America’s Endangered Defense Industrial Base, Part 3

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its review of America’s endangered defense industrial base, and a major Department of Defense Report reviewing the crisis.

It’s not just manufacturing interests and the Department of Defense that worries about these trends. In 2010, a Cornell University study reported: If the civilian manufacturing base that is critical to maintaining the national innovation system deteriorates, and America’s innovative capacity moves overseas to be closer to production and the necessary support base, the underlying technological capability for the nation’s defense industrial base also will deteriorate. And as the United States loses its technological edge through movements of R&D offshore, underinvestment in R&D by U.S. private industry, and lack of attention to this critical loss by the U.S. government—with the shedding of millions of skilled workers as a result—the know-how needed for maintaining and advancing U.S. technology leadership vital for national security, and embodied in those displaced workers, is being lost as well.

The DoD report outlines a number of steps currently underway to address this crisis:

Increased near-term DoD budget stability with the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, providing stable funding through Fiscal Year (FY) 2019
Modernization of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. and investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into Chinese intellectual property theft, to better combat Chinese industrial policies targeting American intellectual property
Updates to the Conventional Arms Transfer policy and unmanned aerial systems export policy to increase U.S. industrial base competitiveness and strengthen international alliances · Reorganization of the former Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the work of the “Section 809 panel,” and development of the adaptive acquisition framework all aim to streamline and improve defense acquisition processes
Restructuring the Defense Acquisition University to create a workforce education and training resource to foster increased agility in acquisition personnel
Response to Section 1071(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 which requires establishing a process for enhancing the ability to analyze, assess, and monitor vulnerabilities of the industrial base
Creation of a National Advanced Manufacturing Strategy by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, focused on opportunities in advanced manufacturing
Department of Labor’s chairing of a Task Force on Apprenticeship Expansion to identify strategies and proposals to promote apprenticeships, particularly in industries where they are insufficient
DoD’s program for Microelectronics Innovation for National Security and Economic Competitiveness to increase domestic capabilities and enhance technology adoption
DoD cross-functional team for maintaining technology advantage
Implementation of a risk-based methodology for oversight of contractors in the National Industrial Security Program, founded on risk management framework principles to assess and counter threats to critical technologies and priority assets.

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The study makes a number of Recommendations for the future:

Create an industrial policy in support of national security efforts, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy, to inform current and future acquisition practices Expanding direct investment in the lower tier of the industrial base through DoD’s Defense Production Act Title III, Manufacturing Technology, and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment programs to address critical bottlenecks, support fragile suppliers, and mitigate single points-of-failure
Diversifying away from complete dependency on sources of supply in politically unstable countries who may cut off U.S. access; diversification strategies may include reengineering, expanded use of the National Defense Stockpile program, or qualification of new suppliers
Working with allies and partners on joint industrial base challenges through the National Technology Industrial Base and similar structures
Modernizing the organic industrial base to ensure its readiness to sustain fleets and meet contingency surge requirements · Accelerating workforce development efforts to grow domestic science, technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM), and critical trade skills
Reducing the personnel security clearance backlog through more efficient processes
Further enhancing efforts to explore next generation technology for future threats A challenge this large demands a multifaceted approach. Therefore, the classified Action Plan also includes direction for DoD to conduct a comprehensive study on the industrial base requirements needed to support force modernization efforts, specifically focused on the technologies necessary to win the future fight.

Photo: Main entrance to Joint Systems Manufacturing Center. An M1A1 Abrams sits on a display platform to the left of the entrance gates. (Wikipedia photo)

Quick Analysis

Ukraine’s Frozen Conflict

As we approach winter in the northern hemisphere, the war in Ukraine is beginning to resemble a “frozen conflict” from many perspectives. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the media he hopes the war will end faster once President-elect Trump takes over in January. Opinions in Moscow, however, differ from that of the Ukrainian leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to exclude Ukraine from joining in “exchange” for peace. If it does not, he says, then no end to the war is in sight. So far there is no Christmas solution. Several NATO countries, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, are tentatively considering “coalitions-of-the-willing” to provide security for Ukraine outside of the formal NATO framework. There is, however, no collective mechanism today under which such an arrangement is viable. According to the NATO Charter, while Ukraine is a NATO partner country, it may not join as a full member since it has not fulfilled the requirements for membership. That has not stopped NATO and allies from continuing “to provide Ukraine with unprecedented levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defence,” according to the organization. Socor says that keeping Ukraine out of NATO will not advance peace with Russia. Waiting for a peace settlement, he suggests, would only serve to encourage Moscow to continue the war indefinitely. Although the Biden Administration officially withdrew its support for Ukrainian membership in 2021, NATO maintains an “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries. The current White House position led the way for European states to oppose Ukraine’s membership saying that a decision should be delayed until “conditions are met.” Biden pushed for changing “open door” to a “bridge” metaphor. It is not intended as an across-the-board NATO policy and has been implemented in the past on a case-by-case basis, says Socor. “The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s non-statutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible.” Russia has successfully blocked states like Georgia from joining, first in 2008 and again after the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Russia recognizes the value add of Ukraine to NATO is enormous and that Kyiv has a better case than some other nations. Putin’s invasion was, in part, intended to foreclose that option. By 2021, Moscow was pushing hard to maximize its war objectives, which included further annexations of Ukrainian territory. A main goal for Putin was, and is, to ensure there is no Ukraine left to join NATO. As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office in January, he is faced with the historical challenges presented by the war. Post-conflict security guarantees were the center of several proposals made during the 2023 military stalemate. The incoming Trump Administration has yet to outline how it intends to handle the Russia-Ukraine war. Analysts in Washington believe that the new Administration will expect its European allies to guarantee the majority of Ukraine’s security needs. As we approach 2025, several European nations have acknowledged that they do not view Ukraine as eligible for NATO membership as it would draw the organization into the middle of the conflict. Others want to wait until the war is over or pending a “peace” settlement before considering Ukrainian membership. Socor reports that some “influential voices” are suggesting that “Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only.” This would mean starting accession talks soon with the actual talks to commence only after a ceasefire is in place. Trump arrives in Washington at a time when Putin’s hybrid strategies of war in Ukraine have eviscerated commonly-held differences between war and peace. “Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. The Biden Administration downplayed the discussions on possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation by sending only an Assistant Secretary of State. For a European peace to hold the Trump Administration would need to formally extend the United States’ nuclear deterrence to Ukraine. Options under discussion in Europe include a “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks, says Secor. European officials are also debating, without any agreement, whether its military forces could perform non-combat logistical roles to free Ukrainian forces to fight. None of the possible courses of action has moved forward as all eyes are waiting on the incoming Trump Administration for clues about its intended level of support for a NATO framework and other non-NATO proposals. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.