ve all heard those that were premature, or still haven’t panned out.

It’s also tempting to critique heralds of revolution, where evolution seems more evident.

I won’t give in to either temptation today.

There’s a tendency, in our field, to either “fight the last war,” or to suffer from “next-war-itis.” I have seen the pendulum swing between these mentalities since my first job in the Pentagon over 30 years ago. Instead of picking sides, we must inhabit the tension between them. If we can, success is not guaranteed, but it’s more within our grasp. If we can’t, failure is all but certain.

That’s because technology, warfare, and the operational concepts where they intersect are never static. They are always in motion. And while it can take years or even decades to fully grasp their consequences, it behooves us to discern key themes as soon as we are able. After all, doing so can save lives, secure national interests, and even deter future conflict.

So here are four early insights from the war in Ukraine that I believe have impact for the character of warfare.

The first insight is that quality intelligence is an enduring advantage. Prior to February 24, 2022, few countries expected Russia to further invade Ukraine; we knew otherwise.

Thankfully we saw the enormous build-up of Russian forces early. We had enough confidence in the indications and warnings, and enough credibility, to disseminate the information and rally our friends and allies. Not everyone believed it at first. But those who did were better prepared.

The second insight, which was evident soon after the wider war began, was this: You can have all the elements of an advanced military on paper, but if you can’t bring it all together into an integrated system-of-systems, if you don’t have consistent operational know-how, winning is tough.

We saw this clearly in Russia’s early battlefield failures, and it’s still worth noting almost three years later.

It’s not as though Russia’s military was inexperienced in modern warfare, with operations under their belts from Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and even Ukraine starting in 2014.

But Ukraine had been working with the United States and other partners like the U.K. since then, training to defend itself. Those efforts paid off early.

It’s a reminder of an enduring reality: readiness, training, and operational art — especially on how to aggregate systems in depth across time and space — are often more important for military power than numbers or technology alone. Indeed, a military force can add up to less than the sum of its parts.

Historically, that kind of integration and ability to operate jointly is a relative strength of the U.S. military and our closest allies like the U.K. And we’re always getting better, both individually and together, by constantly marrying new operational concepts with game-changing capabilities.

We’ve of course seen Russia adapt and improve with time, which brings me to a third insight: Protracted warfare is alive and well, even among advanced militaries.

As RUSI scholars noted two years ago, Putin planned to take over Ukraine within 10 days. To date, he’s missed his target timeline 100 times over. He underestimated Ukraine’s will to fight, and ability to innovate — and frankly, so did many in the west. Even with the best intelligence apparatus in the world, you won’t always get everything right.

The clear takeaway is, no one should underestimate the ability of an educated, networked, capable society to self-organize and resist aggression.

Those societal strengths in Ukraine have made their resistance even more challenging for Russia. The Ukrainians are showing how effectively a smaller adversary can tie down a larger one, with the right capabilities and support.

A big reason why is the fourth insight, which is that alliances and partnerships are an asymmetric advantage, especially when the free world comes together: to provide security assistance, such as air defenses, artillery, vehicles, munitions, and more; to impose costs, including with the many economic tools at our disposal; and to defend the rules-based international order that’s had so much benefit to so many for so long.

From NATO to AUKUS and beyond, the United States and the U.K. are fortunate to be among dozens of like-minded friends and allies who are partners of choice.

We share values. We train together deeply. We provide each other access, bases, and overflight. Our capabilities are seamlessly interoperable and increasingly interchangeable. Our supply chains strengthen one another.

That’s the result of decades — in some cases centuries — of mutual investment in our relationships. We can never take that for granted. And that’s particularly true of this special relationship.

Not every country enjoys these advantages. Our competitors undoubtedly wish they did.

Because, long wars are hard to fight without many friends.

And they’re even harder to win when you’re stuck with bedfellows of last resort.

Whereas genuine, enduring alliances afford a unique sense of resilience.

It’s an ad-hoc arsenal of autocracies that has kept Russia in the fight so far. Despite the impact of what Putin cobbled together, a willingness to send parts, weapons, and troops doesn’t mean everyone’s getting along — although it’s still concerning to see. More serious collaboration would be even more concerning.

For our part, we are rebuilding our arsenal of democracies, plural, because our alliances make our industries stronger.

