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Moscow’s Nuclear Influence Grows

Russia and Rosatom are on the move in Southeast Asia. While China actively pursues its military and economic operations in Southeast Asia, Rosatom is expanding its nuclear energy involvement in the region. Rosatom and Vietnam Electricity signed a new memorandum of the development of nuclear energy six days before President Trump returned to the Oval Office. It creates a long-term commitment for both countries to cooperate in the areas of power plant maintenance, fuel supply, and dispensing. According to Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear energy technology is one of its key foreign-oriented sectors, with numerous power plants under construction in countries such as Bangladesh, Türkiye, China, Egypt, India, and Hungary. The new administration in Washington is concerned that the agreement has negative implications for Western sanctions policies.  It appears that it may allow Russia to do an end run around current restrictions. 

Rosatom’s director, Valerii Likhachev, announced the resumption of construction of the Ninh Thuận-1 nuclear power plant, suspended in 2016, according to Mikael Pir-Budagyan, of the Eurasia Daily Monitor. On January 15, Izvestiya reported that Russia is also scheduled to build a research reactor in Vietnam with the project starting in 2027.  The Trump Administration, according to analysts in Washington, will face new challenges as Russia revitalizes its footprint in the region. 

Earlier this week, Rosatom officials claimed that the nuclear energy industry has been the hallmark of its capacity to outcompete foreign counterparts by offering one-stop-shop projects that include most, if not all, necessary stages of power plant construction, expedited licensing, and lucrative contractual terms. Historical data suggests that these types of Russian contracts are designed to last for decades. Pir-Budagyan notes that reports out of Russia suggest that Rosatom’s foreign revenue has doubled since 2017. Last October Likhachev pointed out that Rosatom  was expecting to receive $18 billion in foreign revenue for the year and owned eighty-three percent of the global nuclear power plant market. 

The Southeast Asia region represents more than a financial win in nuclear energy power for Russia. It is also about improving national pride during a time when Moscow has few accomplishments to cite in its war in Ukraine, now dragging into its third year. “Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly praises Rosatom’s overseas projects and has called them the “best in the world” in terms of technical sophistication and safety standards,” according to Pir-Budagyan. As of this month, Rosatom itself has avoided direct Western sanctions, although its subsidiaries have been targeted by the US Treasury, along with some Rosatom officials. Southeast Asia, according to a 2024 International Energy Agency report, is one of the fastest-growing areas and contributes twenty-five percent of the projected increase in global energy demand by 2035. The Agency points out that within twenty-five years it will surpass the European Union’s total energy consumption.

“On an institutional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has consistently reaffirmed its interest in exploring nuclear energy cooperation with Russia,” notes Pir-Budagyan. ASEAN’s strategic plan, called the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)  and the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Energy Cooperation for 2022–2025, identified nuclear energy as a focus area beginning in 2021. 

In Indonesia, Rosatom is actively engaging with national agencies and institutions to promote its small modular reactor (SMR) technologies. It received recognition in 2024 as the “Best Nuclear Technology Supplier” at the Electricity Connect 2024 event. “In Myanmar,” says Pir-Budagyan, “Rosatom is advancing an SMR project under a 2023 intergovernmental agreement. It is also involved in education, with Russian experts and Myanmar institutions partnering on training programs and science festivals to build local expertise.”

From 2019-2025, according to Likhachev, Rosatom trained approximately 400 Vietnamese workers by employing them in the firm’s projects in other countries. This newest agreement puts Russia back on track to finish the construction of Ninh Thuận 1 and is likely to lead to additional construction projects in Southeast Asia at a time when China is also increasingly aggressive in its foreign moves. ASEAN’s goal of obtaining carbon neutrality by 2050 is driving many Southeast Asian states into increasing their ties with Moscow.

The consequences are significant for the free world. New, regional long-term commitments provides Russia a major role in the area. As more states use complex Russian nuclear technology it will be increasingly challenging to divest those countries of ties with Moscow, Rosatom and its subsidiaries. Sanction may work in the initial development stage but as plans progress, they could end up posing safety concerns once new nuclear plants are in operation. Russia still must overcome a number of hurdles, including fragmented politics in the region and local public opinion, and safety concerns. Western companies, should they decide to compete, will need government support to remain competitive. The Trump Administration needs to add the Southeast Asian nuclear market to a growing list of concerns in the region.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Conclusion

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

• PRC Defense Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defense budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defense spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defense spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defense, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending.

