Month: January 2025

December 10, 2024, As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. HicksRoyal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, The United Kingdom

Every war offers a window into how future wars will be waged. Unquestionably, Russia’s war against Ukraine has much to tell us.

For instance, we’re seeing novel applications of both old and new technologies, some of which will be significant factors in how wars of the future will likely be fought.

The war has had major consequences not only for Europe, but also other regions — especially the Indo-Pacific, where over the last four years we’ve sharpened our focus, and strengthened our posture and capabilities, in recognition of a long-term strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China.

We’ve done so recognizing that competition does not mean conflict — because no one should desire the global devastation that such a war would bring.

That’s why we seek to prevent conflict, by deterring PRC aggression against the United States and our allies and partners, and by defending our core national security interests. And key to deterrence is being able to win if called to fight.

Of course, there are differences between the regions and their security environments. But there are also similarities, and takeaways that are transferable. We’ve seen that clearly, and we know our competitors have seen it.

So, a few quick stipulations up front.

First, to be clear, I’m focused today on changes in war’s character, not its nature. I have no need to dispute Clausewitz that war is violent, it is foggy, full of friction, fear, uncertainty, and chance. There has been so much needless bloodshed in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and such a high cost paid, especially by the people of Ukraine. That’s one reason why war is always the last thing we want.

Second, human beings have a perfectly-imperfect record of predicting the future, let alone the week. So I’m careful here to avoid sweeping statements that leave no room for nuance. Wisdom requires knowing your limitations, after all, and there is irreducible uncertainty in international security affairs.

When future-casting, it’s tempting to proclaim a paradigm shift — even though we’ve all heard those that were premature, or still haven’t panned out.

It’s also tempting to critique heralds of revolution, where evolution seems more evident.

I won’t give in to either temptation today.

There’s a tendency, in our field, to either “fight the last war,” or to suffer from “next-war-itis.” I have seen the pendulum swing between these mentalities since my first job in the Pentagon over 30 years ago. Instead of picking sides, we must inhabit the tension between them. If we can, success is not guaranteed, but it’s more within our grasp. If we can’t, failure is all but certain.

That’s because technology, warfare, and the operational concepts where they intersect are never static. They are always in motion. And while it can take years or even decades to fully grasp their consequences, it behooves us to discern key themes as soon as we are able. After all, doing so can save lives, secure national interests, and even deter future conflict.

So here are four early insights from the war in Ukraine that I believe have impact for the character of warfare.

The first insight is that quality intelligence is an enduring advantage. Prior to February 24, 2022, few countries expected Russia to further invade Ukraine; we knew otherwise.

Thankfully we saw the enormous build-up of Russian forces early. We had enough confidence in the indications and warnings, and enough credibility, to disseminate the information and rally our friends and allies. Not everyone believed it at first. But those who did were better prepared.

The second insight, which was evident soon after the wider war began, was this: You can have all the elements of an advanced military on paper, but if you can’t bring it all together into an integrated system-of-systems, if you don’t have consistent operational know-how, winning is tough.

We saw this clearly in Russia’s early battlefield failures, and it’s still worth noting almost three years later.

It’s not as though Russia’s military was inexperienced in modern warfare, with operations under their belts from Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and even Ukraine starting in 2014.

But Ukraine had been working with the United States and other partners like the U.K. since then, training to defend itself. Those efforts paid off early.

It’s a reminder of an enduring reality: readiness, training, and operational art — especially on how to aggregate systems in depth across time and space — are often more important for military power than numbers or technology alone. Indeed, a military force can add up to less than the sum of its parts.

Historically, that kind of integration and ability to operate jointly is a relative strength of the U.S. military and our closest allies like the U.K. And we’re always getting better, both individually and together, by constantly marrying new operational concepts with game-changing capabilities.

We’ve of course seen Russia adapt and improve with time, which brings me to a third insight: Protracted warfare is alive and well, even among advanced militaries.

As RUSI scholars noted two years ago, Putin planned to take over Ukraine within 10 days. To date, he’s missed his target timeline 100 times over. He underestimated Ukraine’s will to fight, and ability to innovate — and frankly, so did many in the west. Even with the best intelligence apparatus in the world, you won’t always get everything right.

The clear takeaway is, no one should underestimate the ability of an educated, networked, capable society to self-organize and resist aggression.

Those societal strengths in Ukraine have made their resistance even more challenging for Russia. The Ukrainians are showing how effectively a smaller adversary can tie down a larger one, with the right capabilities and support.

A big reason why is the fourth insight, which is that alliances and partnerships are an asymmetric advantage, especially when the free world comes together: to provide security assistance, such as air defenses, artillery, vehicles, munitions, and more; to impose costs, including with the many economic tools at our disposal; and to defend the rules-based international order that’s had so much benefit to so many for so long.