Perversely for Russia, Putin’s aggression led to clearer, more public conversations about the transatlantic defense industrial base and the challenges of capability production at scale, enabling us to make necessary investments to get after those challenges, like:

• maximizing production of key munitions — including newer, lower-cost munitions — for a range of warfighting scenarios;
• investing in our shipbuilding and submarine industrial base, which also matters for AUKUS;
• using on-shoring and friend-shoring to secure supply chains, from critical minerals to microchips; and,
• expanding co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies and partners.

We’re doing all this because production is deterrence. And while the engines of production never spin up to 100 percent overnight, the war in Ukraine galvanized democratic societies to jump-start their industries and deepen their stockpiles to better deter aggression and prepare for the future.

So what should these insights mean for the Indo-Pacific, and the PRC?

For one, Moscow’s early battlefield struggles should be deeply concerning for Beijing. This is especially true because the PLA is far less experienced at modern warfare than the Russian military; the PLA hasn’t fought a war in 40 years.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s example of resistance and innovation against an aggressor should also be appreciated clearly — on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere.

If the PRC were to pursue aggression against a neighbor, it would likely find what Russia found in Ukraine: that both sides must be prepared for a drawn-out, protracted fight — where the costs for all only go up over time.

And the power of what like-minded friends and allies can do together is also on clear display in the Indo-Pacific, where we’ve seen what Secretary Austin has called “a new convergence” of our allies and partners around a shared vision of security, from Northeast Asia down to Australia and the Pacific Islands.

Nowhere is that convergence clearer than in AUKUS, where we’re working closely with our British and Australian allies: to field algorithms that are already enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities; to launch U.K. torpedoes from U.S. platforms, and vice versa; and to advance our capabilities in hypersonics and combined autonomy, among many others.

Again, an instigator of conflict in the Indo-Pacific would find the same outcome Moscow has found in Europe: that military aggression won’t achieve your objectives quickly. That you will become increasingly isolated. And that, above and beyond the military consequences, the free world can impose severe economic and reputational costs.

In such a conflict, an aggressor may find that global goodwill evaporates quickly, because most countries don’t want to be associated with a nation that bullies or invades its neighbors — no matter how much they’ve been debt-trapped.

Of course, not every lesson from Ukraine can or should translate to the Indo-Pacific, or elsewhere. There are noteworthy regional differences.

For example, the Indo-Pacific doesn’t have a NATO, nor do we seek it to. Instead, there’s something even better suited to the region: an organic, broad community of nations that wants the Indo-Pacific to remain free, open, stable, peaceful, and prosperous for everyone. That’s what America and our allies and partners want, too.

Another difference: Taiwan is an island 110 miles off the coast of the PRC mainland. In that respect, Russia had it easier — since an amphibious landing is the world’s hardest military operation — but still the Kremlin failed to take over Ukraine like they’d planned.

While the PRC claims there are no similarities, we know they’re watching this war closely, and taking away lessons — although, observing lessons is very different from implementing lessons. So we will keep a close eye on what they learn. And we’ll remain ready to deter aggression.

It’s clear why Beijing is watching this war closely: because after almost three years, we have seen the character of warfare change.

At first, emerging capabilities and concepts used in Ukraine — and smaller wars prior — seemed like minor adaptations, enabled by a global diffusion of commercial technology. They’ve since become more broad-based shifts embedded into the conduct of the war. And these trends will surely echo in future wars for at least the next generation.

One trend is how commercial technology and approaches, with few modifications, are proving useful again and again, from proliferated commercial satellites to small airborne drones to cloud computing. Decades after talk of “network-centric warfare” first appeared, we’re watching what happens when it’s applied at scale. And we’re seeing how dual-use technologies and talent can help deliver it.

Widespread connectivity and widespread electronic warfare have created new opportunities and new challenges for maneuver, dispersal, sensing, and concealment. If you can be seen, you can be hit. That’s driving innovation in operational concepts, capabilities, and even force design.

It’s also a key factor in our iterative development, deployment, and use of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, which draws upon America’s current global lead in software and responsible AI to give us and our allies and partners a clear decision advantage.

Because, when we can see ourselves and potential adversaries clearly — when we make the battlespace more transparent than ever, for us — we can sense, make sense, and act faster, while still maintaining human judgment and responsibility over use of force: the best of both worlds.

Another trend, which some call precise mass, is the use of lower-cost attritable autonomous capabilities alongside more traditional forces to increase the scale and accuracy of surveillance and attacks. The Russia-Ukraine war didn’t start this trend, but it did accelerate it. And it’s shown how precise mass contributes to magazine depth, which is critical in protraction scenarios.

