Month: December 2018

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its presentation of the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the National Defense Strategy Commission.

Resources

The question of resources cuts across many of the issues we examine in this report, and the Commission assesses unequivocally that the NDS is not adequately resourced. It is beyond the scope of our work to identify the exact dollar amount required to fully fund the military’s needs. Yet available resources are clearly insufficient to fulfill the strategy’s ambitious goals, including that of ensuring that DOD can defeat a major power adversary while deterring other enemies simultaneously. The available resources are also insufficient to undertake essential nuclear and conventional modernization simultaneously and rectify accumulated readiness shortfalls. America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its “means” are badly out of alignment with its “ends.”

Notably, this disparity is true despite the two-year funding increase provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2018. Although that increase provides a healthy initial investment in this strategy, the lack of planned real budgetary growth beyond this two-year period, the lingering damage caused by the BCA and the pattern of government shutdowns and continuing resolutions, and the threat of unpredictable and delayed funding in the future all place the strategy in jeopardy. DOD apparently plans to fill key resource gaps through savings yielded by organizational reform. We strongly agree that the Pentagon’s culture and way of doing business must be brought into the 21st century, yet it is unrealistic to expect that such reforms will yield significant resources for growth, especially within a time frame appropriate to meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. Without additional resources, and without greater stability and predictability in how those resources are provided, the Department will be unable to fulfill the ambition of the NDS or create and preserve U.S. military advantages in the years to come. There must be greater urgency and seriousness in funding national defense.

In accordance with the testimony of Secretary Mattis and Chairman Dunford in 2017, this Commission recommends that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program and perhaps beyond. Although this number is more illustrative than definitive, and although these estimates were provided prior to the conclusion of the process that produced the current defense strategy, it is nonetheless indicative of the level of investment needed to meet the ends the NDS establishes. Making this investment will require lifting the remaining BCA caps for Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021. Congress should also transfer overseas contingency operations funds back to the base budget, and permit more flexibility by giving DOD authority to spend Operations and Maintenance funds for any fiscal year across that fiscal year and the next. More ambitiously, Congress should seek to produce multi-year budget agreements for defense. Above all, Congress must fix a broken funding process that wreaks havoc on readiness and the defense program, and avoid the temptation of viewing defense cuts as the solution to the nation’s fiscal problems. Those problems must be addressed through a holistic approach that scrutinizes the entire federal budget—especially mandatory spending— as well as taxes to set the nation on a firmer financial footing. Although the resulting tradeoffs will certainly be difficult, anything short of these steps will represent an implicit decision not to provide America with the defense it deserves.

Congress, of course, has a critical role to play in all this. In one sense, it is the responsibility of Congress to appropriate the resources necessary for the nation’s defense. More broadly, we urge the Congress to use its oversight tools to encourage the Department to take many of the steps we outline in this report. We also urge Congress and DOD to work as partners in addressing the many issues that can only be resolved through collaboration between the executive and legislative branches. The current crisis is bigger than any single branch of government, and the solutions must be, as well.
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In conclusion, we wish to be crystal clear about one thing. The costs of failing to meet America’s crisis of national defense and national security will not be measured in abstract concepts like “international stability” and “global order.” They will be measured in American lives, American treasure, and American security and prosperity lost. It will be a tragedy— of unforeseeable but perhaps tremendous magnitude—if the United States allows its national interests and national security to be compromised through an unwillingness or inability to make hard choices and necessary investments. That tragedy will be all the more regrettable because it is within our power to avoid it.

Photo: An M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank with Battalion Landing Team 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (USMC)

It has become increasingly evident that America’s defense posture has weakened dramatically, particularly during the eight years of the Obama Administration. What are the most important steps the nation should take to address the crisis? The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its presentation of the Executive Summary of the  Final Report of the National Defense Strategy Commission

Near- and Mid-Term Force Priorities

Innovations in operational concepts and leap-ahead technologies are vital to sustaining U.S. military advantages, particularly over the long term. In the near- to mid-term, the Commission identified a variety of critical improvements to U.S. military posture and capabilities that are imperative for prevailing against our most pressing security challenges.

In the Western Pacific, deterring Chinese aggression requires a forwarddeployed, defense-in-depth posture, buttressed by investments in capabilities ranging from undersea warfare to strategic airlift. In Europe, dealing with a revanchist Russia will entail rebuilding conventional NATO force capacity and capability on the alliance’s eastern flank and the Baltics, while also preparing to deter and if necessary defeat the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, U.S. security commitments and operations in the Middle East cannot be wished away. As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Middle East remains a major producer of oil, and as long as the United States has key U.S. allies and partners in the region, U.S. interests in the Middle East will be profound. Accordingly, U.S. military posture there should not shrink dramatically, even as the precise mix of capabilities is re-examined.

