The New York Analysis of Policy & Government concludes its examination of why America’s Afghanistan policy needed to be changed.
Much attention will be paid to the President’s rejection of the concept of nation building programs simultaneous with military activities within a theater of operations. The “hearts and minds” philosophy that became famous during the Vietnam war, the idea that extensive civilian aid projects are a necessary component of warfighting, failed then, and it is has failed in Afghanistan.
Much of the nation-building drives over the past half-century or so by U.S. political leaders were, at least in part, public relations attempts to appeal to anti-war elements at home by demonstrating that America’s involvement in various conflicts were more than just about the deployment of military force. Unfortunately, much of that effort was unrealistic. Building infrastructure is a waste of time if opposing forces and readily destroy what has been constructed, and punish those who took part in the effort.
Support for nation-building frequently centers on the great success stories of post-WW2 Germany and Japan. Both nations were essentially devastated, and were redeveloped, thanks to America, into exceptionally prosperous and peaceful countries. But the examples miss a key element: both had unconditionally surrendered before their reconstruction began. The military threat was eliminated, and governments were established that had little choice but to cooperate fully with Washington.
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A Rand Corporation study notes “…the costs and risks associated with nation-building have remained high. Consequently, the United States has not embarked on such endeavors lightly. It withdrew from Somalia in 1993 at the first serious resistance. It opted out of international efforts to stem genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It resisted European efforts to entangle it in Balkan peace enforcement through four years of bloody civil war. After intervening in Bosnia, it spent another three years pursuing a nonmilitary solution to ethnic repression in Kosovo. In spite of this reticence, each successive post–Cold War U.S.-led intervention has generally been wider in scope and more ambitious in intent than its predecessor. In Somalia, the original objective was purely humanitarian but subsequently expanded to democratization. In Haiti, the objective was to reinstall a president and conduct elections according to an existing constitution. In Bosnia, it was to create a multiethnic state. In Kosovo, it was to establish a democratic polity and market economy virtually from scratch. During his presidential campaign in 2000, George W. Bush criticized the Clinton administration for this expansive agenda of nation-building. As President, Bush adopted a more-modest set of objectives when faced with a comparable challenge in Afghanistan. The current administration’s efforts to reverse the trend toward ever larger and more ambitious U.S.-led nation-building operations have proven short lived, however.”
The U.S. Army War College offers a particularly sharp criticism of nation-building as a strategy that can defeat terrorism:
“America’s push to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq may have made terrorism and insurgency more feasible. Well before 2001, eminent governance scholars had noted that key democracy enablers, such as liberal institutions and culture, were absent in Muslim-majority countries, making successful democracy unlikely.43 The research further indicated higher levels of political violence were associated with intermediate forms of government, such as infant democracies. An ineffective government may make terrorism more feasible, particularly if the state security force is ineffective or non-existent. Finally, attempts to replace autocracies in Afghanistan and Iraq with representative governments were unlikely to succeed due to the negative effects from decades of trauma. At the time of the US invasions, Afghanistan had been at war for more than 20 consecutive years and Iraq had been at war for 16 of the previous 20. As United Nations data show, both countries already had high numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons for many years. Moreover, Iraqis and Afghans endured extremely high rates of political violence and terror well before 9/11. Both populations were suffering the negative effects of substantial and enduring trauma.”