Today, DoD’s Replicator initiative is one way we’re embracing precise mass for the future, and putting it into production at speed and scale. Replicator’s initial focus is fielding multiple thousands of attritable autonomous systems, in multiple domains, by August of 2025. It’s a pathfinder that is not only on track to meet this operational goal, but also to speed the scaling of responsible autonomy more broadly.

And we’ll continue to adapt as our competitors and adversaries do the same. That’s partly why Replicator’s second iteration will scale systems to counter the threat of small airborne drones, in line with our recently-released Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems.

Precise mass exemplifies a fusion of old and new: throughout history, mass was often decisive in warfare, until Cold War-era tech breakthroughs provided the United States and European allies an opportunity to trade mass for greater precision. Now, the ubiquity of commercially-available precision has made mass matter yet again, even as precision continues to improve military efficacy and efficiency, and contribute to the protection of non-combatants.

The fusion between old and new technology in Ukraine — like small drones enabling real-time artillery correction — also represents a broader trend we’re likely to see in future wars.

While each kind of tech has its community of producers and evangelists — like the Bomber and Fighter Mafias of old, each one claiming they matter most — the reality is that both matter: we need uncrewed systems, and 155mm artillery rounds. And both are needed at scale.

Future full-spectrum wars will likely be characterized by high-low mixes of capabilities — some large, expensive, exquisite systems, collaborating with far more systems that are small, smart, cheap, and used en masse. And the important innovations we often see in times of conflict will likely come at the intersection of the two.

The best militaries will master both. And the greatest advantage is likely to accrue to those who are able to combine extant and emerging capabilities to most effectively achieve their operational objectives.

At the same time, the Russia-Ukraine war reaffirms that technology, whether old, new, or both, is seldom itself determinative.

For instance, we’ve repeatedly seen Russia raining down joint firepower strikes to try to capture Ukrainian territory. That alone didn’t get the job done, even when they were expending their best munitions. Remember: they used hypersonic missiles to virtually no strategic effect. Ukraine even took some of the hype out of hypersonics when a Patriot battery intercepted a Russian Kinzhal last year. Make no mistake: taking and holding territory still requires a capable ground force.

To determine which militaries would win a future war, look at the quality of their people, their existing capabilities, and their emerging technologies — and look at how they fuse all three into new ways of fighting, operating, and adopting innovation at speed and scale.

Today, no one does that better than the U.S. military and allies like the U.K. — and we’ve got the best people doing it, to boot. That will drive and sustain our military edge not just tomorrow, but for years and decades to come.

I’ll conclude today with two key tenets for policymakers that I hope we all take away for the long-haul. Both go beyond the character of warfare.

First, while I can’t say how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will end, everyone should remember that appeasement only emboldens aggressors.

Those who would say “it’s just Crimea,” or “it’s just the Donbas,” should remember those who said almost a century ago, “it’s just Austria,” and “it’s just the Sudetenland.” Remember the price paid by so many when Poland came next.

Second is that, as individual democracies and as democratic allies, we have what it takes to outlast and prevail over any who would see our democracies die.

To be sure, that requires the sustained effort of committed citizens, day in and day out, to preserve self-government, to build trust, and to uphold democratic principles and the rule of law.

That is no small thing. And we cannot take it for granted.

The years to come will test our mettle. They will try our souls.

But we need not wither against the howling winds of autocracy that sweep the globe.

Illustration: Pixabay

House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) has introduced legislation to combat China’s unfair trade policies.

U.S. concern with the issue is bipartisan.

In May, the Biden White House directed his Trade Representative to increase tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on $18 billion of imports from China to protect American workers and businesses.  It was noted that “China’s unfair trade practices concerning technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are threatening American businesses and workers. China is also flooding global markets with artificially low-priced exports.”

The Restoring Trade Fairness Act  could revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). In 2000, as China prepared to enter the World Tade Organization, President Clinton signed legislation  extending PNTR status to Beijing.  It was hoped that the Chinese Communist Party would liberalize and adopt fair trading practices. Achieving PNTR status meant that the Chinese state-run economy received preferential tariff treatment under U.S. law, opening the door for the mass influx of products made there. This gamble failed. In the two decades since, the United States manufacturing industry has been depleted, American firms have had their intellectual property pillaged by CCP economic coercion, and the Chinese Communist Party grew into America’s foremost economic (as well as military) adversary.

Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Josh Hawley (R-MO) introduced companion legislation.

