They move from the war zone in Ukraine, back to Russia, and into the hands of armed criminals. That is the journey many Russian guns used in the war in Ukraine are making this year. They recross the Russian border and are used in armed crimes across the country. This year there is an almost 30% average increase in armed crime in Russia over last year. The Interior Ministry reports this week that increases in crime in border areas, such as the Kurk Oblast, have skyrocketed, with a 675% increase recorded over the same period in 2021. Spikes in armed crime in other border areas are also up by triple-digit percentages.
“This rise in violence is affecting not only businesses but also schoolchildren, with the term ‘Columbine’ having entered the Russian vernacular and raising questions about whether guns could be used more frequently by opposition groups,” says Paul Goble of the Jamestown Foundation. Although the “bleeding back” of weapons of war is not a new phenomenon, it represents a more virulent threat to the country than when it occurred after WWI, the Stalinist era, or after the “Afghantsy” criminals of the 1990’s returned from Afghanistan. There are a number of factors that make the environment in Russia going into this winter different than in earlier events.
Moscow is drafting more soldiers for the war in Ukraine; often men with violent criminal backgrounds. They possess limited combat experience, have less military training, and often lack the discipline of a professional soldier. Their weapons, and those found abandoned in the field, serve as booty to be brought back home. Goble says that the Russian “officers often fail to control these units in the field, and that lack of control directly affects what soldiers may carry away as well.”
Moscow has annexed portions of Ukraine, with much of the war playing out on territories that Putin’s government officially claims as Russia. Goble says that it is clearly intended to make the Russian forces fight harder. Without border checkpoints there are few constraints preventing soldiers from taking their weapons back to Russia. Once home the country’s judicial system is unwilling to prosecute war veterans to the full extent of the law. Few soldiers that are caught using military weapons in criminal acts end up in work camps or prison. Without disincentives, gun ownership has risen to an estimated 25 million firearms in private hands. Along with an increase in gun possession comes an increased propensity to use them to commit crimes.
The profit motive is another contributing factor. Western sanctions are making it harder for Russians to acquire foreign-manufactured guns while simultaneously raising gun prices domestically. This fall, Russians have been caught firing guns at draft centers in an attempt to stop the recruitment process. Goble suggests that Putin’s “partial mobilization” also raises the specter that these illegal guns will be used more frequently by radicals against the regime. Authoritarian leaders fear the decay of public order as it impacts their ability to rule with an iron-clad fist. Putin if left with a difficult challenge: how to return criminals-turned-soldier back into civilians that will lead a normal devoid of armed criminal activity.
The large number of weapons is an enormous challenge to Moscow as it attempts to reintegrate men returning from Ukraine back into civilian life. Goble suggests that some are “questioning whether the campaign in Ukraine is worth further destabilizing Russia’s domestic situation.” Putin soon will be forced to make a choice about how to handle the increased domestic unrest.
Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.