From NATO to AUKUS and beyond, the United States and the U.K. are fortunate to be among dozens of like-minded friends and allies who are partners of choice.

We share values. We train together deeply. We provide each other access, bases, and overflight. Our capabilities are seamlessly interoperable and increasingly interchangeable. Our supply chains strengthen one another.

That’s the result of decades — in some cases centuries — of mutual investment in our relationships. We can never take that for granted. And that’s particularly true of this special relationship.

Not every country enjoys these advantages. Our competitors undoubtedly wish they did.

Because, long wars are hard to fight without many friends.

And they’re even harder to win when you’re stuck with bedfellows of last resort.

Whereas genuine, enduring alliances afford a unique sense of resilience.

It’s an ad-hoc arsenal of autocracies that has kept Russia in the fight so far. Despite the impact of what Putin cobbled together, a willingness to send parts, weapons, and troops doesn’t mean everyone’s getting along — although it’s still concerning to see. More serious collaboration would be even more concerning.

For our part, we are rebuilding our arsenal of democracies, plural, because our alliances make our industries stronger.

Perversely for Russia, Putin’s aggression led to clearer, more public conversations about the transatlantic defense industrial base and the challenges of capability production at scale, enabling us to make necessary investments to get after those challenges, like:

• maximizing production of key munitions — including newer, lower-cost munitions — for a range of warfighting scenarios;
• investing in our shipbuilding and submarine industrial base, which also matters for AUKUS;
• using on-shoring and friend-shoring to secure supply chains, from critical minerals to microchips; and,
• expanding co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies and partners.

We’re doing all this because production is deterrence. And while the engines of production never spin up to 100 percent overnight, the war in Ukraine galvanized democratic societies to jump-start their industries and deepen their stockpiles to better deter aggression and prepare for the future.

So what should these insights mean for the Indo-Pacific, and the PRC?

For one, Moscow’s early battlefield struggles should be deeply concerning for Beijing. This is especially true because the PLA is far less experienced at modern warfare than the Russian military; the PLA hasn’t fought a war in 40 years.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s example of resistance and innovation against an aggressor should also be appreciated clearly — on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere.

If the PRC were to pursue aggression against a neighbor, it would likely find what Russia found in Ukraine: that both sides must be prepared for a drawn-out, protracted fight — where the costs for all only go up over time.

And the power of what like-minded friends and allies can do together is also on clear display in the Indo-Pacific, where we’ve seen what Secretary Austin has called “a new convergence” of our allies and partners around a shared vision of security, from Northeast Asia down to Australia and the Pacific Islands.

Nowhere is that convergence clearer than in AUKUS, where we’re working closely with our British and Australian allies: to field algorithms that are already enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities; to launch U.K. torpedoes from U.S. platforms, and vice versa; and to advance our capabilities in hypersonics and combined autonomy, among many others.

Again, an instigator of conflict in the Indo-Pacific would find the same outcome Moscow has found in Europe: that military aggression won’t achieve your objectives quickly. That you will become increasingly isolated. And that, above and beyond the military consequences, the free world can impose severe economic and reputational costs.

In such a conflict, an aggressor may find that global goodwill evaporates quickly, because most countries don’t want to be associated with a nation that bullies or invades its neighbors — no matter how much they’ve been debt-trapped.

Of course, not every lesson from Ukraine can or should translate to the Indo-Pacific, or elsewhere. There are noteworthy regional differences.

For example, the Indo-Pacific doesn’t have a NATO, nor do we seek it to. Instead, there’s something even better suited to the region: an organic, broad community of nations that wants the Indo-Pacific to remain free, open, stable, peaceful, and prosperous for everyone. That’s what America and our allies and partners want, too.

Another difference: Taiwan is an island 110 miles off the coast of the PRC mainland. In that respect, Russia had it easier — since an amphibious landing is the world’s hardest military operation — but still the Kremlin failed to take over Ukraine like they’d planned.

While the PRC claims there are no similarities, we know they’re watching this war closely, and taking away lessons — although, observing lessons is very different from implementing lessons. So we will keep a close eye on what they learn. And we’ll remain ready to deter aggression.

It’s clear why Beijing is watching this war closely: because after almost three years, we have seen the character of warfare change.

At first, emerging capabilities and concepts used in Ukraine — and smaller wars prior — seemed like minor adaptations, enabled by a global diffusion of commercial technology. They’ve since become more broad-based shifts embedded into the conduct of the war. And these trends will surely echo in future wars for at least the next generation.

One trend is how commercial technology and approaches, with few modifications, are proving useful again and again, from proliferated commercial satellites to small airborne drones to cloud computing. Decades after talk of “network-centric warfare” first appeared, we’re watching what happens when it’s applied at scale. And we’re seeing how dual-use technologies and talent can help deliver it.