Following the bill’s introduction, Chairman Moolenaar said, “… I have introduced the Restoring Trade Fairness Act to stop the Chinese Communist Party from taking advantage of America and to level the playing field for American workers and our allies. Having permanent normal trade relations with China has failed our country, eroded our manufacturing base, and sent jobs to our foremost adversary. At the same time, the CCP has taken advantage of our markets and betrayed the hopes of freedom and fair competition that were expected when its authoritarian regime was granted permanent normal trade relations more than 20 years ago. 

“Last year, our bipartisan Select Committee overwhelmingly agreed that the United States must reset its economic relationship with China. Today, building on tariffs from the Trump and Biden Administrations, the Restoring Trade Fairness Act will strip China of its permanent normal trade relations with the U.S., protect our national security, support supply chain resilience, and return manufacturing jobs to the U.S. and our allies. This policy levels the playing field and helps the American people win this strategic competition with the CCP. China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status has enriched the Chinese Communist Party while costing the United States millions of jobs. This comprehensive repeal of China’s PNTR status and reform of the U.S.-China trade relationship will protect American workers, enhance our national security, and end the Chinese Communists’ leverage over our economy,” said Senator Cotton.

Craig Singleton,  a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is optimistic that the second Trump Administration will continue the toughness on China’s trade policies that marked its first term in the Whiter House.

“Donald Trump’s first term signaled a historic shift in U.S. policy toward China. His strategic blend of economic pressure, unpredictability, sanctions and tariffs knocked Beijing off balance. It was a turning point: Washington moved from passive acceptance of China’s revisionist ambitions to assertive opposition. The Biden administration has wisely maintained and in some cases expanded on this framework. Mr. Trump’s second term could help America to win this strategic contest altogether. China faces an array of challenges, especially a stagnating economy, making it vulnerable to the president-elect’s assertive tactics. If Mr. Trump can couple the blustery style of his first term with a more focused strategy and tighter discipline, the next four years are a golden opportunity to keep Beijing on the defensive and permanently transform the rivalry in America’s favor.”

Photo: China’s Xiamen City (Pixabay)

Following shock and tears, Democrats have struggled to understand how they could have lost so decisively to Donald Trump.

The New York Post  reports that many Democrats are rushing to psychiatrists offices. MSNBC, a deeply pro-Democrat network  states that “Many find themselves stunned, wondering how this could have happened.”

Some key Democratic supporters and advisors have suggested that their party examine their rather contemptuous attitude towards those who aren’t party loyalists.  TV personality Bill Maher, who had repeatedly predicted a Harris victory, suggested that Democrats “look in the mirror.”  He suggests that ultra-progressive positions that many perceived to be contemptuous of the working class turned off many were part of the problem.

Indeed, a long history of contempt for those not deeply tied to the Democrat Party built to a crescendo under both the Biden-Harris Administration and the Harris campaign. It follows a history of party disdain. In an unguarded moment, Obama described them as “”They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment.”   Hillary Clinton described them as “deplorables.” Harris displayed a rejection of basic American Constitutional institutions or  traditional practices such the Supreme Court, the Senate filibuster, and the electoral college. Perhaps most devasting, President Biden, after spending his term in office essentially labelling MAGA supporters as evil, capped off his record of hatred by labelling Trump voters as “garbage.”

Waleed Shahid, writing in The Nation, stresses that “one thing is clear: Democrats need to fundamentally rethink their he party’s cloistered internal governance is also in drastic need of an overhaul… Joe Biden’s decision to remain at the helm instead of opening up a primary and passing the torch to a new generation is probably the defining piece of this election. approach to both politics and policy, and they need to do it now… And for many voters, the transition from Biden to Harris only heightened a sense that the Democratic Party operates as a closed loop, more attuned to the concerns of elite insiders than those of ordinary Americans.”

Undiscussed in Democrat circles, as far as can be determined, is the Party’s addiction to egregious campaign tactics. From ballot harvesting to refusal to a refusal to clean up faulty registration rolls to basically supporting tactics that allow aliens to vote and opposing common sense measures such as voter ID, Democrats turned off those independents who just seek honest balloting.

One possible reason Democrats have so far failed to acknowledge for the widespread GOP victory has to do with its focus on stopping questionable Democrat campaign tactics. The Washington Examiner noted that Republicans “unleashed tens of thousands of poll watchers for the election, an operation that comes after months of recruitment efforts and some controversy and legal disputes.” The move was in conjunction with preparations for legal challenges to objectionable tactics they believed the Harris campaign may have been prepared to engage in.

