The Homeland Security Committee Task Force Combatting Terrorist ad Foreign Fighter Travel has issued a chilling report detailing the failure of the Obama Administration to halt the flow of Americans joining the international jihadist movement—or to prevent those individuals from returning to the United States to engage in attacks on U.S. soil.
The bipartisan committee (consisting of Chairman Michael McCaul (Republican Lead), John Katko, Rep. Barry Loudermilk, Rep. John Ratclife , Rep. Will Hurd, Rep. Martha McSally, Ranking Member Bennie Thompson, Democratic Lead Loretta Sanchez, Rep. Filemon Vela, and Rep. Donald Payne) has found that the White House has not only failed to accomplish the goal of preventing Americans from joining extremist forces, it has not even developed a coordinated strategy to do so.
The Homeland Security Committee Task Force reports:
Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011.
Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group’s “caliphate” and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone.
These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home….
The Task Force makes 32 key findings and provides accompanying recommendations… Among other conclusions reached, the Task Force finds that:
- Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have largely failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join jihadists. Of the hundreds of Americans who have sought to travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, authorities have only interdicted a fraction of them. Several dozen have also managed to make it back into America.
- The U.S. government lacks a national strategy for combating terrorist travel and has not produced one in nearly a decade.
- The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being radicalized by violent extremists is straining federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects.
- Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure websites and apps to communicate with Americans, making it harder for law enforcement to disrupt plots and terrorist travel. • There is currently no comprehensive global database of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including the United States rely on a patchwork system for swapping extremist identities, increasing the odds foreign fighters will slip through the cracks.
- “Broken travel” and other evasive transit tactics are making it harder to track foreign fighters. • Few initiatives exist nationwide to raise awareness about foreign-fighter recruitment and to assist communities with spotting warning signs.
- The federal government has failed to develop clear early-intervention strategies—or “of-ramps” to radicalization—to prevent suspects already on law enforcement’s radar from leaving to fight with extremists.
- Gaping security weaknesses overseas—especially in Europe—are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by making it easier for aspiring foreign fighters to migrate to terrorist hotspots and for jihadists to return to the West.
- Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners are still sharing information about terrorist suspects in a manner which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often incomplete.
- Ultimately, severing today’s foreign-fighter flows depends on eliminating the problem at the source in Syria and Iraq and, in the long run, preventing the emergence of additional terrorist sanctuaries.
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The Task Force makes 32 Key Findings and associated recommendations to improve America’s security posture—and to ensure foreign countries are doing the same. Below is an abbreviated summary
U.S. Government Strategy and Planning to Combat the Threat
KEY FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Key Finding 1: The U.S. lacks a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel.
Key Finding 2: Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have largely failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join jihadists.
Key Finding 3: The growing complexity of the threat may be creating unseen gaps in our defenses, yet it has been years since any large-scale “stress test” has been conducted on U.S. defenses against terrorist travel.
Key Finding 4: ISIS operatives are urging followers to travel to the group’s other “provinces” in places like Libya, yet it is unclear whether agencies are keeping pace with changes in foreign-fighter destinations.
Key Finding 5: Ultimately, severing foreign fighter flows depends on eliminating the problem at the source.
Identifying Terrorists and Foreign Fighters—and Preventing Them from Traveling
Key Finding 6: Improvements have been made to the terrorist watchlisting process, yet no independent review has been done to assess them and whether more are needed in light of the evolving threat environment.
Key Finding 7: Individuals can now contest their status on the no-fly list; however, more should be done to ensure the new process will appropriately balance due process rights with national security concerns.
Key Finding 8: Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners are still sharing information about terrorist suspects in a manner which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often incomplete.
Key Finding 9: There is currently no comprehensive global database of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including the U.S. rely on a weak, patchwork system for swapping individual extremist identities.
Key Finding 10: DHS should continue its efforts to quickly leverage unclassified data in classified environments to identify potential foreign fighters.
Key Finding 11: The DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board has not been authorized by Congress nor does its charter reflect recent changes to the threat environment, including the rise of the foreign fighter threat.
Key Finding 12: More can be done to incorporate valuable “financial intelligence” into counterterrorism screening and vetting processes.
Key Finding 13: State and local fusion centers are underutilized by federal law enforcement nationwide when it comes to combating the immediate foreign fighter threat and terrorist travel generally.
Key Finding 14: State and local law enforcement personnel continue to express concern that they are not provided with the appropriate security clearances to assist with counterterrorism challenges.
Key Finding 15: The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being radicalized by violent extremists is straining federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects before it’s too late.
Key Finding 16: Few initiatives exist nationwide to raise community awareness about foreign-fighter recruitment and to assist communities with spotting warning signs.
Key Finding 17: The federal government has failed to develop clear intervention strategies—or “of-ramps” to radicalization—to prevent suspects already on law enforcement’s radar from leaving to join extremists.
Key Finding 18: Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure websites and apps to communicate with Americans, making it harder for law enforcement to disrupt plots and terrorist travel.
Key Finding 19: The Administration has launched programs to counter-message terrorist propaganda abroad, but little is being done here at home.