Widespread connectivity and widespread electronic warfare have created new opportunities and new challenges for maneuver, dispersal, sensing, and concealment. If you can be seen, you can be hit. That’s driving innovation in operational concepts, capabilities, and even force design.

It’s also a key factor in our iterative development, deployment, and use of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, which draws upon America’s current global lead in software and responsible AI to give us and our allies and partners a clear decision advantage.

Because, when we can see ourselves and potential adversaries clearly — when we make the battlespace more transparent than ever, for us — we can sense, make sense, and act faster, while still maintaining human judgment and responsibility over use of force: the best of both worlds.

Another trend, which some call precise mass, is the use of lower-cost attritable autonomous capabilities alongside more traditional forces to increase the scale and accuracy of surveillance and attacks. The Russia-Ukraine war didn’t start this trend, but it did accelerate it. And it’s shown how precise mass contributes to magazine depth, which is critical in protraction scenarios.

Today, DoD’s Replicator initiative is one way we’re embracing precise mass for the future, and putting it into production at speed and scale. Replicator’s initial focus is fielding multiple thousands of attritable autonomous systems, in multiple domains, by August of 2025. It’s a pathfinder that is not only on track to meet this operational goal, but also to speed the scaling of responsible autonomy more broadly.

And we’ll continue to adapt as our competitors and adversaries do the same. That’s partly why Replicator’s second iteration will scale systems to counter the threat of small airborne drones, in line with our recently-released Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems.

Precise mass exemplifies a fusion of old and new: throughout history, mass was often decisive in warfare, until Cold War-era tech breakthroughs provided the United States and European allies an opportunity to trade mass for greater precision. Now, the ubiquity of commercially-available precision has made mass matter yet again, even as precision continues to improve military efficacy and efficiency, and contribute to the protection of non-combatants.

The fusion between old and new technology in Ukraine — like small drones enabling real-time artillery correction — also represents a broader trend we’re likely to see in future wars.

While each kind of tech has its community of producers and evangelists — like the Bomber and Fighter Mafias of old, each one claiming they matter most — the reality is that both matter: we need uncrewed systems, and 155mm artillery rounds. And both are needed at scale.

Future full-spectrum wars will likely be characterized by high-low mixes of capabilities — some large, expensive, exquisite systems, collaborating with far more systems that are small, smart, cheap, and used en masse. And the important innovations we often see in times of conflict will likely come at the intersection of the two.

The best militaries will master both. And the greatest advantage is likely to accrue to those who are able to combine extant and emerging capabilities to most effectively achieve their operational objectives.

At the same time, the Russia-Ukraine war reaffirms that technology, whether old, new, or both, is seldom itself determinative.

For instance, we’ve repeatedly seen Russia raining down joint firepower strikes to try to capture Ukrainian territory. That alone didn’t get the job done, even when they were expending their best munitions. Remember: they used hypersonic missiles to virtually no strategic effect. Ukraine even took some of the hype out of hypersonics when a Patriot battery intercepted a Russian Kinzhal last year. Make no mistake: taking and holding territory still requires a capable ground force.

To determine which militaries would win a future war, look at the quality of their people, their existing capabilities, and their emerging technologies — and look at how they fuse all three into new ways of fighting, operating, and adopting innovation at speed and scale.

Today, no one does that better than the U.S. military and allies like the U.K. — and we’ve got the best people doing it, to boot. That will drive and sustain our military edge not just tomorrow, but for years and decades to come.

I’ll conclude today with two key tenets for policymakers that I hope we all take away for the long-haul. Both go beyond the character of warfare.

First, while I can’t say how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will end, everyone should remember that appeasement only emboldens aggressors.

Those who would say “it’s just Crimea,” or “it’s just the Donbas,” should remember those who said almost a century ago, “it’s just Austria,” and “it’s just the Sudetenland.” Remember the price paid by so many when Poland came next.

Second is that, as individual democracies and as democratic allies, we have what it takes to outlast and prevail over any who would see our democracies die.

To be sure, that requires the sustained effort of committed citizens, day in and day out, to preserve self-government, to build trust, and to uphold democratic principles and the rule of law.

That is no small thing. And we cannot take it for granted.

The years to come will test our mettle. They will try our souls.

But we need not wither against the howling winds of autocracy that sweep the globe.

Illustration: Pixabay

House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) has introduced legislation to combat China’s unfair trade policies.

U.S. concern with the issue is bipartisan.

In May, the Biden White House directed his Trade Representative to increase tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on $18 billion of imports from China to protect American workers and businesses.  It was noted that “China’s unfair trade practices concerning technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are threatening American businesses and workers. China is also flooding global markets with artificially low-priced exports.”