The GOP was frightened by Joseph Stalin’s adage, “It’s not who votes, but who counts the votes that matters”

Breitbart ‘s Hannah Knudson noted that “The Republican National Committee (RNC) was on top of ‘hundreds’ of issues on election night, working quickly with a team of lawyers to solve any possible instances of election malfeasance, and RNC Chairman Michael Whatley provided several examples of what their team did as Americans anxiously awaited the final election results.”

Democratic failure to listen to kitchen table concerns was a key challenge that some are beginning to comprehend.  Former presidential candidate Andrew Yang, in a Politico article, warns that “they should adopt one central mission: improving Americans’ standard of living. They should abandon policing cultural behaviors, especially since many of their stances aren’t even popular with Democrats in real life. They should also create solutions for men and boys — who are struggling — instead of engaging in identity politics that excludes at least half of the country. In many ways, these all boil down to one thing: The Democratic Party should act more democratically.”

Illustration: Pixabay

China and Russia expanded their security cooperation framework last year to include two joint maritime drills near Alaska and in the Arctic.

For the first time, aerial patrols integrated the nuclear-capable H-6N strategic bomber. Military analysts in Washington suggest Beijing’s intent is to project nuclear deterrence and intensify its challenge to Western strategic dominance wherever it can do so.

People’s Daily Online reported recently that China conducted a total of nine “Joint Strategic Air Patrols,” including the two held in 2024. “A month-long joint patrol between the China Coast Guard and its Russian counterpart in the Arctic shows the expansive scope of Beijing’s defined maritime rights and interests and indicates its growing presence in the Arctic,” according to Yu-cheng Chen writing in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief.

Since last fall, in the Arctic region, the two states have coordinated two maritime exercises and conducted joint maritime law enforcement activities in the Arctic Sea. Taiwan is not standing by idly while the two communist states increase the threat level to its and other nations’ air and oceanic security.

Taipei is building its own hypersonic missiles with a range extending past Beijing to secure its deep strike capabilities inside China. Intelligence sources point out that the Czech Republic is in talks to provide the mobile missile vehicles to launch the missiles. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is mass-producing a supersonic cruise missile with a projected range of 1,200-2,000km. It is also working on an extended range version of its Ching Tien hypersonic missile. Last week military sources told Liberty Times newspaper that the medium-range Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile is currently deployed in bunker-style launch positions with the longer-range Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missiles to be deployed using mobile launch vehicles from the Czech Republic.

Expanded Sino-Russian cooperation, along with the alliance’s increasingly aggressive behavior, indicates that China is willing to use Russia to secure its political-military goals in and outside of Asia. “Since 2019… PLA and Russian military aircraft enter the Republic of Korea’s air defense identification zone once or twice under the guise of military exercises or strategic patrols. They have never provided prior notification of their operations,” says Yu-cheng Chen.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Joint Staff report that two of the PLA’s H-6 bombers and two J-16 fighter jets flew from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan on November 29 while two H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers simultaneously conducted long-range flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. There were a total of 10 Chinese and Russian aircraft operating near Japan.

Last month the PRC Ministry of National Defense released a brief statement saying that its exercises were conducted “in accordance with the annual cooperation plan between the Chinese and Russian armed forces (根据中俄两军年度合作计划). The coordination effort is significant in that it demonstrates recent advances in development in the PLA’s military technology and capabilities. Sanctions by Western nations have at least temporarily pushed China and Russia to work more closely together. The exercises, according to Chinese newspapers, strengthen their mutual trust between the militaries and forms part of broader preparation for comprehensively addressing regional and global security challenges.

This alignment is of growing concern in Washington and other Western capitals. Sino-Russian cooperation is based, in part, on presenting a united front to counterbalance Western powers. Since last summer that cooperation has expanded into maritime law enforcement operations aimed at improving military interoperability in the Bering Sea, the Sea of Japan, and other areas.

NATO is also growing concerned that the Sino-Russian activities pose a potential threat to Europe itself. China Coast Guard vessels traveled a total of 17,000 nautical miles up to the Arctic and back to defend “maritime rights and interests (海洋维权)” under harsh environmental conditions, testing their resilience to conduct protracted missions. “Taken together, these activities also demonstrate the strategic resolve of both countries to counterbalance perceived encirclement by Western allies in the region,” according to Yu-cheng Chen. Such an escalation in collaborative military framework suggests that China, working together with Russia, poses a tangible security threat not only regionally but globally in the coming years.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department