Across all theaters—especially Europe and the Indo-Pacific—our forward posture will be essential to deterring competitors and adversaries and thereby reducing the chances of conflict. In addition, the Army, Navy, and Air Force will all require selective warfighting capacity enhancements, and America will need to improve its capabilities in key cross-cutting areas such as munitions, missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and air and sealift. In particular, it is painfully clear that America is not competing or deterring its adversaries as effectively as it should in cyberspace. We must operate more nimbly, aggressively, and effectively in this crucial domain. Space is also an increasingly important and contested domain and the United States must place special emphasis on ensuring dominance there by devising a coherent space strategy that emphasizes technology, policy, organization, broader awareness through effective communication, and cooperation Another critical imperative is modernizing our nuclear deterrent. The NDS rightly identifies the “re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations” as a primary factor driving U.S. nuclear force posture and planning. Given the need for a robust deterrent, the aggressive nuclear modernization programs some rivals have been carrying out, and the increasing reliance of those rivals—particularly Russia—on escalatory doctrines that feature limited use of nuclear weapons, DOD must remain committed to the bipartisan nuclear modernization program outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. This pertains especially to modernizing the triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. In addition, it is urgently necessary to modernize the supporting infrastructure, including the national laboratories and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) network. At its peak, planned spending on nuclear modernization, operations, and sustainment should consume just 6.4 percent of the defense budget, although the impact on procurement will be greater and will require careful prioritization and sequencing by DOD, with Congressional support. Given that investments made today will pay strategic dividends well into the 2070s and 2080s, America can surely afford to pay this price to preserve such a critical element of its national defense.

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Readiness 

The readiness of U.S. forces to conduct operations as effectively and safely as possible is another crucial component of America’s national security. Yet the readiness of our forces has suffered in recent years, due to extended operations in the greater Middle East as well as severe budgetary uncertainty and austerity. The Commission therefore firmly supports DOD’s efforts to improve readiness. We note, however, that U.S. forces will need additional resources to train to high levels of proficiency across a broader and more technologically challenging range of potential missions than in the recent past, particularly those missions focusing on advanced military threats from China and Russia. DOD must also develop and use analytic tools that can measure readiness across this broad range of missions, from low-intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, highintensity fights. Moreover, while resources alone can never cure a readiness shortcoming, timely and sufficient funding will be vital to overcoming readiness gaps created in part by a broken budgetary process.

The foremost resource required to produce a highly capable military is highly capable people—but the number of Americans with both the fitness and propensity to serve is in secular decline, putting the NDS at long-term risk. DOD and Congress must take creative steps to address the shortage of qualified and willing individuals, rather than relying solely on ever-higher compensation for a shrinking pool of qualified volunteers.

Civil-Military Relations

Constructive approaches to any of the foregoing issues must be rooted in healthy civil-military relations. Yet civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control. The implementation of the NDS must feature empowered civilians fulfilling their statutory responsibilities, particularly regarding issues of force management. Put bluntly, allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently politicalmilitary task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders. Unless global force management is nested under higher-order guidance from civilians, an effort to centralize defense direction under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may succeed operationally but produce profound strategic problems. It is critical that DOD—and Congress—reverse the unhealthy trend in which decision-making is drifting away from civilian leaders on issues of national importance.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: The guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) (U.S. Navy)

The final Report of the National Defense Strategy Commission delivered a picture of America’s dangerously dwindling military prowess, in the face of dramatic challenges from major adversaries Russia and China. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its presentation of the Executive Summary of the study.

                                         Evaluating the National Defense Strategy

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the document this Commission was created to evaluate, represents a constructive first step in responding to this crisis. We support its candid assessment of the strategic environment, the priority it places on preparing for major-power competition and conflict, its emphasis on the enduring value of U.S. alliances and partnerships, and its attention to issues of readiness and lethality. That said, we are concerned that the NDS too often rests on questionable assumptions and weak analysis, and it leaves unanswered critical questions regarding how the United States will meet the challenges of a more dangerous world. We believe that the NDS points the Department of Defense (DOD) and the country in the right direction, but it does not adequately explain how we should get there.