The Restoring Trade Fairness Act  could revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). In 2000, as China prepared to enter the World Tade Organization, President Clinton signed legislation  extending PNTR status to Beijing.  It was hoped that the Chinese Communist Party would liberalize and adopt fair trading practices. Achieving PNTR status meant that the Chinese state-run economy received preferential tariff treatment under U.S. law, opening the door for the mass influx of products made there. This gamble failed. In the two decades since, the United States manufacturing industry has been depleted, American firms have had their intellectual property pillaged by CCP economic coercion, and the Chinese Communist Party grew into America’s foremost economic (as well as military) adversary.

Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Josh Hawley (R-MO) introduced companion legislation.

Following the bill’s introduction, Chairman Moolenaar said, “… I have introduced the Restoring Trade Fairness Act to stop the Chinese Communist Party from taking advantage of America and to level the playing field for American workers and our allies. Having permanent normal trade relations with China has failed our country, eroded our manufacturing base, and sent jobs to our foremost adversary. At the same time, the CCP has taken advantage of our markets and betrayed the hopes of freedom and fair competition that were expected when its authoritarian regime was granted permanent normal trade relations more than 20 years ago. 

“Last year, our bipartisan Select Committee overwhelmingly agreed that the United States must reset its economic relationship with China. Today, building on tariffs from the Trump and Biden Administrations, the Restoring Trade Fairness Act will strip China of its permanent normal trade relations with the U.S., protect our national security, support supply chain resilience, and return manufacturing jobs to the U.S. and our allies. This policy levels the playing field and helps the American people win this strategic competition with the CCP. China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status has enriched the Chinese Communist Party while costing the United States millions of jobs. This comprehensive repeal of China’s PNTR status and reform of the U.S.-China trade relationship will protect American workers, enhance our national security, and end the Chinese Communists’ leverage over our economy,” said Senator Cotton.

Craig Singleton,  a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is optimistic that the second Trump Administration will continue the toughness on China’s trade policies that marked its first term in the Whiter House.

“Donald Trump’s first term signaled a historic shift in U.S. policy toward China. His strategic blend of economic pressure, unpredictability, sanctions and tariffs knocked Beijing off balance. It was a turning point: Washington moved from passive acceptance of China’s revisionist ambitions to assertive opposition. The Biden administration has wisely maintained and in some cases expanded on this framework. Mr. Trump’s second term could help America to win this strategic contest altogether. China faces an array of challenges, especially a stagnating economy, making it vulnerable to the president-elect’s assertive tactics. If Mr. Trump can couple the blustery style of his first term with a more focused strategy and tighter discipline, the next four years are a golden opportunity to keep Beijing on the defensive and permanently transform the rivalry in America’s favor.”

Photo: China’s Xiamen City (Pixabay)

Following shock and tears, Democrats have struggled to understand how they could have lost so decisively to Donald Trump.

The New York Post  reports that many Democrats are rushing to psychiatrists offices. MSNBC, a deeply pro-Democrat network  states that “Many find themselves stunned, wondering how this could have happened.”

Some key Democratic supporters and advisors have suggested that their party examine their rather contemptuous attitude towards those who aren’t party loyalists.  TV personality Bill Maher, who had repeatedly predicted a Harris victory, suggested that Democrats “look in the mirror.”  He suggests that ultra-progressive positions that many perceived to be contemptuous of the working class turned off many were part of the problem.

Indeed, a long history of contempt for those not deeply tied to the Democrat Party built to a crescendo under both the Biden-Harris Administration and the Harris campaign. It follows a history of party disdain. In an unguarded moment, Obama described them as “”They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment.”   Hillary Clinton described them as “deplorables.” Harris displayed a rejection of basic American Constitutional institutions or  traditional practices such the Supreme Court, the Senate filibuster, and the electoral college. Perhaps most devasting, President Biden, after spending his term in office essentially labelling MAGA supporters as evil, capped off his record of hatred by labelling Trump voters as “garbage.”

Waleed Shahid, writing in The Nation, stresses that “one thing is clear: Democrats need to fundamentally rethink their he party’s cloistered internal governance is also in drastic need of an overhaul… Joe Biden’s decision to remain at the helm instead of opening up a primary and passing the torch to a new generation is probably the defining piece of this election. approach to both politics and policy, and they need to do it now… And for many voters, the transition from Biden to Harris only heightened a sense that the Democratic Party operates as a closed loop, more attuned to the concerns of elite insiders than those of ordinary Americans.”

Undiscussed in Democrat circles, as far as can be determined, is the Party’s addiction to egregious campaign tactics. From ballot harvesting to refusal to a refusal to clean up faulty registration rolls to basically supporting tactics that allow aliens to vote and opposing common sense measures such as voter ID, Democrats turned off those independents who just seek honest balloting.