• Developments in Defense Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.

• Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

U.S.-PRC MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

In 2023, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication until weeks before President Biden and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in November 2023. Following the Woodside Summit, where the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communication at all levels, DoD and the PLA conducted several exchanges and working groups at the end of 2023 and through the end of 2024, including senior leader discussions, defense policy talks, operational safety talks, and calls between theater commanders.

 • DoD remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD objectives in maintaining military-to-military channels are to help prevent crisis, reduce strategic and operational risk, and clarify misperceptions.

SPECIAL TOPICS

• Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals. Between July and December 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and defense industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernizing China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions.

• Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been the focus on strengthening and revitalizing political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalize political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces.

• PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualized across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates to at least the 1960s but, in the 1980s, as the PRC developed Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted the use of CNP as a measurement of China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist system and the West’s capitalist system. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.

Photo: China’s unmanned combat Ship (China Defence Ministry Photo)

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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Part 2

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC’S PERIPHERY

• Theater Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theater. ‒ The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. The ETC executed exercise JOINT SWORD, aimed at pressure Taiwan in April 2023. ‒ The Southern Theater Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command, as needed, over all CCG and CMM ships enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRCoccupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including the deployment of howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border. ‒ The Western Theater Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asia borders. The WTC focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.” ‒ The Northern Theater Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. ‒ The Central Theater Command’s (CTC’s) mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to other theater commands.

 • Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing X Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics against Taiwan: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicized major military exercises near Taiwan.

 • Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones useful for defending against PRC gray-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.

• Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLAN, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.

• PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behavior. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced the number of coercive and risky air intercepts of U.S. platforms compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe maneuvers in the vicinity of allied forces operating in the region.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

• The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLAN’s evolving focus from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection” and the PLAAF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.

• PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theaters, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors important experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. XI Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

• Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalize its overseas presence and deepen defense ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC has expanded combined exercises with Russia, especially since 2018, when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.

 • Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: China’s J-20 Multirole fighter (China Defense Ministry Photo)

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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: A Report to Congress

The Department of Defense has publicly released its annual report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), commonly known as the China Military Power Report (CMPR.) This congressionally mandated report charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic and military strategy, and offers insights into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. The CMPR illustrates why the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the Department’s top pacing challenge.

We present the entire Executive Summary of the report in three parts, beginning today.

• The PRC’s National Strategy. The PRC’s longstanding national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC’s national power and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests.

• The PRC’s Foreign Policy. The PRC’s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into what it calls a “community of common destiny” to support its strategy to realize “rejuvenation.” PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an environment favorable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.

• The PRC’s Economic Policy. The PRC acknowledges that internal and external challenges complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favorable factors in the PRC’s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.

• The PRC’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy. In 2023, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.

• The PRC’s Military Leadership. The Central Military Commission (CMC), the PRC’s top military decision-making body, consists of a civilian chair (Xi Jinping), two vice chairs, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission.For most of 2023, Li Shangfu served as the PRC’s minster of National Defense before his removal in October 2023 for corruption-related offenses. In December 2023, President Xi Jinping selected Adm. Dong Jun as the PRC’s new Minister of National Defense.

PLA FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

• The PLA’s Modernization and Reform. The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies including in commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.

 • PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues its decades-long effort to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLAA continued to demonstrate long-range joint fires capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.

• PLA Navy (PLAN). Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLAN continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLAN carrier in a calendar year.

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is modernizing and indigenizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems rapidly, matching U.S. standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLAN shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defense, and radar units to the PLAAF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC’s integrated air defense systems as well as the network of ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC’s national integrated air defense system network.

 • PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

• The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF). On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF, and the alignment of its subordinate forces—Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)—directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF), under the CMC, to coordinate the management of military’s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organizational structure features four theater-grade services—the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF—and four deputy-theater-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).

 • The Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilization, the JLSF probably will rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.

• PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is an additional paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.

 • Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF do not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite an emphasis on joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.

• PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.

 • Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasized power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.

• Advancements Toward an Informatized and Intelligentized Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which it considers a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 • Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.

The Report continues tomorrow

Photo: Xi inspects troops in Macao (China defense Ministry photo)

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What the U.S. Space Force Must Do

U.S. Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, delivered remarks at a CSIS Aerospace Security Project event reflecting on the Space Force’s accomplishments and mission five years after its creation. We present key portions of his address.    