Key Finding 20: The U.S. has not made adequate use of “jaded jihadists” to convince others not to join the fight.
Key Finding 21: Unlike many other governments, U.S. authorities have not relied heavily on passport revocation to stop extremists.
Key Finding 22: While substantial progress has been made since 9/11 to enhance visa security, there may be additional opportunities to expand screening to identify potential extremists earlier in the process.
Key Finding 23: The Administration has improved the security of the Visa Waiver Program, but continuous enhancements must be made in light of the changing threat.
Key Finding 24: U.S. authorities remain concerned about terrorists posing as refugees, yet it is unclear to what extent security improvements to the refugee screening process mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
Key Finding 25: “Broken travel” and other evasive tactics are making it harder to track foreign fighters.
Key Finding 26: More could be done to give frontline operators at borders and ports better intelligence reachback capabilities so DHS can “connect the dots” and uncover previously unidentified terrorists and foreign fighters.
Key Finding 27: U.S. authorities continue to “push the border outward” by deploying homeland security initiatives overseas. Expanding these eforts might help detect threats sooner.
Key Finding 28: Only a fraction of U.S. states have access to INTERPOL databases; wider access could help spot wanted foreign fighters who have slipped past border security.
Detecting and Disrupting Terrorists and Foreign Fighters
When They Travel Overseas Security Gaps Key
Finding 29: Gaping security weaknesses overseas—especially in Europe—are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by making it easier for aspiring foreign fighters to migrate to terrorist hotspots and for jihadists to return to the West.
Key Finding 30: Extremists are using fraudulent passports to travel discretely. However, a third of the international community—including major source countries of foreign fighters—still do not issue fraud-resistant “e-passports,” and most countries are still unable to validate the authenticity of “e-passports.”
Key Finding 31: Many countries do not consistently add information to INTERPOL’s databases, and the majority do not screen against INTERPOL databases in real-time at their borders and airports.
Key Finding 32: U.S. departments and agencies have spent billions of dollars to help foreign partners improve their terror-travel defenses, but the lack of a coordinated strategy for such assistance results in greater risk of overlap, waste, and duplication between programs
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it was clear America needed to take urgent steps to keep terrorists from entering its borders. The 9/11 Commission, for instance, found it was so easy for the hijackers to operate within the United States that they traveled “into, out of, and around the country and complacently [used] their real names with little fear of capture.”
Since then, the U.S. government has taken extraordinary steps to disrupt terrorists at all stages of travel— from fusing real-time intelligence into the border screening process to enhancing travel-document security. These measures have made it harder for extremists to cross our borders. But the threat environment has evolved, which is why the Task Force conducted its review.
While post-9/11 reforms focused largely on preventing terrorists from infiltrating our country to attack, today we need to be equally concerned about keeping Americans from exiting our country to join terrorist groups. The latter challenge demands a different set of tools. This is why it is important for the government to be able to adjust its strategies and plans.
We must adapt to new threats and get resources where they are needed. Unfortunately, our country has a surplus of programs for combating terrorist travel but a deficit of strategic guidance to keep them aligned with the threat. Agencies must be able to make sense of new trends, take stock of existing counterterrorism efforts, and pivot to fix weaknesses.
Yet the Task Force found there is no clear, whole-of-government system for cataloging the proliferation of terror-travel programs, nor a strategy to “stitch the seams” between them. The Administration has undoubtedly stepped up security to cut of foreign fighter flows, as documented throughout this report, but more must be done to identify and close potential gaps in our defenses against terrorist travel writ large.
Key Finding 1: The U.S. government lacks a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorists and foreign fighter travel and has failed to maintain a system for identifying and plugging related gaps in America’s defenses. It has been nearly a decade since the Executive Branch produced a whole-of-government plan to constrain terrorist movements. In its 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission recommended the United States develop “a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.” That year, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act, which mandated such a plan, required the Administration to explain how it would be implemented, and called for an assessment of vulnerabilities in U.S. and foreign travel systems that could be exploited by extremists.
The result was the 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel. It has not been updated since. The 2006 Strategy is woefully outdated. While it provided a thorough overview of U.S. efforts to keep extremists from crossing borders, some of those programs have changed or are now defunct, and new ones have been created. The evolving threat environment has also made the document obsolete.
For instance, the Strategy makes no mention of foreign fighters or the challenges associated with extremists’ social media recruiting. There appears to be no comprehensive accounting of terrorist-travel programs in the U.S. government or any systematic government-wide efforts to identify gaps between them.
The President’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism makes little mention of the subject aside from noting the United States will work with foreign partners to “identify terrorist operatives and prevent their travel…across national borders and within states.”
A full audit of America’s terror-travel preventative and protective measures should be produced, as the Administration has identified “disrupting the flow of foreign fighters” as one of its top priorities in the fight against ISIS.
We found that hundreds of programs, projects, and initiatives have sprouted up to combat terrorist travel since 9/11, but without an overarching strategy to coordinate them, the United States may be wasting taxpayer dollars and failing to allocate resources where they are needed most. Indeed, lack of a strategy not only increases the risk terrorists might exploit weaknesses in the U.S. travel system, but also raises the prospect of waste, overlap, and duplication between agencies.