One possible reason Democrats have so far failed to acknowledge for the widespread GOP victory has to do with its focus on stopping questionable Democrat campaign tactics. The Washington Examiner noted that Republicans “unleashed tens of thousands of poll watchers for the election, an operation that comes after months of recruitment efforts and some controversy and legal disputes.” The move was in conjunction with preparations for legal challenges to objectionable tactics they believed the Harris campaign may have been prepared to engage in.

The GOP was frightened by Joseph Stalin’s adage, “It’s not who votes, but who counts the votes that matters”

Breitbart ‘s Hannah Knudson noted that “The Republican National Committee (RNC) was on top of ‘hundreds’ of issues on election night, working quickly with a team of lawyers to solve any possible instances of election malfeasance, and RNC Chairman Michael Whatley provided several examples of what their team did as Americans anxiously awaited the final election results.”

Democratic failure to listen to kitchen table concerns was a key challenge that some are beginning to comprehend.  Former presidential candidate Andrew Yang, in a Politico article, warns that “they should adopt one central mission: improving Americans’ standard of living. They should abandon policing cultural behaviors, especially since many of their stances aren’t even popular with Democrats in real life. They should also create solutions for men and boys — who are struggling — instead of engaging in identity politics that excludes at least half of the country. In many ways, these all boil down to one thing: The Democratic Party should act more democratically.”

Illustration: Pixabay

China and Russia expanded their security cooperation framework last year to include two joint maritime drills near Alaska and in the Arctic.

For the first time, aerial patrols integrated the nuclear-capable H-6N strategic bomber. Military analysts in Washington suggest Beijing’s intent is to project nuclear deterrence and intensify its challenge to Western strategic dominance wherever it can do so.

People’s Daily Online reported recently that China conducted a total of nine “Joint Strategic Air Patrols,” including the two held in 2024. “A month-long joint patrol between the China Coast Guard and its Russian counterpart in the Arctic shows the expansive scope of Beijing’s defined maritime rights and interests and indicates its growing presence in the Arctic,” according to Yu-cheng Chen writing in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief.

Since last fall, in the Arctic region, the two states have coordinated two maritime exercises and conducted joint maritime law enforcement activities in the Arctic Sea. Taiwan is not standing by idly while the two communist states increase the threat level to its and other nations’ air and oceanic security.

Taipei is building its own hypersonic missiles with a range extending past Beijing to secure its deep strike capabilities inside China. Intelligence sources point out that the Czech Republic is in talks to provide the mobile missile vehicles to launch the missiles. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is mass-producing a supersonic cruise missile with a projected range of 1,200-2,000km. It is also working on an extended range version of its Ching Tien hypersonic missile. Last week military sources told Liberty Times newspaper that the medium-range Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile is currently deployed in bunker-style launch positions with the longer-range Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missiles to be deployed using mobile launch vehicles from the Czech Republic.

Expanded Sino-Russian cooperation, along with the alliance’s increasingly aggressive behavior, indicates that China is willing to use Russia to secure its political-military goals in and outside of Asia. “Since 2019… PLA and Russian military aircraft enter the Republic of Korea’s air defense identification zone once or twice under the guise of military exercises or strategic patrols. They have never provided prior notification of their operations,” says Yu-cheng Chen.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Joint Staff report that two of the PLA’s H-6 bombers and two J-16 fighter jets flew from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan on November 29 while two H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers simultaneously conducted long-range flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. There were a total of 10 Chinese and Russian aircraft operating near Japan.

Last month the PRC Ministry of National Defense released a brief statement saying that its exercises were conducted “in accordance with the annual cooperation plan between the Chinese and Russian armed forces (根据中俄两军年度合作计划). The coordination effort is significant in that it demonstrates recent advances in development in the PLA’s military technology and capabilities. Sanctions by Western nations have at least temporarily pushed China and Russia to work more closely together. The exercises, according to Chinese newspapers, strengthen their mutual trust between the militaries and forms part of broader preparation for comprehensively addressing regional and global security challenges.

This alignment is of growing concern in Washington and other Western capitals. Sino-Russian cooperation is based, in part, on presenting a united front to counterbalance Western powers. Since last summer that cooperation has expanded into maritime law enforcement operations aimed at improving military interoperability in the Bering Sea, the Sea of Japan, and other areas.

NATO is also growing concerned that the Sino-Russian activities pose a potential threat to Europe itself. China Coast Guard vessels traveled a total of 17,000 nautical miles up to the Arctic and back to defend “maritime rights and interests (海洋维权)” under harsh environmental conditions, testing their resilience to conduct protracted missions. “Taken together, these activities also demonstrate the strategic resolve of both countries to counterbalance perceived encirclement by Western allies in the region,” according to Yu-cheng Chen. Such an escalation in collaborative military framework suggests that China, working together with Russia, poses a tangible security threat not only regionally but globally in the coming years.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

The United Kingdom is undergoing a growing free speech crisis. Unlike the United States, there is no “First Amendment” which constitutionally protects free speech.