The NDS rightly stresses competition with China and Russia as the central dynamic in sizing, shaping, and employing U.S. forces, but it does not articulate clear approaches to succeeding in peacetime competition or wartime conflict against those rivals. Resource shortfalls, unanticipated force demands, unfilled capability gaps, and other risk factors threaten DOD’s ability to fulfill the central goals of the NDS, such as defeating one major-power rival while maintaining deterrence in other regions. As America confronts five major security challengers across at least three important geographic regions, and as unforeseen challenges are also likely to arise, this is a serious weakness. To meet those intensifying military challenges, DOD will require rapid, substantial improvements to its capabilities built on a foundation of compelling, relevant operational concepts.

Proposed fixes to existing vulnerabilities—concepts such as “expanding the competitive space,” “accepting risk” in lower-priority theaters, increasing the salience of nuclear weapons, or relying on “Dynamic Force Employment”—are imprecise and unpersuasive. Furthermore, America’s rivals are mounting comprehensive challenges using military means and consequential economic, diplomatic, political, and informational tools. Absent a more integrated, whole-of-government strategy than has been evident to date, the United States is unlikely to reverse its rivals’ momentum across an evolving, complex spectrum of competition.

Operational Challenges and Concepts

As regional military balances have deteriorated, America’s advantage across a range of operational challenges has diminished. Because of our recent focus on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, and because our enemies have developed new ways of defeating U.S. forces, America is losing its advantage in key warfighting areas such as power projection, air and missile defense, cyber and space operations, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, long-range ground-based fires, and electronic warfare. Many of the skills necessary to plan for and conduct military operations against capable adversaries—especially China and Russia— have atrophied.
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DOD and the Congressional committees that oversee national security must focus current and future investments on operational challenges such as protecting critical bases of operations; rapidly reinforcing and sustaining forces engaged forward; assuring information systems and conducting effective information operations; defeating anti-access/area-denial threats; deterring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nuclear or other strategic weapons in ways that fall short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response; enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and developing an interoperable joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that supports the warfare of the future.

The United States needs more than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational concepts that expand U.S. options and constrain those of China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute an essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and budgetary priorities needed to advance them. During the Cold War, the United States developed detailed operational concepts to overcome daunting challenges in Europe and elsewhere. Innovative concepts are once again needed because Russia and China are challenging the United States, its allies, and its partners on a far greater scale than has any adversary since the Cold War’s end. The unconventional approaches on which others rely, such as hybrid warfare (warfare combining conventional and unconventional elements), gray-zone aggression (coercion in the space between peace and war), and rapid nuclear escalation demand equally creative responses. In other words, maintaining or reestablishing America’s competitive edge is not simply a matter of generating more resources and capabilities; it is a matter of using those resources and capabilities creatively and focusing them on the right things. Unfortunately, the innovative operational concepts we need do not currently appear to exist. The United States must begin responding more effectively to the operational challenges posed by our competitors and force those competitors to respond to challenges of our making.

National Security Innovation Base

Aggressively pursuing technological innovation and introducing those advances into the force promptly will be critical to overcoming operational challenges and positioning the U.S. military for success. We applaud the NDS for emphasizing this issue. We remain concerned, however, that America’s edge is diminishing or has disappeared in many key technologies that underpin U.S. military superiority, and that current efforts to offset that decline are insufficient. For example, as part of a whole-of-society approach to innovation, China is currently making great strides in the race to dominate in key areas such as FifthGeneration Long-Term Evolution (5G LTE) broadband wireless networks. That effort may yield great economic, geopolitical, and military benefits for Beijing—and equally great dangers for the United States.

DOD and the U.S. government more broadly must take additional steps to protect and strengthen the U.S. National Security Innovation Base, perhaps by increasing investment in key industries and pursuing selective economic disintegration with rivals to avoid dangerous dependencies. The Department must also continue broadening its efforts to find and incorporate new capabilities commercially developed by the private sector. Not least, Congress and DOD must find new ways of enabling more rapid maturation, acquisition, and fielding of leap-ahead technologies. For two decades, the emphasis for defense programs has been on process and efficiency—navigating smoothly through the acquisition system—rather than on optimizing them for innovation and warfighting effectiveness. This has led to a situation in which innovation occurs outside of government, and those innovations are increasingly difficult for our defense processes to access quickly, if at all. One way of addressing this problem would be to explore a new, narrowly tailored category of acquisition pilot programs that would accept greater cost and risk in pursuit of speed and the game-changing technological breakthroughs necessary to sustain U.S. military advantages.

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Photo: F-15D Eagle piloted by Col. Jeff Smith, 173rd Fighter Wing commander (U.S. Air Force)