Beijing’s influence operations in Hong Kong are a form of psychological warfare that is challenging to oppose. In an analysis of five gray media outlets, Sze-Fung Lee of the Jamestown Foundation found that during the consultation period for Article 23 legislation passed in 2023, the organizations echoed Hong Kong government talking points and coordinated to “produce collaborative content across popular social media channels.” Article 23, a part of the National Security Act, updates or creates new laws in Hong Kong to prohibit treason, sabotage, sedition, the theft of state secrets and espionage, according to a Reuter report. The new provisions redefine “external forces” and outlaw “external interference,” which potentially tightens control over foreign political organizations operating in Hong Kong.
Lee says that “Gray media outlets in Hong Kong now incorporate legal and cognitive warfare tactics to support Beijing’s political agenda” by “targeting Hong Kongers as a part of a broader national security strategy aimed at further cracking down on free expression in the city.” Few studies of Hong Kong’s grey media information ecosystem exist. Fewer still have examined their affiliation with Chinese state entities or the tactics deployed despite the differences from Beijing’s influence operations inside China and abroad. The outlets use both legal and cognitive warfare tactics to reinforce Beijing’s political agenda. As part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) effort to target Hong Kongers’ ability to freely express their views, the authorities create a façade to suggest that the population supports the legislation. They portray themselves as nonpartisan yet, in pragmatic terms, they employ tactics as featuring a small set of so-called subject matter experts while omitting their affiliations and failing to flag conflicts of interest, according to Lee.
China achieves amplification of the media posts by disseminating the content in other channels, including via private group chats on other platforms. Viewership and engagement in the authorities’ narratives, according to Lee, is higher than it initially appeared in Western research. China is becoming adept at steering public opinion in Hong Kong and also aggressive in arresting those who violate Article 23 by redeploying the falsified public endorsements to justify and legitimize crackdowns. The five most prominent pro-Beijing media outlets, according to Lee, are Speak Out Hong Kong, Silent Majority, Today Review, GRT Great Bay Area Channel, and Kinliu HK. Support by the pro-nationalistic outlets, he says, hinge on two points: 1) condemning Western interference, and 2) attacks “smearing” the city’s domestic politics.
The grey media may be financed indirectly by companies linked to the mainland or their work is positively acknowledged by Chinese officials, according to a report in Asia Sentinel. The five media outlets collaborate on videos and posts and are mainly conducted in Cantonese on Facebook and You Tube. These outlets are more popular in the city than WeChat or Weibo. As each of the grey media outlets share each other’s posts, they maximize Beijing’s position on the issues more than the initial following indicates. “First, these posts are widely shared among pro-Beijing and pro-establishment groups in social networks including private group chats—something that the publicly available engagement data does not include,” notes Lee.
The older generation are generally more supportive of the authorities’ actions and often circulate these pro-government narratives in their own various social media groups. Hong Kongers hearing from their own are more likely to believe the disinformation is credible. “This mode of distribution exacerbates echo chamber and filter bubble effects and fosters cognitive biases that reinforce pre-existing beliefs when encountering people with similar dispositions,” according to a Jamestown Foundation report.
A July 2016 report on disinformation from RAND Corp. suggests that featuring an organization as nonpartisan, when it is not, having it publish op-eds and interviews with “experts,” and then relying on them for quotes, creates the illusion that multiple sources all point to the same conclusion. The sense of familiarity adds to the “illusory truth effect.” Lee says this is especially effective with low-literacy populations who lack critical thinking skills.
Target groups in Hong Kong are increasingly susceptible to Chinese influence operations. As elsewhere in the world, the more a single message is repeated, the more likely an individual is to believe it, especially when it is complicated information from a source they trust. Past campaigns, when integrated with legal and cognitive warfare tactics, have sown confusion, polarized public opinion, generated mistrust, and magnified divisions within societies. It appears Beijing has been very successful in polarizing the pro-democracy and pro-government camps over the last half dozen years. As Beijing’s tactics continue to evolve, it is likely the state of repression in Hong Kong will continue and the democratic resistance will suffer. Perhaps learning a lesson from Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong can be applied to Taiwan before it, too, experiences a major change in its information environment.
Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.
Photo: Hong Kong (Pixabay)