One key problem is that Britain’s “Online Safety Bill,” passed in 2023. It was originally meant to provide a “safe space” online. However, it is sufficiently vague to allow authoritarian practices.

According to an official Parliament review, the measure establishes an “online safety regime against current freedom of expression laws … the Bill will significantly curtail freedom of expression in a way that has profound consequences for the British media and journalism, courts and the UK’s digital economy. The Bill gives the Secretary of State overseeing the legislation unprecedented powers to curtail freedom of expression with limited parliamentary scrutiny.”

Earlier this year, Reform Party leader and Member of Parliament Nigel Farage, in a Daily Telegraph interview, warned that the Government’s new extremism definition, unveiled during the spring,  could “shut down” free speech. He stressed that the measure could be abused by the Government to shut down debate on issues that they did not like, and would permit it to block meetings and funding for groups that criticized elected officials.

The issue has attracted international attention. Human Rights Watch reports that “In 2023, the UK government eroded domestic human rights protections and reneged on important international obligations. The government passed a law further criminalizing protesters and limiting workers’ strikes.”

The Index on Censorship publication worries about the increasingly authoritarian approach to protesting in the UK and the worrying climate this creates for those wishing to peacefully exercise their right to free assembly and free expression.

The Spectator notes that “…people [have been] given prison sentences for posting words and images on social media.”

The Action Institute provides this analysis: “We now appear to have settled into a mentality in which government overreach becomes the norm, reinforcing populist alienation, and our churches sink under doctrinal declension and theological liberalism. Who is left to speak for us? In the first three months of the new Labour government, three actions were taken to set us on a road of diminished rights: (1) universities were exempted from protecting free speech, (2) there was the promise of an extension of hate laws and the recording of “hate incidents” based on what we think and say, and (3) we’re now closer to a conversion therapy ban that threatens both parental and church liberties. One of the first acts of the new Secretary of State for Education (in the U.K., the senior government minister in a department is usually styled as Secretary of State), Bridget Phillipson, was to suspend indefinitely the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act.”

The Free Speech Union describes an example of how extreme the environment has become: “In the wake of civil unrest that spread across the UK following the murder of three children in Southport, [Prime Minister]Sir Keir Starmer has overseen the harshest of crackdowns on those suspected of online involvement, and on several occasions spoken approvingly about the ensuing wave of prosecutions. This includes one man who has been sent to jail for 18 months for sharing something “offensive” that someone else said on Facebook, and another man who has been sent down for three years for posting “anti-Establishment rhetoric.”

There is deep concern that so-called “Contempt of Court” charges are being employed to discourage criticism.

Article 19, a free speech group, explains that  The UK is expanding its powers to suppress protest rights, citing measures such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the 2023 Public Order Act, measures soundly criticized by Amnesty International. It described how, In May 2024, former Home Secretary Suella Braverman was ruled by a high court to have acted unlawfully by making it easier to criminalize peaceful protests. Various groups conducting peaceful protests have suffered as a result.

Illustration: Pixabay

The U.S. Defense Department has announced that it has adopted a new, classified strategy for countering the effects of unmanned systems, also called “drones.” 

Unmanned systems are increasing in capability and are posing ever-increasing threats to the U.S. and its allies. The Pentagon notes that “Enabled by growing commercial innovation and the increasing sophistication of artificial intelligence, autonomy and networking technology, unmanned systems are fundamentally changing how militaries of all sizes, capacities, and capabilities — as well as non-state actors — achieve their objectives.” 

Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder worries that drones “..have the potential to pose both an urgent and enduring threat to U.S. personnel, facilities and assets overseas and increasingly in the U.S. homeland,The threats presented by these systems are changing how wars are fought.”

Specific details of The new strategy are classified, but certain threat areas Have been openly discussed.

One effort involves gaining a better understanding of the threats posed by unmanned systems and improving the ability of American forces to detect, track and characterize those threats.  Another aspect of the strategy is to build counter-unmanned system efforts and knowledge into existing U.S. military doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy. 

The military says it is committed to delivering adaptable counter-UAS solutions more quickly and at scale, including by working more closely with U.S. partners and allies. 

Of note also is that the department, within the strategy, recognizes the vast difference between the low cost of developing and deploying unmanned systems and the high cost the U.S. currently spends to defeat those systems.

The intensive use of drones, highlighted by the fighting in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illustrates that warfighting is changing more rapidly than it has in decades. U.S. military strategists are seeking to transform based on “lessons learned and a sober assessment of the modern battlefield.”

As a consequence, major changes in arms programs are taking place.

