Budget constraints are taking an increasingly severe toll on the United States Army, impairing its ability to defend the nation. The financial challenges come at a time when threats from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and terrorists have increased dramatically.
The Army’s base 2017 budget request, including Overseas Contingency Operations, is $125.1 billion. 60% of that figure goes to personnel costs. Major General Thomas Horlander, the force’s budget director, notes that the Army’s base budget has been reduced by 12% over the past six years, and Overseas Contingency Operations funding has been reduced to 20% of what it was in 2010.
Although America’s adversaries field advanced weaponry and cutting edge technology to a degree greater than ever, the Army’s research budget is being reduced. The 2017 Research, Development and Acquisition budget request of $22.6 billion is a decrease of $1.4 billion from the 2016 enacted levels. According to General Horlander, “the Army had to make some difficult choices between current and future readiness. We assess that this risk will continue until we achieve a greater balance between readiness, end strength and modernization early into the next decade.”
In an article in National Defense magazine General H.R. McMaster, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command noted that “Future Army forces may be not only outnumbered … but we also may face enemies who have overmatch capability over us in some key areas…”
The article notes that “Adversary technologies that pose an increasing threat to U.S. forces include: sophisticated air defenses; highly capable anti-tank weapons; unmanned aerial systems and associated swarm capabilities; long-range rockets and artillery; cyber weapons; electronic warfare; anti-satellite capabilities; and advanced combat vehicles…Meanwhile, the Army’s ability to modernize as well as field and sustain critical capabilities ‘is being sorely tested on all fronts,’ said Katrina McFarland, acting assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, technology and logistics.”
The National Commission on the Future of the Army has completed its analysis on the condition of the Army, and the results are truly worrisome.
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The Commission found that demands made on Army to protect the nation are “significant and, in many cases, increasing. Yet, the Army is down-sizing. After all we have heard, read, seen, and analyzed, we find that an Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to meet current and anticipated missions with an acceptable level of national risk. Within that Army of 980,000, the Commission finds that a Regular Army of 450,000, an Army National Guard of 335,000, and an Army Reserve of 195,000 represent, again, the absolute minimums to meet America’s national security objectives. However, the reserve components must be resourced to provide both needed operational capability and the strategic depth the nation requires in the event of a full mobilization for unforeseen requirements. These forces should be maintained at currently planned readiness levels, and every effort should be made to increase funding for modernization…
“Even with budgets permitting a force of 980,000, the Army faces significant shortfalls. Army aviation represents a key example. Today, some aviation assets cannot meet expected wartime capacity requirements. Considering all types of Army units, peacetime demand for aviation assets is among the highest, and demand may grow as threats from Russia and other nations escalate. Retaining an eleventh Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in the Regular Army would help meet these demands. With an eleventh CAB, the Army would be better postured to retain a forward stationed aviation brigade in Korea—a major advantage over rotating forces as currently planned—and shortfalls in capabilities would decline significantly.
“Short-range air defense represents another example of an important shortfall. In the post-Cold War era, the Army envisioned little threat from the air forces of potential adversaries. Recent activities in Ukraine and Syria have demonstrated the threat environment has changed. Yet, no short-range air defense battalions reside in the Regular Army. Moreover, a sizeable percentage of the Army National Guard’s short-range air defense capability is providing essential protection in the National Capital Region, leaving precious little capability for other global contingencies, including in high-threat areas in northeast Asia, southwest Asia, eastern Europe, or the Baltics. Other capabilities with significant shortfalls include tactical mobility; missile defense; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); field artillery; fuel distribution; water purification; watercraft; and military police
“… more efficiencies and fewer redundancies will not be enough; added funding will eventually be needed if major shortfalls are to be eliminated…
“As a result of the budgetary constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Army had to make many significant trade-offs, including cancelling Combat Training Center rotations and furloughing Army civilians. Moreover, the Army replaced four Army National Guard units scheduled to deploy in June 2013 for overseas operations in order to avoid about $93 million in added costs required to mobilize and deploy the units. Given that year’s tight budget situation, the decision to employ Regular Army units in lieu of reserve component units was understandable. However, these decisions caused longer-term harm by reducing opportunities for leader development and training for reserve component soldiers. The decisions also increased tension and suspicions between the Army components, leaving some reserve units feeling that they were not being treated as an important part of the Army…”