People have come to realize the very real threats that exist in space and the compelling need for a Space Force.
 
This was all happening at a time when our reliance on space and the threats to our space systems were growing rapidly, as was a budding commercial space ecosystem. So where are we today?
 
The trends we saw then have significantly accelerated. There has been a roughly 400% increase in the number of satellites, driven primarily by commercial companies. Tens of billions of dollars of private investment are fueling bold innovation.
 
And the fabric of space is extending deeper into the joint force, as well as our daily lives. 
 
I believe we are entering a new “Apollo-like” era for space and I’m excited about the future. But I am also concerned.
 
China and Russia haven’t been idle during this time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started with cyber-attacks of commercial space ground infrastructure. This was followed by persistent GPS jamming, demonstrating what many had warned about 5 years ago.
 
That future conflicts would extend to space. No adversary understands that better than China.
 
China has continued an unprecedented run to deploy systems on orbit designed to remove our space advantages. They will also enable the Chinese military to track and target our joint force.
 
General Saltzman recently described this pace of Chinese activity as  “mind boggling”. And they show no sign of slowing down.
 
So the Space Force has its work cut out for it, but they’re not going it alone.  
Congress will be a partner.
 
We will continue providing the policies and resources to ensure the US is leading and strengthening our posture in space.   
So, let’s get into some areas of focus as we look to the future.
 
I’ll start with people, and I’ll be blunt – the Space Force needs to grow. When we stood up the service, we called for a small, agile force. At that time, the focus was to get them on their feet and running. We addressed issues like having their own budget, personnel, and promotion structure.
 
We have come a long way from those early tasks. But now, it’s time for us to increase the size of the force to meet the growing threats.
 
This increase needs to include both enlisted and civilian guardians as well as, junior officers, and general officers. I know some of my friends in Congress are violently opposed to any growth as just increasing overhead.
 
But if we want to have a Space Force capable of doing what the nation expects, it has to have enough people, and the right people to carry out it’s mission.
 
Now I’m not advocating a wholesale increase in end strength. Everyone is going to have to give a little.
 
Congress should authorize more GOs; The Air Force should transfer some of their billets to the Space Force; And the Secretary of Defense should transfer additional billets from his pool. But, as we push to increase the size of the Space Force, we must make sure we are “developing” our guardians. When it comes to guardians it’s about quality AND quantity.
 
We need to give them the skills they will need to support a technology-driven force.
 
Both Generals Saltzman and Raymond have done a great job building a war-fighting culture and normalizing space as part of the joint fight. Nonetheless, we still have much more work to do.
 
Seven years ago, the General Officer promotion stats for the Air Force revealed that almost all of those promoted were pilots. As I look to the future of the Space Force, I’m going to be watching these statistics to ensure that the Space Force isn’t making the same mistake.
 
The Space Force has to be led by more than just operators. They must recognize the contributions of all career services if it is to be successful.
 
A deep understanding and connection with technology is at the core of the Space Force. Operators, acquisition, intel, and cyber professionals must all be on equal footing.
 
The future of the Space Force will depend on its ability to both nurture these unique specialties and tribes, while also creating a unified fighting force.
 
Don’t get me wrong, I agree that growing and building space operators is critically important. But, the development of acquisition and other professionals is just as important. After all, what are those operators going to operate if acquirers aren’t acquiring?  
 
For the Space Force, and the joint force to succeed we must have guardians that are just as comfortable operating in space as they are breaking down a requirements document. That leads us to budget and acquisition.
 
As mentioned, General Saltzman has talked about a “mind-boggling” growth of national security threats in space. In this threat environment we expect the Space Force to perform two major missions.
 
The first is to enable the joint force.
 
The second is to protect and defend our interests in, to, and from space. This second mission, in particular, is no small task. And, this growth in mission must come with a growth in budget.
 
Space warfighting is a highly technical affair. But don’t expect Congress to just throw more money at doing things the way we always have. 
 
We must approach acquisition differently. We can no longer afford to wait 8+ years to develop requirements, and conduct long drawn-out competition processes.
 
Nor can we afford these endless cost-plus development contracts. Fortunately, progress is being made. Secretary Calvelli for his part has worked to expedite things by emphasizing fixed priced contracts.
 
And SDA has taken advantage of many of the acquisition methods authorized by Congress for just this purpose.
 
Our commercial space sector, the envy of the world, is investing billions in new infrastructure and manufacturing. This includes modern technologies such as AI, autonomy, and more.
 