The Army will discontinue development of the Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft at the conclusion of prototyping activities while continuing investment in the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, and making new investments in UH-60 Blackhawk, and CH-47F Block II Chinook. The Army will phase out operations of systems that are not capable or survivable on today’s battlefield including the Shadow and Raven unmanned aircraft systems. The Army will increase investments in cutting-edge, effective, capable and survivable unmanned aerial reconnaissance capabilities and the procurement of commercial small unmanned systems.

“The Army is deeply committed to our aviation portfolio and to our partners in the aviation industrial base,” said Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth. “These steps enable us to work with industry to deliver critical capabilities as part of the joint force, place the Army on a sustainable strategic path, and continue the Army’s broader modernization plan which is the service’s most significant modernization effort in more than four decades.”

“We are learning from the battlefield—especially in Ukraine—that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed,” said the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Randy George. “Sensors and weapons mounted on a variety of unmanned systems and in space are more ubiquitous, further reaching, and more inexpensive than ever before…”

It’s not only the American armed forces that are taking note. The Australian Army Research Center explains that “Overall, drones have been shown to provide lethality at range, low cost, and with economy of effort that can be used in the air, land and sea. The ability to see farther accurately, coupled with cost savings, has made UAVs indispensable for both Ukrainian defensive and offensive operations. Apart from the overwhelming use of drones in the air, the war in Ukraine unveiled successful use of the naval drones, and the infancy of the land drones for various purposes.”

Photo: Army Spc. Kevin Jiminez operates the “Dronebuster” during counter-unmanned aerial systems training near Pabrade, Lithuania

In its dramatic reach for global dominance, China has ignored both geographical reality and global agreements to pursue territorial gains.  While Beijing’s activities in the Indo-Pacific region have been noted, particularly in its aggression against the Philippines and Taiwan, its threatening moves in the Arctic have received lesser attention. Combined with Russia’s massive military presence in the far north, the U.S. and its allies are at an increasingly dangerous disadvantage.

There is no governing treaty, as there is in Antarctica, which mandates that the area be used only for peaceful purposes.

The Arctic Institute reports that “While China is located 1500 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle, Beijing is evidently interested in the region in terms of economic activities, international partnerships, scientific research, regional governance, and demonstrating the nation’s return to its historical role as a great power. China’s role in the Arctic continues to be a significant development in international politics. At the strategic level, there have been instances of Sino-Russian joint military maneuvers around the Arctic.”

Both the United States and Russia have taken note. Russia maintains that key portions of the region, including the Northern Sea Route, are part of its “Strategic patrimony.” It backs up that claim with an overwhelming military advantage in the area.

A Chatham House analysis warns that “Russia’s seeks consistent control over foreign military activity in the Russian Arctic, and ensured access for Russian armed forces, particularly the Northern Fleet…Parts of the armed forces, such as the Arctic Brigade, are now Arctic-capable and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. The Northern Fleet has been repurposed with the Arctic environment in mind, and has been provided with Arctic-specific military technology and training.”

Russia’s military activities in the region are long-standing, but China’s intense interest in new and growing.

A Pentagon review featuring Iris A. Ferguson, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and Global Resilience, speaking at Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that “The Arctic strategic environment is changing profoundly, and the United States must pay greater attention and dedicate more resources to this crucial area.”

Ferguson stressed that “China is, by no means, an Arctic nation. But Chinese leaders see the region as a new crossroads of the world, a new source of raw materials and new avenues for manifesting its growing power.”

She pointed out that China is working closely with Russia in its attempt to be seen as an Arctic power. Putin is investing heavily on military and economic strategies in the Arctic. “We’re seeing Russia continue to have immense focus on the Arctic region… we still see them … heavily focused on the region.” 

Ferguson reports that “Even more disturbing is the increasing levels of collaboration between Russia and China especially in the military domain, she said. Russia and China exercised together in the Bering Strait in summer of 2023. “Just this past summer, right after we released our department strategy, we saw a joint bomber patrol off of the coast of Alaska.There has also been increasing cooperation between the Chinese and Russian coast guards in the region.

The Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies illustrated that true Arctic regional nations are substantively worried. “China’s Arctic strategy follows what we describe as a ‘comprehensive approach’ consisting of four main arms: political, economic, scientific, and military. This strategy is designed to advance the party-state’s influence in the Arctic through simultaneously molding discourses and challenging legal concepts of the Arctic (political), boosting its economic interests in the Arctic (economic), fusing civil-military scientific and technological innovation (scientific), and preparing for a military presence in the Arctic (military). Finally, the article concludes that as the significance of the Arctic for China’s long-term security strategy is guided by Xi Jinping’s thought on total national security, future analyses of China’s Arctic intentions should pay particular attention to this evolving concept.”

Photo: Nearly 800 paratroopers assigned to the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 11th Airborne Division, jump into Malemute Drop Zone, Alaska, Oct. 15, 2024.

