A new U.S. Air Force report to Congress outlines the challenges and goals up to the year 2050 of both that service and its Space Command,
The document notes that “A great deal of change can occur in 25 years. There is enormous uncertainty about the events that will transpire over the next 25 years, about the technologies that will be available by then, and about the threats to national security that will exist. Threats will include both conventional and nuclear adversaries with the capacity and the will to challenge the interests, the values, and even the existence of the United States and its allies.”
In 2050, the document discloses, “unless there is a fundamental change in the direction of international affairs, the United States will be facing a peer competitor in the Pacific and a near peer competitor in Europe. By that time, existing trends in technology maturation will have moved forward considerably, and new trends will have become evident. China is doing everything it can to exploit the opportunities that emerging technologies are providing to field forces designed to defeat the United States in the Western Pacific, especially in space and in the air. By 2050, if not well before, the Air Force and Space Force will not be competitive unless we make substantial improvements in how these forces are equipped, trained, and operated. We can no longer acquire new systems and assume they will be dominant for decades …the ability of the Air Force and Space Force to support that strategy is at risk if we do not have the necessary resources and move aggressively in the direction described in this report.
“China will remain the pacing challenge to the United States and to democratic powers in general, especially, but not solely, in the Indo-Pacific region. Recognizing this reality, the [Air Force] has spent considerable effort in reoptimizing the Department for great power competition. These efforts were designed to create an enterprise-wide competitive ecosystem, postured for long-term strategic competition. They included: establishing a Space Force Futures Command and an Air Force Integrated Capabilities Command; creating deployable Air Force operational wings; standing up new Air Force acquisition and technology Systems Centers; reshaping the education of Air Force Airmen and Space Force Guardians; creating a core of more technical professionals, including by reestablishing Air Force warrant officers for cyber and information technology; and, in the DAF Secretariat, creating organizations to perform strategic program assessments, guide modernization, and conduct competitive activities. This framework will evolve through 2050 but should not fundamentally change.
The document notes that:
“By 2050 it is all but certain that Xi Jin Ping and Vladimir Putin will be out of power. There is a wildcard possibility that new leadership will choose fundamentally different directions for China or Russia, but the baseline assumption will be that both states remain autocratic and consider the United States and other democracies to represent rival powers. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken has indicated, an alignment that includes China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran against the democratic powers is a possibility and should be deterred if possible. Conversely, increasing concerns about China’s aggressive intentions could stimulate a multi-lateral alliance or alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. If these developments did occur, they would have impacts on size and distribution of capabilities in the DAF of 2050, but not on the nature of the Department nor on the types of organizations, training, and equipment of the Air Force and Space Force.
“China’s growth will continue, but at a reduced rate as demographics and authoritarian economic mismanagement influence productivity. China will continue to grow its nuclear forces to levels comparable to those of the United States and Russia. China will also continue the expansion and reach of its military and its attempt to influence global events. China is likely to acquire some additional international basing, but it will avoid the large scale global deployments that characterize the current posture of the United States. The Taiwan “issue” may or may not be resolved, however, if it has been, other points of friction between China and neighboring states will still exist. China’s reliance on a combination of cutting-edge technology, innovative operational concepts, operationalized use of the space domain, emphasis on information dominance, and, increasingly, long-range precision weapons of all types will continue.
“Russia will remain hostile, but its ambitions will be limited by the weakness of its economy. If clean energy technology matures before 2050, Russia’s dependence on extractive fossil fuel exports will be a limiting factor in its ambitions. Russia and China are likely to remain at least opportunistically aligned, with Russia as the weak partner in the relationship. Russia will continue its high reliance on nuclear weapons for security against the West and will field some combination of the exotic weapons it has in development today, even potentially stationing nuclear anti-satellite weapons in space. Any stationing of nuclear weapons in space would be highly destabilizing; this is not a baseline assumption for this report, but it is a real possibility. Russia will also attempt to rebuild its conventional forces following the termination of the Ukraine war, but it will not be able to rival the conventional forces available to NATO due to its economic constraints.
“A mutual defense pact between Russia and China is possible but is not considered a baseline assumption. Neither Russia nor China will want to be obligated to enter a conflict the other initiates.
“Arms control agreements will not limit the nuclear or conventional forces of the major powers. Wildcards are plausible. For example, some set of events, such as a nuclear detonation or regional exchange, may motivate a renewed impetus for arms control, but the difficulty in reaching a three-party agreement and China’s lack of interest in arms control make it unlikely. If there is a renewed interest in arms control, it will not lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The “nuclear club” will not shrink, and there is a good chance that there will be additional members by 2050, motivated by local threats and the perception that nuclear weapons provide deterrents against others who have joined the nuclear club. If the perceived value and reliability of the nuclear security umbrella provided by the United States to our allies diminishes, proliferation will be more likely to occur.
Photo: A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket booster carrying a payload of two WorldView Legion satellites launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., May 2, 2024. This launch marked a collaboration between the U.S. Space Forces – Space and Maxar Technologies, a commercial space company. This mission was supported by S4S’s CIC program, which fosters collaboration between the DoD and commercial space companies to deliver critical space capabilities. (U.S. Space Force photo by SrA. Joshua Leroi)