Everyone is moving a little bit in the right direction, but it is not enough.
 
The Department must be more agile and continue to use every lever that has been given to it by Congress to: 
1) increase competition on these programs;
2) minimize requirement changes;
3) buy commercial; and
4) find ways to partner and draw more non-traditional companies into the defense market. 
 
To be clear, this is not a problem with one solution but it is a problem that can be solved by hard work and creativity. It’s going to take a concerted effort from all sides to get capabilities into the hands of warfighters faster.
 
We need it all, more competition, better requirements, agile acquisitions, efficient programs, and on time appropriations.   
 
So, we’ve talked about people, budgets, capabilities, and acquisition. 
 
Next, lets talk about the policies that drive all of this.
 
As has been said so many times that it’s become cliché, operating in space is very different than operating in any of the other domains. The testing and training protocols that are tried and true for a new ground combat vehicle or an upgraded F-16 are not an option for space systems.
 
Guardians typically cannot take these systems out for a “spin” and get comfortable with how they operate during peace time. The Space Force needs to develop tactics, techniques and procedures that they then turn into training courses for future guardians.
 
Many of the limiting factors that contribute to this disconnect come from the demands of distance and the space domain itself. We must do our best to establish the test ranges, realistic simulators, and capabilities we need to ensure our dominance in space.
 
The remaining limitations are self-imposed.
 
My hope is that the incoming Trump Administration will take a hard look at some of the policies that limit how our guardians test and train on orbit. I believe there is room to allow the service to get better experience operating in space while also maintaining norms and behaviors that we in the U.S. have upheld for decades. 
 
This brings me to my final point.
 
We must continue to aggressively push against the many policy and classification barriers that remain as relics of the Cold War. Here, I’ll take a moment here to commend the work of Dr. John Plumb. During his time at Space Policy, he began some of this hard work.
 
But there is more still to do.
 
There are Presidential policy directives, Defense Department directives, Joint Staff instructions, and on and on that need updating.
 
Many of these documents never considered more players than the U.S. and Russia in space, much less the existence of a Space Force.
 
We have to address this so that the public better understands the threats and the investments we need to make to mitigate them.
 
Looking forward, General Saltzman has developed new concepts guiding the Space Force such as “competitive endurance.”
 
This includes a key tenant for the need to be able to conduct “responsible counterspace campaigning.”
 
It challenged the Guardians to understand what systems we need to disrupt or deny an adversary’s space-based targeting.
 
This is the important work that we must tackle if we are to be successful and continue to develop guardians that can protect and defend our national interests in space.
 
These policy changes are at the heart of what we must do to: 
1) establish deterrence;
2) integrate with the joint force;
3) conduct training;
4) and develop warfighting doctrine.
 
The continued changes in Space Force personnel, acquisition, and policy I’ve covered today highlight some of the establishing principles for the force.
 
We have to maximize our asymmetric advantages to ensure American’s continued space superiority. 
 
We cannot standstill.
 
When we started we knew it wasn’t just about how many guardians and platforms we have in the force, but the quality of those guardians and platforms. 
 
In my 2017 speech, when referring to a future Space Force, I said “it must be as world-class as our Army, our Navy, our Marines, and our Air Force. It must be as good as the University of Alabama football program or at least before Saban left!”
 

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Quick Analysis

Campus Anti-Semitism Can no Longer be Hidden

Based on a year-long investigation, the Congressional Committee on Education and the Workforce majority, under Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC), has released findings on how antisemitism engulfed college campuses while administrators put the wants of terrorist sympathizers over the safety of Jewish students, faculty, and staff.
 
“For over a year, the American people have watched antisemitic mobs rule over so-called elite universities, but what was happening behind the scenes is arguably worse. While Jewish students displayed incredible courage and a refusal to cave to the harassment, university administrators, faculty, and staff were cowards who fully capitulated to the mob and failed the students they were supposed to serve,” said Chairwoman Foxx. “Our investigation has shown that these ‘leaders’ bear the responsibility for the chaos likely violating Title VI and threatening public safety. It is time for the executive branch to enforce the laws and ensure colleges and universities restore order and guarantee that all students have a safe learning environment.”
 