Amid the nuclear challenges facing America, General Anthony J. Cotton, who leads the U.S. Strategic Command, has stressed the importance of readiness and adaptability in U.S. nuclear forces. The Nuclear Posture Review, a key component of national defense planning, highlights the urgency of modernizing the nuclear triad — bombers, submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles — as well as the systems that ensure their cohesion and reliability. Cotton affirmed the NPR’s guidance, stating, “We cannot remain stagnant. Our modernization programs must include on-ramps and off-ramps to adjust to new challenges.” 

 Central to this modernization effort is the NUclear COmmand, COntrol, and Communications (NC3) system, which serves as the backbone of strategic deterrence. The NC3 infrastructure ensures that the president can communicate securely with nuclear forces, providing unambiguous orders and maintaining control under any circumstances.  

Cotton described the NC3 system as enabling three essential actions: deciding when an order is valid, ensuring the authenticity of that order and confirming when operations must cease. “NC3 enables us to decide, direct and confirm every step of a nuclear operation,” he explained. “It ensures connectivity with the president and validates every order as authentic.” 

Despite its importance, the NC3 system remains a vulnerability due to its Cold War-era architecture. Cotton acknowledged that while the system has performed reliably for decades, it now faces significant challenges from evolving cyber threats, space-based vulnerabilities and its own aging infrastructure. While he agreed that modernization efforts must integrate advanced technologies — such as artificial intelligence — to process massive amounts of data efficiently, Cotton stressed that human oversight remains non-negotiable. “AI supports decision-making, but humans will always stay in control,” he declared. 

The challenges of modernization extend beyond technology. Funding and integration represent obstacles as well. The NC3 enterprise encompasses more than 200 interconnected systems across multiple services and agencies, requiring seamless coordination to ensure operational continuity. Cotton highlighted the complexity of this task, noting that each element must align with the overarching strategy while maintaining flexibility to adapt to emerging threats. He emphasized the need for collaboration, “Modernization is about ensuring continuity, building a road map and aligning near-term actions with long-term goals.” 

This complexity underscores the vital role of the NPR and the NDS in shaping modernization priorities. Both documents emphasize that America must sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent to meet the challenges posed by adversaries. These assurances are particularly important for maintaining the credibility of extended deterrence commitments to allies like Japan and South Korea. 

The modernization effort also comes with significant financial implications. Critics often cite the costs of nuclear modernization, projecting expenditures of over $1 trillion over the next 30 years. However, Cotton provided a clear perspective on this issue, arguing that modernization represents only 4% of the defense budget. “Modernizing our forces today costs far less than facing the consequences of unpreparedness,” he argued. The four star also emphasized that the investment covers all three legs of the nuclear triad as well as the NC3 system, making it essential for maintaining strategic stability. 

As the United States navigates this modernization process, lessons from adversaries further underscore the importance of maintaining a credible deterrent. Russia’s saber-rattling during the Ukraine conflict and its continued nuclear threats reveals the coercive power of nuclear capabilities. And China’s growing arsenal highlights the need for the United States to adapt its strategies to deter both conventional and nuclear aggression. Cotton stressed that U.S. forces must be prepared to prevent conflicts from escalating to the nuclear level, stating that ” must ensure that no conventional conflict escalates into nuclear war.” 

Cotton’s vision for STRATCOM reflects this urgency. As the command enters its “year of acceleration,” he outlined a forward-looking strategy to address immediate needs while building a foundation for long-term success. “We’ve laid the foundation for modernization and taken action to address immediate needs. Now we must accelerate progress to meet the challenges ahead,” he said. His approach includes fostering collaboration across agencies, leveraging technological advancements and engaging with allies to strengthen collective defense. 

While he addressed immediate operational challenges, Cotton also called for a renewed focus on cultivating the next generation of strategic thinkers. He emphasized the importance of blending traditional nuclear theory with contemporary insights to address today’s unique threat environment. “Theoretical foundations remain important, but we need new thinking to address the interwoven dynamics of alliances, economic interdependence and technological advancements,” he explained. His remarks emphasize a multidisciplinary approach to strategic deterrence — one that accounts for the complexities of a multipolar nuclear age. 

Cotton’s insights highlight the stakes of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces in an increasingly competitive and unpredictable world. The integration of advanced technologies, the reinforcement of NC3 infrastructure and the maintenance of strong alliances form the bedrock of this effort. At its core, modernization ensures that the Defense Department retains a credible deterrent capable of meeting any challenge. “Deterrence is about producing effects that meet the president’s objectives,” Cotton concluded. 

A Pentagon release notes that “The United States stands at the crossroads of strategic competition. The modernization of its nuclear forces represents not just a defense imperative but a critical investment in global stability.”

Photo: A ballistic missile system attached to a brigade under the PLA Rocket Force is well-prepared during a night training exercise in early March, 2020. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zhang Feng)