Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Conclusion

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

• PRC Defense Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defense budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defense spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defense spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defense, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending.

• Developments in Defense Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.

• Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

U.S.-PRC MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication until weeks before President Biden and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in November 2023. Following the Woodside Summit, where the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communication at all levels, DoD and the PLA conducted several exchanges and working groups at the end of 2023 and through the end of 2024, including senior leader discussions, defense policy talks, operational safety talks, and calls between theater commanders.

• DoD remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD objectives in maintaining military-to-military channels are to help prevent crisis, reduce strategic and operational risk, and clarify misperceptions.

SPECIAL TOPICS

• Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals. Between July and December 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernizing China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions.

• Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been the focus on strengthening and revitalizing political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalize political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces.

• PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualized across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates to at least the 1960s but, in the 1980s, as the PRC developed Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted the use of CNP as a measurement of China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist system and the West’s capitalist system. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.

Photo: China’s unmanned combat Ship (China Defence Ministry Photo)

Quick Analysis

Moscow’s Nuclear Influence Grows

Russia and Rosatom are on the move in Southeast Asia. While China actively pursues its military and economic operations in Southeast Asia, Rosatom is expanding its nuclear energy involvement in the region. Rosatom and Vietnam Electricity signed a new memorandum of the development of nuclear energy six days before President Trump returned to the Oval Office. It creates a long-term commitment for both countries to cooperate in the areas of power plant maintenance, fuel supply, and dispensing. According to Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear energy technology is one of its key foreign-oriented sectors, with numerous power plants under construction in countries such as Bangladesh, Türkiye, China, Egypt, India, and Hungary. The new administration in Washington is concerned that the agreement has negative implications for Western sanctions policies. It appears that it may allow Russia to do an end run around current restrictions. Rosatom’s director, Valerii Likhachev, announced the resumption of construction of the Ninh Thuận-1 nuclear power plant, suspended in 2016, according to Mikael Pir-Budagyan, of the Eurasia Daily Monitor. On January 15, Izvestiya reported that Russia is also scheduled to build a research reactor in Vietnam with the project starting in 2027. The Trump Administration, according to analysts in Washington, will face new challenges as Russia revitalizes its footprint in the region. Earlier this week, Rosatom officials claimed that the nuclear energy industry has been the hallmark of its capacity to outcompete foreign counterparts by offering one-stop-shop projects that include most, if not all, necessary stages of power plant construction, expedited licensing, and lucrative contractual terms. Historical data suggests that these types of Russian contracts are designed to last for decades. Pir-Budagyan notes that reports out of Russia suggest that Rosatom’s foreign revenue has doubled since 2017. Last October Likhachev pointed out that Rosatom was expecting to receive $18 billion in foreign revenue for the year and owned eighty-three percent of the global nuclear power plant market. The Southeast Asia region represents more than a financial win in nuclear energy power for Russia. It is also about improving national pride during a time when Moscow has few accomplishments to cite in its war in Ukraine, now dragging into its third year. “Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly praises Rosatom’s overseas projects and has called them the “best in the world” in terms of technical sophistication and safety standards,” according to Pir-Budagyan. As of this month, Rosatom itself has avoided direct Western sanctions, although its subsidiaries have been targeted by the US Treasury, along with some Rosatom officials. Southeast Asia, according to a 2024 International Energy Agency report, is one of the fastest-growing areas and contributes twenty-five percent of the projected increase in global energy demand by 2035. The Agency points out that within twenty-five years it will surpass the European Union’s total energy consumption. “On an institutional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has consistently reaffirmed its interest in exploring nuclear energy cooperation with Russia,” notes Pir-Budagyan. ASEAN’s strategic plan, called the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Energy Cooperation for 2022–2025, identified nuclear energy as a focus area beginning in 2021. In Indonesia, Rosatom is actively engaging with national agencies and institutions to promote its small modular reactor (SMR) technologies. It received recognition in 2024 as the “Best Nuclear Technology Supplier” at the Electricity Connect 2024 event. “In Myanmar,” says Pir-Budagyan, “Rosatom is advancing an SMR project under a 2023 intergovernmental agreement. It is also involved in education, with Russian experts and Myanmar institutions partnering on training programs and science festivals to build local expertise.” From 2019-2025, according to Likhachev, Rosatom trained approximately 400 Vietnamese workers by employing them in the firm’s projects in other countries. This newest agreement puts Russia back on track to finish the construction of Ninh Thuận 1 and is likely to lead to additional construction projects in Southeast Asia at a time when China is also increasingly aggressive in its foreign moves. ASEAN’s goal of obtaining carbon neutrality by 2050 is driving many Southeast Asian states into increasing their ties with Moscow. The consequences are significant for the free world. New, regional long-term commitments provides Russia a major role in the area. As more states use complex Russian nuclear technology it will be increasingly challenging to divest those countries of ties with Moscow, Rosatom and its subsidiaries. Sanction may work in the initial development stage but as plans progress, they could end up posing safety concerns once new nuclear plants are in operation. Russia still must overcome a number of hurdles, including fragmented politics in the region and local public opinion, and safety concerns. Western companies, should they decide to compete, will need government support to remain competitive. The Trump Administration needs to add the Southeast Asian nuclear market to a growing list of concerns in the region. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept. Illustration: Pixabay