The report’s findings clearly support four conclusions:

  1. University administrators made astounding concessions to the organizers of illegal encampments. For example, in the case of Northwestern University (Northwestern), administrators entertained demands to hire an “anti-Zionist” rabbi and divest from and remove Sabra Hummus from campus cafeterias. 
  2. University administrators deliberately chose to withhold support from Jewish students. Harvard University’s (Harvard) decision making was particularly egregious, as demonstrated by choices to intentionally omit condemnation of Hamas and acknowledgment   of hostages in its widely-criticized equivocal statement  on the October 7 attacks, and then-President Claudine Gay asking Harvard Corporation Senior Fellow not to call the phrase “From the River to the Sea” antisemitic hate speech.
  3. University administrators overwhelmingly failed to impose meaningful discipline for those who engaged in antisemitic conduct. Across the board, enforcement of campus rules was wildly uneven, from Harvard and Columbia faculty playing key roles in derailing discipline toward antisemitic conduct violations and Rutgers University (Rutgers) actually disciplining Jewish students who spoke out against the harassment, to the overall lack of consequences for those involved in encampments at schools including the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), Yale University (Yale), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
  4. University administrators considered Congressional oversight a nuisance at best and with open hostility at worst. Administrators at the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), for instance, attempted to orchestrate negative media coverage of Members of Congress who scrutinized the university while Harvard president Claudine Gay disparaged U.S. Representative Elise Stefanik’s (R-NY) character to the university’s Board of Overseers. 

Independent of Congress, private organizations have reached similar conclusions.

Recently Brooke Goldstein, the founder and executive director of The Lawfare Project, who also served as the founder of the #EndJewHatred civil rights movement, addressed antisemitism on campuses, using DePaul University as an example.

Brooke’s opinions were published in a campus paper, the Algemeiner https://www.algemeiner.com/2024/11/25/depaul-university-enabled-violent-attacks-and-brain-injury-on-jewish-students/ 

Goldstein noted that even before the horrific October 7 tragedy, problems were identified. She directly criticized the University’s administrators, stating in her article that “The unprecedented wave of hatred launched against Jews and Israelis at DePaul University over the past year is a direct result of the administration’s failure — not just to help its Jewish community feel safe, but to actually keep its Jewish students safe.”

She didn’t indicate that this was an issue confined to any one university, pointing out that “Jew-hatred has become systematized in higher education, and we are now seeing the consequences playing out on campuses across the country — including at DePaul University. Radicalized agitators who openly support foreign terrorist organizations target Jewish students with calls for their genocide.

“From the river to the sea” is a call for genocide…“Globalize the intifada” is a call for worldwide violent attacks on Jews, like we see in the streets of New York City and Amsterdam, and on campus here at DePaul…”

Categories
Quick Analysis

Spying on Congress

During the Biden Administration, there were deep and justified concerns that official agencies of the federal government were being used to suppress lawful opposition.  One of the measures included spying on members of Congress. The Department of Justice’s own Office of Inspector General has reviewed that charge, and has found there is merit to it. We present the executive summary of that report.

A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance

of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of

Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and

Members of the News Media

In the spring and summer of 2017, CNN.com (CNN), The New York Times, and The Washington Post published articles containing classified information, some of which was classified as Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. In May and June 2021, multiple news media outlets reported that, in 2020, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) issued compulsory process to obtain non-content communications records of reporters at CNN, The New York Times, and The Washington Post in an attempt to identify the sources of the leaked classified information. The reported revelations sparked widespread concern, including from the news media, that the Department’s use of compulsory process was an encroachment on the news media’s ability to report on government activities.

Concerns also were raised about the Department’s use of non-disclosure orders (NDO)—sought by the Department and issued by federal courts—that prevented the reporters and newsroom leadership from learning about the use of compulsory process to seek reporters’ non- content email records.2 Such NDOs could prevent reporters and news media companies from having an opportunity to challenge the compulsory process in court.3 Concerns also were expressed that the NDOs impeded the news media’s ability to report on the orders, thereby hindering public scrutiny of the government’s activities.4 In addition, the news media was troubled by the Department’s lack of notice prior to issuance of the compulsory process because in 2014 and 2015, in the wake of a controversy stemming from similar efforts by the Department to obtain reporters’ communications records, the Department issued new guidelines that presumptively favored prior notice to and negotiation with the affected parties when the Department sought records of members of the news media to allow the affected parties to challenge any request and negotiate the scope of the records sought.

On May 21, 2021, President Joseph Biden stated that the practice of subpoenaing news media records to identify reporters’ sources was “simply, simply wrong,” and he would not allow it.6 On June 5, 2021, the Department announced it would no longer “seek compulsory legal process in leak investigations to obtain source information from members of the news media doing their jobs.”

Shortly after the Department’s announcement, news media outlets reported that the Department used compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers in connection with the alleged unauthorized disclosure of classified information. In response to this reporting, Members of Congress expressed concerns that their records had been obtained for political reasons and/or that issuing the compulsory process violated the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government.8 Similar to the news media’s criticism, Members of Congress also voiced concern about the use of NDOs to prohibit the communication service providers from disclosing the existence of the compulsory process.

On June 11, 2021, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated a review to examine whether the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain communications records of Members of Congress and affiliated persons and members of the news media in certain investigations of alleged unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the news media complied with Department policies and procedures, and whether there was evidence that compulsory process seeking non-content records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers was sought based on party affiliation.

This report summarizes the results of our review and describes the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and members of the news media in four criminal investigations into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information that were opened in 2017.

The Department did not charge anyone in these investigations with unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and all four of the investigations are now closed.

As described in this report, we make several findings regarding the Department’s use of compulsory process to obtain non-content communications records of Members of Congress and congressional staff and members of the news media. With respect to Members of Congress and congressional staff, which are the focus of Chapter Two, we found the Department issued compulsory process for the non-content communications records of 2 Members of Congress and 43 individuals who were congressional staffers at the time the articles containing the classified information were published as part of the investigations to identify the sources of the leaked classified information. Both Members of Congress were Democrats, and of the 43 congressional staffers, 21 worked for Democratic Members of Congress or the Democratic staff of a congressional committee or congressional leadership office, 20 worked for Republican Members or the Republican staff of a congressional committee or congressional leadership office, and 2 worked in nonpartisan positions for congressional committees. All of the Members and staffers whose records were sought became aware of the classified information in connection with their congressional responsibilities. For most of the staffers, the basis for the Department’s decision to include them in the pool of possible leakers (subject pool) was that the Department or a U.S. Intelligence Community agency determined that they had been provided, consistent with their job responsibilities, access to the classified information by the Department, a U.S. Intelligence Community agency, or another congressional staffer, or may have otherwise gained access to the information; the decision to issue compulsory process was based in most instances on the close proximity in time between that access and the subsequent publication of the news articles.

During the relevant timeframe of this review, the Department did not have a policy that expressly or clearly addressed the use of compulsory process to obtain from third parties the communications records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers, or the use of NDOs in connection with such compulsory process. Further, Department policy did not require any supervisory approval, including by senior Department officials, before a prosecutor issued such compulsory process or sought an NDO in connection with such process.

The Department’s decision to compel the production of non-content communications records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers implicated the constitutional rights and authorities of a co-equal branch of government. Although Members of Congress and congressional staff are not immune from prosecution for criminal conduct, including the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and we did not find any evidence of retaliatory or political motivation by the career prosecutors who issued the compulsory process for non-content records that we reviewed, we believe that using compulsory process to obtain such records when based solely on the close proximity in time between access to the classified information and subsequent publication of the information— which was the case with most of the process issued for non-content communications records of congressional staff in the investigations we examined—risks chilling Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch because it exposes congressional officials to having their records reviewed by the Department solely for conducting Congress’s constitutionally authorized oversight duties and creating, at a minimum, the appearance of inappropriate interference by the executive branch in legitimate oversight activity by the legislative branch. Moreover, even non-content communications records—such as those predominantly sought here—can reveal the fact of sensitive communications of Members of Congress and staffers, including with executive branch whistleblowers and with interest groups engaging in First Amendment activity.

We also determined that the Department obtained 40 NDOs related to the compulsory process that was issued for records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers, most of which were renewed at least once, with some extended for up to 4 years. The NDO applications filed with the courts—both in original and renewal applications—relied on general assertions about the need for non-disclosure rather than on case-specific justifications. Department policy permits prosecutors to make boilerplate statements in applications. However, Department policy also expects that in the later stages of investigations, applications will include more specific facts relevant to the requests “as available” to extend non-disclosure. The renewal applications in these investigations, including a renewal application filed in August 2021 after news broke about the Department’s issuance of compulsory process for congressional records and after the Department determined that a former congressional staffer on whom one of the investigations had focused likely did not leak the classified information, contained the same boilerplate assertions about the need for non-disclosure that were contained in the original applications. Additionally, DOJ policy in effect at the time did not require the NDOs filed with the courts to reference, and they did not reference, the fact that they related to requests for records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers.

In November 2023, the Department substantially revised its policy on congressional investigations (Congressional Investigations Policy) to require, among other things, approval of the Department’s Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorney before issuing compulsory process to a third party for records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffer when related to the staffer’s duties and before seeking NDOs in connection with such compulsory process. The revised policy also stated that the Public Integrity Section “should” notify the Criminal Division’s Assistant Attorney General of approvals, although it did not unambiguously require similar notice to the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General. Although we believed the revised Congressional Investigations Policy represented an improvement over prior policy, we were concerned that it still lacked a provision clearly requiring senior level DOJ notification to ensure that senior leadership would be able to consider and decide matters potentially raising constitutional separation of powers issues. This report therefore recommends that the Department evaluate when advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General, should be required before compulsory process is issued, and any corresponding NDOs are sought, for records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffers and establish, as necessary, implementing policies and guidance. We also recommend that the Department consider the circumstances in which NDO applications and renewals should identify for the reviewing judge that the records covered by a proposed NDO are records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers.

After reviewing a draft of this report that included these recommendations, the Department revised applicable DOJ policies in September 2024 in response to the concerns we identified. The newly revised Congressional Investigations Policy now requires the Public Integrity Section (PIN) to notify the Criminal Division’s Assistant Attorney General of all consultations and approvals undertaken by PIN in connection with investigations involving Members of Congress or congressional staffers, including concerning the issuance of compulsory process to a third party for the communications records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffer and related NDOs.

The newly revised policy also makes explicit that, prior to taking one of the enumerated investigative steps specified in the policy, including issuing compulsory process and related NDOs for records of Members of Congress or congressional staffers, the U.S. Attorney’s Office or other prosecuting component must file an “Urgent Report” to Department leadership, including the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.

At the same time, the Department also revised the Urgent Reports Policy to explicitly add “investigations involving elected or appointed officials” to the list of circumstances that require urgent reporting when there are major developments.12 The Department also revised applicable DOJ policy to require that, in cases where an NDO would delay notice to a Member of Congress, congressional office, or a congressional staffer, the prosecutor must disclose this fact in the application filed with the court.

Our review also observed that while the Department’s former and current News Media Policy requires the government, with some exceptions, to exhaust all reasonable avenues to obtain the information sought from non-news media sources before seeking approval to issue compulsory process for news media records, no similar exhaustion requirement exists in the Department’s revised Congressional Investigations Policy. Consistent with the News Media Policy’s exhaustion requirement, DOJ prosecutors issued compulsory process for records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers approximately 3 years before issuing similar process for records of the news media.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Department consider whether there are circumstances in which a similar exhaustion requirement should be a prerequisite for issuing compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers.

With respect to compulsory process to obtain communications records of members of the news media, which is the focus of Chapter Three, the Department has emphasized the need to “ensure the highest level of oversight” when using this investigative tool. However, in the three investigations we examined as part of this review in which compulsory process was issued for non-content communications records of members of the news media, we found that the Department complied with some but not all of the then applicable provisions of the News Media Policy. Specifically, we found that the Department failed to convene the News Media Review Committee to consider the compulsory process authorization requests; the Department did not obtain the required Director of National Intelligence (DNI) certification in one investigation, and we were unable to confirm whether the DNI certification it obtained in another investigation was provided to the Attorney General before he authorized the request; and the Department did not obtain the Attorney General’s express authorization for the NDOs that were sought in connection with compulsory process issued in the investigations. Given the important interests at stake, we were troubled that these failures occurred, particularly given that only a few years had elapsed since the Department substantially overhauled its News Media Policy in 2014 and 2015 following serious criticisms concerning the Department’s efforts to obtain communications records of members of the news media. Having once again revised its News Media Policy to address this most recent criticism, the Department must make every effort to ensure full and exacting compliance with its new policy in the future.

Photo: Pixabay

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TV Program

Key Issues: Keeping Americans Safe and Educated

America spends more per student than just about any nation in the world, and yet our students continually fall behind. Those dollars are being diverted to progressive propaganda. Author, film maker, Elena Barbera fearlessly describes the crisis.

 John Lott, an internationally recognized expert on crime and gun laws, discusses why the mass deportation of illegal aliens, especially criminals, is feasible, and necessary.  

If you missed the program on your local station, watch it here

Photo: Pixabay